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REMONSTRANCE

AGAINST

Lord Viscount BOLINGBROKE'S
PHILOSOPHICAL RELIGION.

ADDRESSED TO

DAVID MALLET, Esq; the Publisher.

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By G. ANDERSON.

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EDINBURGH:

Printed in the Year MDCCLVI.

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DAVID MALLAT, Esq; the Publisher

BY G. ANDERSON.

PRINTED BY

Printed in the Year 1791

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To the R E A D E R.

OF all that hath been published against Lord Viscount BOLINGBROKE's philosophical works, I have only seen two letters. How this hath come to pass, you are not much concerned to know. To excuse my ignorance, I can plead, that it was not owing to want of respect to those who have appeared before me, but to my situation. By this incident, if you have not the fullest, you have my freest thoughts on the subject; and you should have had them sooner, had health permitted. If this my Remonstrance is done to your satisfaction, and if it becomes a means of reclaiming one single person from irreligion, or of confirming another in the persuasion that he is an accountable subject of GOD's moral government, I shall think my labour well bestowed. Farewel.

REMONSTRANCE

AGAINST

Lord Viscount BOLINGBROKE's

PHILOSOPHICAL RELIGION.

SECTION I.

The INTRODUCTION.

TO DAVID MALLET, Esq;

S I R,

THERE is no man alive so much concerned in the late Lord Viscount BOLINGBROKE's philosophical works as you, who have published them; for what end, you yourself best know. To publish the works of another, gives no great honour to one who hath published his own; and adds no more to your reputation as a writer, than that of a bookseller like-

A

wife.

wife. By your merit in the literary way, you have acquired the military honour of an Esquire, or *Armiger*. I am pleased to hear that your worldly circumstances put you above doing a mean and dirty thing for bread. By occupation you are neither bookseller nor printer, who, as such, are not supposed to know more about books than what they bring in the way of trade and business; but you can judge of their intrinsic value, and of their tendency to promote the virtue and happiness, of the vices and misery of mankind.

—THE book, as it hath your *Imprimatur*, must likewise have your approbation. I have your word, and I have no more than your word, that it is the late Lord BOLINGBROKE'S. Did I give credit to reports, I might be induced to believe, that neither he was, nor you are, the author of what you have published in his name; but a certain Reverend D. D. Such a one hath been accused publicly for revising and correcting the work at least. The evidence must be strong to make me believe, that any clergyman hath had a hand in a work so inconsistent with his profession and sacred character. Infidel and Atheistical authors are apt to insinuate, that divines do not believe what they teach. Thus your author or you have dealt with Dr CLARKE'S memory. To say one thing, and to think another, is the common practice of all those who profess Christianity, and at the same time disbelieve it. I have not heard that you have renounced

nounced your baptism as yet; but I think you have renounced sincerity, by publishing to the world, that the religion you profess to believe is fable and fiction.

WERE I vain enough to think it more honourable to deal with the Noble philosopher, than with one of no greater dignity than that of an Esquire, I should have suppressed your name, and only mentioned you as a bookseller: but as I chuse to speak to the living, rather than speak of the dead, I shall charge you with all the blunders, all the errors, all the immorality, all the impiety, and all the Atheism, that I find in Lord BOLINGBROKE's philosophical works, and for all the disservice they are calculated to do mankind. I shall therefore have occasion to ask you many questions, and to make my demands on you to reconcile many apparent contradictions, and to clear and justify yourself from the imputation of impiety and Atheism.

AND I ask you, how you came to publish a book so large, and so confusedly written, without an *index rerum*? Was it because you was not able, or not willing to take the pains to do it? or was it rather to bewilder your readers with the disorder of the work? I do not complain of this neglect without a reason: for I have found it more laborious and difficult to collect and join the scattered passages, than to refute the reasonings contained in them. If you find it for your

purpose to make another edition, do, give the public an *index verborum*, if you are not capable to give an *index rerum*.

AND I ask you again, what hath provoked, or rather enraged you, to give very hard words, when softer might have served your purpose? The expressions used in speaking of the fundamental articles of Christianity, are so rude and shocking, that I cannot but judge the publication premature. The fall of man is called profane nonsense; and the doctrine of redemption, founded on this *fall*, is represented in a worse light. And that none of his hard words may be forgotten, he concludes his philosophical works thus. “ * If GOD must appear to be the fountain
“ of all good, and the sole author of all the happiness we can hope for; can any man now presume
“ to say, that the GOD of MOSES, or the GOD of
“ PAUL, is this amiable Being? The GOD of the
“ first is partial, unjust, and cruel; delights in blood,
“ commands assassinations, massacres, and even exterminations of people. The GOD of the second
“ elects some of his creatures to salvation, and predestinates others to damnation, even in the womb
“ of their mothers. The precept of the GOSPEL,
“ *Thou shalt love the LORD thy GOD with all thy*
“ *heart*, cannot refer to such a GOD as either of
“ these.” Such language might do, were the BIBLE

* Vol. v. p. 217.

abolished by law as an impious book: but whilst it is reckoned the sacred record of salvation, and esteemed such by Christians of all denominations, it is intolerably rude and offensive. We use to speak with decency, of things and persons which those we address put a value upon, though we ourselves may differ from them in opinion. To do otherwise, is to insult them out of conceit with their own, rather than to reason them into our way of thinking.

SURELY, you and he must have imagined, by treating the religious part of mankind with so much contempt, that instead of the GOSPEL of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, the time was at hand when the GOSPEL of ST JOHN LORD BOLINGBROKE should be the established religion of the nation, and 'Squire MALLET have the honour of his Evangelist; and without such hopes, however so vain, ye were both idly employed at least. There may be some who are ready to impute his Lordship's antichristian and irreligious labours, to a spirit of resentment and revenge against his native country, for the neglect of his great abilities in the administration of national affairs. Nor is this conjecture altogether without ground; for it is perfectly agreeable to his angry and abusive style. Solemn nonsense, cant, and jargon, he says, is part of the clergy's trade; and that artificial theology, that is, such theology as the clergy teach, is blasphemy and Atheism.

THE

THE character or distemper of *madness* he bestows so freely and frequently on those that differ from him, that I have not yet determined whether I shall publish these few sheets with my name or without it. For I do not like to be called a madman by name, by any one of rank and reputation, and particularly by DAVID MALLEY, Esq; and I presume to put him in mind, that such maltreatment is actionable. I do not like to be outdone in any thing I take in hand: and though I think myself capable enough to return hard words, perhaps with harder; yet, because I acknowledge your superior talent in scurrility and rusticity, I shall endeavour to avoid returning you the abuse you put upon as good men, and men as learned, and as good reasoners, as you, or your Noble Lord.

THE weakness of infidel and atheistical writings, is no reason for neglecting them, as unworthy of regard or answer; for the weakest of them is strong enough for those that are strongly inclined to embrace their principles; of which there are but too many. A religious author hath said above a hundred years ago, “ * When I consider those scandals which the “ looseness of our times have offered, even to the re- “ ligious, and the bold and horrid pride and pre-

* Seth Ward's philosophical essay, second edition, anno 1655, *init.*

“ sumption

“sumption of Atheists and Epicurés, which, by pro-
“fane and confident asserting the uncertainty of all
“things, (undervaluing the abilities of our nature,
“to raise an opinion of their own personal excel-
“lencies), have laboured to introduce into the world
“a general Atheism, or at least a doubtful scepticism
“in matters of religion; and when we consider the
“nature of our minds, which are upon ill suggestions
“apt still to receive ill impressions, (those things be-
“ing of like operations with calumny, which, if it
“be confidently and boldly charged, will be sure to
“leave some scar behind it); when we observe this
“use and inclination in ourselves, which is in things
“where we have not a belief of what is spoken, and
“do not give perfect credit to an accusation, yet to
“admit of a suspicion that things may be as they
“are spoken; and although our contrary belief do
“keep us from a full assenting to the thing in que-
“stion, yet if it happen that the thing concern our-
“selves, and we have used to cross our opinions
“and our belief in the way of practice; such is the
“perverseness of our hearts, that in some cases they
“will make use of the belief of others, (especially
“if they have the reputation of knowing men), to
“oppose against their own belief, and to interpose
“betwixt the lashes of their consciences and them-
“selves.” Few, if any, have attacked Christianity
more plainly and boldly, and with greater contempt
and indignation, than his Lordship and you; and no
writer

writer hath more directly endeavoured to root out of the minds of men, a belief of the capital articles of natural religion. Read these works who will, they can never be the better for their pains; and the danger of being worse is truly great. The free and frequent rejecting God's moral attributes, the immateriality and the natural immortality of the soul, a particular providence, and a future state of rewards and punishments, takes off the horror which such impious assertions are apt to raise in the minds of the truly religious; and weakens the influence which the principles of natural religion, and the Christian revelation, commonly have on the minds of those who believe both. And certainly it is a disagreeable task (I speak from experience) for one who fears God, and believes the GOSPEL, to employ his thoughts, and to let them follow you through shocking expressions into horrid and blasphemous conclusions. For this I see no remedy: for men cannot be hindered or persuaded not to read what others are allowed, commended, and, perhaps, rewarded for publishing.

It is said by Lord BOLINGBROKE and by you, That “* religion is necessary to strengthen, and “ that it contributes to the support of government, “ cannot be denied without contradicting reason and “ experience both.” This is something in favour of

* Vol. iii. p. 45.

religion,

religion, but not said with precision. For if it is *necessary*, it must be more than a *contribution* to the support of civil government; and if it does but contribute, it cannot be said to be necessary. But in as far as it contributes, in so far at least should civil governors sustain and support it. His Lordship, more to the purpose, says, “ * To make government effectual to all the good purposes of it, there *must* be a religion; this religion must be national; and this national religion must be maintained in reputation and reverence.” These, in my apprehension, are the first principles of good policy.

THEREFORE you either act the part of a bad politician, or the religion nationally established in this country must be very absurd, and even hurtful to society; because you attempt, and deliberately endeavour to expose it to contempt and ridicule; and notwithstanding you say, in Lord BOLINGBROKE’S name, “ † Supposing Christianity,” the religion professed and believed in Great Britain, “ to have been purely an human invention, it had been the most amiable and the most useful invention that was ever imposed on mankind for their good.” As a Theist, a philosopher, and a politician, you have no reason to find fault with it, if it is really your opinion, that “ ‡ Christianity is founded on the universal law of

* Vol. iii. p. 330.

† Vol. iii. p. 24.

‡ Vol. ii. p. 287.

“ nature. I will not say, that Christianity is a repu-
 “ blication of it; but I will say, that the GOSPEL
 “ teaches the great and fundamental principles of this
 “ law, (universal benevolence), recommends the pre-
 “ cepts of it, and commands the observation of them
 “ in particular instances occasionally, always supposes
 “ them, always inforces them, and makes the law
 “ of right reason a law, in every possible definition
 “ of the word, beyond all cavil.” And you further
 add, “ * The system of religion which CHRIST pu-
 “ blished, and his evangelists recorded, is a complete
 “ system to all the purposes of true religion, natural
 “ and revealed. It contains all the duties of the
 “ former, it inforces them by asserting the divine
 “ mission of the publisher, who proved his assertion
 “ at the same time by his miracles.” And again,
 “ † Christianity, as the Saviour published it,” (Chri-
 stians usually say *our* Saviour), “ was full and suf-
 “ ficient for all the purposes of it. Simplicity and
 “ plainness shewed that it was designed to be the re-
 “ ligion of mankind, and manifested likewise the di-
 “ vinity of its original.” Another good thing which
 you say of the national religion established in our na-
 tive country is, That “ ‖ the Christian law is no-
 “ thing else than the law of nature inforced by a new
 “ revelation, every friend to Christianity admits, and

* Vol. ii. p. 329.

† Vol. iii. p. 96.

‖ Vol. iv. p. 26.

“ the

“ the worst of its enemies dares not deny, though he
“ denies the reality of the revelation.”

I should thank you for all these fine sayings, if I thought they were fairly and honestly said ; though in the last you blunder. For no man that denies the reality of the Christian revelation, will say that Christianity is enforced with a new revelation ; unless you can make a *new* revelation to be *no* revelation. However, you are honest enough, as far as designed contradictions are consistent with honesty, to decline calling CHRIST your SAVIOUR. Of the New Testament, you only admit the GOSPELS to be genuine ; and at the same time you pay but little regard to these records, or to the author of them. Without stopping here, and entering into an examination of particulars, I only instance, as want of respect to the founder of the Christian faith, these three things. 1. Your accusation of our SAVIOUR's judgment, given in the case of divorce. 2. Your denying a particular and universal providence, which our Lord extends to sparrows. And, 3. Your denying a life of future rewards and punishments, though CHRIST teaches it plainly, fully, and expressly. Abstracting from the divine authority of the teacher, it can be made appear, that the first is a decision according to the rules of morality, and that the two last are articles of natural religion. And as my design is to correct your many mistakes in morality and natural religion, I

shall find a place to justify Christianity in these three instances.

WITHOUT going further, I think it proper to inform the reader, that my design is to give a distinct defence of natural religion, without meddling with, or mixing your objections against revelation, with those which you bring against natural religion. You say, in name of your Noble philosopher, or rather he says without your assistance, “ * That the Theist is “ a much more formidable enemy to the Atheist than “ the divine. The former takes all the real advantages against a common adversary, which the latter “ has it in his power to take; but he gives none against himself, as the latter is forced to do. When “ the divine writes or disputes on any subject relative “ to his profession, he is always embarrassed by his “ theological system. Whether his mind be so or not, “ his tongue and his pen cannot be otherwise. A “ Theist is under no restraint of this kind.” True; provided he does not pretend to be a Christian, a Jew, or Mahometan, or to believe any revealed religion. “ He may speak the truth, such as it appears to him; “ when the divine, though it appears the same, must “ be silent. The Theist may be silent, by regards “ of prudence; when the divine is obliged to speak, “ by the obligation of his profession, and to maintain what he cannot defend, as well as what he

* Vol. v. p. 315.

“ can.”

"can." He knew his advantage, and so he takes it, by a medley of objections against natural and revealed religion, in such an immethodical way, that it becomes very difficult to follow him foot by foot; and this, perhaps, as I said before, on purpose to bewilder his readers with the disorder of the work, and without doubt to cramp and straiten, or to stop the divine in his examination of it. Did he not dread the divine as an adversary, he would have afforded him a plainer and fairer field for debate. To say that divines are obliged, right or wrong, to maintain the doctrine they are by their profession obliged to teach, and to speak and write against their own real sentiments, is invidious, and injurious to men of as much probity and piety as you or your deceased Lord. However, in reasoning on philosophy, and morality, and natural religion, they do not expect to be believed on the credit of their character, but on the strength of their arguments. And though I have made many remarks on what you say against the Christian revelation, I will trouble you with none of them, until I have finished what I have to say upon the subject of natural religion. For my own part, I can assure my readers, that, without breach of any professional obligation, I might have been silent, if I had pleased; and that no temporal advantage, either in possession or expectation, hath induced me to make my thoughts public. It is my concern in the subject that hath made me embark in the debate.

S E C T. II.

Of logics, metaphysics, and abstraction.

Y OUR Noble philosopher and you, in order to accomplish your undertaking of a new system of philosophical irreligion, bar two of the sciences from your philosophical works, *logics* and *metaphysics*. Like gallant disputants, ye give the challenge, and chuse the weapons. A necessary precaution it is, for one that pretends to know nothing of God, and the duty he owes him, than by *sense and experience*. To go no further, if he is not sure of victory, he is sure of safety. For it is impossible to disprove what he asserts of his own sensations and experience; but it must give surprise to every man besides, that one pretending to be a philosopher should reject such useful and necessary parts of it. Logic is the organ of science. It is the art of thinking, and the rule of reasoning. It is the square and plumb-line by which our thoughts are adjusted, and by which rational systems are erected with order and symmetry. There is a natural logic with which every rational creature is adorned; some in a higher, and others in a lower degree. Artificial logic is the improvement and cultivation of it; and to reject the one, is to reject the other. You may as well say, that arithmetic, or the art of measuring numerical quantity, is an useless or a hurtful

ful part of mathematics. There never was an able mathematician that despised, or did not understand the rules of arithmetic; nor was there ever a good architect who rejected the use of the line and square. But Lord BOLINGBROKE is the first who seriously rejected the rule of reasoning, as a hindrance to reasoning. Had he taken pains to have squared his loose thoughts and precarious conclusions according to the rules of logic, his volumes of philosophy would have wanted fewer of my corrections; and instead of five, less than one would have contained the whole that deserves reading, either for the good or the ill to be found in them; and he had saved himself the trouble of writing, and the public of reading, a great deal of small talk. Your Lord approves of the succinct and precise reasonings of the scholastics, though he doth not approve, nor do I, of the many curious and needless questions which they decide. And this precision in their writings is as much owing to their observation of logical rules, as to their greatness of genius. An author universally learned, and much acuter than Lord BOLINGBROKE, is very far from judging logic to be an impertinent part of philosophy *.

* Patet ex omnibus logicæ nominibus et definitionibus, eam esse disciplinam qua ingenium humanum efficitur idoneum ad probandum bonis rationibus quod probandum incumbit; ad detegendam falsitatem rationum quibus aliquid probatur; ad respondendum difficultatibus in veritatem propositis; uno verbo, ad superanda impedimenta quæ veritatem nobis obtegunt. *Oeuvres diverses de M. Bayle, vol. iv. p. 206.*

THERE

THERE hath lately happened a deplorable instance of ignorance of logic. An Honourable author * undertook to prove, that motion is essential to matter, by this argument: A stone moves downwards, and I do not know why it doth not move upwards; therefore it moves itself. For this is concluding against the premisses, and extracting knowledge from his own ignorance. I wish he had published his essay apart, and not disgraced an useful work with his blundering speculation. He gravely regrets the misfortune of mathematicians for their want of logic. But to learn that part of philosophy, they must have a better master than Lord KAIMS. Did he make good his point, it would be a supplemental improvement of the Epicurean and Lucretian Atheism. But he knows best whether he intended it as such or not.

IF it lies out of the way of a philosopher to reject logic, it is still more out of his way to despise metaphysics. It treats of *being* in general, of essentials and accidentals; and were it properly taught, it would become a system of axioms, definitions, and distinctions. It treats of the very first principles of knowledge and ratiocination, and the *criteria* of the truth or falsity of all propositions, in ethics, physics, mathematics, and natural religion. For instance, to prove that two contradictory propositions cannot be both true,

* The Honourable Henry Home, Esq; a Senator of the college of justice.

it is sufficient to subsume, that it is impossible a thing can be and not be at the same time. And this axiom is the foundation of all truth. And notwithstanding DESCARTES's *Cogito, ergo sum*, it stands, as it did long before, the *principium absolute primum*, and is the last resort in reasoning. And to shew, that this principle was not precariously established as the very first, that of DESCARTES is no more than a repetition of the same thing. For *I think*, is to be resolved into *I am thinking*; and then his *ergo* is just, *I am*, therefore *I am*. I am able to convict you and your Noble author, of using metaphysical arguments; and that metaphysics, which ye despise, are your *ne plus ultra*. He says, and you publish, “ * I cannot soar so high as PLATO “ and CUDWORTH; I will not sink so low as PRO- “ TAGORAS and other ancients, as HOBBS and “ other moderns. The former amuse, instead of in- “ structing me; and if I understand the latter, I on- “ ly understand them to know, that they impose on “ themselves, and would impose on me the grossest “ absurdities. Strange extremes! When CUDWORTH “ holds up the metaphysical glass to my eye, I see “ something, I know not what; something that glit- “ ters at an unmeasurable distance from me. When “ HOBBS holds it up, he changes the position, and “ I see something monstrous at the very end of the “ glass.” The glass which CUDWORTH uses, is finished and sufficient: it shews truth at a very great,

* Vol. iii. p. 349.

but not at an unmeasurable distance; it shews it in splendor; not in glittering and corruscation, but in a sure and settled light. For such truths are fixed and immutable, as eternity itself. If such truths appear to the author in a dazzling view, it must be owing to a defect in his intellectual eye; or to a voluntary, and therefore a greater imperfection: *None so blind as those that will not see.* That some men are capable of some sciences, who are incapable of others, is but common. His Lordship might have made wonderful progress in history and politics, in law and languages, and even in the useful science of medicine, and the noble science of mathematics; while at the same time he had no turn of mind for metaphysics. On the other hand, a good metaphysician may make but a sorry mathematician. This was M. BAYLE's case, who complained, that fractions, or broken numbers, would break his head. Another reason may be given for calling metaphysics a delirium of the understanding. In many instances metaphysics are against his Lordship. And when reason is against a man obstinate and *opiniatre*, he will be against reason. Metaphysics are by Lord VERULAM said to be the trunk of all sciences, on which all others depend as branches. In this the first and universal principles of reason are to be found; and it is to these principles that the last appeal is made in all matters of ratiocination. When authors not much inclined to favour religion, find, that abstract reasoning doth not favour them, they despise

spise the science from which such reasoning proceeds. DAVID HUME, Esq; a gentleman of such largeness of thought, that it takes in all religion as a very little thing, to shew his contempt of that as established in England, calls the thirty-nine articles the metaphysics of the church of England *. As I gave you M. BAYLE's judgment of logic, I here present you, on the margin, with his opinion of metaphysics †. And I take the liberty to assume, that no man despises metaphysics, but he who doth not, or pretends not to understand them; and he who does not understand them, can never write on any subject, and especially natural religion and morality, correctly, and with precision.

AFTER talking abstractly about abstraction, his Lordship says ‖, “ This abstraction becomes as great
“ a mystery as any mystery that religion holds out to

* History, p. 389.

† Quamvis metaphysica versetur circa res ab omni connexionem materiali segregatas, ideoque postulet summam mentis attentionem, ingratam tamen plerisque mortalibus, qui rebus tantum delectantur; nulla tamen est disciplina dignior, in qua perdiscenda ardentissimo studio laboretur. Hæc enim est quæ generales differentias perscrutatur; quæ attributa essentialia a ceteris adjunctis rerum discernere docet; quæ ideas, seu principia æternæ veritatis suppeditat, quibus omnes veritates aliarum scientiarum probentur; et ad quæ, tanquam ad regulam, expandentur omnia disciplinarum principia peculiariora. Igitur necessaria in primis est illis, qui non leviter imbui philosophia, sed ad intimos usque recessus illius pervenire cupiunt. *Oeuvres diverses, vol. iv. p. 464.*

‖ Vol. iii. p. 368.

“us.” To have writ with precision, he should have said *revealed* religion. For he cannot mean mysteries in natural religion; for he rejects all the articles of it which he doth not comprehend. Natural religion is the result of reason; and no man will reason out to himself what he doth not understand. I do acknowledge, that the doctrine of *abstraction* and *universals* hath been the subject of much debate from PLATO down to this day. *Ens rationis*, or mental entity, and *universale a parte rei*, or real universals existing independently of thought, have exercised his Lordship’s understanding, and his readers patience, until he is forced to confess, that he understands nothing of the matter. His understanding, such as it was, and yours, such as it is, might serve him, and may serve you; but it cannot therefore be imposed on others for the standard of reason.

PLATO is accused of holding ideas really existent out of the divine and human mind; but he is accused unjustly. There is no such thing to be found in his writings, nor once mentioned by his most famous disciples and followers. On the other hand, passages are brought to prove that he was of the contrary opinion, and with which I do not think it proper to stop myself and the reader from matters much more material. This mistake of PLATO’s doctrine gave rise to a sect called the *Nominales*; who maintained, that there were no *universals* but in the mind which framed

framed them. Between them and the *Peripatetics* arose another debate. These maintained, that there were universals *in rerum natura*, of which these mental universals were but ideas and representations. From the *Nominales*, with whom the Stoics joined, the debate descended to the scholastics. The disciples and followers of SCOTUS, or John of Duns, your countryman, were of opinion, that the nature of a circle, or of a man, was not made, or in itself universal, but only discovered to be such by the mind. On the other hand, the followers of AQUINAS held, that all nature was contracted and singular; and that without the operation of the mind these natures must remain singular and contracted, to the exclusion of all *universals*. Hence arose a distinction between metaphysical and logical universals *. The *universale metaphysicum* was said by them to be that by which we contemplate the essential parts of a subject, separately, distinctly, and by degrees. For as the eye cannot see at once the four sides of a square pillar, no more can the mind take in at one view every property of the thing to be considered and examined. Let a circle be the subject of thought. The first thing which offers itself to consideration, is its extension, next the figure, and then what sort of figure it is; such as, it

* Of which they gave this definition, *Unum aptum inesse, vel prædicari de multis univoce et divisim*. The word *inesse* makes *universale metaphysicum*, and the word *prædicari* makes *universale logicum*.

hath a centre, from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. And such *universals* are the essential ingredients of all sciences. *Universale logicum* is that whereby the mind, cutting off all differences, takes into one idea the similitude, specifical or generical, as the unity of many; *v. g.* the humanity of SOCRATES and PLATO, and the triangularity of all triangles of whatever particular sort.

THESE are the things which become a mystery to your Noble and voluminous philosopher; and not only a mystery, but a most important mystery; and a more important mystery to all writers in matters of speculation than he imagines. Without these things nothing can be said with exactness and precision. “* For my own part,” saith he, “I know that I am “not able to make such abstractions. I am utterly “unable to elevate my mind from particulars to generals.” But he is able to contradict himself, and say †, “Out of a variety of ideas, the mind selects “such as have a more remote, and such as have a “more immediate resemblance, and classes them accordingly. From this operation of the mind arises “the school-distinction of *genus* and *species*, and we “speak according to it intelligibly on this occasion.” And why not on all occasions? The terms are explained, and you understand them, though you call them the gibberish of the schools. So far as you un-

* Vol. iii. p. 365.

† Vol. iii. p. 354. 355.

derstand

derstand what is meant by *genus*, and what is meant by *species*, you and the scholastics are agreed. But whoever agrees with you in what follows, I can never agree with you; because I do not like words that have no meaning. You say, "As the mind is unable " by abstraction to comprehend any one *species*, and " much more any one *genus*, under one general idea, " it comprehends one under one general name; and " we say, for instance, *man* and *animal*." Thus, when he says, or you say, *man* or *animal*, you understand yourself, and I understand you; but you mean nothing, because you have not an idea that corresponds with the word. The design of language is to make one's self to be understood; and when you and I understand the word *animal*, it is not a mere word to either of us, or a word without signification, as *blicktri*. Abstraction cuts off differences, and considers the animal nature, without the difference that is between a *man* and a *horse*; and by not allowing this difference to enter into the idea or conception, the conception always leaves a remainder; and this remainder is intelligibly called *animality*, and so understood by such as never learned either logics or metaphysics. But his Lordship's subtraction is so sublimated, that it leaves nothing. *Abstraction* or *subtraction*, is to take away one part, and to leave another; it is therefore a division; and a division which takes away the whole, is a mathematical as well as a metaphysical absurdity. And Lord BOLINGBROKE, when he
says

says *man* or *animal*, means nothing; and only uses found instead of sense. But for this he offers a sort of reason: "Some make themselves and others believe, that, from a multitude of particular ideas, one general nature and essence is abstracted, which is all of them, and none of them." I answer, When many individuals agree in some attributes and properties, as SOCRATES and PLATO agree in the attribute of rational; and as it is said, *univoce et divisim*, that SOCRATES is reasonable, and PLATO is reasonable in the same way, without equivocation; this agreement of rationality, or of their being reasonable, is the abstracted idea, and that by which all those animals who are adorned with this faculty of reason, are classed in the same species. Whatever Mr MALLET may think of me, I am not ashamed to acknowledge, that I profess to understand logics and metaphysics, abstraction and universals, and think the knowledge of them a necessary qualification of a philosophical writer; and I know both formally and fundamentally, and what *universale* is *a parte mentis*, and what it is *a parte rei*: and I know that all specific and generical ideas are not the ideas of all men, nor of all animals, nor the ideas of any particular man or animal; but the ideas of those powers, faculties, and attributes, which are common to men, and to all animals as such.

THEREFORE it is not by making one individual
man

man represent all mankind that we generalize: for one man cannot represent all men, but in that very thing which is common to all. If from the *species* we ascend to the *genus*, it will appear evidently, that a horse cannot represent a man, nor a man represent a horse, but in those things in which they agree, *viz.* in life, sense, and locomotive power. That my reader may the better understand my meaning, I shall give it in the words of Dr KING's annotator *.

" We are at first only acquainted with particular substances; but observing, that as these particular substances differ in some respects, so they agree in others, (*i. e.* though this particular excites in the mind some simple idea or ideas which another does not, yet there are some ideas excited equally from both); we take no notice of those ideas in which two or more particular substances differ, but select those only in which they agree, and connect them into one complex idea, by giving them one name: which complex idea becomes general; that is, it may be affirmed of, or belong to, or is found in more than one particular substance †: and the several substances of which it is affirmed, &c. are said to be contained under that general idea. General ideas of substances therefore are not made, by adding all or any of the particular ideas found in each

* The ingenious Edmond Law, *Origin of evil*, p. 5. 6.

† This is *unum aptum inesse, vel prædicari de multis*.

D

" substance;

“ substance;— but only by leaving out all those
 “ ideas in which two or more substances differ, and
 “ retaining those in which they agree. And from ge-
 “ neral ideas thus made, we proceed to more general
 “ ones in the same way, *viz.* by always dropping the
 “ particulars in which they differ. Thus, by obser-
 “ ving a certain agreement among individuals, and o-
 “ mitting the rest, we form an idea of the several
 “ *species*. In like manner, leaving out the distin-
 “ guishing marks of each *species*, we get an idea of
 “ the *genus* *. The method of making or forming
 “ general ideas, by making the idea of an individual
 “ stand for the whole species, must be wrong on this
 “ very account, *viz.* according to the forementioned
 “ scheme, universals, such as *animal* or *matter*, would
 “ have a real existence in the same precise manner in
 “ which we consider them; whereas, under such pre-
 “ cisions, they are confessedly the creatures of our
 “ own minds, and exist no where else. We have no-
 “ thing at all to do therefore with *analogy* in forming
 “ abstract ideas: we can never come at them, by sub-
 “ stituting one particular for the rest; but, on the
 “ contrary, we must conceive them, by removing all
 “ particularities of existence, and leaving only what
 “ remains in common.”

THE idea we have of *man* or *animal*, as *specific*
 or *generic*, are not the ideas of all men, and all ani-

* Origin of evil, p. 8.

mals, (for as it is only in the mind, it hath no objective *ideatum*); but the ideas of the agreement of powers, faculties, and attributes, common to the *species* of mankind, and to the *genus* of animals: and this idea is called *general*, because it is to be found in, or may be said of many; and is signified, and very well understood by the abstract words, *animality* and *humanity*.

LORD BOLINGBROKE with a good deal of assurance says, we cannot abstract *whiteness* from all things white. This is not a matter of speculation, but of experience. And if he cannot, it doth not follow that no man can. And if you 'Squire MALLET cannot abstract whiteness from all white things, it must be owing to your ignorance of *implicit* and *negative*, and *explicit* and *affirmative* abstraction. By the one we join the *abstract* and *concrete* together, as *white*; which then ceases to be a mere abstraction: and in this sense neither you nor I can abstract *whiteness* from all white things. By the other we exclude out of the idea or conception all white things, or every particular thing that is white. This I can, and you may easily do, and you do it daily. A colour of any kind may be considered without its being inherent either in cloth, or in stone, or timber; for as an accident, it is separable from the subject.

I am afraid I have wearied the reader with the au-

thor's affected ignorance of the nature of abstraction. I say *affected*; for every man is conscious of a power of abstracting. Though he says he is not able to elevate his mind from particulars to generals, yet he affirms, and that with reason, that, without generalizing, there can be no ratiocination.

Ex particulari non licet syllogizare.

His Lordship makes use of abstract terms as freely and frequently as any modern writer does; such as, *possibility*, *actuality*, *activity*, and *passivity*. After all his pains to introduce *sense and experience* as the only standard of knowledge, he hath these words: " * After saying so much about these abstract ideas, " I must freely confess, that I scarce comprehend " what they are intended to be. Abstraction is a " mystery in philosophy." He therefore hath no right to admit or to reject it, nor to use them, and far less to abuse others for doing the same. I do pretend to understand abstraction; and have therefore a better right to declare this operation of the mind, or the capacity of the human understanding to form general ideas, to be real, than he hath to call it metaphysical jargon.

EVERY reader will not easily apprehend the Noble author's design of expunging abstraction out of philosophy. It is common to all that think, speak, or

* Vol. iii. p. 368.

write; for there is no reasoning without it. How this comes to pass, and for what purpose, is not easily imagined. But I have learned from Dr CUDWORTH, that Atheists have the same quarrel with innocent and harmless abstraction. He says *, “Because it is generally conceived, that an error cannot be sufficiently confuted without discovering the cause of the mistake; therefore Atheists will undertake to shew the original of the doctrine of incorporeal substances, and from what misapprehension it sprung; as also to take occasion from thence further to deny a Deity. They say, that the original of this doctrine of incorporeal substances proceeded chiefly from the abuse of abstract names, both of substances, and also of accidents, when they are considered alone without their subjects and substances. —As there is some use of those abstract names, so the abuse of them hath also been very great. Though the essence of this and that man is not any thing without the man, nor an accident any thing without its substance; yet men have been led into a gross mistake by them, to imagine them realities existing by themselves.” For which the scholastics are chiefly blamed. He quotes an author, then modern †, who says, “It is a great abuse which some metaphysicians make of abstract names, because co-
“gitation can be considered alone without the confi-

* Intellectual system, p. 67. edit. fol.

† Hobbes.

“deration

"deration of body, therefore to conclude, that it is
 "not the action and accident of that body which
 "thinks, but a substance by itself; and that it is
 "upon this account, when a man is dead and buried,
 "they say his soul (that is, his life) can walk separa-
 "ted from the body, and is seen by night amongst
 "the graves." That abstraction should be blamed
 for superstition, is an accusation too finely spun. And
 who would think, that the vulgar ever learned from
 the scholastics all their tales of fairies, apparitions,
 and hobgoblins, and particularly by perusing their
quiddities, entities, essences, haecceities? But to this
 the Reverend and very learned author himself hath
 returned a satisfactory answer *: "The belief of
 "ghosts and spirits incorporeal, and consequently of
 "an incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridi-
 "culous mistake of the abstract names and natures
 "of mere accidents for substances, nor from the
 "scholastic essences said to be eternal. As for the
 "latter, none of those scholastics ever dreamed, that
 "there was any universal man, or universal horse, ex-
 "isting alone by itself, and separate from all singulars;
 "nor that the abstract metaphysical essences of men,
 "after they were dead, subsisted by themselves, and
 "did walk up and down amongst graves." The reader
 may peruse the rest of the answer. One can scarce
 forbear laughing, to hear men of common sense-blame
 metaphysics and abstraction for the superstition of the

* Intellectual system, p. 835. 836. edit. fol.

vulgar. Those men who have impudence enough to pretend to censure mankind for their folly and madness in believing religion, and to account for the antiquity and universality of the mistake, should not look upon their fellow-animals to be stupid enough to believe, that those who never heard of PLATO or the scholastics, were induced by them to believe a God, and a life of rewards and punishments when this life is ended.

I cannot say that it is for this purpose, directly and immediately at least, that Lord BOLINGBROKE hath attacked the doctrine of abstraction; but he hath done it for a purpose bad enough. “* Who can help “smiling,” saith he, “when he is told, that, by the “help of such ideas, and of certain self-evident “maxims, knowledge is a comprehension of things *a priori*?—Strange effects of mysterious abstraction! strange foundations of eternal and immutable “morality! They might be rejected with contempt, “if they were absurd only; but they are carried so “far, that they become profane, a sort of metaphysical blasphemy, and deserve indignation.” His Lordship says, “† We can take the properties of “things both physical and moral, into distinct consideration. This philosophers have done, with honour to themselves, and advantage to others. But

* Vol. iii. p. 368.

† Vol. v. p. 58.

“when

“ when they have been long accustomed to such
“ abstract considerations, and have established certain
“ mathematical and moral truths upon them, some
“ of these philosophers assume, that these general
“ notions are natures, independent on God.” These
notions can never become *natures*; nor can any philosopher give being and existence to notions, and turn his ideas into *ideata*. For this he blames logicians, metaphysicians, and divines; and I have as good a right, and I hope to make it appear that I have a better right, to blame him for talking nonsense, on purpose to darken the first principles of knowledge, and to cast a thick veil over the moral attributes of the ALMIGHTY, and to sap the foundation of morality and the moral law. When his Lordship looked through Dr CUDWORTH’S metaphysical glass, he saw nothing so horrid as blasphemy; he saw something that glittered, though he knew not what; and, sure, he did not see glittering blasphemy. Metaphysics are the same thing now that they were then; and why should he charge them not only with absurdity, but likewise with blasphemy? The science treats of being in general, and not of theology. If it is carried too far, it is by departing from the fundamental truths which it teaches. For this neither the science, nor these truths are to be blamed. Be assured, ’Squire MALLET, that there is no more blasphemy in metaphysics than in mathematics. All things which this philosopher doth not like, or that stand in the way of his system, must be swept away with strong and abusive

usive expressions; logics, metaphysics, divinity, and even disputation, because it is fraudulent; fraudulent, not sure, as managed by him; but by all that oppose him or differ from him: and all this to lay a new foundation of morality, not only in opposition, but in injurious contempt of all writers on the subject, except Mr POIRET, so far as I know. To charge the greatest philosophers and moralists with absurdity, discovers more vanity than wisdom, and more rusticity than becomes a gentleman. But to treat them as profane blasphemers, deserves such a return as cannot decently be given to the dead; and I have no mind to enter the lists with his Esquire the publisher, on the art of debating in ill language.

HIS Lordship's doctrine is, That the will of God is to be learned from his works, and that there is no other way of knowing it. Any one who is disposed to take repetition for reason, would find this thesis or position confirmed with forty arguments. And that he had nothing to say on the subject, but *so it is*, is to me evident, by his not bestowing one single page to shew the connection between the works and the will of GOD, as the rule of our behaviour, and a law which we are bound to obey. Now, what I have to say on this, and other following assertions contained in this Nobleman's philosophical works, are, in my opinion, the greatest and most important things that can come under human consideration. QUOD FELIX FAUSTUMQUE SIT.

E

S E C T.

S E C T. III.

Of eternal truth and righteousness.

I BEGIN with the author's thesis or position, That *the will of GOD, as the rule of our behaviour, and a law which we are bound to obey, is to be learned only from his works.* And it deserves the first place according to the rules of good order. For Atheists and Theists agree, that there is a natural and essential difference between *right and wrong, just and unjust, moral good and moral evil.* And how an Atheist can have such a notion, I cannot understand: nor can Mr MALLET, if it is only by the works of GOD that morality is to be learned; for an Atheist neither believes a GOD, nor that the world is his work.

THIS new foundation of morality hath two faults at least. *1st,* The works are not the only way of knowing the will of GOD; and, *2dly,* It is not the proper and immediate way. And I say, first, It is not the only way of finding out, and of laying a foundation for morality. For it is of his own shewing, “ * That a moral obligation may subsist without a law, and a law may be such as to create no moral obligation. When we speak of moral obli-

* Vol. iii. p. 402. *ad marg.*

“ gations,

“gations, either we mean nothing; or we mean that
“we are tied, bound, and under an internal, that
“is, a moral necessity, of conforming ourselves to
“those rules which are expressed in the constitution
“of our nature, and on the observation of which
“the happiness of our kind depends. Reason is in
“this case the obliger. A rational creature is the
“obliged, and he is so obliged as no law made by
“mere will can of itself oblige.” Here he must
mean human laws, because such laws may enact im-
moral things. — “This order is inverted in the
“divine law of nature. The moral necessity of act-
“ing agreeably to it, in order to secure the happi-
“ness which we are determined irresistibly to de-
“fire, is a first consideration, and is alone sufficient
“to create obligation. In discovering this law, we
“are led to discover the legislator; and will is add-
“ed to invest obligation with all the forms of law;
“the will of that Being who constituted the obliga-
“tion, when he made the human system, and who,
“by constituting the obligation, made and promul-
“gated the law.”

HIS Lordship talks here beyond metaphysics, and
beyond human understanding. A moral obligation
without a law, is a law known independently of the
works and the will of GOD. In this case then it is
not by the works that we know the will of GOD.
To make a law without a lawgiver, is what neither

you nor I can do. And therefore, posterior to this known lawless law, *will* is added to invest the *obligation* with all the forms of law. I ask, If before this investment the obligation had the force of a law, or not? If it had the force of a law, it did not want any additional forms; and if it had not the force of a law; it was not a law; for a law without the force of a law is an absurdity. In discovering this law, we are led to discover the legislator. The law, and the knowledge of it, are antecedent to the discovery of the will of God known by his works. There can be no law without a lawgiver; and yet the law is known before it discovers the lawgiver. The moral necessity of acting agreeably to the moral law, and the security of our own happiness, is a first consideration, and is alone sufficient to create obligation. Therefore this obligation wants no more force or form. If happiness is the first consideration, and foundation of the moral law, which lays us under a moral necessity to observe it; what is a moral law to one, may not be a moral law to another; because men may, and often do differ in their opinions of happiness. Reason, he says, is the obliger, and the rational creature the obliged. Well and wonderfully distinguished between a reasonable creature and his reason! This distinction is so fine that I cannot see the difference. This reasonable creature is both the obliger and the obliged. He obliges himself to himself; and so leaves himself absolute master, without law and without obligation. And how, in this case, we can be tied,

III. tied, bound, and under an internal moral necessity of conforming ourselves to the rules expressed in the constitution of our nature, cannot be understood. A law is given to those, and to those only, who may, and can break or obey it; and can therefore be under no necessity of acting according to any rules prescribed by it. These rules are expressed in the constitution of our nature; and are made obligatory by the will of that Being who made the human system. This is, in short, that GOD made man a reasonable creature, and the dictates of his reason a rule of action. And this is all the sense that can be extracted out of a heap of incoherent stuff.

MORALITY is one thing, and the moral law is another. We must know what actions are moral, and what are immoral, before we can judge of what is commanded, and what is forbidden. The question arising from this is, How do we know morality? Lord BOLINGBROKE says, by the will of God manifested in his works. But this is against himself, and against universal experience. For, as I said, men, whether Theists or Atheists, have a notion of *right* and *wrong*, *just* and *unjust*. The first men, saith he, could not discover the being of GOD, until their understandings were ripened into maturity. And he says *, (though most falsely), that "this was done so slowly, that polytheism was prior to monotheism." By

* Vol. i. p. 204.

this time men had formed themselves into societies. And can one think, that, during so large a space of time, they did not know a distinction between just and unjust, equity and iniquity, morality and immorality? A mere savage, a child, knows the difference between an injury and a good office, without ever thinking of GOD, or of his works. And GROTIUS said, and said well, that though it should be granted there is no GOD, yet the distinction betwixt *just* and *unjust* would take place; *aliquem locum haberet*. His Lordship distinguishes between the moral law, and the positive law, that depends entirely on the will of GOD; which distinction cannot hold, unless there is something in morality considered in itself, which makes it independent of, or anterior, in our conception, both to the will and the works of GOD.

ALLOWING the moral sense to be nonsense, and, if you will have it, let it be ethical enthusiasm, and let innate ideas or proleptical knowledge be discarded from philosophy; there remains no other way of knowing *just* from *unjust*, *morality* from *immorality*, but by the use of understanding and reason. We distinguish virtue from vice the same way that we distinguish *true* from *false*. And we may as well say, that it is only by the works of GOD that we discover every mathematical truth and metaphysical axiom, as that it is only from these works that we can deduce and conclude the essential difference between morality
and

and immorality. Observe, I do not say *sin* and *duty*. Is it not by reason (his Lordship says, by long and strong reasoning) that we discover the being of God, his unity, and other attributes? And had we no previous conception of power and wisdom, of goodness, justice, and truth, it is absolutely impossible that we could conclude the unity, wisdom, and power, the justice, goodness, and veracity, and even the being of God. To affirm, that it is only from the works of God that we discover his will; and that it is owing to his will, that two and two are equal to four, that the cause is prior to the effect, and that just cannot be unjust; that power cannot be weakness, nor wisdom folly, is really to reason in the round. These truths, whether mathematical, metaphysical, or moral, do not depend on the arbitrary will and appointment of God. We do depend on him in every thing; for he hath made us, and not we ourselves. And he hath made us capable to know truth from falsity, *right* from *wrong*, as he himself knows, and as they really are; that is, antecedently and independently on his will, as eternal, immutable, and independent on his power and wisdom, or any other of his attributes, his intelligence only excepted. As his own necessary existence and nature doth not depend on his will, no more do necessary truths depend on his pleasure.

It would cost more pains than the work would be worth, to collect all the passages the author hath scattered

tered in his voluminous philosophy against eternal and independent truth. In place of which, I shall transcribe part of a paragraph *. “ We say, that the law
 “ of nature is the law of reason; and so it is in this
 “ (CICERO’S) sense, and thus far. A right use of
 “ this faculty which GOD hath given us, collects this
 “ law from the nature of things, as they stand in the
 “ system which he hath constituted. Reason can look
 “ no higher, nor will right reason attempt it. For
 “ surely no disquisition can be more vain and need-
 “ less, than that which examines whether actions are
 “ lawful or unlawful, *debiti aut illiciti*, because they
 “ are commanded or forbid by GOD; or whether they
 “ are such *per se* independently of GOD, and there-
 “ fore necessarily, *necessario*, commanded or forbidden
 “ by him. GROTIUS adopts the last of these no-
 “ tions, and the general current of metaphysical re-
 “ finement runs that way. It assumes in man a com-
 “ munity of reason with GOD; and then it seems
 “ consequential to assume, that men, such at least as
 “ these reasoners imagine themselves to be, are able
 “ to discern natures, and to judge of things antece-
 “ dently to actual existence, and abstractly from it:
 “ whereas, perhaps, to think rightly, we must think,
 “ that these natures and things, considered abstractly
 “ from the manner and the relations in which they
 “ exist, are nothing better than imaginary entities, ob-
 “ jects of ill-chosen speculation, not of knowledge.

* Vol. iv. p. 12. 13. 14. 15.

“ He

“ He who thinks thus, will be apt to ask, What
“ would become of justice, if we suppose a system
“ wherein there was no property? or what of tempe-
“ rance, if we supposed one wherein there is no ex-
“ cess? Such questions, and many other objections,
“ would not be easily answered. And the sole effect
“ of this hypothesis must be, as I think it hath been,
“ to render our notions of natural laws disputable and
“ undeterminable in many cases. The disquisition is
“ not only vain, but hurtful. It is needless too, ab-
“ solutely needless. For will any man deny, that
“ however indifferent natures may be *per se*, and sim-
“ ply considered, they cease to be so when they are
“ connected with a system, and cannot be separated,
“ even in imagination, from the relations they bear to
“ other parts of the system, nor from the effects on
“ the whole? The system to which we belong, like
“ every other system, was made by the will of God;
“ and therefore all the creatures contained in it, both
“ physical and moral, are ordained by the same will.
“ It hath been said, with shocking impiety, by school-
“ men, and others, That if things were made as they
“ are by the mere will of God, and not according
“ to the essential differences, and the eternal inde-
“ pendent nature of things, God might have made
“ our obligations to the law of nature to be contrary
“ to what they are: He might have made it our du-
“ ty to blaspheme, not adore him; to exercise inju-
“ stice, not justice, in our dealings with other men.

F

“ But

“ But this is an instance, and not the least, of that habitual presumption which men contract in the schools of metaphysics and theology; where they are accustomed to reason about what infinite wisdom and power might or should have done, instead of contenting themselves to know what they have done, and pronouncing for that reason fittest to be done. In creating man, God designed to create, not only a rational, but a social creature, and a moral agent; and has framed his nature accordingly. If he had designed this world to be the habitation of devils, he might have made us by nature what we say they made themselves by rebellion. But as we ought not to presume to censure the divine perfections, nor the proceedings of infinite wisdom, by our fancy and precarious ideas; so it is worse than presumption, to ascribe, even hypothetically, to the all-perfect Being, any thing that is evidently repugnant to our ideas of perfection. Once more, therefore, let us be content to know things as God hath been pleased to shew them to us, and to look no further than our own nature for the law of it. In that we shall find this law co-eval with our system, if not with the author; and as immutable as the system, if not as immutable as God.”

To me it appears a wilful misrepresentation of abstract essences, to call them *natures*, and yet more expressly

expressly *spiritual substances*. “ * The essences of “ things, the *eternæ veritates*, are incorporeal substances.” For he must know, that in truth they are no more, and at present are held for no more, than relations, which are unchangeable. For instance, the conformity or the agreement of the *subject* with the *predicate*. It is certain, that every truth is such an agreement; but every truth is not immutably such. It is now true, that PETER was learned; but PETER was not always learned, and PETER may forget all his learning: but the equality of two and two to four, (which is but a relation), always was, and always will be true, without arbitrary appointment, and even though there was no mind to compare them. For by comparing they are not made equal; but being equal, they are found such when compared. So is this truth, The cause is prior to the effect; and this other truth, Morality is the product of right reason, or, Justice is a conformity of our actions to the dictates of it. It is no wonder your Noble author falls into many blunders, when it is obvious to every reader the least acquainted with such matters, that he either doth not understand, or perpetually misapplies the common terms. For it is certain, that the relation of the *subjectum* to the *prædicatum* is neither nature nor substance. Substances are made to exist, and may be unmade: but though omnipotence may destroy, it cannot alter the essences of things. This

* Vol. iii. p. 346.

he acknowledges. Though all triangles were turned out of the universe, and though no such figure existed in matter, still it would remain a truth, that a triangle is a figure comprehended with three lines. And were it not for such truths, we could prove nothing.

I have said *, “That there are eternal and unchangeable truths, is as certain as that there is any truth at all. Essentials are invariable; and what is essentially predicated of a subject, is invariably true. For instance, to the idea of man belong the ideas of *animal* and *reasonable*; and therefore that man is a reasonable animal, is an eternal and immutable truth. It was a truth before man was made, and will be a truth if man should be no more.— And though GOD is infinitely free, and can do or not do whatever doth not imply a contradiction; yet there must always be a difference in the things considered in themselves, not in the divine pleasure, to constitute some *possible* and others *impossible*; otherwise GOD might make *impossible* to become *possible*.” Possibility consists in the consistency of attributes, *consistentia attributorum*; and impossibility in their repugnance. And to make a thing consistent and inconsistent at once, is the height of absurdity, and against the first and fundamental principle of ratiocination. The root of possibility, in part known

* Estimate of religion, p. 82.

to us, and perfectly known to GOD, is the immutable rule of his creation. And so his knowledge of *right* and *wrong*, *just* and *unjust*, is an invariable rule of his government of the world. As the divine knowledge of things possible doth not make them possible, (for it is the will that is operative); so no more doth the divine knowledge of *just* and *unjust* make actions either the one or the other. To the divine mind, the knowledge of *true* and *false*, *right* and *wrong*, is as essential as is his omniscience. It admits therefore of no change, no variation; and what is thus fixed and immutable, never had, and never can have any dependence on the will. It therefore can be no objection, That “ * God makes things dependent on him “ to exist conformably to natures independent on “ him:” for, before existence, things have no dependence on GOD; and after existence, the nature of these things remains the same, as in a state of possibility they were in the divine mind. Their existence is owing to his will; and as existent, they depend upon him. But the eternal omniscience of GOD, by which not only things actual, but possible likewise, are known, doth not depend on his will, because it is an essential attribute of his being. Nothing depends on the supreme Being, but what he wills to be; and he doth not will himself to be omniscient, for he is such essentially. You, or your Noble author, say †, That “ GOD may have conscious knowledge of all

* Vol. iii. p. 351.

† Vol. iii. p. 378.

“ things

“things possible, as we have conscious knowledge of
“our own existence.” Whatever GOD knows, he
knows intuitively: but I would not say that this is
conscious knowledge, and such as we have of our
own existence; because it sounds as if possibilities
were inherent and essential to the divine essence, and
knowledge and things known are not just the same.
GOD knows the equality of two and two to four, not
consciously, but intuitively. But his knowledge doth
not make the equality. For, upon supposition that
this equality never was, and never will be known, it
is still the same in itself, independently of all intel-
ligence.

I will not deny that it hath been said by school-
men and others, That if all actions were indifferent
antecedently to divine appointment, and if their equi-
ty and iniquity depended on his will and arbitrary
pleasure; then might he have commanded what he
forbids, and forbidden what he commanded. And if
this is shocking, it doth not follow from that which
he opposes, but from that which he vainly and weak-
ly endeavours to support. He who makes all things
true, just, and good, to depend on the arbitrary will
of GOD, may be charged with this shocking impiety;
but it is not to be placed to the account of those
schoolmen and others who hold, that morality and
immorality, virtue and vice, are essentially, eternally,
and unchangeably different. I give you and your
Lord

Lord back your absurdity, with the addition of an advice, Never to meddle with things too high for your low understanding, and who profess to know nothing but by *sensation* and *experience*.

He imagines it a very puzzling question, and not easily answered, "What would become of justice, if we supposed a system wherein there was no property?" A wonderful system it must be, which doth not admit of intelligent beings. Exclude them, and there remains no place for the knowledge and the exercise of justice. Admit intelligent beings, and private right and property must go along with them. For every intelligent being hath a right and property to what it is; to his life and to his limbs; which, without a crime, he cannot forfeit; nor other intelligent beings deprive him of, without a violation of justice. But upon supposition of no system at all, (and before the creation there was none), justice would be justice, right would be right, and truth would be truth, because unmade and eternal.

It is further said, "Will any man deny, however indifferent actions may be *per se*, and simply considered, they cease to be so when connected with a system, and cannot be separated, not even in imagination, from the relation they bear to other parts, nor from their effects upon the whole?" That is to say, That there were no truths, either mathematical,

mathematical, metaphysical, or moral, before this or some other systems were made. Before, it was not true, that a triangle was a figure comprehended with three lines; nor was it true, that the cause is prior to the effect, and that there was nothing bad or good; but that all these things began to be when the system was made. He forgets that God knew from eternity all possibilities; and therefore all agreements and disagreements of things, and so all truths, were open to his omniscient intelligence. These truths he did not make, as I have proved, for he knew them from eternity; and nothing eternal can be made. And if he did not make them from eternity, he did not make them in time. If before the commencement of the world no propositions were true, no actions just; then no propositions were false, no actions unjust; true and false, just and unjust, and I may add *possible* and *impossible*, were unknown to the omniscient, the supreme Being, the Author of our system, and all other systems: than which nothing is more absurd, nothing more blasphemous.

There are truths necessary, and truths contingent; there are some actions in themselves necessarily good and just, and others indifferent, or contingently such. For the Noble philosopher admits the distinction between the moral and positive law. This is variable according to circumstances and occasions; but that is fixed and immutable. It is a matter of indifference to

to eat thrice or twice a-day. And our lawful superiors and sovereigns may determine which is to be done; and their commands become lawful and binding. And God may bring us under many obligations to act in things, which he knows, and we know not, that tend to our happiness. And the difference between human and divine law, as contingent and positive, is, that human legislators may be mistaken, but the divine legislator never errs. But to break or to perform a promise, is not a matter of indifference; but is determined to be moral or immoral, by the dictates of right reason, previously and independently of all appointment, and all authority, human or divine. Had he said, that ALL actions are indifferent until the constitution of the system makes them otherwise, he had spoken intelligibly, though erroneously; but to say that *some* actions are indifferent until the system makes an alteration, looks like the fraud of disputation. For, because some actions indifferent become lawful or unlawful, by the mere and arbitrary appointment of a superior and lawful power, therefore all actions are such, is such a conclusion that logic doth not admit. And for many such arguments to be found in his philosophical works, it is no wonder he hath declared it impertinent to his purpose.

THE men who maintain, that many actions are *just* and *unjust* in themselves, antecedently to divine appointment,

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pointment,

pointment, do not in every case determine what infinite power and wisdom should do. Many things still depend upon GOD's arbitrary will and pleasure. He may create more worlds, (for extension is not actually infinite), and he may preserve or reduce those worlds which he hath made. But it is no discredit to the schools of metaphysics and theology, that in them they have learned, that GOD always acts according to the rectitude of his essence; and that therefore he cannot change necessary and eternal truths into error, nor necessary and eternal righteousness into injustice. Instead of being guilty of presumption, it would be a neglect of duty in them, not to inquire into the equity and iniquity of actions, that thereby they may know and obey the will of their Creator: and the sooner the better. I cannot therefore take your or your author's advice, and suspend giving judgment of the morality and immorality of actions, until I have learned by their consequences, what good or what evil these actions do. Place Mr MALLET in any post or station in this our system, in which he hath neither been nor acted; if he will act a reasonable and a moral part, he must immediately and first of all have recourse to the dictates of his reason. And as this life is the only scene of acting and suffering, according to your opinion, you may live forty years before you can state the balance of the advantages and disadvantages of morality; and consequently before you can settle to yourself a rule of
of

of life. This metaphysics and theology teach; and this every reasonable and moral man ought to practise. He knows that it is his duty to act reasonably; but he cannot know the consequences with certainty, until they happen. His certain knowledge is to be his rule of action, and not those contingent consequences, of which he hath no fixed and determined knowledge. This is a rule of morality which good Theists do, and ought to observe, To do what is right, and to refer the consequences to God, who sees, and can provide for them. And because "it is worse than presumption, to ascribe to the all-perfect Being any thing that is repugnant to our ideas of perfection," I do assert, that there are truths and actions eternally and essentially such, independently on the divine appointment; and that God cannot change the equality of two and two to four, nor command impiety and immorality. And that God may command what he forbids, and forbid what he commands, is not metaphysical or theological blasphemy, but a conclusion which follows from his Lordship's principles; that is, That the truth of all propositions, and the equity of all actions, depend upon the arbitrary appointment of the supreme Being. I am content, as his Lordship advises, "to know things as God hath been pleased to shew them." But if God hath been pleased to make me understand things above your capacity of understanding, and particularly, that some truths and some actions are necessary

and eternal, these morally good, and those unchangeably true; I am not obliged to stop when he says Halt. I am as ill pleased with the other part of his advice, "To look no further than our nature, for the law of it."

My reason for this is, that I find it laid down as a principle by another writer, That " * actions common to the nature of every species, are considered by us as regular and good.—The laws of nature are to be derived from the common nature of man, of which every person partakes who is not a monster.—And this is the ground-work of all morality. We are not left to gather our duty by abstract reasoning, nor indeed by any reasoning. It is ingraven upon the table of our hearts. We adapt our actions to the course of nature by mere instinct, without reasoning or experience." This I have already examined †. It is true, his Lordship of BOLINGBROKE says, that " the law of nature is the law of reason ;" but he admits it with this restriction : " A right use of this faculty which God hath given us, collects this law from the nature of things, as they stand in the system which he hath constituted." Reason then can only make the discovery, by observing the course of nature in the material, animal, and moral world, so far as

* Lord Kaimes's *Essays*, p. 37. 40. 316.

† *Estimate*, § iv.

we know it. In the lower part, or mere material, we observe order and regularity. But this is no foundation for regulating our actions according to the dictates of reason; because this material regularity doth not teach us what is morally right, or immorally wrong. Tho' his Lordship believed that he was made after the image of some beast or other, I am persuaded he did not think it his duty to live and act as brutally as they do. He had too little reason to live like a moral man, and too much to live by mere instinct. There is no other way left then to learn his duty, but from the course of human life, as it stands in our system. And to follow his human leaders, and in his turn to lead the way in the practice of virtue and vice, without regard to the law of reason, enforced by divine authority, is a very bad school to learn in, what is *good* and *evil*, *right* and *wrong*, *just* and *unjust*, unless by the consequences of his actions, founded on long experience. And I am of opinion, that his Lordship's life was an instance of the vanity and uncertainty of such a moral science. Better he had made use of his faculty of reason in the metaphysical and theological way, to have learned his duty to God and man. Before I have done, I do believe that I shall make it appear, that his philosophy amounts to this, That this world, and all other worlds that are, together with their inhabitants, are necessarily what they are, and

and cannot possibly be otherwise, either better or worse.

BEFORE I leave what I have transcribed, the conclusion, which ought to be the most important part, must be considered. His words are: "In our nature we shall find the law of nature co-eval with our system, if not with the author; and as immutable as the system, if not as immutable as GOD." Sure, no man writes with less precision; and no wonder, for he considers metaphysics as the delirium of human understanding. Is the human nature the whole of our system? Has man no relation, no connection with other beings? We are but a small part of what we know, and a much smaller of the numberless and unmeasurable imaginary worlds, and the author's imaginary scale of beings. If the law of nature is only found in our nature, such as it is, and such as we find it, it is idle to talk of a larger system. This law, you say, is as immutable as the system. What system? that of human nature, or that of the universe? In the human, which I take to be the superior part of our terrestrial globe, nothing is fixed, because there is nothing more various than man. Some agree to-day, and differ to-morrow from one another; and some are not the same in principle and practice for a day. To say, that the law of our nature is as immutable as our system, is no great encomium. It is rather *constant in inconstancy*. Such a phrase I have heard

heard in speaking of the human nature. But if the law of nature is not more permanent, it is so far from being a law, that it is an archetype or pattern of irregularity. I allow, that this irregularity is almost or very near co-eval with mankind. I likewise not only admit, but affirm, that the law of right reason, that teaches the eternal difference betwixt virtue and vice, morality and immorality, is co-eternal with the author of the universe, because independent of all arbitrary appointment, and therefore as immutable as the supreme Being. This his Lordship neither denies nor affirms. And what hath he learned by searching our system for the foundation of morality? Is not all that he hath said on the subject no better than small talk, seeing from it he can conclude nothing certain? But I have learned from him, that he knows nothing of the matter.

ON another occasion, notwithstanding, he talks dogmatically on the same subject. “ * We must go “ through a process of reasoning, that connects cer- “ tain evident truths intuitively together, and so ar- “ rive at demonstration. Though the Atheist doth “ not connect them into a demonstration of God’s ex- “ istence, yet he knows them all to be truths, as well “ as the Theist. He knows they result from the na- “ ture of things, he pronounces them therefore im- “ mutable and eternal: but he takes no side of the

* Vol. iii. p. 343. *ad marg.*

“ question;

“question, whether they are dependent or independent on GOD, since he acknowledges no GOD.” In these few words, there are two errors of inadvertency, *alias* blunders; such as, a process of reasoning, which connects evident truths *intuitively* together. Intuitive knowledge depends on no process or series of argumentation. The other blunder is, that the Atheist doth not determine, whether these eternal and immutable truths depend on GOD, or not, because he acknowledges no GOD. And because he acknowledges no GOD, he certainly determines in the negative. It is not for these remarks that I take notice of the passage, but to shew, that he is positive and peremptory in asserting the eternity and immutability of essences and essential truths, in which Theists and Atheists are agreed. He further acknowledges, that some truths are not only eternal, but also independent on GOD. “* Truths relating to GOD, always have been, and always will be the same. They are absolutely from all eternity to all eternity independent on his will: for he is what he is, by the necessity of his nature; and self-existence is a part of his essence.” *A part of his essence.* I do not like the expression. GOD’s necessary existence is a truth, and such a truth from which it necessarily follows, that he is not the cause of his own existence; and from this truth follows another more general truth, That nothing can make itself to be; and this

* Vol. iii. p. 343. *ad marg.*

great truth, That this necessarily-existent and uncaused Being is the cause of all things contingent. Whatever truths necessarily follow from such as relate to the supreme Being, are of the same nature with those they follow from, and are therefore independent of the divine will and appointment. This is metaphysics, which his Lordship treats with contempt; though without such principles, and such reasoning from them, he cannot connect his ideas and notions into a demonstration of the existence of GOD. He often speaks of this truth as demonstrated *a posteriori*; and so makes the existence of other beings the means of knowing, not only the being, but likewise the power and wisdom of GOD. He must have known, that Atheists of all denominations strive to destroy the connection between our existence and the existence of the supreme Being; yet in all his voluminous works he takes no notice of their exceptions; which had he done, he would have found it absolutely necessary to take into his reasoning many metaphysical maxims.

WITH the help of a truth which he acknowledges, all this affair of dependence and independence of essences and essential truths is easily determined. He admits, and so do I, that “ * GOD knew, from all eternity, every system, corporeal and intellectual, which he created in time. He knew, by consequence, for he ordered the various manners in which

* Vol. iii. p. 339.

“ all the parts of these systems, and the systems themselves, should operate on one another; the relations they should have; the proportions they should bear; the ideas they should communicate to creatures fitted to receive them. All this he foreknew; but all this did not therefore exist. Such an existence was at most eventual; and depended on the will, not on the knowledge of God, if we may distinguish them, to be a little more intelligible.” Without this distinction, what he says must have been perfect nonsense. And it is much better founded than his distinction betwixt a reasonable creature and his reason, and better than his distinction between God’s necessary existence and his essence. If God knew all things from eternity, he cannot deny that some truths are eternal in the divine mind. His Lordship extends this knowledge to contingent truths, and cannot therefore put necessary truths beyond the reach of omniscience. If God foreknew, that you and I should exist, and be persuaded that two and two are equal to four, that a triangle is a figure comprehended with three lines, and that man is a reasonable animal; and that we know that an injury is not a good office, and that these things cannot possibly be otherwise: all these truths must have been known to God from eternity, such as they are; the first as contingent, and the others as necessary and immutable. But that which I chiefly fix upon, is BOLINGBROKE’s distinction between the divine understanding and the divine will. And it is allowed

allowed by him, that it is not the knowledge, but the will of God, that makes being and reality. Therefore whatever receives nothing from God, is independent of him. The essences and natures of systems made, or possible to be made, were eternally in the divine mind; and as such, they were and are the objects of his knowledge, but not of his power or will. Existence and essence therefore are not the same. The divine knowledge is more extensive than the divine will; for God knows what is possible, as well as what is actual. All essences and essential truths never were, and never can be dependent on God: not on his will; for he must first know them, before he wills them to be; and knowledge makes no alteration in the things known. Possibilities known to God, remain possibilities until produced into actuality: and when produced, they retain the same essences which they had in the divine knowledge previously to their existence. In a state of mere possibility, all things only possible were independent; and such things as do exist, depend only on God for their being and existence. This, I believe, his Lordship was aware of; and therefore asserts, that God makes things possible. Of this more hereafter. That there are eternal truths, metaphysical, mathematical, and moral, independent of divine appointment, is no limitation of the divine power, because it doth not extend to impossibilities. And impossibility is a *purum nihil*, a mere nothing

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objectively

objectively and relatively. And what is limited by nothing, is unlimited.

DESCARTES held all necessary and essential truths to be immutable, but dependent on God. About which, after your Lord had exhausted his stock of metaphysics, he acknowledges that he hath done it to no purpose. For he says, "It is now time to conclude a note too long perhaps already; though I have hurried through it, and treated the matter more lightly than I could have done. I do not pretend to decide the question between him and his adversaries. All I would inculcate from this is, that since his opinion may receive a reasonable interpretation, it should not be condemned as absolutely and as dogmatically as it hath been; and that it becomes a Theist to incline always to the side which ascribes the greatest possible power to God; since that which even hath the appearance of limiting it, by maintaining an independency, when a dependency on him implies no contradiction." This able philosopher, after pleading to no purpose for the dependency of eternal truth and righteousness on the arbitrary appointment of God, humbly begs the favour of such Theists as himself to incline, without a reason, (for he gives none), to take part with DESCARTES in the debate. I cannot grant the favour; because I have proved, that his Lordship's reasonings are not only weak, but absurd. If independency
hath

hath an appearance of limiting the power of GOD, it is only to those that extend it to impossibilities.

PERHAPS he did not know, nor do you Mr MALLET, that schoolmen distinguish possibility into *objective* and *relative*, or *ad intra* and *ad extra*. When we conceive a consistency of attributes and predicates with one another, and with the subject, we judge the thing possible, provided there is a power sufficient to produce it. Some things are possible to human power, and all things conceivable are possible to omnipotence. To find out what is possible, we first consider this consistency and agreement of the attributes with the subject, and by this we pronounce it a possibility; if instead of an agreement we discern a repugnancy, it becomes, *in our idea*, an impossibility; and comparing the agreement of the subject with its predicates, and both with omnipotence, we declare it possible both objectively and relatively, intrinsically and extrinsically. And I learn from AQUINAS, that if absolute possibility was to be sought only in GOD's omnipotence, this omnipotence could not be explained but in the circular way. For if we say, that GOD is omnipotent, because he can do all things to which omnipotence extends, (and it can extend no further); this is just to say, that GOD is omnipotent, because he can do all things that he can do.

THOUGH perhaps I am as weary of the subject as
his

his Lordship was, I cannot think of leaving it as he did; that is, just as he found it. He contends, in contradiction to what he elsewhere asserts, that essence and existence is the same; and I absolutely refuse it, for the following reason and distinction. The word *to be*, ESSE, hath in philosophy three significations. *1st*, It is taken for *existence*; IT IS, or it exists. *2dly*, It is taken for the essence and nature of a thing. For this ARISTOTLE's authority is appealed to; who says, that a definition explains the *esse rei*; the being, nature, and essence of a thing; which some call the *quiddity*. And, *3dly*, It is taken for the connection of the predicates with the subject; as when we say a circle is round, and two and two are equal to four. In the first sense it is plain, that only GOD is eternal. Universals do not exist really, but in singulars; and no singulars, GOD excepted, do exist from eternity. In the second sense, it is obvious, that essences and eternal truths are not really existent natures. They are something real and positive in the divine intellect, but not out of it. But out of it these essences are but negatively eternal, in so far as they are not limited or circumscribed with time. When we consider human nature in itself, we abstract from all time, and mentally separate it from duration: for time doth not in any manner belong to the human essence. *3dly*, It is certain, that those propositions in which the subject and essential attributes are connected must be eternally true; such as, A triangle is a figure comprehended

prehended with three lines; Man is a reasonable animal. These propositions are definitions which are convertible with the things defined: for if we say, *Man*, or, *A reasonable animal*, we only say the same thing in other words: and *idem non est aliud*. This always was, and always will be a truth; and no time can alter or change it, no not when men shall be no more. The definition of *man* may be divided into two propositions: *Man is an animal*; and, *Man is reasonable*: and as the whole definition is an immutable truth, so are the parts of it. This doth not hold in propositions contingently true, because they depend on time. For instance, DAVID MALLET, Esq; is a philosopher; and certain it is, that once he was neither Esquire nor philosopher.

NECESSARY, essential, immutable, and eternal truths, consist in the inseparable connection between the subject and the predicate, and the identity of the definition with the thing defined. And it is by a consistency of attributes, and their conformity to the subject, that we judge of the truth of things actual, and the possibility of others. This connection and conformity we cannot ascribe to the will of GOD; because, in our conception of essential truth and possibility, the consistency is anterior to the divine appointment, as I have proved from AQUINAS. And it is by supposing this consistency to be independent and immutable, that, by a series of argumentation, we arrive

arrive at a demonstration of the being of GOD. It would be a ridiculous circle, first to prove that GOD made truths, and from these truths to prove that there is a GOD. The conclusion goes first before the premises, and then follows them.

ALL truths of speculation are, or ought to be the orderly ground-work of action. “ * *Truth and right* are “ so nearly related, that they are often put for one “ another. CICERO says, *What is right, is also true.* “ And the LORD JESUS CHRIST saith, *He that “ doth the truth, cometh to the light.* And the apostle “ PAUL speaks of those *who obey not the truth, but “ obey unrighteousness.*” Let it be observed, that I do not transcribe scriptural phrases and expressions, as of divine authority, (for I write for those who do not believe the BIBLE), but as sayings of sense and antiquity. “ A wicked action is an opposition to “ truth, as well as a violence done to justice. It is “ an error or a lie in action; * from which it follow- “ eth, that the *prima regula morum*, and the *radix “ possibilitatis*, that is, the first rule of morality, and “ the root of possibility, are the same.” As propo- sitions are some necessarily, and others contingently true; so there are actions, some necessarily, and others contingently moral. And upon this is founded the distinction of the *moral* and *positive* law. As the agreement of the subject with the attributes is truth,

* Estimate, p. 83.

and

and their disagreement falsity; so the rectitude and obliquity of actions is said to be, and really is, the equity and iniquity of actions. Reason is the faculty by which we compare our speculative ideas, and judge of their identity or diversity; and reason is the faculty by which we judge of the equality or inequality of our doings. The measure of this equality or inequality, can be nothing else but right reason. And this is more obvious to the understanding, than most truths of pure speculation. It is conscious knowledge, and such as we often perceive intuitively, and without argumentation. And I suppose it is from this that the word *conscience* denotes our approbation or disapprobation of what we call good and what we call bad actions. And it is an observation of Lord BOLINGBROKE, that "we search out and discover " mathematical truths; but moral truths force themselves upon the understanding." And no man capable to know that a whole is more than any of its parts, but knows that a good office, and the murder of a benefactor, essentially differ; that the one is disgraceful, and the other laudable; that the one is wrong, and that the other is right. And since the Atheist, who denies the divine being, and since they who have no rational conviction of it, know the difference; it is certain, they neither do, nor can consider morality as dependent on the will of God. All who allow the * distinction between the natural or

* Vol. v. p. 193.

moral law, and the voluntary and positive law, must admit, that the one depends, and that the other is independent of *will* and authority, whether human or divine.

IT is the consistency of the subject with the attributes which makes truth, whether we conceive the subject to be actual, or only possible; and it is the conformity of the action to the dictates of right reason, that makes it morally good and just. All these relations are discovered by reason, and many of them are even forced upon the understanding; and not by the will, nor by a third unknown faculty of the soul, nor by an unintelligible moral feeling. All things are known to GOD, from everlasting to everlasting; but as knowledge makes no alteration in the things known, neither truth, possibility, nor morality, depend upon the arbitrary appointment of his will.

WILLINGLY would his Lordship restrict our faculty of reason, and confine all human knowledge to sensation and experience. “* It is,” saith he, “absurd to reason about substances that are not actual, though they may be possible.” And this absurdity must be the same which LUCRETIVS states against the being of GOD.

* Vol. i. p. 86.

*Quove modo est unquam vis cognita principiorum,
Quidnam inter sese permutato ordine possent,
Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?*

That is, "How could the Creator understand the
" force and possibility of the principles, what they
" would produce when variously combined together,
" before nature and things themselves, by creating,
" had given a specimen?" The Noble philosopher
was not surprised into this assertion; for in many
places he asserts, that there can be no knowledge
but of things actual; and frequently distinguishes be-
tween real and fantastic knowledge. To this I may
borrow an answer from himself; for he says, " * I
" am far from saying, that we should not reason about
" things possible, as well as actual." And where
then is the absurdity before mentioned? He that pre-
tends to prove *a posteriori* the being of God, and
to know his will by his works, cannot but maintain
most absurdly, that things must be prior to know-
ledge, and that he did not know them until they ex-
isted. I am obliged to schoolmen for their distinc-
tion between *actuals* and *possibles*, and for giving to
possibilities an *esse cognitum*, though not an *esse*
actuale. In the conception possibilities have an en-
tity, or being, but not without the conception.
" † It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern Atheistic

* Vol. i. p. 81.

† Dr Cudworth's intellectual system, p. 731.

“ writer, that universals are nothing else but names
“ attributed to many singular bodies ; because what-
“ soever *is*, is singular. For though whatsoever ex-
“ ists without the mind be singular, yet it is plain
“ there are conceptions in our minds *objectively* uni-
“ versal. Which universal objects of our mind,
“ though they exist not as such any where without it,
“ yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an
“ intelligible entity, because they are conceivable:
“ for since non-entity is not conceivable, whatsoever
“ is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is there-
“ fore something.” So far is knowledge from de-
pending upon the existence of singulars, that, pro-
perly speaking, knowledge does not arise from them,
nor depend upon them at all. Nothing more true
than that of BOETHIUS, *Omne quod scitur, non ex
sua, sed ex comprehendendum natura, vi, et facultate
cognoscitur.* “ Whatever is known, is known not
“ by its own force and power, but by the force and
“ power, the vigour and activity of that thing itself
“ which knows and comprehends it.” It is said by
ARISTOTLE, that “ there is no knowledge, even of
“ the universal theorems of geometry, by sense. For
“ if we could perceive by sense, that the three
“ angles of a triangle are equal to two right; yet
“ should we not rest satisfied in this, as having a
“ sufficient knowledge thereof, but we would seek
“ further after a demonstration of it; sense reach-
“ ing only to singulars, but knowledge to univer-
“ sals.”

"fals." When from the universal or abstracted idea of a triangle, which is neither here nor there, nor any where without our mind, but yet hath an *esse cognitum*, or intelligible entity, we see a plain necessity, that its three angles must be equal to two right angles; then, and not till then, do we know the truth of this universal theorem: and so we understand that every singular triangle hath this property in it. From which it follows, that the knowledge of this and the like truths is not derived from singulars; nor do we arrive at them by way of ascent or induction; but, on the contrary, having first found them in generals and universals, we afterwards descending, apply them to particulars and singulars. Thus our knowledge is not derivatively from singulars, but in the order of nature before them. It is not only possible, but very probable, that there are not in actual existence, any straight lines, perfect circles, squares, or cubes, as answer to the exactness of our conceptions, nor ever will be; yet they are not therefore absolute *non-entities*, because we can demonstrate things concerning them; and though but possibilities, yet are they the foundation of many mathematical and useful truths. It is so far therefore from being absurd to reason about things possible, that the very first principles of mathematics are no more than suppositions and possibilities.

THOUGH his Lordship admits, that the human
mind

mind can compound and decompound ideas; yet he maintains, that it cannot form any one simple idea; and therefore all our knowledge must be originally owing to outward objects. The mind, admitting it to be a fermentation of some material parts, (and his Lordship thinks it is), hath much more activity than the sensible objects which it perceives, and therefore is fitter to form ideas than they. I have an idea of my pen and of my paper; and this idea must either be formed by them, or by my mind. If made by them, my mind must be a passive recipient, and my pen and paper must have activity, power, and faculty of making those ideas, not in themselves, but in my mind. If it is otherwise with your or your Lord's understanding, all I have to say is, that our understandings differ essentially.

I do believe, that the Noble philosopher is the first who hath advanced, that God makes possibilities. “* God,” saith he, “made things actual, because he knew them; and why should not I say, because he made them possible?” After saying this, you may say as much nonsense as you please. *Possible* and *impossible*, or *not possible*, are contradictions. And if *impossible* can become *possible*, then two contradictory propositions can both be true; and a thing may be and not be at the same time. When God makes things possible, it is by an act of the will; for

* Vol. i. p. 81.

understanding

understanding makes nothing, and these new-made possibilities remain only possibilities. And therefore, upon the supposition that God makes possibilities, he wills, and by his will produces nothing. The Noble author, without scruple, admits, that God, by one single act of his almighty will, created, preserves, and governs the universe. Before actual creation the whole system was possible. It must have been absolutely and independently possible, or it must have been made possible. The first is what I contend for. But if the second takes place, that is, if the world was first made possible, then its existence was not the effect of one single volition, but of two. He had no occasion to make possibility depend upon the will of God: for it is the object of his knowledge; and he says expressly, *It is the range of infinite knowledge.* A made possibility was not always a possibility; before, it was impossible, or not possible; and an impossibility or non-possibility is not an object even of divine omniscience; and therefore it could not be made possible; for God did not make what he did not know. He must therefore have waited until

—*Ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi.*

This is either his meaning, or he doth not understand what he says in another place, viz. “ * We do not, “ like reasoners *a priori*, imagine what may have “ been according to our abstract reasonings, and so

* Vol. v. p. 287.

“ conclude

“conclude from possibility to actuality; we proceed
 “much more reasonably from actuality to possibility,
 “in a method so often, and so absurdly reversed by
 “philosophers.” Philosophers can answer for them-
 selves, by affirming, that it is absolutely certain, that
 in any case, except one, they never do conclude,
Such a thing is possible, therefore it is actual. The
 case excepted, is the possibility of one supreme Be-
 ing, self-existent, and self-sufficient; and if such a
 Being is possible, it must be actual, because it cannot
 be made to be such. And I leave the author to an-
 swer for his allowing nothing to be possible but what
 is actual, and for numberless contradictions; many of
 which are industrious and designed,

PHILOSOPHERS, after establishing certain mathe-
 matical and moral truths upon abstract considerations,
 “* assume,” says he, “that these general notions
 “are natures independent on God, and in themselves
 “of eternal necessity. God hath made triangles and
 “men; but triangularity, they say, and they might
 “just say as well humanity,” (and why not?), “are
 “independent natures, antecedent to his will, and that
 “do not owe their original to arbitrary positive appoint-
 “ment. That there are necessary truths, mathemati-
 “cal and moral, and such must be as long as there
 “are men, and as the present system of things con-
 “tinues, is certain: but these would not perhaps be

* Vol. v. p. 58.

“called

“ called eternal truths, nor would these notions be
“ represented like eternal independent natures, if it
“ was more considered, that the self-existent Being is
“ the fountain of all existence; and that since every
“ thing subsists by his will, it must exist according to
“ his will. For which reason it seems as absurd to
“ say, that when he made man, he could give him
“ no other nature than the human, which was before
“ necessarily, not abstractly, given; as it would be to
“ say, that when he made a man, he did not make a
“ tree. A man with the properties of a tree, would
“ not be a man; a tree with the properties of a man,
“ would not be a tree. The same will which made
“ each, made the properties of each. It is one and
“ the same act; and to say, that the nature of any
“ thing, or the truths resulting from it, are independ-
“ ent in any sense on the will that made them, seems
“ to me therefore to imply a contradiction.”

It hath been said, and proved, that *essence* and *ex-
istence* are not precisely the same; and if any thing
his Lordship says can give strength to an opinion, (for
he says and unsays at pleasure), we have his word,
that they are not precisely the same; because he says,
that “ God may destroy the thing, but he cannot
“ alter the *essence* of it.” And if he cannot alter it,
it cannot proceed from his arbitrary appointment, and
must have been from eternity and to eternity the same
in the divine mind. Dr CLARKE says, that “ the
K “ existence

"existence of things depends upon the arbitrary will
 "of GOD; but when they are created, and as long
 "as they do exist, their proportions, respects, and
 "relations, are abstractly of eternal necessity, according to the different natures of things." And Lord BOLINGBROKE says, that " * GOD instituted moral obligations, when he made moral agents; that
 "the law of their nature, is the law of his will; and
 "that how indifferent soever we may presume every
 "thing is to him before his will has determined it to
 "be, it becomes, after this determination, a necessity, though a created nature. Such justice is in
 "man, though in GOD it may be nothing more than
 "one mode of his infinite wisdom. As long as there
 "are men, this nature must exist. Where it will be,
 "and what it will be, when they, and this moral system
 "is at an end, let those able persons who know so
 "well where and what it was before they both began to exist, determine. The Platonists assume an
 "eternal morality, antecedent, not only to any signification, but to any actual determination of the will
 "of GOD.—By this GOD published a moral law
 "when he made moral agents, but he was not properly the legislator. The law existed before them,
 "and it binds both him and them."

OF all this I do admit something to be right, but much more I assert to be wrong. And I observe, *first*,

* Vol. v. p. 64.

That philosophers, by abstracting one property of a thing from another, take them all by turns into distinct consideration; and by accustoming themselves to such abstract considerations, they establish certain mathematical and moral truths upon them.—That there are necessary truths, both mathematical and moral, and such there must be as long as there are men, and the present circumstances of things continue, is certain. Agreed. And I might suppose by this, that he hath lost his aversion to *abstraction* and to eternal truth. I observe, *2dly*, That it is not true that any of these philosophers assume, that these general notions are general natures. “Since philosophers abstract so well, that they do honour to themselves, and service to mankind; and from their abstracted notions draw many necessary truths, both mathematical and moral;” it is to repay good with evil, to refuse them the use of the distinction between *abstractum* and *concretum*. In the first case they say, and say justly, that those notions which they call *essences*, (not natures), are necessary, eternal, and independent; but *in concreto*, or a state of actuality, they are contingent and dependent. These men called *philosophers* (and great men they were) distinguished likewise between *hypothetical* and *absolute* necessity. In the first sense they held *essences* to be necessary, and in the other contingent. Hypothetically, man while he exists, is *in concreto*, and necessarily too, a *reasonable animal*; but *in abstracto* he is absolutely and necessa-

rily a reasonable animal. I said, that word *EST*, *it is*, in a third sense, is put for the connection between the *subjectum* and the *prædicatum*, the subject and the attribute; and this, when done without respect to time, is *negatively* eternal; as, Man is a reasonable animal: for man always was, and is, and always will be such. But the connection between Mr MALLETT and his philosophy is but temporary, and therefore neither necessary nor eternal. Your Lord admits, that there are, and must be moral truths, as long as there are men. And Dr CLARKE says, that the existence of things depends upon the arbitrary will of GOD; but when they are created, and as long as they exist, their proportions, respects, and relations, are abstractly of eternal necessity, according to the different natures of things. The schoolmen asked no more than this hypothetical necessity, and less cannot be allowed them.

HIS Lordship insists, That as every thing exists by the will of GOD, it must exist in the way and manner in which he wills it to be. Certainly. For instance, if GOD makes a man, he makes a rational animal. This is the *esse rei*, the essence of the thing made and created. In a state of actual existence, this essence is something positive, and therefore dependent on the will of the Creator; but not so in a state of abstraction. The connection, or rather the identity of a *reasonable animal* with *man*, is necessary, independent,

ent, and eternal. By comparing PLATO with HOBBS, he rejects both their doctrines. He rejects that of HOBBS justly, in so far as he represents it; that is, that "there was no distinction made between *just* and *unjust*, *moral good* and *moral evil*, till the will of man made this distinction by civil constitutions, and positive laws." But it will be found, though HOBBS acknowledged no law, no obligation, until human constitutions made law and obligation by authority and force, that he did admit the distinction between *just* and *unjust*, not as an obligation, but as a *rule*. And this Atheists do, and do consistently with their principles. The fault he finds with PLATO, is, that though GOD published a moral law when he made moral agents, "yet he was not properly the legislator. The law existed before them, and it binds both him and them." The distinction between *just* and *unjust*, *right* and *wrong*, was as necessary, eternal, and independent of all appointment, as the equality of two and two to four. And though this was known to GOD, yet when he made moral agents, he made their knowledge of it a law to them; and by so doing he became very properly a legislator. If by this law binding him as well as them, he means, that GOD always acts according to the rectitude of his own nature, and cannot act otherwise, the meaning is good, though the expression is indecent. And it derogates nothing from the majesty and sovereignty of the Almighty, that holiness is one of his

his essential attributes. A monarch who knows the equity and iniquity of actions, and who makes laws for the practice of virtue, and for the avoiding vice and wickedness, is still a legislator: and if he is a wife and a good prince, the same that serves his subjects as a law, serves himself as the rule of his behaviour. Thus ALMIGHTY GOD and righteous LORD, who knows and loves righteousness, brings his intelligent creatures under a moral law, as soon as they become actually rational. His Lordship would have allowed, and I hope you will allow, that GOD is essentially holy, (and such he is whether you allow it or not); and whenever he exerts his power, it is always in consistency with this most glorious attribute. From the sanctity of the Deity flows his approbation of morality, and our obligation to the practice of every good and reasonable action. And GOD, in effect, says to all his reasonable creatures, *Be ye holy, for I am holy.* Our holiness is imperfect and contingent; but the holiness of GOD is perfect, and as necessary as his being. His is the pattern, the archetype, the paradigma; and it becomes our duty to copy, transcribe, and imitate it as near as we can in all our actions. Because we know that GOD is holy, a GOD of truth, and without iniquity, and that just and right is he; and that he therefore approves of all our moral doings, and even of our moral endeavours; it may be said, that GOD's holiness is to us a moral law, at least the source of it; and since GOD wills, and acts suitably

to his holiness, or moral attributes, and cannot act otherwise, the same rules by which he governs the moral world become a law to us. And therefore, since morality flows necessarily from the sanctity of God, it is as necessary, eternal, and independent of his arbitrary appointment, as is his own being and essence. This I take to have been PLATO's opinion; and it is my opinion that his Lordship maintains a worse.

FOR he imagines he hath found out a medium between PLATO's and HOBBS's doctrine. His words are, " * GOD instituted moral obligations when he made moral agents; that the law of their nature is the law of his will; and that how indifferent soever we may presume every thing is to him, before his will has determined it to be, it becomes, after the determination, a necessary, though created nature:" That is, upon supposition that God makes moral agents, it is necessary to bring them under moral obligations; but before these agents were made, morality and immorality were indifferent to the Deity. And how can any thing in itself and eternally indifferent, become necessary upon any new emergency whatever? And did not God, who made this reasonable and moral agent, know that it was fit and reasonable he should be under a moral law? If he did not, then he acted at random. And if he did know it, then morality and immorality were not in-

* Vol. v. p. 62.

different to the Deity, before the existence of these rational agents. If it is fit, if it is necessary, that every rational and intelligent creature should act rationally and morally, and for that purpose come under a law; this is what GOD previously approved of. And if he approves of this rectitude in his intelligent creatures, it is because he himself is essentially holy, and holy in all his works. From the works of GOD his Lordship learns the existence and the will of the supreme Being, his infinite wisdom and power. And if his argument *a posteriori* is good, then our knowledge and approbation of what is good and just proves, that GOD knows and approves all goodness and justice. He knows and approves what is such in all cases, actual and possible, and we only in a few. But still we know, even against our inclinations, that there is an unchangeable difference between right and wrong in general, and in many particular instances. His Lordship thinks it shocking impiety to assert, that GOD can command whatever he forbids, and forbid whatever he commands; and so do I; and yet I cannot see how this consequence can be avoided, if it is true, that, before the creation of rational agents, equity and iniquity were in themselves, and to the Deity, indifferent. A man who is ready to renounce his GOD, rather than believe that he strengthens the hand of a parricide, when he plunges a dagger into the heart of a father, cannot imagine that the action, previously to the existence of
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the murderer, was indifferent to the Deity. For my part, I am as confident, as I am certain of the being of GOD, that from eternity he disapproved all such horrid crimes.

THIS saying, "The law of our nature is the law of GOD's will," appears to me to be an equivocation. I suppose that by the law of nature is by all understood, the law which our reason and understandings dictate to mankind for the rule of their righteous and moral behaviour; which, whether they observe or neglect, still remains a law to them. The law of nature is the law which we discover by the light of nature; but the law of *our* nature may signify, and I believe he intends it should signify, the ordinary course of human actions. It is his opinion, that GOD hath made man such as he is, without obliging him to be another kind of creature, or to observe another conduct above his present make and constitution. It was the will of GOD he should be such; and as he is, so he acts. And thus the law of his nature becomes the law of GOD's will. An adventitious disqualification to observe the law of GOD and nature, his Lordship ridicules. He was, during all the days of his life, such as he was made; and if he was not a better and a more moral man, he could not be blamed. But I leave it to DAVID MALLET, Esq; to reconcile this to the many faults which his conscience accused him of. For it witnesseth against you

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and me, and all mankind, for falling short of our duty.

HE that challenges an equivocation, is obliged, by the rules of debate, to correct it with a distinction. And as I have said, there is an equivocation in these words, *The law of our nature is the law of God's will*; I offer, in my defence, a double acceptation of the will of God. It is commonly said, that God wills things to be, when he makes things which were not before. And in this sense his Lordship uses it frequently. For instance, "God only knows how many sorts of beings his omnipotent will hath made." Another sense of the will of God is that whereby he commands such of his creatures as are intelligent and rational, capable to understand and to obey, to observe such a conduct and behaviour as they discover to be prescribed and appointed by divine authority. This my author likewise admits. This I call the legislative and *imperative* will of God; and the other I call his *operative* will. When my author says, that the law of our nature is the law of God's will, he understands his *operative* will, and can understand no other. The law of nature, and the law of *our* nature, are different things. The one is the course and tenor of the human life, and the other the dictates of right reason. This is so perfect and complete, that the observation of it would render our state truly paradisaical. This the author admits

mits it would effect in speculation, but in practice it would place man in a higher rank than he is fitted or designed for. But as for the law of *our* nature, which he abusively calls the law of GOD's will, being only the effect of his operative will, it is not transgressible. As the nature of the vegetative part of the universe, and of the animal system, continues the same; so, according to my author's plan, doth the human and rational continue the same which they were originally, beyond the power of those beings to make any alteration. His Lordship objects against the law delivered by MOSES, That it hath proved more ineffectual than any other law that can be quoted. And if this be ascribed to the hardness of the heart, and obstinacy of the people, to save the honour of the law; this honour will be little saved, and its divinity ill maintained. “ * The excuse “ might be admitted in the case of any human law; “ but we speak here of a law supposed to be dictated “ by divine wisdom, which ought and would have “ been able, if it had been such, to keep in a state “ of submission to it, even a people rebellious and “ obstinate enough to break through any other.” If this is true, then the law which men break cannot be the law of GOD. Therefore, according to this philosopher, whether the will of GOD be *operative* or *imperative*, it must be irresistible. How happy and safe are you, DAVID MALLEY, Esq; in this opinion?

* Vol. v. p. 362.

If you transgress any law, if you make void all that other men account obligation, your very transgression proves, that it is not, nor can be the law of GOD, though it may be one of the dictates of right reason. All your business is to follow your nature, lead whither it will. But mean time please to know, that you then cease to be a rational, a free, and a moral agent. And believe this if you are able. You make no account of the *imperative* will of GOD; and that your great principle, That the will of GOD is only to be learned from his works, amounts only to his operative will. Thus, from first to last, your reasoning from the works to the will of GOD, is but a *paralogism*, or rather a most fraudulent *sophism*.

“As long as there are men, this nature” (that is, the nature upon which truth and righteousness is founded) “must exist. Where it will be, and what it will be, when this moral system is at an end, let those able persons who know so well where, and what it was before they both began to exist, determine.” If there were no intelligent, rational creatures, no moral agents, the exercise of all moral virtues must cease. But it is an immutable truth, that such creatures owe obedience to GOD’s will, upon supposition of their existence. That virtue and vice, equity and iniquity, are contradistinguished, and that what is wrong cannot become right, is certain. As the equality of two and two to four, is not

a made truth by comparing, but upon comparing is found to be such; so justice is not a made virtue by judging, but by judging is found such. And neither justice, nor the equality of two and two to four, are made such by arbitrary appointment. And therefore there is eternal truth, and eternal righteousness. This his Lordship inadvertently admits, when he maintains that God cannot make a rational creature, without bringing him under a moral law. "As long as there are men, the law of nature must exist." Because it is commonly said, that truth and righteousness were eternally in the divine mind; to cut off this resource of the eternity and independency of them, he says, "Justice in man may be a mode of divine wisdom." But as he says much to the same purpose, or the same thing very often, I shall defer an examination of this extraordinary doctrine, until I come to the consideration of God's moral attributes. Against all I have said, this Noble philosopher hath a capital answer in reserve, That it amounts to no more than to the delirium and blasphemy of metaphysics. To which I return no other answer, than, had he understood *ontology*, which is properly metaphysics, he had not committed so many faults in his natural religion.

It is a pity his Lordship had been so idle as to write so much to no purpose. As he declined deciding a preceding question between DESCARTES and

and his opposers, he here again concludes to the very same purpose. “ * If I insist much on this point, “ I do not pretend to clear it of all the difficulties “ that lie in the way, neither by what is said here, “ nor by what hath been said elsewhere, nor by “ what I may say hereafter. There are many on “ either side that have perplexed, and may continue “ to perplex better heads than mine. But, in the “ first place, I feel an insuperable repugnancy to “ own that any thing is independent on God; and, “ in the next place, I am shocked at the consequences that are drawn from this doctrine.” His feelings are for himself, and he ought to allow others the same privilege. God’s being and attributes, physical and moral, do not depend on his arbitrary will; and whatever necessarily flows from them, is independent likewise. But morality, as hath been proved, flows necessarily from the holiness of the supreme Being, and is therefore independent on his arbitrary will and appointment. We, with all our faculties, and all our knowledge, depend upon God, and particularly our knowledge of *right* and *wrong*, *just* and *unjust*. But right and wrong do not depend upon God’s will and appointment. God essentially and necessarily approves whatever is good and true, and disapproves whatever is false and evil morally. It is therefore plain, that his Lordship doth not speak with precision, when he says, he feels an insuperable repugnancy to own that any thing is independent

* Vol. v. p. 62.

on GOD. For all the creation, all his doings *ad extra*, depend entirely on his good will and pleasure; but *true* and *false*, *right* and *wrong*, are founded in the divine sanctity, and therefore are as independent on his will as his own being. He is the *suprema ratio*. From this all right reason is derived. His only is the knowledge and the authority, to lay his intelligent creatures under an obligation to be holy, as he is holy. Morality is one thing, and our obligation to practise it is another. The first we know as a capital and fundamental truth; a truth, I may say, indelibly imprinted on the human mind. Morality in itself, that is, justice, goodness, and truth, is independent on GOD's will. But our obligation to be moral and holy, is founded in divine dominion and authority, and imperative will and command promulgated by our own reason and understanding. Whatever your Lord saw, or you see, I see no insuperable difficulty in this decision. But as he sees many on both sides of the question, he ought to have treated those who differed from him with more respect than he hath done; and particularly Dr CLARKE, who, in my opinion, had a better head than his own. The consequences that follow from the supposition, That the equity and iniquity of actions were indifferent in the divine mind, before the constitution of any moral system, is, by his own confession, shocking impiety; and nothing follows from the other side of the question that can give offence to the most pious understanding.

S E C T.

S E C T. IV.

Of morality, and the moral law.

I HAVE observed, that Lord BOLINGBROKE lays down as a principle, That the will of GOD is to be learned from his works, and that there is no other way of knowing it; and from this concludes no more than his wisdom and power. I did say, that this principle of his hath two faults. 1st, That it is not the only way to know the will of GOD; and, 2^{dly}, That it is not the direct and immediate way. I have done with the first; and I hope to discuss the second in fewer words. His Lordship should have distinguished between *skill* and *wisdom*. Formerly such philosophers as you admitted no more than *knowledge* and *power* to be learned from the works of GOD; but, in place of knowledge, you have shuffled in the word *wisdom*, but inconsistently with your scheme or system of natural religion, *alias* Atheism. It will be easily admitted, that the make of the world, as far as we know, doth display the wonderful and amazing skill of the artificer, and a power in proportion. But wisdom consists not in the work, but in the use and end for which it is made. An architect builds a house which spectators take for an hospital. The edifice is exquisitely finished. This shews that he hath skill; but it is the end and use of the erection that shews his wisdom.

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wisdom. The material parts of the creation, however so well fitted and adapted to one another, cannot pass for their ultimate end and use. The design of the grand artificer must go beyond the order and symmetry of the fabric. The hospital mentioned was not made for shew, but supposed to be for the benefit and accommodation of the poor and indigent. The work in that case would be morally good. Were the building, by its beauty, so contrived, as to insnare inhabitants, in order to crush them under its sudden ruin; the end would be bad, and the action morally evil. To do good, is wisdom; and to do evil, is weakness and folly. Therefore, before you can prove the wisdom of God from his works, you must prove, that they are finally intended for holy and good purposes; good for himself, or good for others. He is eternally and essentially happy, and can receive no addition to his happiness from all the works that he hath made; it must therefore be good for others; for such beings as know what is good, and what is evil; that is, for intelligent and reasonable creatures. And can any man, for the Noble author, search out the ALMIGHTY and his works unto perfection? This earth, and its rational inhabitants, is the part of the creation we are best acquainted with. All the moral and rational inhabitants he puts upon the same level. The best and the worst of men he places within the reach of the wheels and springs of the mechanical fabric, that keep their stated course, sometimes for the preservation, and sometimes

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for the destruction of the inhabitants. Famine and pestilence, inundations and earthquakes, sweep away into nothing millions of reasonable animals, without difference and distinction. The author, who refuses these multitudes any future life, and places individuals below the care of divine providence, cannot possibly from the works conclude the wisdom of God. But if this surpasses his skill in philosophy, he hath found out a very short conceit, to prove, that all the world is wisely made, by subsuming, that God is infinitely wise. This is a shameful, and even a stupid begging the question. He undertakes to prove the wisdom of God from his works; and because he cannot do it, he puts the intended consequence in place of the antecedent, and proves from that, that the world is wisely made.

IT is in God's dealings with the rational part of the creation that he can be said to do either good or evil. And if the Noble philosopher will take in his brethren the beasts, and make them susceptible of moral government, and sensible of the obligations incumbent on them to do their duty to God and to their fellow-animals, he cannot make the divine wisdom any thing more apparent. They all go the same way into a state of eternal insensibility. If the beasts have less reason and understanding than men, they have less concern for their loss, and less anxiety for the preservation of life. The lamb licks the hand that holds the knife
lifted

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lifted up for its destruction: but I have seen instances of dread and horror raised in breasts thought brave, by the apprehension of approaching dissolution; and I have heard, that a Noble philosopher, for fear of death, died mad and distracted. Not so died MAHOMET EFFENDI, condemned for Atheism at Constantinople, who scorned to tell a lie to save his life. I am very sure that his Lordship, in his philosophical works, hath told several for a meaner purpose, if industrious and designed contradictions can be reckoned lies. The difference between EFFENDI's case and his Lordship's was, that EFFENDI was condemned by the civil magistrate, and his Lordship by his own conscience. *The spirit of a man will sustain his infirmity; but a wounded spirit who can bear?*

THE author, who reduces all the divine attributes into wisdom and power, and who, instead of proving wisdom from the works of GOD, only proves his skill and knowledge, can never discover from them the will of GOD as a law which we are bound to obey. And when he attempts any thing of this kind, (and I think he doth it twice), he presently passes from the works to the necessary existence and infinite perfection of the supreme Being. I have said, and proved *, that morality hath no relation to the works of nature or art, let them be ever so exquisite. The author whom I have examined had said †, "A state

* Estimate, p. 97.

† Lord Kaimes's Essays, p. 136.

“ of nature is represented by all writers as a state of
 “ war, nothing going on but rapine and bloodshed.
 “ From this picture of the first men, one would be
 “ apt to conclude, that man by nature is a wild and
 “ rapacious animal, little better than a beast of prey,
 “ but for his inclination to society, which moulds
 “ him gradually into a rational creature. And from
 “ this original state of mankind, it would seem, that
 “ moral virtues are not natural, but acquired by
 “ means of education in a well-regulated society;
 “ in a word, that the whole moral part of our system
 “ is artificial.” This he states as an objection against
 what he said concerning the moral sense. To which
 he returns for answer what strengthens the objection:
 “ Savages, being conscious of nothing but disorder
 “ and sensual impulse within, cannot be conscious of
 “ any thing better without them. Society teaches
 “ mankind self-denial, and improves the moral sense.
 “ Disciplined in society, the taste for order and regu-
 “ larity unfolds itself.—And thus to society we
 “ owe all the blessings of life, and particularly the
 “ knowledge of God.” The Honourable author
 remits mankind to learn morality from one another.
 And certain it is, if they have not previous know-
 ledge of right and wrong, all must be founded on
 custom and practice. What I have further remarked,
 I forbear to transcribe.

HIS Lordship of BOLINGBROKE pretends to learn
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the will of GOD from his works. Were all the material world as open to his understanding as the surface of my paper is to my eye, no conclusion could thence be drawn for the government of rational creatures. I do not think, that he takes the mere material and animal parts of the creation for his teachers. Intelligences superior to himself he is not acquainted with. Men alone must be his masters. These he knows not so well as he doth himself. Less therefore should he trust to their practice, than to his own understanding. I recommend it to you, DAVID MALLET, Esq; to consult your own reason and understanding, as the surest and only way (for you refuse revelation) to know the will of GOD, as the law which you are bound to obey. His Lordship talks of learning the will of GOD by experience. And what experience can he have of morality or the will of GOD, but by the consequences of actions? Were every good and moral action attended with good and happy temporal consequences, and every evil and immoral doing attended with bad and hurtful consequences in this life, (for he doth not admit another), he might learn morality by his own practice. But all the world knows that this is absolutely false.

BESIDES, to measure the morality of actions by the advantage and profit arising from them, Lord SHAFTESBURY holds not only to be mean and fordid, but also reason sufficient to destroy the worth and value

value of them. Certain it is, that morality is good and reasonable, let the consequences be what they will; and that GOD is to be obeyed without reserve. In close contradiction to this, his Lordship says, “ * The morality of actions does not, I think, consist in this, that they are prescribed by will, even the will of GOD; but in this, that they are the means, however imposed the practice of them may be, of acquiring happiness agreeable to our nature.” And he says, “ † When we have reasoned *a posteriori*, from the works to the will of GOD, and from the constitution of the system wherein we are placed by him to our interest and duty in it, we shall have laid the foundation of morality on a rock. Let us trust to pure intellect less than we are advised, and to our senses more.” I can allow, that morality, that is, goodness, justice, and truth, are such antecedently to the will of GOD; such in themselves, because they flow from his essential holiness: and though his Lordship doth not conceive how the practice of these virtues may be imposed, I do conceive that it is the will of GOD that brings us under the obligation, and not that which we may esteem our happiness in this life. If every man is left judge of what will make him happy, and if his happiness is the first and only rule of morality, I am convinced that nothing can have a more precarious foundation than virtue. And for that rocky foundation which

* Vol. ii. p. 290.

† Vol. iii. p. 384.

his Lordship lays for morality, our interest and duty as we find them in the system wherein we are placed, it is but a foundation for every wicked and profitable work. Interest is the leading principle; and if there is any subsequent duty, it is only to pursue it. And can any man have worse principles, than to make, or justify his making, his temporal interest and advantage take place of every consideration? Mr MALLET, do, renounce such villanous philosophy, for the sake of your honour and reputation. GOD hath made us reasonable creatures, and such he made Lord BOLINGBROKE; but it was not GOD, but he himself, who made him a vitious and immoral man. As we are reasonable creatures, we are the work of GOD; from which we may conclude, that it is his will that we act and live reasonably. It is our reason then that discovers to us morality, and the moral law. But we must not mistake our own works for the works of GOD, and reason from them, that it is his will that we should principally and only consult our temporal advantage in the system in which we are placed. Had GOD made us such as the beasts, only with animal instincts, it had been vain in us to have attempted a higher life. It is the will of GOD that beasts should live as beasts, for he hath made them beasts: but if men make themselves beasts, and worse than beasts, it is their own will, and not his, that they live as such.

It is something extraordinary, that a stir should be held

held about the nature and origin of morality, and the means of knowing it. One may as well pretend not to see, when his eyes are open and well disposed, the object at a due distance, and the medium duly enlightened; as to pretend, that the knowledge of *right* and *wrong*, *just* and *unjust*, depends on a course of natural philosophy, or on a long observation of the practice of mankind. This piece of knowledge is essential to all rational beings. In men it begins with reason, if not before it, and continues while almost every other thing is forgot. It is possible a man may work himself up into a disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments, and even into Atheism; but it is not in his power to rase out of his mind the distinction between the equity and iniquity of actions: nor can he hinder himself to judge those actions that are right and equal, to be praise-worthy and rewardable; and such actions as are bad and unjust, to be contemptible, hateful, and punishable. Without offence to Mr MALLET's, and to all other antichristian ears, on this head I may quote the Apostle PAUL: ** The Gentiles not having the law, were a law unto themselves; which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing, or else excusing one another.* To make amends for any offence this quotation may give, I add the *δικαιον ενφυλον* of ARISTOTLE. Conscience, that is, conscious know-

* Rom. ii. 14. 15.

ledge,

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ledge, we have in ourselves, without seeking it abroad ; and we therefore know *right* from *wrong*, as we know our own understanding.

THOUGH the knowledge of *right* and *wrong* is essential to all rational beings, I do acknowledge, that this doth not become a law, nor acquire the force of obligation, until we consider ourselves, our understanding, and other faculties, and particularly this our knowledge of morality and immorality, as owing to GOD. We then learn, that it is his will and command, that we live soberly, righteously, and godly ; and that we practise every virtue, and decline every vice ; and that in all cases, all times, and all circumstances, without regard to our temporal advantage or disadvantage, we should act according to the dictates of right reason, and lead our lives in all godliness and honesty. Thus, what is improperly called the law of nature, becomes the law of GOD. To be a creature, and to be dependent on GOD the Creator, is the same. Every creature depends according to its nature. Man must depend on GOD, not only as an animal, but as a rational animal ; and as such he cannot depend without being subjected to a law. Therefore to be rational, and to be a subject of GOD's moral government, is the same thing.

I did say, that the morality of an action is one thing, and our obligation to practise it is another ;
N and

and now I distinguish between *morality* and the *moral law*. Morality is acknowledged by Atheists and Deists; but a moral law cannot be acknowledged by any one who does not believe himself a subject of the supreme Being. The dictates of right reason are common to all reasonable creatures, and in so far they have a common influence on the conduct and behaviour of all men. And this makes place for another distinction, too little observed by philosophers, between a *rule* and a *law*. This I have already set in a clear and distinct light *; to which I now add two authorities; one from the rules of the civil law, *viz.* *Regula juris non est jus*; "A rule of law is not law:" and the other is that of HOBBS, as quoted by the Noble author †; "who, though he acknowledged "right reason to be the rule, would not allow it to "be the law of human actions." Whether HOBBS was an Atheist or not, his Lordship did not know: but I know very well, that the law of nature can be no more to an Atheist than a rule. And this my author, and many better philosophers than he, do mistake. "|| An Atheist," saith his Lordship, "may "think and call the law of nature, a law imposed "on him by the operation of a superior, though un- "intelligent power; the course of which he cannot "alter, and therefore must conform himself to it,

* Estimate, § iv. & x.

† Vol. iii. p. 419.

|| Vol. ii. p. 291.

“ in order to be happy. And something of this kind
 “ even GROTIUS himself was forced to allow, a
 “ little unwillingly, when he said, *Et hæc quidem*
 “ *locum aliquem haberent, etiamsi daremus non esse*
 “ *Deum.*” The author understands Atheism as little
 as he does religion, when he makes the knowledge
 of *right* and *wrong* in an Atheist, the effect of the
 operations of a superior unintelligent power: for
 chance and fatality exclude the operations of supe-
 rior causes, whether intelligent or unintelligent. The
 Atheist’s unintelligent power and cause that imposes
 on him a natural law, nonsense as it is, answers the
 purpose of morality just as well as his Lordship’s be-
 lief of a supreme Being of knowledge and power,
 but wanting every moral perfection. The Atheist
 cannot alter the course of things; and therefore con-
 forms himself to it, that he may be happy. The au-
 thor’s GOD hath established general laws with regard
 to individuals; these laws his Lordship cannot alter,
 and therefore he conforms himself to them, that he
 may be happy: and his happiness and the Atheist’s is
 of the same kind and duration. If there is any dif-
 ference betwixt the author’s philosophy and that of
 an Atheist, it consists in speculation, and such a spe-
 culation as occasions no difference in their conduct and
 behaviour.

HAD his Lordship perused the passage quoted from
 GROTIUS with attention, he must have observed, that

he very willingly admitted, that the knowledge of *good* and *evil*, *right* and *wrong*, takes some place with an Atheist, and brings him under a reason, or (if you will have it) a rational obligation to act morally. The author, *great* by name, but much greater by abilities, draws it as a corollary from what he had said, and what he might have omitted, had he not thought it an useful truth. However, I can easily excuse the voluminous philosopher for not observing, that GROTIUS doth not say a word of *obligation*, until he had first established GOD's authority and dominion over us: for it hath escaped acuter writers, and some who have wrote as his commentators. Lord BOLINGBROKE yields this point to GROTIUS, by asserting, that "the morality of actions does not consist in this, that they are prescribed by will, even the will of GOD;" without observing, that this overturns his whole system of morality from the foundation. The capital point which he labours most to prove, is, That truth and righteousness do depend on the arbitrary will of the supreme Being. But, says he, the morality of actions consists in this; That they are the means, however imposed the practice of them may be, (whether these actions take their rise from an intelligent or unintelligent power), of acquiring happiness agreeably to our nature. At this rate, the morality of an Atheist and the morality of his Lordship is just the same, and equally enforced, not by any authority, but a desire of happiness.

AFTER

AFTER all the pains his Lordship hath taken to settle his principles of morality, he is not able to speak sense on the subject. The Atheist may have regard to natural differences, and to acting or not acting according to them. I allow he may. But I desire to be excused in not joining with the author in what immediately follows. "The Atheist may see, " that human actions, considered abstractly from all " relations, circumstances, and consequences, might " be deemed absolutely indifferent; yet no human " action can be so considered." The Atheist may therefore perform an impossibility, and consider things in a way in which they cannot be considered. If this is ill worded, his *therefore* subjoined is as ill placed. "The Atheist *therefore* may think himself under an " obligation of interest, though he acknowledges no " divine legislator." He means, or he ought to mean, an obligation to live morally: and this is as it happens. For he may occasionally think it his interest, even to break a promise, and betray his trust. In which case, all his philosophy of right and wrong, and all his rational morality, must yield to his temporal interest and advantage. If the principles and practice of Atheists were not too well known, his Lordship would deserve thanks for informing the world, " that the advantages and disadvantages annexed, by natural consequence, to the observation " or breach of the law of nature, without believing " a law in the strict sense of the word, but believing " an

“an obligation in the strictest, do determine him. And
 “it is manifest, that no other consideration can,
 “nor, on his principles, ought to determine him.”
 The law of nature, then, lays the Atheist under no
 obligation. For, *1st*, It is strictly and properly no
 law to him. And, *2^{dly}*, His own interest, of which he
 himself is the only judge, lays him under the strictest
 obligation. As he that hath not the best right, hath
 no right at all; so the strictest obligation dissolves and
 unties all others. And, *3^{dly}*, His Lordship acknow-
 ledges in so many words, that it is manifest, that no
 other consideration (but self-interest) can, nor, on
 his principles, ought to determine him. And to what
 purpose then doth his knowledge of the law of na-
 ture, of right and wrong, of morality and immo-
 rality, of the equity and iniquity of actions, serve?
 The grand and noblest faculty of the mind, by
 which we discover the difference between *right* and
wrong, or rather perceive implanted in our under-
 standing, becomes entirely useless, and superfluous,
 and troublesome to every one who disregards the
 impression. For if this knowledge hath any place in
 the human understanding, I mean of an Atheist, it is
 only in subserviency and subordination to what he
 esteems his temporal interest.

THE Noble author, averse to differ from the
 Atheist, freely acknowledges that the Theist, that is,
 he himself, “is determined by the same advantages
 “and

“ and disadvantages, still more strongly.” If it happens, that no temporal advantages attend the practice of morality, then it takes no place with him. But if what he esteems an advantage or happiness, attends immorality, then the Atheist and he act upon the same principles. The difference mentioned is really none. *His advantages determine him more strongly,* “ because he looks upon them as annexed, not only “ by natural consequence, but by positive and divine appointment.” Is not an annexation by natural consequence, and an annexation by positive and divine appointment, the same, if God is the author of the established course of nature? But however annexed the consequences of action are to the action, it is certain, that they come alike to the Atheist and to the Theist, in this life; and neither his Lordship, nor you, nor the Atheist, expect another. If there are no worldly advantages at all attending moral actions, or if the advantages of immorality exceed those of morality, you find yourself discharged from the practice of the first, and indulged, or rather enjoined, the practice of the second. And thus you make God authorise your obedience or disobedience to the moral law, as it serves your purpose. For if your advantage is the fundamental and formal reason or motive of your actions, then God cannot command one and forbid another action, but in so far as they are subservient to what you imagine your happiness. God doth not say, *Be ye holy*, that ye may be happy; but, *Be*

Be ye happy, that ye may *be holy*. His Lordship speaks of morality in an Atheist as a duty; but it is only a duty owing to himself, and not to God. And this the Atheist does as well as he. All Theists who believe themselves the subjects of God's moral government, look upon the dictates of right reason, or the rule of right, of justice, goodness, and truth, that is, the law of nature, as the law of God, unchangeable, (and such the Noble author admits it to be); which they are bound to obey without reserve, let the consequences in this life be what they will. It is their persuasion, that instead of temporal advantages binding closer and stricter than this law, they look upon them as of no force, and no discharge of their obedience. Like the good subjects of a temporal sovereign, they refer the consequences of their obedience to divine providence; and trust themselves to the disposal of their sovereign Lord and Lawgiver, who can and will provide a better for them than they can do for themselves. Whereas Atheists and his Lordship treat the law of nature worse than it becomes subjects to treat the laws of an earthly sovereign. He requires obedience without submitting to them the personal and public advantages that may attend it. For were they left judges of the expediency or inexpediency of the law, it would be no more a law, and he neither sovereign nor lawgiver. But whatever you or the Atheist may imagine, God hath not, nay, cannot, surrender his moral government

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ment into your hands, nor allow you to change or abrogate his immutable law.

IT is not easy to understand the Noble author's meaning in these words. "Whatever actions are naturally good or evil, must appear to the Theist to be so morally. They derive their particular nature from the constitution of our system. They might not have been what they are, if this system had not been what it is. And this system had not been what it is, if GOD, who made it, had not willed that it should be so." The doctrine of a system runs through all his philosophical works, as if it were a settled point not to be mistaken; and yet what he means by it, I have not been able to understand, with any kind of precision. Sometimes it is the whole universe, consisting of parts connected with, and depending on one another. Of which, notwithstanding the assistance of modern astronomers, he knows as little of the morality or immorality of the inhabitants of the visible and invisible heavens, as I do. At other times this system is restricted to our terrestrial planet. And what lesson of morality did he learn from verdant fields and azure skies, from spreading oaks and large rivers, from stupendous mountains and impending precipices? or did the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, or the fish of the water, teach him his duty to GOD, and to his own species? Therefore his system, with which our

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moral

moral doings are connected, is restricted to rational beings, and particularly to what he calls the *human system*. He travelled far to search out what is only found at home. Taking his Lordship's system to signify *human nature*, (and to take it in any other sense, is impertinent), he says, actions morally good had not been such, if our system, that is, human nature, had not been what it is. I allow him, if GOD had not made man a rational creature, he had not been a moral agent, nor under a moral law. But on supposition that he is what he is, (and no more is contended for by metaphysicians, than a hypothetical necessity), he is immutably and eternally bound to conform his actions to the dictates of right reason. This is far from the author's meaning. He supposes that GOD can make a system of creatures, in which what with us is accounted *moral*, shall with them be esteemed *immoral*, and immorality shall pass for morality, and virtue for vice, and vice for virtue, and both with equal good reason. Reasoners *a priori*, with whom he finds fault for teaching what GOD may or may not, can or cannot do, never were guilty of such horrid blasphemy as this, That our holy GOD, our GOD of truth and without iniquity, who is essentially just and right, can, if he pleases, establish iniquity by a law. The absurdity of this doctrine is equal to the blasphemy of it. For it may be as well supposed, that GOD can make a system wherein creatures, such as we, or creatures far superior

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perior to us in intelligence, shall necessarily and truly judge, that two and two are unequal to four. This the author may as easily digest, as he does God's power to make what is absolutely impossible to become possible. His memory is no better than his judgment. From the make of the mundane system, he concludes God's infinite wisdom and power; and from infinite wisdom and power, he concludes the world could not have been better nor worse made; and from this he must allow me to conclude, that, according to his principles, the present system cannot be altered, nor a new system made another way. He hath said, that morality doth not consist in this, that it is prescribed by will, even the will of God. Let his Lordship make as many systems as he can imagine, they must be the effect of will: and as morality does not consist in being prescribed by will, it cannot with them be changed or altered. He further adds, "that upon supposition of eternal differences and independent natures," that is, as I would word it, upon supposition of eternal truth and righteousness, "it would still be true, that the will of God constitutes the obligation of duty." I do admit, and I have proved, that it is the will of God that constitutes our obligation to act morally. But it is his essential holiness from which morality flows, not by an act of his arbitrary will, but by a necessary consequence. And therefore it is the will, and must be the will of God, that all rational

beings conform their actions to the rule of justice and equity. God, by making the human system, did not then, and not until then, make a difference between *just* and *unjust*; nor did he consider all actions previously to the creation of the human race, to be in themselves indifferent. From eternity he approved of what is good and just; and could not disapprove or disregard it, without becoming himself an unholy and an unjust being. If he hath pleasure in the works of his hands, (and no doubt he hath pleasure in whatever he does), no system of rational creatures, whether actual or possible, but must be subject to his moral government.

WHOEVER overlooks the duty he owes to God, will be found to build morality without a foundation. His Lordship says, "God appears in his works, and
 " from easy deductions of our knowledge of them,
 " to be the first, self-existent, intelligent cause, a
 " being of infinite wisdom and power; and there-
 " fore an object to all rational creatures, not of cu-
 " riosity, but of awe, reverence, of adoration, of
 " gratitude, of obedience, and resignation." In no system therefore whatever can rational creatures be freed from their duty to God, nor from the observation of the law of nature. I know that some distinguish between morality and piety. By this they understand the duties immediately owing to God, and by that the duties which men owe to one another. In
 place

place of *piety* I should chuse the word *godliness*, as of more restricted and precise signification. With this the author is not much concerned. He rather seems to mock than recommend devotion, when he ridicules prayer, and insinuates, that to give audience to all at all times, is a trouble that God cannot take upon him. As God's essential holiness is the source of all morality, of all solitary and social, of all public and private virtues, they must be considered as so many acts of obedience to the divine will; and as an acknowledgment of his dominion over us, and of our subjection to his moral government. If we are godly, if we are sober, if we are social, we should always have in our thoughts, that it is the will of God we should be such. This should be our perpetual and principal motive, in order to be really religious. Take any other consideration or motive as the ground of our moral and rational doings, and they will in many cases be found insufficient to enforce the practice of them. For instance, his Lordship makes the social duties, and the blessings of society, man's principal duty and happiness. I have already made appear, that, without godliness and religion, he cannot perform the duty, nor deserve the reward. I hope the reader will not find my words a digression. Some plead against the necessity of religion to this purpose: " * For their " common safety and comfort, men entered into so- " ciety, and became mutually bound to one another

* Estimate, p. 325.

" for

“ for mutual assistance ; and as their safety still de-
 “ pends upon the peace and power of the community,
 “ it is still the interest of every member to maintain
 “ it, by performing every social duty. Their own
 “ happiness (and there cannot be a greater) is mo-
 “ tive sufficient to make them good citizens. And as
 “ this is the Atheist’s” [Lord BOLINGBROKE’s, and
 Mr MALLET’s] “ only life, he is more obliged to
 “ take care of the society, without which he cannot
 “ take care of himself, than the religionist, who ex-
 “ pects a better life when this is done.

“ I do allow, that it is better for society in general
 “ to observe than to violate the mutual obligations
 “ which it brings men under : but as this doth not
 “ hinder some particulars from catching an advantage,
 “ by betraying their trust ; it cannot oblige a person
 “ who only considers himself, and this life, as his
 “ ALL, to suffer much for the ease of others, or to
 “ be a loser himself for another’s profit. It is a
 “ truth, not of pure speculation only, but also of
 “ experience, that it is possible in a community, for
 “ a man to consult his own advantage to the detri-
 “ ment of the society of which he is a member : but
 “ this religion doth not allow, and Atheism doth.
 “ An Atheist hath no interest but his own ; and as his
 “ interest in this world is his only interest, he is un-
 “ der the strongest obligations, as he must think, and
 “ under unsurmountable temptations, as religionists
 “ speak,

“ speak, to consult and promote it at any rate; and
 “ even to sell the society into the hands of the ene-
 “ my for his superior and only interest. And this
 “ certainly they do mean, who plead, as the basis of
 “ their social virtues, that their own interest obliges
 “ them to consult the good of the society, because
 “ their own depends upon it. For this very BE-
 “ CAUSE or reason will induce a man to ruin the so-
 “ ciety when it is his own interest to do it. For if
 “ *interest* is a good reason for entering into society,
 “ it must remain a good reason for renouncing every
 “ social duty, when, by so doing, the Atheist can
 “ serve himself to better purpose. And his only in-
 “ terest consists in this life, and the appendent plea-
 “ sures of it.

“ BUT the religious man hath an interest to serve
 “ of infinitely more value than all that he can gain
 “ or enjoy in this life. And it is part of his religion,
 “ and a condition without which he cannot obtain his
 “ glorious end, faithfully to perform all contracts,
 “ formal or implicit, even at the expence of what the
 “ Atheist esteems his chief happiness. Therefore he
 “ is just as much obliged to consult the advantage of
 “ the society of which he is a member, and that to
 “ his own temporal loss, as the Atheist thinks himself
 “ obliged to prefer his own advantage in this world,
 “ to the advantage of society, when in competition,
 “ notwithstanding all the obligations he hath come
 “ under

“ under to sacrifice all for the sake of it. This life
 “ is his chief happiness, his ALL, to which every
 “ other consideration, however so just and generous,
 “ must give place.

“ I am sure that no society upon earth would ad-
 “ mit a member on such a declaration as this. *I do*
 “ *expect your assistance in every thing, and that all of*
 “ *you will promote the happiness of the community at*
 “ *the hazard, and even at the expence of your lives;*
 “ *and I will likewise contribute thereto as far as is*
 “ *consistent with my personal interest: but seeing it is*
 “ *for that that I now become a member of your society;*
 “ *when that must be lost, I plead to be excused; yea,*
 “ *rather than lose myself, ye may expect that I will*
 “ *ruin you all.*

“ ANY man who would speak so, would not be
 “ allowed the blessings and advantages of society;
 “ and he that thinks so, would not deserve them.
 “ But so thinks the Atheist, and so in effect he speaks,
 “ when he makes his own temporal and worldly in-
 “ terest the only tie of society, and the only reason
 “ for performing the mutual obligations of it. A
 “ community made up of such members (if it could
 “ be made up at all) would not last for a day; the
 “ very foundation being a settled and fundamental
 “ reason for the dissolution of it.”

As

As I promised to call on DAVID MALLET, Esq; to reconcile what appears to me to be contradictions, *contra bonos mores*, or the good of mankind; I now, in the most serious and solemn manner, call upon you to shew the difference between your principles and those of Atheists, which lay a foundation for the preceding reflections. You acknowledge no future state of rewards and punishments. You consider yourself as below the care of divine providence in this life; and what more doth Atheism practically amount to? You say, that the advantages and disadvantages annexed, by natural consequence, to the observation or breach of the law of nature, do certainly determine the Atheist, as believing it an obligation in the strictest sense; and that no other consideration ought to determine him. The Theist, such as you, is determined by the same advantages and disadvantages; and therefore hath no more occasion for the law of nature, or the law of GOD, to influence his choice. Well, but the author and editor are determined more strongly. For what? to push for their temporal interest. Be it so. The reason is not theological. It is not because it is the will of GOD, made known to them by the dictates of their reason; but because these advantageous consequences are not only annexed to moral actions naturally, but likewise by positive and divine appointment. To him that pleads an universal dependence of all nature and all natural consequences on the arbitrary will of the supreme Being, the distinction of

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natural

natural and divine annexations must appear impertinent. The Atheist is moral for his temporal advantage, and for that only: and such a Theist as you, or your Noble author, are precisely moral for the very same, and no other reason. If you have a greater regard for those temporal inducements than the Atheist hath, because you consider them as of divine appointment, you only make God approve and patronize your conduct in acting for your own advantage; the same with that which the Atheist hath in view, and that at any rate. His *suprema regula morum*, and his *summum bonum*, are restricted to this life, to which actions, just or unjust, must be subservient; and so are yours. And thus you treat God rather worse than the Atheist doth, who denies his being. When you and your ALL is to be totally and eternally lost for performing the obligations you owe to society, it is your opinion, that God doth not only dispense with your fidelity, but approves, and even commands your perfidy. His Lordship says, that the reason why men fail in performing social duties is, because they consider themselves as individuals. For this there is no remedy, nor is there any occasion for it. Individuals men are; and as they are, so they may and ought to be considered. He further says, that the law of nature lays the whole society under an obligation to live morally: and this all acknowledge; but every one endeavours to become an exception when his case requires it. This is to acknowledge, that such is the condition

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condition of every one who looks on this as his only life, that in some circumstances it is his duty to act reasonably, against his reason. The debate about *utile* and *honestum*, *honest* and *useful*, which hath lasted from beyond the days of SOCRATES until now, cannot be determined without a supposition of a future state of rewards and punishments. And if philosophers should dispute on the head while the world lasts, they must talk nonsense and contradictions. But of this more afterwards.

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S E C T.

S E C T. V.

The antiquity and universality an evidence of religion.

IF the Noble author's morality is not good, it is because his theology is very bad. For he who hath no right notions of the Sovereign and Governor of rational creatures, can have no just perception of his laws. It is unaccountable, (if the whole performance was not such), that, writing so voluminously on natural religion, he should say so very little on the being and attributes of God, upon which all piety and morality, our duty to God and man, is founded, and by which it is inforced. One might have reasonably expected a system of natural religion set forth at least in a new light and order. But such was his aversion to revealed religion, and such his indignation to the teachers of it, that he was even willing, that in order to discredit Christianity, natural religion should share the contempt. He sometimes mentions topics used in proving the divine existence, but he follows out none of them to a well-connected conclusion. Some of them he refuses, particularly DESCARTES's, from his idea of God; and the universal consent of mankind; and he modestly, but with authority, says, Dr CLARKE's demonstration of the being and attributes of God hath obtained more reputation than it deserves.

deserves. I shall pass all his faults of omission, though to him they are material; but I have several faults of commission to lay to his charge; such as, 1. Denying any reasons, whether probable or demonstrative, that establish the belief of a supreme Being. 2. He denies God's moral attributes. 3. He forbids all imitation of his moral perfections. 4. He holds a particular providence as a task too arduous for infinite wisdom and power, or below the majesty of the ALMIGHTY. 5. He admits the co-eternity of the materials with the maker of the world. 6. He denies the immateriality of the soul. And, 7. He denies the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments.

THE universal consent of mankind in believing a Deity, if not strictly demonstrative, is one of the greatest probabilities that can be pleaded in any case. This appears from the opposition it hath met with from all the learning that history, modern travels, and logics, can afford. M. BAYLE in particular hath wrote as much against it as would make a volume as large as one of Lord BOLINGBROKE's five. There must be a good deal of strength in it, or he must have been idly employed. And whoever will examine the exceptions he makes, will find, that they rather confirm than weaken the argument. Those who use the argument, do not assert, that every individual person believes the existence of God, or that

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in every nation it is believed nationally. And I am content with the universality, as it is allowed, and must be allowed by Atheists. His Lordship admits, “ * That this consent is general enough to shew the proportion which this truth bears to the universal reason of mankind.” I likewise allow, that some errors have been as universally believed as the existence of God ; such as, the impossibility of *antipodes*, and the rest of the earth, and the motion of the heavens. But then, no man can dispute the almost unfurmountable prejudice of sense and imagination, as the source of these two errors. This doth not weaken, but rather strengthen the argument, because no such thing can be pleaded for mens erring universally in believing a Deity. And I have his Lordship’s authority, “ † that prejudice was against religion.” M. BAYLE objects further, That polytheism was more universally believed than monotheism. But all the world knows, that polytheism is a misimprovement of monotheism ; and so natural, so common and insinuating, that a great many learned and judicious Christians cannot be hindered, by their belief of the GOSPEL, from making subordinate gods and goddesses, who hear their prayers, and use their credit with the ALMIGHTY to befriend them. The argument is not to be stated thus, *What all mankind believes, is true ; but all mankind believes the being of God : therefore, &c. :* but thus, *What all mankind believes without the in-*

* Vol. ii. p. 250. *ad marg.*

† Vol. v. p. 307.

fluence of prejudice, is true. The argument is good, unless Atheists, and those who deny it, can shew any prevailing prejudice, such as the impossibility of antipodes, that first gave rise, and continues to support the belief of a God. After his Lordship had published in his own time, that “* CUDWORTH has endeavoured “ to prove, many have thought, and I incline to think, “ that the unity of a first intelligent cause was the “ original belief of mankind;” he retracts. And I am as sure that this was their original belief, as I am that numbers are made up of units. But if there is but a possibility of wandering from the road of reason, his Lordship is sure to go astray. And notwithstanding his inclination to believe what Dr CUDWORTH hath proved, or what, as I think, is too plain to need proof, he positively affirms, that polytheism was the first religion, and idolatry the first worship †. It is his opinion, though a truth, it is so far out of the reach of ordinary understanding, that it must have taken some generations of men of mature and improved judgment, before it could have been discovered; that is, before they could have learned to count one before two. Such a blank in the progress of religion, or such a neutrality between Atheism and religion, at the commencement of the human race, would effectually defeat the argument drawn from the universal consent, to prove the divine existence. From this way of representing the primitive inhabitants of the earth,

* Vol. v. p. 309.

† Vol. i. p. 299.

Adam, and his new coterporaries, (if he had any), were no more than overgrown children. But this doth not go down with his Lordship; who says, “ * If we are persuaded that this world, and the inhabitants of it, had a beginning in time, we must of necessity assume, that the first men and first women, and that one man and one woman at least, were produced in full strength and vigour of body and mind.” And I am persuaded, that Adam, before he was forty years old, was a better philosopher than Lord BOLINGBROKE.

NOTWITHSTANDING his Lordship says, *IF this world, and the inhabitants of it, had a beginning*, he hath wrote more than was just necessary to prove such a beginning; and that this being a matter of universal tradition, must be true. From which it follows, that from the beginning of the human race, to this day, it was, and continues to be the belief of mankind, that they were made by the supreme Being, the first intelligent cause of their own and all other beings. And this is a consequence he cannot refuse, because he reasons thus. “ † STRABO represents the Ethiopians rather barbarous than civilized; and yet this people believed a supreme immortal Being, the first cause of all things. This people therefore believed that the world had a beginning.” If from the being of God, the Ethiopians believed the

* Vol. iv. p. 43.

† Vol. v. p. 260.

world had a beginning, it was as easy for all that believed the world had a beginning, to conclude that it proceeded from a prior cause; just as easy and obvious as it is to me, who believe that a house is not eternal, to conclude that it was made by a builder. According to my author's opinion, the commencement of the world is a stronger proof of the existence of a Deity, than the existence of a supreme Being is of the beginning of the world. For he says, “* I am far from resting the proof of God's existence on the authority of this tradition, That the world began. I know we are able to demonstrate this fundamental truth of all religion, whether it began or no.” I am very sure he is mistaken, as shall afterwards be made appear. The matter of fact, and the reason of it, are essentially connected; and whatever proves the one, proves the other; and therefore what disproves the one, disproves the other likewise. So says his Lordship, “† There is one fact conveyed to us by tradition, *viz.* That the world we inhabit had a beginning in time; the truth of which we must admit, because it is absurd to assume the contrary.”

DID he believe that the first men sprung out of the earth like mushrooms, and from such observations as they were able to make on their own and other beings, they were obliged to provide for the support

* Vol. v. p. 311.

† Vol. v. p. 236.

and preservation of their lives, he might indeed hold it as an absurdity, (as he doth), that they became philosophers as soon as their feet were free from the earthen womb. But to consider man as the workmanship of God, (and he must allow him to be such, seeing he admits the world and its inhabitants to have had a beginning), at his first appearance, he was in full strength and vigour of body and mind, perfectly fitted for every duty of humanity, whether religious or civil, solitary or social. No article of belief and persuasion was more obvious to him, than that he was made; and that as he owed his being to his Creator, so he owed him obedience. All that could be learned by a fresh and vigorous understanding, must immediately, or very soon, be known to him. And that God should have had extraordinary intercourse with such a noble creature, the chief inhabitant of this planet, in order to his speedy qualification for acting a religious and reasonable part, is a supposition entirely unworthy of the ridicule with which his Lordship treats it. A supposition, had I no regard for the Bible, I should embrace with pleasure. For he that makes intelligent beings, hath many ways, such as inspiration, revelation, and more ways than we can imagine, to lead them to the knowledge of truth, and to prevent their falling into error. It is what we do in some measure to one another; and surely God can do it to all his intelligent creatures. I can, and do believe, that the first animals

mals were completely fine and finished; and that, for instance, the first horse excelled *Bucephalus*; and that ADAM, as soon as he became a living soul, was superior to all his race in bodily and intellectual parts. He owed his being to immediate creation; and Almighty God is no bungling artificer. The first complete man could not want paternal affection to his posterity. For all that came into being by generation and birth, must have perished as soon as procreated, without the care of those that came into being by immediate creation. And as man is reasonable, as well as animal, he could not have failed to have instructed his children in the duties they owed to God and man. And why should it be thought incredible, that the belief of a supreme Being hath been traditionally handed down from the first man to all his posterity? And he who proves the commencement of the world by tradition, ought in consequence to admit, that the knowledge and belief of God may be transmitted the same way; for the one supposition cannot stand without the other. It is his Lordship's opinion, that “* no people were wholly ignorant of the principles of religion; and no government could subsist without them.” This universal spread, the remotest antiquity, and long duration of religion, I impute partly to tradition, and partly to this, “That the being of God is a truth that bears proportion to the general reason of mankind.”

* Vol. iv. p. 201.

THE Noble author, as afraid that his traditional proof of the commencement of the world should turn out a traditional proof of the existence of a supreme Being, takes care to inform his unwary reader, that the consequence will not hold, because of the disparity between a matter of fact, and a matter of ratiocination. His words are, "As much as I am convinced of the existence of a supreme all-perfect Being, as seriously as I adore his Majesty, blefs his goodness, and resign myself entirely to his providence; I should be sorry to rest my conviction on the authority of any man, or of all mankind; since authority cannot be, and demonstration is the sole proof in this case." And to what religious purpose hath he been at pains to prove by tradition, that this world had a beginning? If tradition proves one, it proves both. Separate the commencement of the world and the being of God, and all he hath said on the subject must go for nothing. He must therefore prove, that the eternity of the world is an absurdity, or give up all arguments *a posteriori* for the being of God. He pretends to be able to demonstrate this fundamental truth of all religion, whether the world began or no. Though I am loath to weaken any support of religion that men may fancy sufficient, yet I cannot but declare, that I am persuaded we are not able to demonstrate the being of God, if the world is eternal. He with great freedom accuses divines of betraying the cause of
 God;

GOD; but I can say with better reason, though not so triumphantly, that in this he betrays the cause of GOD, and misleads his readers into Atheism. How strongly he is convinced of a supreme all-perfect Being, how seriously he adores his Majesty, blesses his goodness, and how chearfully he resigns himself to his providence, I cannot determine from any thing that he hath published on the subject of religion. Goodness is one of GOD's moral attributes, which he is very unwilling to admit; and a personal providence he denies. I am persuaded he had too much humility, or too little vain assurance, to have considered himself in the sight of GOD as more worthy of his care and regard than the rest of mankind.

HE may be as sorry as he pleases, to rest his conviction of a supreme Being on the authority of any man, or of all mankind, provided he is sure of better proof. But I must differ from him in the reason he assigns, that "authority cannot be, and demonstration is the sole proof in this case." This is the utmost demand an Atheist can make, and in him a most unreasonable demand it is. He holds the negative part of the question, for which he is not obliged to bring any proof; nor is he able to bring any, except the impossibility of a supreme Being. And rather than admit this as an impossibility, he substitutes the world, or the universal system of beings, which some call an *aggregate*, and others one single

single being, in place of God. And all of them ascribe to this grand being, or this one collection, all possible perfection. This nonsense only serves as an evasion from the force of the arguments that prove a Deity, or as an excuse for not believing it. They that can give no reason for their disbelief, but their own ignorance, obstinacy, and stupidity, have no right to insist upon the highest reason from those who are willing to teach and to instruct them. Upon supposition that the truth is on the side of Theists, it is no excuse for an Atheist, that the Theist is not able to demonstrate that truth to his conviction. For if it is a discoverable truth, the Atheist is as much obliged to find it out and believe it as the Theist is. If the Theist can bring any reason, and the Atheist can bring none for his opinion, not only the strongest, but even the weakest reason should carry the cause. And though I should allow, that the universal agreement of mankind in the belief of God, is not a close demonstration, it is certainly the highest probability that ever was pleaded in any case. His Lordship finds fault with metaphysicians for first establishing possibility, and thence concluding actuality; whilst he, with more precaution, first establishes actuality, and thence concludes possibility. I conclude, that the being of God is credible, because it is universally believed. What is credible is conceivable, and what is conceivable is possible. And admitting the possibility of the being of God, there can be no objection

jection against it. So far from that, the very supposition that such a being is possible, affords a demonstration of his actual existence. For this possible being is either necessary or contingent. If contingent, it must be caused, it must be made, it must begin to be; and such a being cannot be necessary, self-existent, and self-sufficient. Therefore since the divine Being is possible, it must actually be.

BUT admitting these inferences could not be drawn from the universal consent of mankind, that consent considered in itself would be sufficient to determine my approbation of Theism, and my disapprobation of Atheism. Atheists prove nothing, believe nothing. They remain on the defensive, intrenched to the teeth, in an obstinate negative. And whatever objections they may raise against God's government of the moral world, they have nothing to say against his existence. Were the question put to me, (and I suppose myself a reasonable man), Whether, upon the highest probability, I would chuse to believe and live like a Theist; or to believe nothing of the matter, and to live independently of a Creator and Governor of the world? I do think I should not, I would not hesitate a moment. The Noble philosopher did not consider, that Theism and Atheism are contradictory doctrines; and that both therefore should be adopted or rejected upon equal terms. And yet nothing below demonstration can satisfy him that God is, when for

no reason at all he holds the negative, and disbelieves religion. Were this a matter of pure speculation, he might divert himself with reasonings *for* and *against*. But when, upon the belief and persuasion of the being or not being of GOD, the conduct of life depends, the debate should be determined as soon as possible. He who refuses the principles of religion, does, by his refusal, chuse Atheism; and thus, because he hath not the strongest of all reasons to be a religionist, he becomes an Atheist for no reason at all. For between *yes* and *no*, *it is* and *it is not*, there is no medium; and between Theism and Atheism there is no neutrality.

EACH of these opinions is attended with consequences both opposite and important. The belief of GOD constitutes duty and obligation, regulates human conduct, and bears home upon the mind impressions of divine sovereignty, and our subjection. The Atheist considers himself as an independent being; and though he knows right from wrong, and morality from immorality, he is under no obligation to act any otherwise than he himself thinks advisable *pro hic et nunc*. If the Theist judges right, and in so far as he lives accordingly, he hath the approbation of his Lord and Lawgiver. The other denies his subjection, refuses his obedience, and sets up for independency, and thereby incurs the divine displeasure, for no reason but his own ignorance and obstinacy. I see no dangerous,

gerous, nay no disadvantageous consequence attending the belief of a Deity, upon supposition of believing without grounds. But if the Atheist is mistaken, the consequence of his disbelief is the displeasure of God; and what the effects of that may be, is dreadful to imagine.

I know, that some Atheists plead their honesty and sincerity as their justification in disbelieving the being of God; and persuade themselves, that, supposing they are mistaken, they are as safe from divine resentment, as the firmest believer of his being and attributes. But they do not consider, that if there is any duty owing to God from his intelligent creatures, the first of all is to know it. Ignorance therefore, notwithstanding its apparent innocence, may be criminal. Their fellows and equals in understanding, and thousands of them to one, did believe, adore, and obey a supreme Being. If they succeeded in their inquiry into this fundamental truth, and if the Atheist miscarries and errs, the difference cannot be in their capacities and opportunities to know the truth, (these are supposed equal); but must proceed from something blameable in their conduct, and in the management of their reason and understanding. Did the Atheist imagine himself standing at the bar of an omniscient and just judge, pleading that his ignorance was honest and sincere, what could he reply, if it were answered, And so were many thousands honest

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and sincere in their inquiries, who had no advantage of you in reason and understanding, and all opportunities of knowing their dependence on God for their being; they believed, and you did not; they admitted the evidence which you rejected; they have succeeded, and you have miscarried? It may be said, and I know it hath been said by some Atheists, that they are as willing to believe the being of God, and their obligations to obey him, as the most sincere and zealous religionist; but it is not in their power to believe without evidence, and are really sorry that they cannot see any. And something like this is said by Lord BOLINGBROKE. “ * There is nothing, philosophically speaking, at least I could never find, to my sorrow, that there is any thing that obliges us necessarily to conclude, that we are a compound of material and immaterial substance. According to all appearances, we are plainly one single substance; all the parts of which are so intimately connected, and dependent on one another, that the whole proceeds and ends together.” Of his doctrine of the immateriality and immortality of the soul, due notice shall be taken hereafter. That which I fix upon here is his sorrow. If it gave him trouble and sorrow of heart to find, that the system of his being began, proceeds, and would end all together, it is surprising, that he should accuse those who are of another opinion, with pneumatical madness. I have proved at some length,

* Vol. i. p. 20.

that

that both personal and public advantages are on the side of religion, particularly the persuasion of the immortality of the soul, and a state of future rewards and punishments *. And his Lordship, as hath already been made appear, admits the subserviency, and even the necessity of religion, and particularly the belief of future rewards and punishments. But had he been really sorry that this doctrine was not better established, at least to his conviction, I cannot see any reason why he should triumph over, and even abuse those who differ from him. If he was troubled in his own mind that this useful doctrine was not better grounded, it was cruel in him to take so much pains, and to use so many insulting expressions, only to raise disquiet in the minds of others, and to do mankind the greatest disservice. And you have not acted the part of a good and benevolent man, in proclaiming and publishing such a doctrine to the world. Was it any loss to him, is it any loss to you, that all mankind, you only excepted, should believe themselves obliged, under the most awful sanctions that can attend a law, to live morally and virtuously, not only inoffensively, but usefully? On the contrary, it is your advantage: for such, instead of hurting you, will be, and are bound to be your friends, your assistants and protectors. His Lordship, who dealt the character or distemper of madness so freely, did himself deserve it as much as any man, except yourself. He was pru-

* Estimate, § ix. x.

dent enough to suppress his philosophical works during his life; but you have had the imprudence, to say no worse, to publish them after his death.

WHATEVER force is in the universal consent of mankind in believing a GOD, to infer that he really is, it hath the same to enforce the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: for the one is as ancient and universal as the other. His Lordship admits, that, as far as history or tradition go, the notion of another life is to be found an established article of religion. It is true, he says it is a human invention. But, to make good his assertion, he ought to shew when, where, and for what it was invented. When it was first invented, he cannot tell, because it is beyond all tradition. For the place where this notion took its first rise, he would willingly pitch upon Egypt. And VANINI, who alone, so far as I know, is positive, that it proceeds from a custom of preserving there the bodies of the dead *. He might have added, from DIODORUS SICULUS, the custom of judging, whether these corpses were to be honoured with funerals or not. Notwithstanding all the pretended antiquity of that nation, the custom is not so old as the belief of a

* Post mortem puniendi et remunerandi mali et boni homines, initium duxit ab Ægyptiorum superstitione in asservandis mortuorum corporibus. *Amphitheat. aternæ providentiæ*, p. 83.

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future state *. Nor can it be imagined, that, from that spot of earth, it could have overspread all mankind, as was found of old, and is now found to do. Navigation and commerce is now improved beyond the imagination of the ancients. And if it is the belief of nations who never heard of the Egyptians or their customs, at this day, we may as well suppose, that distant nations of old were as little, and less acquainted with them, their superstition and notions. If America was not soon inhabited, it is certain the more eastern parts of Asia were; and they believed a future state of rewards and punishments. And the inhabitants of the islands in the *Archipelago di Lazaro* retain this persuasion, when it is forgotten, as is pretended, that GOD made and governs the world. I think myself obliged to do a very ingenious modern writer † the justice to give in his own words the account of time, as pretended by three several nations, and settled by more candid and impartial chronologists. The nations are, the Assyrians, the Egyptians, and the Chinese. “ That the pretensions of the Assyrians
“ were vain, may be concluded from hence, that
“ CALISTHENES going with ALEXANDER the Great
“ to the conquest of Persia, and being desired by
“ ARISTOTLE to search into the antiquities of Ba-
“ bylon, preserved by the Chaldeans, (who were at

* The custom was posterior to superstition, and superstition was posterior to religion.

† Colliber, Essay on creation, p. 137.

“ that

“ that time a set of Babylonish philosophers), writ
 “ back, that, after the most diligent inquiry, he
 “ could find no account above one thousand nine
 “ hundred and three years. As for the account of
 “ the Egyptians, we are assured, that it did not ex-
 “ ceed the Chaldean account above sixty-seven years.
 “ The difference between the Mosaic and the Chinese
 “ account of time hath been sufficiently adjusted,
 “ and is found to extend no further than four thou-
 “ sand odd hundred years;” that is, some hundreds
 above that of the Egyptians. MANETHO’s history of
 Egypt, and BEROSUS’s history of the Chaldeans, did
 not appear until the *Old Testament* was translated into
 Greek; for which Mr COLLIBER charges them with
 fable and forgery. Of all the nations mentioned in
 history, Egypt, in my opinion, hath the worst claim
 to the greatest antiquity. For it is not to be imagi-
 ned, that a people or family would leave fertile and
 high grounds, free from anniversary inundations, to
 take up their dwelling, to be secured with great la-
 bour, as is done at this day. The first inhabitants of
 that great glen must have been driven into it by a
 more powerful people; or if they went thither volun-
 tarily, it must have been when the neighbouring and
 higher countries were overstocked. And as the Assy-
 rians and Chinese were more ancient and powerful
 than they, and believed a future state of rewards and
 punishments, there is scarce a possibility of their ha-
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ving received the *invention* (as his Lordship calls it) from the Egyptians.

BUT it was not the Assyrians, the Chinese, the Egyptians, the Ethiopians, but all the known world, that believed a future life. Where-ever a people were found, they were found with this belief and persuasion. This his Lordship acknowledges, and, to his astonishment, makes the children of Israel the only exception. I did promise not to mix his objections against the Christian revelation, with his misrepresentations of natural religion. But it cannot be reckoned a departing from my resolution, to shew that he mistakes the case of MOSES and the Israelites, in an historical way. It was, and is the opinion of some, and particularly of DR KING, that man was created mortal; and though he does not, I know that others found this opinion, on supposition that this earth must have been in a very little time too narrow an habitation for the inhabitants. Immortals begetting immortals, long before now this earth would not have furnished a foot square for each person. But upon supposition that man was created immortal, (I need say nothing stronger), GOD could have disposed of them otherwise. And to shew that they were to be removed into other habitations, both soul and body, it is said, ENOCH *walked with GOD; and he was not, for GOD took him.* ENOCH's father lived nine hundred and sixty-five years; ENOCH's son lived nine hundred and

and sixty-nine years; and ENOCH himself lived only three hundred and sixty-five years; and MOSES, as an historian, gives this reason why GOD took him away so soon, That he walked with GOD; that is, that he was pious. A happy immortality was the reward of his piety. And what GOD did to ENOCH, he would have done to all the race of ADAM, had they not disqualified themselves for it. And had not MOSES believed, and had it not been the belief of the Israelites, that there was a life after this, this translation of ENOCH had not been recorded and received, as a peculiar reward of his piety. This instance served likewise to prove another part of their history, *viz.* That death was the consequence of disobedience. This happened in the antediluvian world. ELIJAH was translated in the Mosaical dispensation; and the Lord JESUS CHRIST, after death, arose to life, and bodily ascended into the higher regions.—The two last instances I do not insist upon in this place.

THE Egyptians, though not inventers of a future life, even in the days of MOSES, believed it nationally; and both MOSES and the Israelites took it for a truth universally established. At least no proof can be brought that they did not believe as the Egyptians, and all other nations did, unless it can be made appear that MOSES denied it. So far this belief of a state of rewards and punishments after this life must stand

stand confirmed by history, that of *MOSES* not excepted. From a custom of preserving the bodies of the dead in Egypt, even the belief of a future life among the Egyptians could not proceed. For it rather supposes a previous persuasion of a future life, than that it is the foundation of it. To give the belief of a future judgment the greater influence on their virtuous and moral behaviour, they thought it expedient to represent, or act this judgment on the bodies of the dead. *BOLINGBROKE* says, it was a custom in Spain, to act some of the mysteries of the Christian religion. And I have historical evidence, that *CHARLES V.* Emperor of Germany, and King of Spain, witnessed the acting of his own obsequies in the abbey of *ST JUST*. No nation outdid the Egyptians in the misimprovement of natural religion; and no people added to it more of their own conceits. And this of judging, whether the corpses of the deceased were to be laid up in repositories or not, was one, and such as did not want its use; and must have had as great an influence as possible upon their honest and moral behaviour, had they believed that *GOD* would judge of the soul as they did of the body. If other nations had learned the immortality of the soul from the Egyptian custom of judging the bodies of the dead, they must, together with that opinion, have adopted the custom, which none of them did.

I suppose Mr *MALLET* may demand of me to account

count for the antiquity and universality of a belief of a future state, in order to shew that it is not a human invention, established without proof or divine authority. And, with your leave, I will tell you my tale. Though there are many reasons to induce mankind to believe a future existence after death, yet I do not think, that it was only for these reasons that this belief and persuasion was so early and so universal. The thing in itself is not so level to the human understanding as the being of GOD. It is my opinion, that it owed its origin to divine authority. The first man by disobedience became mortal. The punishment was not remitted. Die he must, and die he did. But for his comfort, and for the encouragement of his good behaviour, until the execution of the sentence, another and a better life was made known to him; and this he taught his descendants. And such a promise and such assurance was so reasonable, that without it there had been as little encouragement for piety and morality, during the first transgressor's reprieve, as LORD BOLINGBROKE hath left as a legacy to the world. And if GOD thought fit to continue the human race subjects of his moral government, it was fit they should know, that, according to their good or ill behaviour in this life, they were to be treated in another. For without such knowledge man cannot be governed as a moral agent.

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FROM the first man, this doctrine of a future life hath been handed down to this present generation, notwithstanding, as saith his Lordship, the appearances are against it. The credit of a divine tradition prevailed against them all, until there arose some BOLINGBROKES and MALLETS, who refused to accept of the testimony of all mankind, and even the testimony of one risen from the dead, for the truth of a future state of rewards and punishments. With these Greece was pestered and plagued. Other nations retained the opinion upon credit of the tradition. It is true, that those who denied a future state, denied a providence; and it is also true, that those who denied a providence, denied consequentially a first intelligent cause, a supreme all-perfect Being. In a word, whoever believed a God, believed a future state. Both these truths, though grounded in the strength of reason, were originally and divinely taught. BOLINGBROKE, speaking of the commencement of the world as a traditional truth, says, “* It is relative no more to the particular character of one people than of another. It favours no more one general principle of religion or policy than another. In a word, force your imagination as much as you please, you will find unsurmountable difficulties in your way, if you suppose the fact invented. But these difficulties vanish when you suppose it true. *The universal consent of mankind*

* Vol. v. p. 279.

" follows naturally and necessarily the truth of the fact." If all mankind consented in the belief of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, it must have suited the natural and common disposition, conveniency, and advantage of every people and nation; and if there had been any material and political difference between the inclinations of one people and another, then, upon supposition that these two great truths had been a mere human invention, they might have been received by some, but must have been rejected by others. "Force your imagination as much as you please, and you will find unfurmountable difficulties in your way," if you suppose that the doctrine of the being of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, is an invention and an imposition. "The universal consent of mankind follows naturally and necessarily the truth" of this fact, that God made mankind, and taught them religion. Though this is not a close and a succinct demonstration, yet it is a convincing proof, that the being of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, is neither fable nor fiction; and as strong and convincing as many metaphysical and mathematical evidences. You cannot properly and strictly demonstrate to me that there is such an island as Jamaica; but you and I are as firmly persuaded of it, as we are that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Upon such evidence we venture our lives; but without any risk you may conduct

duct yourself in this life, upon the evidence arising from the universal consent of mankind, that there is another. Perhaps I had not said so much on this topic, had not his Lordship denied the validity of the argument in the strongest terms. And as I write rather for religion than against him, I presume it will not be taken for a digression.

S E C T.

S E C T. VI.

The idea of GOD a demonstration of his existence.

AS I did not give up the universal consent of mankind as a proof of the divine existence, no more will I yield the famous argument of DESCARTES drawn from his idea of GOD. The only fault I find in it, is too much subtilty and refinement for antimetaphysical understandings. The argument hath undergone the narrowest examination; and such objections and exceptions have been raised against it, as have made Lord BOLINGBROKE conclude, that it is a paralogism. I must therefore give my reasons why I differ from him.

THE argument, as I conceive it, runs thus. "What-
 " ever I understand clearly and distinctly to belong to
 " the nature and essence of any thing, I can with cer-
 " tainty and truth affirm concerning it, as rotundity
 " to a circle; but when I apply my thoughts in the
 " most attentive and closest manner on the nature of
 " GOD, I find, that existence is one of his essential
 " attributes: I therefore conclude, that it is as cer-
 " tain that he actually exists, as that a circle is round."
 To this GASSENDI objected, That from an ideal to
 a real state the consequence doth not hold. DES-
 CARTES said, that this is not his meaning. Nor in-
 deed

deed doth he rest his proof on such a general proposition, as GASSENDI certainly mistakes grossly, *Whatever we conceive, must exist*; but upon a reason peculiar to the divine Being, to which existence is as essential, as rotundity is to a circle. From the idea of an all-perfect Being to his actual existence, the consequence is good, because existence is a perfection. The question then is, Whether we have such an idea or not?

IF we can conceive any perfection, (and a great many we find in ourselves), we can easily remove from it all restriction and limitation. Power in us is a perfection; remove from it all bounds and limitation, and we have an idea of omnipotence; as, by removing from space and time all limitation, we have an idea of infinity and eternity, or everlasting duration. BOLINGBROKE allows infinite power and wisdom to GOD; and he that admits any one infinite perfection, must admit all. Now, such a being, who hath all perfection, never was, and never could be in a state of mere possibility. This is what the schoolmen mean, when they say, that GOD is *actus purus*. This bare so hard upon GASSENDI, that he was obliged to deny that existence is a perfection; though it is not only a perfection in itself, but the ground of all other perfections.

INSTEAD of the word *existence* take *independency*,
and

and then the argument will run thus. "An all-perfect being must be an independent being; but an independent being must be actually existent." The subsumption is evident; because if from a state of mere possibility it could become actual, it must owe its actual being or existence to some other being, and so could not be independent, nor all-perfect. It therefore follows, that actual existence is as essential to an all-perfect being, as rotundity is to a circle.

OTHERS allowing GASSENDI's objection, That from an ideal to a real state the consequence doth not hold; yet maintain, that from an ideal to a possible state the consequence is good. And they reason rightly: for whatever we can clearly and distinctly conceive, is possible. And then from the possibility of such a being as GOD, that is, an all-perfect Being, they argue his actual existence; because if such a being is made, or caused to be, it could not be all-perfect; it could not be a necessary, self-existent, and self-sufficient being, but dependent on some other being who made it. But turn the argument into what form you please, still it is true, that necessary existence is essential to the divine Being; and the very conception of such a being is a proof of his actual existence. It is only the closeness and the shortness of the argument that makes it to be considered as a *paralogism*. And DESCARTES did not think himself obliged, or perhaps

perhaps thought it below him, to use many words, when fewer were sufficient for his purpose.

To evade this argument, I can imagine no way, except denying the possibility of an all-perfect Being. And this no man can do who knows what perfection and imperfection is. We conceive *limited* and *unlimited*, *finite* and *infinite*; and therefore that all possible perfections, in the most perfect manner, perfections *simpliciter simplices*, belong to one single being. The argument, as stated by DESCARTES, turns upon necessary existence as an essential attribute of the supreme Being, and is much to the same purpose with one used by AQUINAS. "All things," saith he, "are necessary or contingent. If all were contingent, nothing could have been. Something therefore must be necessary, one at least. And as there is no necessity to imagine more necessary beings than one, there must be one, and but one, necessary, self-existent, and self-sufficient, the free and voluntary cause of all contingent beings." This argument is plain, succinct, and invincible. Let this suffice, because more words cannot make it plainer, and possibly might make it more intricate and obscure.

T

S E C T.

S E C T. VII.

Of GOD's moral attributes.

I HAVE said, that the reason why Lord BOLINGBROKE's morality is not good, is, because his theology is very bad. I do not charge him with irreligion only because he denies the sufficiency of the two arguments for the being of GOD, which I have supported. This is so common, that every topic used for that purpose hath been rejected by one or other. This was a trick of VANINI, who refused all the arguments for the divine existence, under a pretence of giving better. But though my author had admitted all the arguments commonly brought to prove the divine existence; yet what he maintains concerning GOD, must defeat all that he admits for the glory of GOD, and the good of mankind. "A necessary connection between the physical and moral attributes of GOD, no man who believes in GOD will deny." These are his own words *. But they are words of course, and complaisance to his Christian reader. And because it is not easy to persuade a candid and honest reader, that he, notwithstanding, denies the moral attributes of the supreme Being, I think it incumbent on me to give his own words. And he says, "† The knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts ne-

* Vol. iv. p. 224.

† Vol. iv. p. 25.

" necessary

"cessary to such a creature as man; and therefore
 "we are made able to arrive, by a proper exercise of
 "our mental faculties, from a knowledge of God's
 "works, to a knowledge of his existence, and of that
 "infinite power and wisdom which are demonstrated
 "to us in them. *Our knowledge concerning God goes*
 "*no further.*—How little reason have we to expect
 "any knowledge of the nature and essence of the in-
 "visible God, or of his physical and moral attributes,
 "beyond what his works, and the effects of his na-
 "ture and attributes, communicate to us? This de-
 "gree, this sufficient degree of knowledge concern-
 "ing God, is a fixed point; on one side of which lies
 "Atheism, and metaphysical and theological blasphe-
 "my too often on the other." To this add another
 passage. " * Heathen philosophers discovered in his
 "works a first intelligent cause of all things, a being
 "of infinite power and wisdom, whose providence is
 "over all his creatures, and whose will relatively to
 "man is manifested in the whole human system.
 "Here was abundant matter of real knowledge.
 "Thus far the supreme Being lets himself down, if
 "I may use such an expression, within the verge of
 "human comprehension; and of human alone, as
 "far as we can judge of the animal world about us.
 "Beyond this fixed point we can have no real ideas,
 "and therefore no real knowledge. All that we ima-
 "gine we have, is, and must be fantastical. We are

* Vol. ii. p. 366.

“ no more able to acquire knowledge beyond, than
 “ other animals up to this point: and the divine na-
 “ ture, the manner of being, *the moral attributes of*
 “ GOD, the general system of his providence, are as
 “ inscrutable as to them.” That is to say in short,
 that we know no more of GOD's moral attributes than
 the beasts. And to make his meaning still more plain,
 he teaches plainly, that the moral attributes of GOD
 are not real, but supposed. “ * We cannot rise from
 “ our moral obligations to the *supposed* moral attributes
 “ of GOD. I call them *supposed*, because, after all
 “ that hath been said to prove a necessary connection
 “ between his physical and moral attributes, the latter
 “ may be all absorbed in his wisdom.” And further,
 “ † It is evident, that the first and strongest impres-
 “ sions that we receive of benevolence, justice, and
 “ other moral virtues, come from reflection on our-
 “ selves, and from our dealings with one another;
 “ from what we feel in ourselves, and from what we
 “ observe in other men. These we acknowledge to
 “ be limited and imperfect, the excellencies of our
 “ own nature; and therefore conceiving them with-
 “ out any limitations or imperfections, we ascribe
 “ them to the divine.” And this all judicious and
 orthodox Theists do; and they do well. But he is of
 a contrary opinion, that is, they *do ill*; for he adds,
 “ they do worse.” And rather than not carry his
 point against the divine moral attributes, he affirms,

* Vol. iv. p. 18.

† Vol. iv. p. 19.

that

that “ * the knowledge of the divine attributes is
“ impossible and unnecessary for us to have, even on
“ the supposition there is a GOD.”

I desire it may be observed, that I have given his assertions against the moral attributes or holiness of GOD, not in detached expressions, which very often are misrepresentations of an author's meaning, but as they stand connected with a pretty large context. And as he is not the first that acknowledged in the supreme Being only power and knowledge, I need say no more to prove, that he absolutely denies the moral attributes of the ALMIGHTY. Here I have omitted nothing material, except a practical inference, afterwards to be considered at large, *viz.* That we are under no obligation to imitate GOD in his moral attributes, and that it is even impiety to attempt it. And, in consequence, he rejects the distinction between the moral and physical attributes of the supreme Being. “ † Divines have distinguished, in their bold
“ analysis, between GOD's physical and moral attri-
“ butes; for which distinction, though I see several
“ theological, I do not see one religious purpose it is
“ necessary to answer.”

In profound submission to, and in adoration of the supreme Being, he resolves to know as little as possible of him; and, with an air of piety, he dares not

* Vol. v. p. 224.

† Vol. iii. p. 410.

raise his thoughts to that ineffable, and unspeakable, and inconceivable Being, nor conform his conduct to the wise government of his GOD in the administration of his providence. In this pious ignorance his Lordship follows the example of VANINI *, and the example of those who said *unto GOD, Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways.* I have already observed, that his Lordship acknowledges GOD to be “the first, self-existent, intelligent cause, “a being of infinite wisdom and power; and therefore an object to all rational creatures, not of curiosity, but of awe, reverence, of adoration, of gratitude, of obedience, and resignation.” And for his own part, “he seriously adores his Majesty, blesses his goodness, and resigns himself entirely to his providence.” This is language becoming a Theist, but such as he leaves no foundation for. For, upon supposition there is no moral perfection to be found in the Deity, he may be an object of awe and terror, but not of love and adoration. And how can he bless the divine goodness, or resign himself to his providence, who denies both? It is not an easy matter to talk of GOD, and to reject his goodness, and other moral attributes, and to blind the eyes of readers from discovering the inconsistency. Did he really believe that GOD is good and just, to what purpose doth he *absorb* his moral attributes in his wisdom?

* Quæris a me, quid sit Deus? si scirem, Deus essem.

Sect. VII. Of GOD's moral attributes. 151

ABSORB is not a philosophical word. When a small quantity is mixed with a quantity so great that the small quite disappears, it is then said to be *absorbed*. And can this be applied to the divine attributes, which are all equal, all infinite? And when he hath swallowed up the goodness, justice, and truth of GOD into his wisdom, they thereby become imperceptible. I desire your Esquireship to tell me, whether his wisdom is a physical or moral attribute. Your author makes wisdom a physical attribute of the supreme Being; and yet he makes it comprehend all the moral attributes, or rather he makes it extinguish them all. "We cannot rise from our moral obligations to the supposed moral attributes of GOD. I call them *supposed*." And why? because there is no necessary connection between them and his physical attributes. And why? because they all disappear, by being absorbed in the divine wisdom. Take notice how he and you blunder away the wisdom of the supreme Being. That wisdom which swallows up goodness, must be of the same kind and nature with the goodness which it devours. But this goodness is not real, but supposititious, and therefore such is the wisdom. And were not goodness and wisdom of the same kind, they could not be diluted into one another. And seeing you acknowledge, that you know no more of GOD's moral attributes than the beasts, I am very sure that you know as little of his wisdom.

I hope your Esquireship will allow, that if there are no moral perfections in the Deity, neither are there any immoral imperfections; and therefore your God can neither do good nor evil, and cannot therefore be an object of your love or of your dread: nor can you have any greater regard to your Deity, than an Atheist hath to his unintelligent cause. With such a cause your doctrine doth agree, but not with an intelligent first cause of infinite knowledge. You know, and can distinguish between the equity and iniquity of actions; and if God doth not know that, you know more than he. You approve of what is just and right, and you disapprove of what is wrong and unjust: but a God of supposititious wisdom and goodness, who is himself neither morally good nor immorally evil, is neither pleased nor displeased whether you be virtuous or vicious. But if you will allow that God knows as much as you, and that he is as good and just as you are in theory and speculation, you must acknowledge his moral attributes, or you must deny that you are a moral man in theory; though, for the sake of decency and conveniency, you may acknowledge you are such in practice.

THOUGH I have already said, and proved, that God is essentially holy, and that his holiness is the foundation of morality; yet, because this is a matter of the highest importance in natural religion, I presume to insist still more largely on the subject. To
know

know the will of GOD as the law of our life and actions, recourse must be had to his moral perfections. Admitting the physical perfections of the Deity, his eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, immensity, self-existence, and self-sufficiency, no conclusion can be drawn from them to lay us under an obligation to be moral and virtuous, good and just, unless we establish it as a first foundation of the will and law of GOD, that he himself is holy, just, good, and true. And on this supposition and persuasion that GOD is a holy being, we conclude demonstratively, that it is his will, his law, his command, that we be moral, just, and good. If it is GOD who hath made us capable to know and to distinguish the equity and iniquity of actions, and to approve the former and disapprove the latter, and hath put it out of your power to do otherwise; you must conclude, that as * he who formed the eye, must himself see; so he who commands you to be holy, must himself be holy. Lord BOLINGBROKE's zeal for infidelity, and his aversion to MOSES and the Apostle PAUL, have obliged him to assert, in the strongest manner, the justice, goodness, mercy, and truth of the supreme Being. He accuses them for ascribing to the Deity, such partiality, barbarity, and cruelty, as the most arbitrary tyrant would scarcely be guilty of; and says, "† I would sooner be reputed, nay I would sooner be a Pagan than a Christian, an Atheist than a Theist, if to be one or

* Psal. xciv. 9.

U † Vol. i. p. 315.

" the

“ the other it was necessary to believe such absurdities” as these two have taught. That is to say, he would sooner disbelieve the being of GOD, than believe that GOD commanded what MOSES commanded, or what ST PAUL taught in his name and authority. And why all this, if GOD is not essentially good and just? If MOSES and PAUL found it expedient for their temporal happiness to act such a part, they have done no more than he justifies in his own, and in the conduct of others. For take away GOD's moral attributes, you can be under no obligation to live morally; for he cannot subject you to a moral law: and, as his Lordship says, you may as well, and more consistently with yourself, be an Atheist than a Theist. Had I only to do with you and your author, I might leave the doctrine of GOD's moral attributes as sufficiently proved and acknowledged. But I write for the glory of GOD, and only against you, as ye stand in the way to oppose it.

To make a world, at least the mere material part of it, power and skill were sufficient; but to make out of mere matter, or to make without matter, rational creatures, and to rule and govern them when made, requires wisdom, justice, truth, goodness, and mercy. And as far as the moral exceeds the mere material part of the creation, in so far, in my apprehension, do the moral exceed the physical attributes of GOD. The heavens declare the glory of GOD, by displaying

displaying his skill and power: this they did not from eternity, for they had a beginning. But GOD is essentially glorious in holiness, from everlasting to everlasting. Before there was any place for the exercise of his goodness, truth, and justice; before he was the Creator and Governor of the world, he was just, and true, and good. All that is in GOD is GOD. His being doth not admit of *magis* and *minus*, or of any degree of perfection. Our nature doth; all human attainments of body and mind, are but mere trifles in comparison of virtue, probity, and morality. An honest man, said his Lordship's correspondent, is the noblest work of GOD. One had better be a man of real virtue and piety, than be possessed of all the learning and knowledge that ever adorned a human mind, and all the power of the greatest monarch on earth, without piety and morality. Learning and knowledge have been abused, and power hath been perverted to very bad purposes. But virtue and piety is the salt of the soul, incorruptible in itself, and the preservative of all attainments. Is it not astonishing, that you, or any man pretending to be virtuous and honest, should refuse to ascribe to GOD all goodness, justice, and truth? O HOLY, HOLY, HOLY, LORD GOD ALMIGHTY! If morality is the brightest ornament of the human nature, holiness must be a most splendid and glorious attribute of the supreme Being. We have no way of knowing the divine perfections, (and Lord BOLINGBROKE admits

U 2

they

they are infinite), but by considering the perfections which we ourselves are possessed of. We could not know that the Deity is wise and powerful, if in ourselves we experienced nothing of wisdom and power. And we must first know by ourselves, what is wisdom, and what is power, before we can ascribe these attributes to the Deity. This you, most inconsistently with yourself, deny. “ * Let us not ascribe our “ perfections to him, even according to the highest “ conceptions we are able to frame of them; though “ we reject every imperfection conceivable, when “ imputed to him.” By removing all imperfections from our perfections, we form the highest conceptions of them. From finite and limited, we raise them up to infinite and unlimited. And by this method, and by no other, BOLINGBROKE hath found out that GOD is infinite in wisdom and power. And what danger can there be, or wherein doth the absurdity and blasphemy lie, to say that he is infinitely holy? But I cannot imagine what can be said of the supreme Being, though we remove from him all imperfection, and ascribe to him no perfection at all. Then he is no being; for all beings are perfect or imperfect. We must therefore say nothing, and we must think nothing at all of GOD. And doth not this amount to Atheism? There are Mahometan philosophers, who have refined their thoughts of GOD into nothing. They will not say that GOD is

* Vol. i, p. 270.

ONE, though it is the first and fundamental article of their religion. One of these puritans called the crier a liar, when from the mosque he summoned the people to the worship of the ONE GOD; and gave for a reason, that GOD is GOD, and no more should be said. I am far from suspecting you or your Noble author capable of such super-refined piety. On the contrary, I have reason to think, and I shall afterwards make appear, that he is willing to overlook the justice of GOD, and, together with that, his goodness, in so far as he himself is concerned. “ * Let us not “ humanize GOD; let us not measure his perfections “ by ours; much less let us ascribe to him, as every “ system of theology does, under the notion of good- “ ness, what would be partiality; nor, under the no- “ tion of justice, what would be cruelty in man. “ We have nothing to fear in one world more than “ in another.”

THOUGH I am not obliged to know every system of theology, as his Lordship pretends to do, yet, so far as I am acquainted with these systems, I do not find that they ascribed to GOD partiality instead of goodness, nor cruelty instead of justice. Not surely the Jewish system; which affirms, that their GOD is a GOD of truth, and without iniquity, and that just and right is he. It was ABRAHAM's opinion, that GOD was the righteous judge of all the earth. It

* Vol. i. p. 269.

was sung to his praise in their assemblies, that he was good, and did good. The Christian system of theology, instead of representing GOD as a cruel master, represents him as good and amiable. He will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth. For this purpose he spared not, but gave his only begotten Son, that whoever believed in him, might not perish, but have everlasting life. As conquerors assume to themselves new names, expressive of their brave and gallant exploits; so the LORD GOD, when he had finished the grand plan of man's salvation, assumed a new name instead of JEHOVAH, even that of LOVE: For, saith the Apostle JOHN, GOD IS LOVE *. If there are any sub-systems made of the Christian revelation, which ascribe to GOD either partiality or cruelty, I renounce them. I do not at present undertake a defence of the Christian faith; but only taking it as I find it upon record, it is certain that Lord BOLINGBROKE misrepresents it. And I do think he mistakes the effects of GOD's absolute sovereignty for partiality. As the potter of the same clay makes one vessel for honour, and another for lower and meaner use; so, without partiality, GOD bestowed more understanding on him, than upon his dog or his parrot.

THE author's plain man, who will not reason beyond his sense and experience, and thinks that his

* 1 Epistle, iv. 16.

own knowledge, whether owing to his stupidity, negligence, or to his inclinations, or whether it is according to truth, or according to error, is just such, and as much as GOD requires or allows him to have, concludes that GOD will deal with him hereafter, (if there is an hereafter), as he deals with him here.

“ * In whatever state he is, he knows that GOD governs, and hath nothing to fear in one more than in another. GOD is an all-perfect being.” By this Lord BOLINGBROKE, in the character of a plain man, means, if he means any thing at all, that GOD's administration is as perfect here as it can be hereafter; so that if there is another life, he cannot be worse off than he was in the life he lived here. That is, a bungling minister of state, a betrayer, or a cobbler of the constitution of his country, who, for fear his blood should be made a cement for a new association, fled to France; and there learned French enough to spoil his English †. That his political talents might not rust, he entered into the service of a new master, whose secrets he sold for a safe return to his native country: and in order to reinstate himself in his former employment, quarrelled in vain with his friend and protector, and spent the remain-

* Vol. i. p. 269.

† To hold language. *I come from reading.* Had he translated Irish, he would have said, *I am after reading.* It revolts me, from the word *rebuter*, very ill translated; and to *infirm* an argument.

ing part of his time in discontent; and, *pour tuer le temps*, he became writer against the administration, against religion, and against GOD and goodness. *He had all the charms of friendship, but was not a friend*, was publicly said of him in his lifetime. Such was his life, and all the while he neglected no animal pleasure that he was capable of. If he did not expect a better life, and more happiness hereafter, it was not worth his contending for. His prospect at best was but poor and mean, and such as no wise man would desire. But upon supposition of an *hereafter*, the infinite perfections of the supreme Being cannot assure the plain man, that it will not be worse than the present. For all perfection includes justice, or justice must be an imperfection. That his Lordship was a sinner, is notoriously, and by his own confession, true; and therefore liable to be a sufferer, whenever GOD thought fit to call him into judgment. But plain man BOLINGBROKE will tell his sovereign and judge, Since you did not punish me when you knew me guilty, you have no right to punish me now. And this is all the ground of Lord BOLINGBROKE's and your future happiness or safety, that ye cannot be worse or more miserable in another world, than he was, or you are, or may be in this. How dangerous is your case, and how desperate was his!

THERE are many awful questions concerning the
justice

justice of GOD, the discussion of which would be too tedious, and unnecessary, in my animadversions on Lord BOLINGBROKE's philosophy. I have proved, that truth and righteousness are eternal, and independent on GOD's arbitrary will and appointment. From which it follows, that he is necessarily and essentially true and just; and therefore he as necessarily approves of what is just and right, and disapproves of what is unjust and wrong. Our knowledge therefore of what GOD is pleased or displeased with, becomes to us the divine law, which we are bound to obey. It is his *imperative*, not his *operative* will, which is inconsistent with human reason and freedom. So far is the imperative will of GOD from being inconsistent with our liberty, that it is by our freedom of will that we become subjected to a law, and become obliged to obey. The effects of GOD's pleasure and displeasure, whatever they are or may be, are a double sanction. And though the light of nature cannot determine precisely what these effects are or may be, yet reason can assure us that they are certain. A law without a sanction is vain, or rather a contradiction in terms; and a sanction not to be put in execution, is none at all. The righteous Lord, who loveth righteousness, and, consequently, who is angry with the wicked, (I speak analogically to the manners of men), and who is true, as well as just, will reward and punish his rational creatures, according to their good or bad beha-

viour. That a vicarious punishment, at least, is necessary to vindicate the divine justice, was the opinion of all those who offered sacrifice. And it is for the sake of such a punishment, that Christians believe, that, on certain secondary conditions, sins are pardonable. And sinners of such a persuasion comfort themselves in the mercy of GOD, and in the merits of their SAVIOUR; and considering themselves under the additional obligation of redeeming love, they are delightfully led into repentance, and amendment of life. Great must their guilt be, and strong their disbelief of the justice, truth, goodness, and mercy of GOD, who treat the GOSPEL as a fable and fiction; dreadful must their apprehensions be, on every surmise of GOD's vindictive justice. And who can assure himself, that all penal sanctions annexed to the moral law, are but empty threatenings, which never will be executed? If there is a GOD, this GOD is a holy being; and if he is a holy being, then there is a moral law; and then there is a sanction annexed to it, and the sanction must be executed; and therefore the last is as sure and certain as the first. His Lordship found no safety, no resting-place for his sinful soul, but in his impious and blasphemous persuasion, that GOD is not a holy being, but an intelligent being, without every moral perfection.

HE pretends to be perfectly well acquainted with
Dr

Dr CUDWORTH's intellectual system, and for his learning he shews respect and deference. And had he acted candidly, he ought to have considered what the DOCTOR had said on the moral attributes of the ALMIGHTY. The passage is too long for a quotation, but too strong to be altogether omitted. “ * Knowledge and power alone will not make a GOD. For GOD is generally conceived by all to be a most amiable and desirable being: whereas an omniscient and omnipotent arbitrary Deity hath nothing either of benignity or morality in its nature to regulate and measure its will; as it could not be truly august and venerable, according to that maxim, *Sine bonitate nulla majestas*. Neither could it be desirable, it being that which only could be feared and dreaded, but not have any firm faith and confidence placed in it.”——From PLUTARCH he says, “ We fear and stand in awe of the Deity, for its power; but we worship it, that is, we love and honour it, for its justice.”——And he says, “ The whole Manichean hypothesis taken together, is to be preferred before this of an omnipotent arbitrary Deity (devoid of goodness and morality) ruling all things; because there the evil principle is yoked with another principle essentially good, checking and controuling it. And it also seems less dishonourable to GOD, to impute defect of power, than of goodness and justice, to him.

* Folio edition, p. 202.

" NEITHER can power and knowledge alone make
 " a being completely happy. We have all of us by
 " nature a certain divination, presage, and porturient
 " vaticination (as both PLATO and ARISTOTLE call
 " it) in our minds of some higher good and perfec-
 " tion than either power or knowledge.—It may
 " be proved from the nature of GOD, who is happy,
 " not from things external, but because he is essen-
 " tially moral and virtuous, that every man hath as
 " much happiness as he hath of virtue and wisdom.
 " —In what both PLATO and ARISTOTLE say,
 " there seems to be little more than what may be ex-
 " perimentally found in ourselves; namely, that there
 " is a certain life, or vital or moral disposition, which
 " is much more inwardly and solidly satisfactory, not
 " only than sensual pleasure, but also than all know-
 " ledge and speculation whatever. Now, whatever
 " this chief good be, which is a perfection superior
 " to knowledge and understanding, PLATO says, that
 " it must be first and principally in GOD: and there-
 " fore virtue is defined to be an assimilation to the
 " Deity. Justice and honesty are not fictitious things,
 " made by the will and command of the more power-
 " ful to the weaker; but they are nature and perfec-
 " tion, and descend downward to us from the Deity."

DR CUDWORTH, though master of all the learn-
 ing of Greece, does not think it below him to look
 into the BIBLE. " The holy scriptures, without any
 " metaphysical

“ metaphysical pomp or obscurity, tell us plainly
 “ what is that highest perfection of intellectual be-
 “ ings, which is better than reason and knowledge,
 “ and which also is the source, life, and soul of all
 “ morality; namely, love and charity.” And, after
 paraphrasing the Apostle's words *, he says, “ What-
 “ ever dark thoughts men entertain concerning GOD,
 “ it can never be conceived, that the most self-suffi-
 “ cient and most happy Being should have any ma-
 “ lignant despiteful thoughts towards his creatures.
 “ Nevertheless, because so many are apt to abuse
 “ the notion of divine love and goodness, and to frame
 “ such conceptions of it, as destroy that awful and
 “ reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity,
 “ and make men presumptuous, and regardless of their
 “ lives; therefore we think it fit here to superadd al-
 “ so, that GOD is no fond, soft, and partial love;
 “ but justice is an essential branch of the divine good-
 “ ness, an impartial law, and the measure of all
 “ things and actions.

“ IT is evident, that Atheists themselves, in the
 “ times of Paganism, took it for granted, that good-
 “ ness was an essential attribute of the Deity, whose
 “ existence they opposed, (so that it was generally
 “ acknowledged such by Pagan Theists); that is,
 “ they did think and maintain, that if there was a
 “ GOD, he must be holy. And to disprove the ex-

* 1 Cor. xiii.

“ istence

“istence of the Deity, they argued from the topic
 “of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and
 “want of providence over human affairs; which, if
 “they were true, would not at all disprove such an
 “arbitrary Deity, (*as is now fancied by some*),” and
 strenuously contended for by you and your Noble au-
 thor, “made up of nothing but will and power, with-
 “out any essential goodness and justice. But these
 “arguments of the Atheists are directly levelled
 “against the Deity, according to the true notion and
 “idea of it; and could they be made good, would
 “do execution upon the same.”

I suppose the learned author quotes the Apostle PAUL, not as a writer divinely inspired, (for he knew for whom he wrote), but as a philosopher, (and a philosopher is as susceptible of divine inspiration as another man), when he makes love the highest accomplishment of a reasonable creature. And I presume to quote the Apostle PETER as a philosopher, who exhorts Christians in these words, * *As he who hath called you is holy, so be ye holy in all manner of conversation; because it is written, Be ye holy, for I am holy.* And indeed most philosophically, and even metaphysically, he makes the holiness of God the reason, ground, and obligation of our holiness and morality. For this he gives MOSES as the author, who three times delivers the command of God in these words,

* 1 Epist. i. 15. 16.

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* *Be ye holy, for I am holy, saith the LORD.* The credit of MOSES as an historian and divine apart for this time, he certainly speaks and gives his orders as a good moral philosopher. We can be under no obligation to live morally, unless we are persuaded, that it is the will and law of GOD that we should; and we cannot be persuaded that it is his will, unless we believe that he himself is holy. Is it not with you a matter of the highest assurance to affirm, that "the knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts necessary for such a creature as man †?" For the amount of your philosophy is, that your Creator hath nothing to do with you, nor you with him. You pretend to believe that GOD is a being of infinite knowledge and power; and beyond this sufficient, this fixed point, you are resolved to know no more: for this reason you think, that they who will know that GOD is a holy being, run into metaphysical and theological blasphemy.

WERE this true, it is sufficient to terrify a man of piety from going beyond the fixed point of GOD's power and knowledge. But how can he hinder himself from inquiring, and endeavouring to know, whether this omniscient and omnipotent Being is a moral being or not; whether he is good or evil, or neither? If he hath made, and if he governs the world, and

* Lev. xi. 44. xix. 2. xx. 7.

† Vol. ii. p. 25.

governs

governs us as we are moral agents, we are more concerned to know his moral, than his physical attributes; his truth, his justice, his goodness, and mercy, than his knowledge and power. It is our interest, it is our duty to inquire. It is to follow the dictates, and to comply with the make of our mind and understanding. Whether our inquiry ends in truth or in error, proceed we ought, and must. I know, that the schoolmen are accused by his Lordship of metaphysical blasphemy in their doctrine concerning the Deity. But neither he, nor you for him, can shew in their writings any thing unworthy of GOD, or unbecoming the supreme all-perfect Being. On the contrary, they have reasoned on his attributes with the greatest reverence, caution, and accuracy. It were to be wished, that neither you nor he had come nearer to Atheism, than they came to blasphemy. One would be apt to think that his Lordship was in jest, in denying and affirming GOD's moral attributes, (if such a serious and awful subject could bear a jest). He blesses GOD for his *goodness*; though his goodness, and other moral attributes, are as unknown to him as to the beasts. All the moral attributes he calls *supposititious*, with a reduplication: and yet, on repeated occasions, he mentions and asserts the goodness, justice, and truth of the supreme Being; and rather than exclude the moral attributes, he absorbs them all in the divine wisdom. In his vindication, he owns he admits them; but pleads that it is not in the same sense in which

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which others do, who make the human and divine goodness the same either in kind or degree. - That the divine and human goodness is the same in degree, no theologist, no metaphysician, ever said. That intelligent creatures may be completely moral, or without sin against GOD, is possible: and such I suppose those in the highest rank of his Lordship's hypothetical scale of beings, are. Notwithstanding, there is still a difference between the sanctity of GOD and the sanctity of those created and sinless beings. For all such beings are contingent; and so are all their perfections, whether natural or moral. But GOD is a necessary, self-existent, and self-sufficient being; all that he is, he is essentially. Human or created goodness, as it is contingent, may be lost by transgression of the law of GOD; but his goodness endureth from eternity to eternity. The divine goodness is perfect; but the goodness of the noblest created being is imperfect, because it is not essential to the nature of a creature. But this doth not hinder even human goodness to be goodness, and real goodness. But whether the divine and human goodness are specifically and generically the same, is a debate that may admit of more subtilty than your Lord was, or you are capable to understand. It gives no offence, so far as I know, to the most pious, to say, that GOD is *ens* or *being*, *substance*, *intelligent spirit*; and that such likewise is man or angel. And, except his Lordship and you, no good man ever took it amiss to hear GOD and man

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spoken

spoken of with this difference, and no other, that the one is a finite, and the other an infinite being.

I appeal to DAVID MALLET, Esq; and to any man capable of reflecting on his own mind, if he must not previously have ideas of knowledge and power, before he can ascribe them to GOD in an unlimited and infinite sense. And when he hath ascribed infinite wisdom and power to the supreme Being, doth he at the same time omit his primitive and original notions of power and knowledge, and raise them entirely out of his mind? If those ideas are done away, all that he ascribes to GOD is something infinite, or mere infinity, and nothing else: and he should drop the words *knowledge* and *power*, as he does their ideas. To speak intelligibly, these original and previous ideas of knowledge and power must remain in the mind, when applied to the Deity in an unlimited and infinite sense. But, to do justice to his Lordship, it is proper to take into due consideration what he hath said on this subject. And in hopes the reader will be pleased to see things in the strongest and clearest light as stated by him, I presume to give him the following extract.

“ * GOD is, in the notion of Deists,” who believe another life, “ nothing more than an infinite man. He knows as we know, is wise as we are wise, and moral as we are moral: but his know-

* Vol. iv. p. 296.

“ ledge,

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“ ledge, his wisdom, and morality, are in their nature infinite, though they are not exercised alike, nor with a constant harmony, nor consistency, in the production of all the phenomena. No man hath been more dogmatical on this head than CLARKE. He is much scandalized at those Theists, among others, who, being so absurd as to imagine, that goodness and justice are not the same in GOD which they are in our ideas, but something transcendent, think it is impossible we should argue with any certainty about them. This opinion, he says, doth not stand on any consistent principles, and must finally recur to absolute Atheism. Now, I own very freely, that the opinion is mine, and that it is one of those I think it impious to alter.—Far from apprehending that I shall be reduced to Atheism by holding it, the Doctor seems to me in some danger of being reduced to manifest absurdity by holding the contrary opinion.”

IF justice and goodness be not the same in GOD as in our ideas, then we mean nothing, when we say, that GOD is necessarily just and good. And for the same reason it may as well be said, that we know not what we mean, when we affirm, that he is an intelligent and wise being. “ These are the Doctor's own words: and surely they shew, that great men, in common estimation, are sometimes great triflers. When they who are of his opinion affirm, that

" GOD is necessarily just and good, according to their
 " precise notion of justice and goodness, they know
 " indeed what they mean, and they mean very pre-
 " sumptuously. When they who are not of his opi-
 " nion say, that GOD is just and good, they too have
 " a meaning, which is not less reasonable for being
 " more modest. They ascribe all conceivable per-
 " fections to GOD, moral and physical, which can
 " belong to a divine nature, and to a supreme being:
 " but they do not presume to limit them to their con-
 " ceptions; which is their crime with Dr CLARKE.
 " Every thing shews the wisdom and power of GOD,
 " conformably to our ideas of wisdom and power in
 " the physical world, and in the moral: but every
 " thing does not shew in like manner the justice and
 " goodness of GOD, conformably to our ideas of these
 " attributes in either. The physical attributes are in
 " their own nature more glaring, and less equivocal.
 " The divine and the Atheist *therefore* deny that to
 " be just and good, which is not one or the other,
 " according to their ideas. The Theist acknowledges
 " whatever GOD hath done to be just and good in it-
 " self, though it doth not appear to be such in every
 " instance, conformably to his ideas of justice and
 " goodness. He imputes the difference to the defect
 " of his ideas, and not to any defect of the divine at-
 " tributes. Where he sees them, he owns them ex-
 " plicitly; where he does not see them, he pronoun-
 " ces nothing about them. He is as far from deny-
 " ing

ing them, as he is from denying the wisdom and power of GOD. In every case he knows what he means; and his meaning is in every case rational, pious, and modest.

WILL the divine say, that he does not deny the justice and goodness of GOD, because he proves them in general *a priori*; and that when he denies them in particular, he only denies the complete exercise of them in this world, because that is reserved for another? When he proves then the justice and goodness of GOD, he proves them as he could not prove even his own intelligence, that is, *a priori*; and when he denies them, his denial is absolute, unless an hypothesis,—which may be denied on much better grounds, be true. But what is this proof *a priori*? Does it prove, that justice and goodness, though they are so connected with the physical attributes, that when we ascribe one, we are obliged, by necessary consequence, to ascribe the other to the supreme Being, are yet so distinct, that they may be separated in the exercise of them, and that either of them may act as independently on his wisdom, as of one another? If this be said, they who say it may assume, in consequence, that the supreme Being is sometimes partial, instead of being always just; and sometimes evil, instead of being always good.—And this sets the reasoning of such a divine as CLARKE on principles as little consistent

“ consistent as those of an Atheist. Does the argu-
 “ ment *a priori* prove, that the justice, and goodness,
 “ and wisdom, and power of God, are so intimate-
 “ ly connected, and are so much the same by na-
 “ ture, that they cannot be separated in the exercise
 “ of them? In this case his natural attributes absorb
 “ the moral. The will of God is not sometimes
 “ determined by one moral attribute, and sometimes
 “ by another, like that of man; but by a concur-
 “ rence of them all with his wisdom in every act of
 “ it. God is then infinitely wise: he does always
 “ that which is fittest to be done; that which is fittest
 “ to be done, is always just and good; and the dis-
 “ pute is over.”

THESE words are his Lordship's strong reasons for
 divesting the divine Majesty of all moral perfections,
 and excluding the moral and excellent perfections of
 God from his first philosophy. It hath been a point,
 and a settled point, that the way of coming to the
 knowledge of God, is by *negation* and *eminence*:
 that is, by removing from what we know of our
 own or other minds all defect and imperfection, and
 by raising our conceptions of our own abilities and
 faculties above all restriction, bounds, or limitation.
 We know, for instance, what our own knowledge is;
 and we know, as I have just now said, what it is pre-
 viously to our application of knowledge to God. Our
 knowledge is imperfect; but knowledge in any degree
 is

is so far a perfection, as it exceeds ignorance. And when all limitation is removed from it, we ascribe it to GOD, and pronounce that he is omniscient. And when we have done the same by every thing that we know is good and commendable in ourselves, we form as just and perfect an idea of GOD as possibly can be formed by human understanding, and perhaps by the completest created intelligence. We say, and say without blasphemy, that GOD is omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise, holy, just, good, and true: and, consequently, we deny that GOD ever was, or can be ignorant of any thing; that he is weak; that he mistakes the just means of creating, preserving, and governing all his creatures, and all their actions. We deny that he is either malevolent or unjust; and that he can either be deceived himself, or deceive others. A GOD with all these natural and moral attributes is worthy of our adoration and obedience; and much more worthy than BOLINGBROKE's God, who wants many of them. From which no man in the exercise of a sound judgment will conclude, that this is to make GOD nothing more than an infinite man. Had he any other way to come to the knowledge of GOD's omniscience and omnipotence, but by his previous ideas of knowledge and power, he might with the better grace maintain, that Christian philosophers make GOD too much like to themselves. But with the same reason I do maintain, that he makes GOD nothing more than an omniscient and omnipotent man.

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All man's imperfections are left to himself; his errors, ignorance, weakness, folly, malice, injustice, and deceit. Some virtues too remain his portion; such as, temperance, fortitude, prudence; because they can take no place in an omniscient, holy, and infinitely happy being.

ALL this I own is according to our ideas; and do think, that Dr CLARKE is justly scandalized at those Theists, who are absurd enough to imagine, that goodness and justice are not the same in GOD that they are in our ideas, but something transcendent. For it is by our own ideas that we reason and judge, and by no other besides, whether superior or inferior to them. And if it were possible to have any thing in our minds transcending our ideas, we must have an idea of that transcendency. And if it is by this transcendency that we know, judge, and reason, and at the same time we have no idea of it, it is impossible that we can judge or reason about it. When he says, that GOD is infinitely good and just, but not according to his ideas of infinite goodness and justice, but in a way transcendent to them, of which transcendency he hath no notion, (nor can he, for nothing transcends infinite); his meaning is, that he understands nothing of divine goodness and justice. He hath been at some pains to prove, that there are useful words which signify nothing, such as *force* and *chance*.

chance. And such to him, and to you, are all the moral attributes of GOD.

WITH this absurdity Dr CLARKE charges such Theists as his Lordship; and he honestly gives some of the DOCTOR's words, but not all of them that make for the DOCTOR's purpose. He introduces his answer with an indecent reflection on the DOCTOR's abilities, if the character of a *great trifler* signifies any contempt. He owns, the DOCTOR, and those of his opinion, do know what they mean, when they say, that GOD is necessarily just and good; but they mean presumptuously: and he, and such as he, who use the same words, mean something as rationally, but more modestly. I cannot think, nor will I believe on his authority, (and I have nothing else for it), that he who judges and speaks according to his own ideas and conceptions, does either presumptuously or rashly. And if his Lordship spake and thought, and if you speak and think below or above your ideas, you do wrong; I mean when you speak, for think you cannot. He who speaks in words transcending his ideas, when he says, that GOD is good and just, certainly speaks without a meaning. He makes it a crime in the DOCTOR, to limit the perfections of GOD to his ideas and conceptions: but he who says and thinks, that the divine perfections are unlimited and infinite, can never be guilty of setting bounds and limits to them. He conceives them unlimited, and therefore

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includes in his conception the very thing which his Lordship charges him with excluding. I desire you would learn to distinguish between *apprehensive* and *comprehensive* knowledge. There are but few objects of thought, if any at all, of which we have comprehensive knowledge; but every thing that we do know, we know apprehensively. I do apprehend, that God is an infinitely-perfect being; but my knowledge of him is not therefore comprehensive and adequate. I know that I live and think; and though I know this intuitively and consciously, yet I do not fully comprehend what is my life, and what is my mind. I have an apprehensive knowledge of God's infinite perfections, physical and moral; but not a comprehensive knowledge, and that because they are infinite. When authors write philosophical volumes, they should learn philosophical language.

HIS Lordship says, that he, and such as he, ascribe all conceivable perfections to God, *which can belong to a supreme being*; but he doth not say, that holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, do belong to this supreme being. This is playing the *legerdemain*, and stealing himself away from an absurdity. The question is not, Whether the supreme Being hath all the perfections that belong to such a being? for that hath every thing; but, more particularly, Whether justice, goodness, and truth, are attributes and perfections of the Deity? and sure he hath given
his

his judgment for the negative oftener than once. He knows no more of GOD's moral attributes than the beasts; no more than his omniscience and omnipotence: nay, with him they are all supposititious; they are absorbed in his wisdom; there they all vanish, and the wisdom of his GOD along with them.

THIS I have proved. And I am not surprised that he says, "I am as far from denying the moral attributes of GOD, as I am from denying his power and wisdom." And as little do I accept as a testimony of his Deism, these solemn words: " * A necessary connection between the natural and moral attributes of GOD, no man *who believes in him*, will deny. All the perfections of an all-perfect being must be consistent and connected; to be otherwise, would be imperfection." For if no man who believes in GOD, will deny the necessary connection between his natural and moral attributes; and if you and Lord BOLINGBROKE deny this connection, then he was, and you are ———. Dr CLARKE's meaning I understand, when he says, that justice and goodness are the same in GOD, that they are in his ideas and apprehension: but for his Lordship's meaning, he keeps it to himself; and therefore I cannot allow, that "his meaning is in every case rational, pious, modest;" I rather think it is irrational and absurd, impious and blasphemous, pre-

* Vol. iv. p. 224.

fumptuous and atheistical. I am far from thinking it "a foolish and wicked rhodomontade in Dr CLARKE, that the man who denies the moral attributes, such as he and every Theist apprehends (I do not say comprehends) them to be, may be reduced to a necessity of denying the natural likewise, and consequently into absolute Atheism." To save himself, his Lordship pretends, that he admits moral attributes *in general*. But a general that excludes particulars, is what neither he nor any man can understand. And for all the moral attributes of God, must we accept of his Lordship's *ens rationis*?

BUT there is nothing more obviously false, than the difference he makes in the facility and difficulty of conceiving the natural and the moral attributes of God. "Every thing shews the wisdom and power of God, according to our ideas of wisdom and power, in the physical and moral world; but every thing doth not shew in like manner, the justice and goodness of God, conformably to our ideas of these attributes in either." This saying is both short and senseless. Every thing doth not shew the justice and goodness of God in the physical world. Nothing more certain; but nothing to his purpose. A tree shews neither the justice nor goodness of God, because it is not a moral agent; and therefore hath no connection with his moral attributes. But it doth not therefore follow, that we cannot form an idea of
goodness,

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goodness, or understand what it is, as easily as we understand knowledge and power. I have just now said, (and I have reason to repeat), that we must know what goodness and justice is, before we can affirm them of the Deity; and so must we know what power and wisdom is, before we can ascribe either to God. And the difference between good and evil, just and unjust, is sooner and more easily known than power and wisdom. Children know when they are ill and well used; and can reason on their right and property, upon a good office and an injury, better than on power and knowledge. This rational instinct (if I may use the expression) is confirmed and strengthened by experience, and habit of deciding easily, in numberless instances, where the equity and iniquity of actions lies, till at last it is indelibly ingrained in the human nature. If we call him a good man, who is faithful, true, and just, who is benevolent and beneficent to his power; surely we may call God a good being, who is good to all, conformably to our exactest idea of goodness. It is therefore false, that the physical attributes are more glaring, and less equivocal, than the moral. But admitting this to be as true as it is false, how can he conclude, that the Atheist must deny that to be just and good, which is not one or other, according to their ideas? There is no connection between these two propositions. "The physical attributes of God are more glaring than the moral; therefore the Atheist and the divine must

" must deny that to be just and good, which is not
 " so according to their ideas of either." The consequence is true, but it doth not follow from the antecedent. This is an instance of his impertinent logic. And no less impertinently does he in the present case join the Atheist and the divine together. The Atheist denies the existence, wisdom, power, justice, and goodness of GOD, because inconsistent with his ideas. The divine asserts the being, and all the physical attributes of the Deity. The divine, besides, ascribes all moral perfections to GOD, according to his idea of morality. But his Lordship says, that the divine cannot have an idea of divine goodness. Here he and the Atheist join, as they do in many other things. It is his own case not to have, or to pretend not to have, such a clear and certain idea of the divine goodness and justice, as he hath of the omniscience and omnipotence of the supreme Being; but not the case of the divine. For the moral attributes of GOD are more strongly imprinted on the human mind than the physical attributes. Mathematical and physical truths we discover by application of thought, but moral and ethical truths force themselves upon our understanding.—So says his Lordship.

BOLINGBROKE'S Theist acknowledges whatever GOD hath done to be just and good in itself, though it doth not appear such in every instance: and so does DR CLARKE; he consistently with his principles,
 but

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but his Lordship inconsistently with the whole of his system of divine attributes. And never man was so vain as to pronounce every particular administration of government to be just and good, by reasons *a posteriori*, without knowing the case, and all the circumstances of it. We can reason from the infinite goodness and justice of the supreme Being; and reason *a priori*, that GOD's government of the moral world is good and just. But nothing below omniscience can determine the equity of every thing which happens to intelligent and rational creatures. And therefore his Lordship unjustly and injuriously imputes to Dr CLARKE, that he denies the divine goodness and justice in particular instances. And, for what I know, no Christian philosopher ever did. Because GOD is a being of all perfections, religious philosophers conclude that he is therefore good and just. This is proof *a priori*. But his Lordship, who knows nothing but by sense and experience, must call GOD to the bar of his shallow understanding, to justify every act of his administration. "When he
" sees things which GOD hath done to be good and
" just, he explicitly owns them; and when he doth
" not see them to be such, he pronounces nothing about
" them." Wonderful modesty in dealing with an all-perfect being! Though he doth not see nor believe, that this and the other act of divine providence is either just or good, he declines pronouncing any thing about them. He imagines that he can save every absurdity,

dity, by asserting that GOD is infinitely wise; and therefore doth always that which is fittest to be done; and that which is fittest to be done, is always just and good. To let his argument stand as he states it, it is to reason *a priori*. And why may not Dr CLARKE and others do the same? The argument, however, is not distinctly stated; for the works of GOD in creation and providence, are of different kinds and sorts. There is a mere material, and a moral or rational world. With respect to the material, skill and power is sufficient for its production; but the case is quite different with respect to rational beings. In the first instance, neither the goodness nor justice of GOD take place; for material and unintelligent things are not subjects for the exercise of these moral attributes; and though they are well and wonderfully made, they cannot be said to be made according to goodness and justice. In the second case, the creation of rational beings, capable to know the equity and iniquity of actions, divine goodness and justice do take place, as they do in the government of them when made. GOD made them all capable of being holy and happy, and of making themselves such. And as he put this in their power, he consequently left it in their power to make themselves worse. But the doctrine of divine wisdom, which absorbs all the moral attributes, whether real or supposititious, that makes them vanish and disappear, can bear no conclusion from them, to prove that rational creatures

creatures are either well or ill made, or governed according to goodness and justice. And that this is no mistake of his real meaning, shall be made appear when I come to consider his doctrine of providence.

I cannot pass over the argument drawn from the infinite wisdom and power of GOD, to prove that all which GOD hath done is just and good, without another remark, "GOD is infinitely wise; he does all ways that which is fittest to be done; and what is "fittest to be done, is always just and good." A being infinitely wise and powerful does always what is fit to be done, but not that which is fittest; and that because he is infinitely wise and powerful. This world is well and wonderfully made; but in making it, he hath not acted adequately to infinite wisdom and power. These attributes are inexhaustible. GOD can make many more worlds, both material and moral, than now exist; and with more knowledge in the one, and more splendour and beauty in the other, than I can imagine. It is likewise to be observed, that there is a fitness of design, and a fitness of means; this is intermediate, and that is final. This world is going on to perfection, and to a conclusion worthy of infinite wisdom. If the parts bear an analogy to the whole, it must be so. GOD doth not make trees to start up at once out of the ground. An oak is folded up in an acorn, and requires to be

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nourished

nourished in the earth for many years before it comes to maturity. And from conception to birth, and from birth up to maturity, do animals gradually arise. Many things are fit and proper as means, that are not finally so. Therefore there is nothing more precarious than what Lord BOLINGBROKE frequently inculcates, that the material and moral world is such as it is, and could not, nor cannot possibly be otherwise; in so far that he makes the errors and immorality of mankind to be a necessary and essential part of their constitution. "Did man," saith he, "ob-
 " serve the law of nature, this our habitation must
 " have been a paradise; but then we had not been
 " what we are, and what God designed we should
 " be; and a gap had been left in the scale of beings." Not only MOSES, but Heathen philosophers held, that the materials of the visible world were first a chaos; from this arose all the order and beauty which is now observed. And until the consummation or conclusion of the grand plan, things will be carried on from lower to higher degrees of perfection. Christians need not be surprised to see such doctrine published as makes sinners safe in their own conceit; being forewarned by the Apostle PETER *, *That there shall come in the last days scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, or, except*

* 2 Epistle, iii. 3. 4.

that

that the fathers have fallen asleep, *all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.*

BUT to return: That there are some actions necessarily and essentially good and just, and others evil and unjust, I have already proved, and that in the sight of GOD and man. From which it follows, that Dr CLARKE hath well said, that there is a rule of action common to both; and that this rule of action consists in the eternal and necessary relation of things to one another; that is, in the essential difference between good and evil, just and unjust. And I think his Lordship hath no where directly denied this difference. So far from it, that he makes this difference the principle on which he reasons against HOBBS. And therefore, without contradicting himself, which is common enough), he cannot find fault with the Doctor for demonstrating that there is such a difference. And if the Doctor affirms that men may: but that GOD cannot mistake one thing for another, it doth not follow, that he judges of GOD as he doth of man: but it follows, that his Lordship is to the highest degree injurious, in asserting that the Doctor is to the highest degree impertinent. To this injury he adds another, That he, and those of his profession, “seek
“ for nothing more than the honour of the gown, by
“ having the last word in every dispute.” In this I have no personal concern: for I am as little influenced by temporal obligations or expectations to defend religion, as his Lordship had, or you have to oppose

it. But the third injury is the greatest of all, and highly unbecoming men of any honour or honesty. For he affirms, though not upon his own personal knowledge, that Dr CLARKE did not believe what he wrote. It is said, that some men lie for the sake of the truth. But, for what he knew, his Lordship hath lied most scandalously for the sake of a system of impiety and iniquity. Had he had a due value for his own memory, he would not have aspersed the memory of another.

I take it now for granted, and for proved, that there is an essential difference between *right* and *wrong*, *equity* and *iniquity*; and that GOD is essentially and necessarily whatever he is, and man only contingently such; that the rule of right is fixed and unchangeable. This rule GOD observes by the rectitude of his being, and that as unalterably as his being is unchangeable. But man, whose nature is liable to change and variation, is not essentially good and just in all his actions, because he is not a necessary and unchangeable being. And though he doth not observe this rule of righteousness always, it doth not follow that GOD doth not. The rule is still the same, and men ought to observe it, because GOD doth. Add to this, that it is GOD who hath made man capable to distinguish between right and wrong: and in vain must he have bestowed this power on him, had it not been his will and pleasure that man should be just and good. From what

what we know of ourselves, we learn GOD's moral attributes; and from these we learn our duty to GOD and man. But we do not form an idea of GOD on the plan of human perfections. These perfections are only openings for a higher view of the Deity. And from this view we know whose we are, and what we ought to be and to do. So far is Dr CLARKE, and so far are all religious philosophers, from making GOD an infinite man, that they rather make man, were he such as he ought to be, a diminutive god. In profound piety, his Lordship did, and you do, decline, or rather, in the vanity of heart, despise the dignity, as much more for your honour to be independent, than a dependent being on the almighty Creator of the world.

ALL that the Noble author hath said against Dr CLARKE's ideas of GOD's moral attributes, he revokes in these words. “ * We are forced to help our
 “ conceptions of the divine nature by images taken
 “ from the human nature; and the imperfections of
 “ this nature are our excuse. But then we must
 “ take care not to make humanity the measure of di-
 “ vinity, and much more not to make the last the
 “ least of the two. When we have raised the idea
 “ of any human excellency as high as we are able, it
 “ remains a very limited idea. When we apply it to
 “ GOD, we must add to it our negative idea, or our

* Vol. ii. p. 59.

“ notion

“ notion of infinity; that is, we must not confine it
 “ by the same, nor suppose it confined by any limi-
 “ tations whatever.” To add a negative idea, is a
 very small addition. I do not think that infinity is
 properly negative; for bounds, and limitations, and
 restrictions, which hinder extension, are in themselves
 something negative. They stop our thoughts from
 rising higher than their limited and imperfect objects
 permit. And nothing is more positive and real than
 the divine perfections; and the nearest and exactest
 conceptions that we have of them are such as exclude
 all wants and defects. And this exclusion of imper-
 fection we call *infinity*. By this we distinguish the
 supreme Being from all other beings, and the almighty
 Creator from his works. Perfection is positive, and
 imperfection is therefore negative. When from our
 idea of the Deity we remove all imperfections, we
 conceive GOD to be the most positive, the most real,
 the fullest, completest, and most perfect being. This
 Noble author shews as much dishonesty as skill in writ-
 ing on both sides of the question.

OF which take this other instance. Though no
 man ever treated PLATO with greater contempt, he
 nevertheless gives his theology the preference to all
 of his own and some succeeding ages. “ * There
 “ are,” saith he, “ many notions scattered in the wri-
 “ tings of PLATO, which the most orthodox Theist

* Vol. ii. p. 379.

“ may

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“ may adopt. He acknowledges one supreme being,
“ ineffable, incomprehensible, all-perfect, the self-
“ existent fountain of all existence, divine and hu-
“ man, himself above all essence. God is truth, but
“ above all truth; intelligent as well as intelligible,
“ but above all intelligence; good, but above all
“ goodness. He is none of these, but the principle
“ of them all; as the sun is the principle of light,
“ and as he makes all things to be seen, without be-
“ ing light or sight himself. In a word, PLATO ac-
“ knowledged the omniscience, the omnipotence, the
“ omnipresence, the infinite power and wisdom of
“ God. These are very elevated sentiments, which
“ may be collected from his writings. They are
“ strained as high as the utmost pitch to which we can
“ carry our ideas, and they still point higher. And
“ so they should: for after all the efforts that the
“ mind of man is capable of making, our conceptions
“ will fall infinitely short of their object, when this
“ object is the majesty of the all-perfect Being. Nei-
“ ther PLATO, nor they who received his philosophy
“ four or five hundred years after his time, and who
“ were even more extravagant, and less intelligible
“ than he, could push their general or abstract notions
“ of this sort too far. The intellectual prospect is
“ immense; and the intellectual sight must be strained
“ from objects clearly and distinctly perceived, to
“ such as are less so; and from these still farther, till
“ it can be strained no more, and the mind is lost in
“ the

“ the sublimity of its own conceptions.” To which he adds, “ If these speculations cannot discover
 “ by infinite degrees the whole truth, they cannot
 “ lead us into any error ; and may serve to maintain
 “ in our minds that awful sense of the supreme Being,
 “ of the true GOD in the unity of his nature, which
 “ are due to him from every intelligent creature.
 “ Thus far, therefore, and in this manner, PLATO
 “ was an excellent master of natural theology.”

THESE things, and sayings, and sentiments, saith he, the most orthodox Theist may adopt. Some of them I do not, and some he himself doth not adopt. I cannot allow, that GOD is above all essence, above all truth, above all intelligence, above all goodness; unless it be admitted, that this essence, this truth, this intelligence, is only such as is found in creatures. For as these perfections are in GOD, he is not, nor can he be above them, without being above himself. The reverse of which seems to me to be a doctrine of the same sort with VANINI's, who denies that GOD is *ens*, but admits that he is *essentia*; something *in abstracto*, but nothing *in concreto*. And to me it appears plainly, that BOLINGBROKE makes the same use of GOD's being above all essence. For he says,
 “ * Though the Heathen philosophers spake some-
 “ times of the monade, or first unity, alone, as God ;
 “ yet they ascribed often so much to the second God,

* Vol. iii. p. 116.

“ that

“ that the first became in some sort a non-entity, an
 “ abstract or notional being, a being without essence
 “ or nature, *because above them*, and rather an intel-
 “ ligible than an intelligent principle. Thus they
 “ left no place to the true GOD in their conceptions,
 “ whilst they endeavoured to raise him above all con-
 “ ception.” And if a being above essence is a non-
 entity, his Lordship, orthodox Theist as he is, must
 not adopt all that he imputes to PLATO; nor can he,
 without running into Atheism, and making GOD a
 non-entity. And though he admits, that PLATO
 was extravagant, and those that received his philoso-
 phy afterwards were more extravagant than he, in
 pushing their general and abstract notions of the Deity;
 yet none of them could push them too far. Is not
 this a contradiction? Whatever is extravagant, ex-
 ceeds; and notwithstanding this excess, Platonic phi-
 losophers still fell short. This is nonsense in terms.
 And then, like one that doth not know nor care what
 he says, he finds fault with such intellectual attempts
 to know GOD. “ * The divine nature cannot be ex-
 “ plained by human words; for it cannot be concei-
 “ ved by human ideas: and therefore none but de-
 “ lirious metaphysicians, who impose by their sound,
 “ and have no determined ideas affixed to them,” (so
 far is neither sense nor grammar), “ will ever at-
 “ tempt such explication. All that the wit of man
 “ can do, is to speak cautiously and reverently of it,

* Vol. iii. p. 113.

“ according to those general notions of wisdom, and
 “ power, and majesty, and all other perfections
 “ which we are able to collect *a posteriori*; that is,
 “ from the works of God; and which serve still
 “ more to shew our ignorance than our knowledge *.”

And it must not be omitted, that, in order to carry his point against our knowledge of God, he affirms, that “ the knowledge of the divine attributes” (not only the moral, but the physical) “ is impossible, and “ unnecessary for us to have, even on the supposition “ there is a God.” With what industry doth he inculcate our ignorance of God? For if upon supposition there is a God, and on supposition that it is impossible and unnecessary to know whether this God hath any natural or moral perfections or attributes; then such knowledge of the existence of a Deity is the very same to us as Atheism.

FROM the works of God we learn no more *a posteriori* than his knowledge and his power. But, as Dr CUDWORTH hath demonstrated, knowledge and power will not make a God. The rest therefore must be learned *a priori*; such as, the unity, the eternity, the immensity, the independency, and the necessary existence of the supreme and all-perfect Being. And for all the delirium and blasphemy of metaphysics, it must require some skill, either natural or artificial, in that science, if we intend to acquire any

* Vol. v. p. 224.

more knowledge of GOD *than what we can learn by sense and experience* *. What a noble philosopher must he be who takes no other method to learn and to teach? He hath no use for reason. But can he demonstrate by his sense and experience, that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles? that the earth moves every day round its axis, and every year in an orbit, that touches the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn? He seems to be very certain, without sensation and experience, that there is no future state of rewards and punishments. Neither doth he know by sense and experience, that GOD is omniscient and omnipotent, the first intelligent cause, and an all-perfect being. For such philosophy, as the greatest savage knows as well as his Lordship, one single page, instead of five volumes, was more than enough. Rather than know or admit the physical and moral attributes of the Deity, he resolves not to know, or not to acknowledge that he knows any more than the greatest savage, and some beasts.

MR MALLEY, you and I know that every stream hath a source, and that every source is sufficient for the stream that flows from it. Many streams we have seen, but the sources of few. If you and I should follow a stream up to the unknown fountain, I would desire you, when we reached it, to stay a little, and examine what this source and fountain is. You im-

* Vol. iii. p. 412.

mediately return, and you know no more than you did before, that this, as well as all other streams, hath a source. I stay, and, by examination, I find, that this fountain receives no supplies; and that it never increases nor decreases, notwithstanding the stream that flows from it; that in it was found every thing that can satisfy the largest desires of a reasonable soul. I pursue the similitude no further. All that you know is, that the world is a production, and that the producer is sufficient to have produced it; that he must have skill and power enough for the purpose. But I know beyond what you do, or rather will understand, that this Being who made the world is the first cause, and therefore himself uncaused; therefore eternal, necessarily existent, and independent: and that therefore no perfection, either physical or moral, is to be found in his works, but what was and is in this first cause, this supreme Being, in an eminent way; that is, without restriction and limitation. GOD cannot limit himself, and nothing else can. It is no less absurd than astonishing, that one who acknowledges the omniscience and omnipotence of a Deity, should deny his holiness, goodness, justice, and truth. These things we reckon perfections in ourselves; and yet you refuse them to GOD, and that because in us they are no more than human. With the same reason you may argue, because we are, GOD is not.

THE distinction between the physical and moral
attributes

attributes of GOD, BOLINGBROKE frequently mentions and admits. But in greater sincerity of heart, he says, that “ * divines have distinguished, in their “ bold analysis, between GOD's physical and moral “ attributes; for which distinction, though I see several theological, I do not see one religious purpose that it is necessary to answer.” And without a persuasion of the moral attributes of almighty GOD, I do not see that there can be any place, any purpose, for religion, and morality founded in religion. For if I am not persuaded that GOD is holy, (or moral), I can never know that it is his will that I should be such, or that I can procure his approbation by regulating my conduct according to goodness, equity, truth, and justice. Wonderful was his Lordship's aversion to every thing that might bring him under an obligation to obey the will of GOD; and no less wonderful is his inadvertency, or insincerity; for I dare not say his stupidity. There is not a savage, even the most thoughtless, nor an Atheist, even the most obstinate, but knows the difference between a good office, and the murder of a benefactor. And doth not GOD, who hath made the savage and the Atheist, the Noble philosopher and DAVID MALLETT, Esq; know as much as they? And if he knows what is right and what is wrong, what is just and what is unjust; which of the two we observe and practise, cannot be to him a matter of indifference. It is not such to us.

* Vol. iii. p. 410.

We approve of and commend morality in ourselves and in others, we discommend and disapprove of all immoral and wicked doings; and that because we know the difference. And if GOD doth not know the difference, he is not omniscient; nay, we know more than he. And if he doth not commend all good and condemn all evil actions, LORD BOLINGBROKE was, and DAVID MALLETT is, a better being than the GOD who made them moral and rational agents. This is horrid blasphemy; but they are to be blamed for it. * *If our heart condemn us, GOD is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things; and particularly that we are justly condemned. If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards GOD, that neither will he condemn us.*

NUMBERLESS are the contradictions to be found in LORD BOLINGBROKE's philosophical works. For notwithstanding all that he hath said against GOD's moral attributes, or against any attempt to know them, we are gravely told, that "† the principles " and duties of natural religion arise from the nature of things, and are discovered by the reason of man," (therefore not only by sense and experience), "according to that order which the author " of all nature, and the giver of all reason, hath " established in the human system." And how is it possible that GOD, who hath given reason to man,

* 1 John iii. 21.

† Vol. iii. p. 46.

by which he knows the principles and duties of natural religion, can himself be destitute of all holiness and morality? If GOD hath bestowed reason on man, he is the author and original cause of all the good and noble discoveries that men make, either in the physical or moral world, and particularly of the difference between the equity and iniquity of actions, and our commendation of the first and our condemnation of the second. Our morality is the effect of GOD's holy good will and pleasure; and whatever is in the effect, must be prior in the cause; and in this particular case, must be eminently and infinitely so. But all this is nothing to the author. He follows his point through absurdities and contradictions to the last. And because I intend to follow him as far as he goes, (for the subject is of the greatest importance), I beg the reader's leave to transcribe two paragraphs.

“ * LET us draw a line of separation between natural and artificial theology. By that we are taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite wisdom and power of GOD, which he hath manifested to us in some degree or other, in every part, even the most minute, of his creation. By that too we are taught to ascribe goodness and justice to him, where-ever he intended we should so ascribe them; that is, where-ever either his works, or the dispensation of his providence, do as necessari-

* Vol. v. p. 168.

“ ly communicate these notions to our minds, as
 “ those of wisdom and power are communicated to
 “ us in the whole extent of both. Where-ever they
 “ are not so communicated, we may assume very
 “ reasonably, that it is on motives strictly conform-
 “ able to all the divine attributes, and therefore to
 “ goodness and justice, though unknown to us, from
 “ whom so many circumstances, with relation to
 “ which divine providence acts, must be often con-
 “ cealed. Or we may resolve all such cases into
 “ the wisdom of GOD, and resigning ourselves to
 “ that, not presume to account for them morally.
 “ Thus we follow GOD, and pretend to have know-
 “ ledge of his moral character no further than he
 “ gives it; no further than these abstract or general
 “ notions, which we collect from the proceedings of
 “ his providence, are confirmed by the same.

“ BUT we are taught a very different lesson in the
 “ schools of artificial theology. In them all the no-
 “ tions of those obligations under which men lie to
 “ one another, by the constitution of their nature,
 “ are transferred to GOD; and an imaginary con-
 “ nection between his physical and moral attributes
 “ is framed by very precarious reasonings *a priori*;
 “ all of which is founded on that impertinent sup-
 “ position, that moral fitnesses and unfitnesses are
 “ known, by the eternal reason of things, to all ra-
 “ tional beings, as well as to GOD. They go fur-
 “ ther.

“ ther. As GOD is perfect, and man very imper-
 “ fect, they talk of his infinite goodness and justice,
 “ as of his infinite wisdom and power; though the
 “ latter may preserve their nature without any con-
 “ ceivable bounds; and the former must cease to be
 “ what they are, unless we conceive them bounded.
 “ Their nature implies necessarily a limitation in the
 “ exercise of them. Thus, then, the moral attri-
 “ butes, according to this theology, require infi-
 “ nitely more of GOD to man, than men are able,
 “ or would be obliged, if they were able, to exer-
 “ cise to one another; greater profusion in bestow-
 “ ing benefits and rewards, greater rigour in punish-
 “ ing offences. This whole system of GOD's moral
 “ obligations, or of divine ethics, being raised *a pri-*
 “ *ori*, and not *a posteriori*, is a system of the duty
 “ of GOD to man. Let the blasphemy of this ex-
 “ pression be charged to the account of those who
 “ make it proper and necessary to be used, in order
 “ to expose their doctrine. It is a system of what he
 “ ought, or is obliged by his attributes to do, and
 “ not a scheme of what he hath done. It prescribes
 “ to GOD: and the dispensations of his providence
 “ are acquitted or censured, as they are conformable
 “ or not conformable to it.”

THIS passage is such sublime nonsense, that it fur-
 passeth all understanding. By natural theology we
 acknowledge the infinite wisdom and power of GOD.

Agreed. By this we are taught to ascribe goodness and justice to him. And we are taught the same by artificial theology; that is, such theology as Christian philosophers teach. But this goodness and justice he ascribes to God only, when God intends we should ascribe them. From which it follows, that in some cases it is not the intention of God, that we should ascribe goodness and justice to him. And how doth he learn the intention of God to be sometimes worthy, and sometimes unworthy of the appellation of good and just? or where doth he learn, that God is sometimes good, and sometimes evil, sometimes just, and sometimes unjust, or sometimes neither? This doctrine of yours suits better an atheistical unintelligent cause, than a being of infinite wisdom and power. For if God is just and good, he is necessarily and essentially such; and therefore justice and goodness is ascribable to him at all times, and in all cases. But, say you, God's intention is to be known, and our duty of ascribing goodness and justice to him, by the works and dispensations of his providence, communicating to our minds as necessarily those notions of justice and goodness, as those of wisdom and power are communicated to us in the whole extent of both. Which is to say, when we perceive as clearly the justice of every administration of his providence, as we do his knowledge and power in his works of creation, then it is God's intention that we should ascribe to him goodness and justice:

but

but if we do not perceive the justice of divine providence, then are we forbidden to call him just. His Lordship can never pardon Dr CLARKE for quoting to a Christian audience an appeal said to be made by GOD to man, for the justice and goodness of his government: and, notwithstanding, he takes upon himself to determine, whether this or the other event is good or evil, just or unjust; and assumes, that it is GOD's intention and command that he should do so. Before he can justify his GOD, and acquit him of wrong and injustice, he must have as good evidence of the justice and goodness of every particular dispensation of his providence, and administration of his government, as he hath of his wisdom and power. Nor is this enough to absolve him for ascribing goodness and justice to him. He must further be instructed in the full extent of GOD's goodness, as the notions of divine wisdom and power are communicated to him in the full extent of both. No man but this vain and conceited writer ever pretended to know the utmost extent of all that GOD knows and can do. And if he will not say that GOD is good and just, until he knows the utmost extent of divine knowledge, that is, until he himself becomes omniscient, he never will, he never can. I have said that our knowledge of right and wrong, just and unjust, is intuitive, and even conscious; and I have the testimony of all mankind for it: and this our knowledge exceeds in general that of skill and power. And

though I cannot account for the justice of every particular event, I may, and must say, that GOD is just and good. As we cannot account for every phenomena of the material world, yet knowing that they are the doings of omniscience and omnipotence, we conclude, and so doth BOLINGBROKE and MALLET, *a priori*, that these things are neither idly nor ill placed, but rather to answer some good end, of which we are ignorant. And so this opposer of GOD's moral attributes is obliged to acknowledge, in contradiction to himself, that where-ever the goodness and justice of particular dispensations of divine providence do not appear to us, we may assume very reasonably, that it is on motives strictly conformable to all the divine attributes. In every case then, and not occasionally, we conclude, that GOD is just in all his works, and righteous in all his ways.

BUT is this "to follow GOD, and to pretend to
 " have knowledge of his moral character no further
 " than he gives it; no further than these abstract and
 " general notions, which we collect from the proceed-
 " ings of his providence, are confirmed by the same?"
 And you follow GOD! and for what purpose? You first allow, that he is essentially just and good, and on that account you assume reasonably, that whatever GOD does, it is on motives strictly conformable to all the divine attributes, though the justice and goodness of every particular dispensation of his providence does
 not

not appear such to you; and then you pretend to have knowledge of GOD's moral character no further than he gives it. And what more knowledge would you have of GOD's essential holiness, than that it is essential; or what less can you have? And because your words *no further than he gives it* are not easily understood, you explain yourself in a way still more unintelligible: "No further than these abstract and general notions, which we collect from the proceedings of his providence, are confirmed by the same." You collect, in the analytical method, abstract notions of the justice and goodness of GOD, from the proceedings of his providence. The particular events, the justice of which you cannot account for, are to you the proper means of knowing the goodness and justice of GOD; and that is to say, that your collection of such events is the reason why you cannot ascribe to the Deity any one moral attribute. And if in this you are mistaken, it is not you that are to be blamed: for you pretend to have no more knowledge of GOD's moral character than he gives. And these abstract and general notions of the goodness and justice of GOD in particular, (nonsense enough), you admit no further than they are confirmed by the same, the *same collection*. This is to begin at particulars, and there to end with your inquiry and your knowledge. To deny divine providence, and to appeal to that for the goodness and justice of GOD, is to treat the reader with intolerable contempt. This is
not

not all. BOLINGBROKE and you admit no other sanction of the moral law, than the natural consequences of our good and bad actions. These are not all immediate. Some of them follow our doings at the distance of many years. And how then can you by induction make a full enumeration of particulars, to justify or to impeach the justice and goodness of GOD? It is an observation of considerable antiquity, *That the righteous and the wise, and their works, are in the hand of GOD. No man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before them. All things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath.* And if sentence against an evil work was immediately to be executed, there would be no place left for repentance and amendment. Of this more hereafter. He had, more agreeably to his system of natural religion, said, that GOD neither does good nor evil, but that every thing comes to pass according to the necessary constitution of nature, or according to fatality.

INSTEAD of troubling himself with GOD's moral attributes, he and you think it a better way to resolve or dissolve all the collections made from the proceedings of providence, "into the wisdom of GOD; and " resigning ourselves to that, not presume to account
" for

“ for them morally.” His attempt to absorb all GOD's moral attributes into his wisdom, I have already proved to be nonsense. But it may be asked, whether this wisdom is a moral or a physical attribute of the Deity? If it is a moral attribute, he only shifts the word, and retains the thing. If it is a physical attribute, implying skill and knowledge, morality hath no relation to it. If he makes wisdom stand for both a physical and moral attribute, he is guilty of a contradiction becoming the greatest blunderer, by asserting, that “ an imaginary connection is framed between “ GOD's physical and moral attributes, by very precarious reasonings *a priori*.” For how can goodness and justice be absorbed in the divine wisdom, if there is no connection between them?

THE Noble author is pleased to call Dr CLARKE's invincible demonstration an impertinent supposition. The Doctor had made it plain, that morality is not founded on positive and arbitrary appointment, (and his Lordship says the same against HOBBS), more than the equality of two and two to four, seeing actions in themselves are some fit and others unfit to be done. And this is known, by the eternal reason of things, both to GOD and man. The righteous LORD loveth righteousness; and GOD is good, and doth good, and that according to the essential rectitude of his nature. And this justice and goodness he essentially proportions and adapts in a way the most fit and
suitable

suitable to the subjects of his moral government. It is therefore no objection against GOD's moral attributes, that they are limited in the exercise of them. "Infinite wisdom and power may preserve their nature, without any conceivable bounds; but divine goodness and justice must cease to be what they are, unless we conceive them bounded." A little more attention would have made his Lordship see, that the moral and natural attributes of GOD, and particularly his power, are in the very same case as to the exercise of them. I shall suppose, that GOD made the man BOLINGBROKE by an act of his infinite power; but this man was not an infinite man, but a person limited and bounded in power and understanding; and therefore the divine power in making him was limited in the exercise of it. For as boundless as GOD's power and knowledge are, yet are they both limited in the exercise of them, unless GOD can make an infinite creature; than which nothing is more absurd. To give his reasoning the appearance of an argument, it must run thus. "If GOD is good and just, he must always bestow the greatest blessings and benefits, and exercise the most complete and exact justice; but he doth neither: therefore he is neither good nor just." In answer, I deny the condition of the first proposition, or what logicians call the *sequela majoris*; for the reason immediately above; and for another reason already mentioned, that we have no grounds of persuasion that GOD must immediately re-ward

ward and punish, poorly doth his Lordship conclude, that, "according to Dr CLARKE's theology, GOD's
 " moral attributes require infinitely more of GOD to
 " man, than men are able, or could be obliged, if
 " they were able, to exercise to one another; greater
 " profusion in bestowing benefits and rewards, and
 " greater severity in punishing offences." That GOD
 exercises goodness and justice in a more complete and
 better proportioned way than men exercise their good-
 ness and justice to one another, all who believe in GOD
 will admit. But his supposition of man's being as able
 as GOD, is both idle and impious; and not only im-
 pious, but it defeats the purpose for which he makes
 it. The term *require* might admit an orthodox mean-
 ing, if he did not resolve it, in the next sentence, into
duty and *obligation*. "The whole system of GOD's
 " moral obligations, and divine ethics, being raised *a*
 " *priori*, and not *a posteriori*, is a system of the duty
 " of GOD to man.—It is a system of what he
 " ought and is obliged by his attributes to do, and
 " not a scheme of what he hath done. It prescribes
 " to GOD: and the dispensations of his providence
 " are acquitted or censured, as they are conformable
 " or not conformable to it."

THAT all reasonings *a priori* are not precarious,
 the author does allow. For, from the infinite wisdom
 and power of GOD, he concludes the world is well
 (not infinitely well) made. And from this it follow-

eth, that GOD is a free and voluntary agent, because he might not have made it at all, or made it otherwise than it is. No man ever carried this supposition so far as his Lordship, who maintains strenuously, that GOD can make a system, wherein what is now just shall be unjust, and wherein what is true shall be false, and two and two shall be unequal to four. GOD can do all his pleasure; but he is pleased with nothing but what is good and just. And though he hath made every thing perfect *suo ordine et genere*, yet there is a difference in degree of perfection in one creature from that in another. His Lordship's scale of being from an oyster up to a man, and from a man higher and higher than he can tell, all of which being, in his opinion, mere matter, endued some with more, and some with less elasticity; it depended on GOD's free will to have made of the same materials a he-goat or the man BOLINGBROKE. But this man being once made a rational creature, capable of knowing his duty to GOD and man, and thereby the relation of a sovereign and a moral subject being established, he became obliged to obey the will of his maker and master. GOD acts as the supreme Being, the sovereign Lord, and Ruler, and Governor of the world, according to the essential holiness, morality, and rectitude of his nature. And the eternal truth and righteousness, and the moral fitness of things, is indeed the rule of GOD's conduct with regard to man, and all other rational creatures. It is likewise a rule
of

of conduct to all such creatures; and no more than a rule to an Atheist; but to a religionist it becomes a law and obligation. It is therefore an unfair representation of the sanctity of the supreme Being, and of Dr CLARKE's demonstration of the certainty and obligation of natural religion, to say, That "the whole system of GOD's moral obligations, or divine ethics, is a system of the duty of GOD to man." Though there may be a rule, there can be no obligation without a law; and there can be no law without a superior; and the supreme Being admits of none. In consequence of GOD's having made reasonable creatures, he becomes their Lord and Lawgiver, their Ruler and their Judge; and he rules and judges them according to the sanctity and rectitude of his own nature, without coming under any obligation, but that of his unerring wisdom, and holy will and good pleasure, which is essentially good and just. Dr CLARKE did not pretend to give a scheme of what GOD hath actually done, because that was not for his purpose; but to shew the grounds and evidences of natural religion, and the unchangeable obligations of it. And this he hath done to the satisfaction of every reader of unbiassed reason. His intention was, to shew what men are to believe and to expect from a good and just GOD, and what they ought to do in order to procure his approbation and protection. But this Nobleman writer, (I beg pardon for having said a Noble writer), with an impious affectation of wit, misapplies the term

obliged, intimating some restraint on the ALMIGHTY by acting always according to his own attributes. "It is a system of what GOD ought or is obliged by his attributes to do." GOD, for the glory of his being, always acts consistently with his attributes; but cannot properly be said to come under an obligation. But man, who is obliged by the law of GOD to act reasonably and morally, doth not always act as he is obliged to do. The author therefore poorly insinuates, that in this very thing man has the advantage of his maker. "The same rule of conduct is common to GOD and man, with this difference, that man may, but GOD never must depart from it." A poor advantage, for a reasonable creature to act unreasonably: and such a privilege it is, as it would be for a wise man to become mad at his pleasure. His Lordship must have imagined himself happier than GOD, because he could depart from the rule of reason at his discretion. How happier is he who knows, that a reasonable and moral life is an acceptable service done to a GOD of holiness, justice, goodness, and truth; a GOD who knows all his good doings and endeavours, and who can, and will protect, and plentifully reward him; a GOD whom none seek, whom none serve in vain?

LORD BOLINGBROKE, being resolved not to be bullied by orthodox divines, hath exerted all his strength in his last and dying words, and fled from
life

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life to take refuge in an everlasting insensibility. How vain, and how weak must he have been! proud of his philosophical labours, but without fortitude to publish them during his life. The brave part he hath left you to act, and to maintain his philosophical infidelity and Atheism. And I have a right to say so, for some more than this reason, That a GOD of no moral perfections cannot be the Sovereign and Governor of moral agents; and therefore, as such, you have nothing to do with him, nor he with you.

S E C T.

S E C T. VIII.

Of our imitation of GOD's moral attributes.

ONE would think, that he who denies GOD's moral attributes, employs himself idly in the debate concerning the imitation of them. But the author knew his business better. For, upon supposition that he might not prevail in persuading mankind that GOD is neither good nor just, he was resolved that their *opiniatreté* should profit them as little as possible. It is only on supposition that GOD is holy, that he contends we ought not to presume to imitate him in holiness. To prevent misrepresentation, take his opinion in his own words. “ * I must give some
 “ answer to a question, which our good friend the
 “ B. of C. makes, Whether there is any absurdity in
 “ supposing, that man should imitate the author of
 “ nature as far as he is able? This is said to be, not
 “ only agreeable to the Christian plan, but also to
 “ that of the Stoics.—In answer to this query, I
 “ confess, and think myself obliged in conscience to
 “ confess, that I hold it to be absurd, and worse than
 “ absurd, to assert, that man can imitate GOD, ex-
 “ cept in a sense so very remote and so improper,
 “ that the expression should never be used, and much
 “ less such a duty recommended.” After observing

* Vol. iii. p. 410.

the distinction made by divines, of GOD's physical and moral attributes, (which distinction must be admitted), he says, "They admit, that though we cannot imitate GOD in the exercise of the former, they insist, that we can, and ought to imitate him in the exercise of the latter. And to complete this proof, which consists in affirmation rather than argument, they maintain, at least CLARKE does so, very peremptorily, that the divine moral attributes, that is, holiness, goodness, justice, righteousness, and truth, are the very same in GOD that they are in our ideas.—And that GOD desires to be imitated by men in those perfections, which are the foundation of his own unchangeable happiness."

I willingly admit, and admit for the honour of the Christian plan, that there is no absurdity in supposing that man should imitate the author of nature as far as he is able, and in so far as the author of nature is imitable. I likewise admit, that Dr CLARKE doth maintain, that the divine moral attributes are the same in GOD that they are in our ideas; but I do not find, that he makes use of this affirmation as an argument for our imitation of these moral attributes. And I further allow, that GOD desires, or rather commands us to be holy, because he himself is holy. But this Nobleman writer thinks himself obliged in conscience to confess in the face of the world, that he holds this to be absurd, and worse than absurd.

IN

IN order to proceed to the examination of this heavy charge brought against Christians, and the best of Heathens, I desire you will be pleased to let me know, what sort of conscience is here to be understood, whether a private or a public conscience. As a good citizen, he thinks it best to disclaim private conscience. For on every occasion, and sometimes without an occasion, he tells us, that private conscience is dangerous to the public peace and tranquillity. If we are to understand a public conscience, a pretence to it in a Christian nation, against the national profession, if not the national principles of religion, is a direct violation of that conscientious duty which you owe to the society whereof you are a member. As this, I think, is the only appeal made to conscience, (for I do not remember another instance in all your voluminous works), it is fit that this conscience of yours should be narrowly looked into. A man is bound in conscience, when his reason dictates to him what he ought to do, and what he ought to forbear. Whatever a man *ought* to do, he is *obliged* to do. This presupposes the knowledge of a duty, a duty presupposes an obligation, and an obligation presupposes a law, and a law, as such, is indispensable at the discretion of the obligee. Whoever therefore stands accountable to his own conscience, stands accountable to a superior legislator, and to a legislator who knows the thoughts of his heart, his designs and his endeavours, as well as his actions. Conscience therefore

therefore belongs to no man but to him who believes himself one of GOD's moral subjects, sensible of his sovereignty, and of his own subjection. Leave the man and his conscience subject only to the authority of his own understanding, he will find himself under no obligation of conscience, but what is dispensable at his pleasure; and such an obligation is none at all. So far as civil authority reaches, a subject may find himself bound by that authority to conform his conduct to the laws of the society, but no further than the judge knows his obedience or transgression: whereas a subject of GOD's moral government hath a religious conscience; and this conscience binds and obliges at all times, in all cases, without reserve or exception. And how could he, or how can you plead a religious conscience as dictatrix of what is morally good and evil, when you deny GOD's moral attributes? He was not bashful, and you are not blate, to discharge your consciences against those who think themselves obliged to be holy in all manner of conversation, because GOD is holy, for the absurdity, and worse than absurdity, in taking such an obligation on them. And whatever in this case is worse than absurdity, must be impiety and blasphemy. *Absurd* is a word his Lordship uses freely and frequently; but had he known that nothing is absurd but what is demonstrably false, he had used it more sparingly. Notwithstanding he allows, that the Christian doctrine may bear an orthodox sense; but a

sense so remote and so improper, that the expression should never be used, and much less such a duty recommended. Whatever he might say as a nobleman, it became him as a philosopher to have pointed out this remote and improper sense, that his reader might judge whether the expression was to be used, and the duty recommended, or not. I cannot take his assertions, even his appeal to his conscience, for a decisive argument.

THERE are many generical attributes which may be predicated of GOD and his creatures. To GOD we and he ascribe being, existence, intelligence, wisdom, and power; and Mr MALLET is a being adorned with intelligence and power, and wisdom too; for he is not an idiot: and these things are said of him, and said of GOD, *univoce et divisim*. And therefore, without impiety or absurdity, in so far man may be said to be like to GOD. The difference indeed is extremely great, and therefore plain. But difference doth not take away the generical agreement. Let *reasonable animal* be the definition of man, in which *reasonable* stands for the most proper difference between *man* and other animals; it doth not take away *animality*, in which *man* and *beast* agree generically. Man is still a real animal; and such is a horse. No more do the existence, knowledge, power, the goodness, and justice of GOD, take away the reality of justice, goodness, power, intelligence,

gence, and existence from man. To ascend with his Lordship in his hypothetical scale of beings, to the highest of them in the highest rank, who never departed from the rule of equity, who never transgressed the law of nature, and who never disobeyed the will of his GOD, and whose goodness and beneficence extended as far as his power; such a being must resemble a GOD of holiness, more than Lord BOLINGBROKE ever did. I do admit, and his Lordship admits it too, that between finite and infinite there is no proportion: yet it doth not follow, that the creature must in every thing be unlike to the Creator. For then it would follow, that if GOD is an intelligent being, we must be unintelligent; and if he exists, we cannot *be*. And therefore, though GOD is infinitely holy, we may be finitely such. And sure I am, it is not our duty to GOD, to differ from him in every thing, and to be wicked because he is good and just. You would do well to consider, that such profound piety and reverential awe of GOD as hinders you from imitating in your conduct the divine moral attributes, tends to make men immoral. On supposition that we are the subjects of GOD's moral government, it is our duty to conform our conduct to his known will, and to improve in piety and morality; and all our endeavours to that purpose may be construed aspiring to a similitude with our sovereign Lord and Master. It is making his will the rule and foundation of our will, and of our

works. And when we will and do the same things which GOD wills and commands us to will and to do, in so far we agree with him: and in this agreement we resemble him more than the devil and damned spirits, who are said to act a contrary part. This is what I understand, and what all Christians understand, and what the best of Heathens did understand, by the imitation of GOD's moral attributes.

FOR this purpose, among others, all religious people and nations have instituted a worship and adoration of the Deity. When in the most solemn and serious manner we employ our thoughts in contemplation of the supreme Being, and with our voice praise him for his glorious perfections, and *blefs him for his goodness*, we are led to love him; and whom we love, we wish to resemble as far as we are able. This is natural: and to desire to be like the being whom we adore, is natural likewise; so natural, that wicked Heathens made their deities like themselves. The Siamites admire and adore their god SOMMONO-CODDAM, who neither doth good nor evil, that by this adoration they may become the liker to him in his perfections. And he who copies the completest pattern, will sooner learn the business, though he doth not come up to the original, than he who works without any. But let us hear what his Lordship says against the opinion of so great and so good a part of mankind. And he says,

“ THEY

“ * THEY would do well to consider, that if the
 “ moral attributes of GOD were demonstrated by ar-
 “ guments *a priori*, and they are not so even by
 “ them, to be the same in GOD that they are in our
 “ ideas; yet this general assurance would be far from
 “ making them objects of human imitation. To be
 “ such, they must be known *a posteriori*, like his
 “ physical attributes: for we can have no knowledge
 “ of either, *except that which sense and experience*
 “ *gives us*. They must be discerned in the works of
 “ GOD, and in the conduct of his providence. And
 “ it is evident, that they cannot be so discerned in
 “ them, as to be proper objects of our imitation. The
 “ divine attributes are exercised in such innumerable
 “ relations unknown to us; though we are sure the
 “ exercise of them, in the immensity of the universe,
 “ is always directed by the all-perfect Being to that
 “ which is fittest to be done on the whole; yet the
 “ notions of created beings, who see them in one re-
 “ lation alone, like us, cannot be applied to them
 “ with any propriety, nor with any certainty, suffi-
 “ cient to make them objects of their imitation. This
 “ is so true, that in many cases we should act in direct
 “ contradiction to the law of our nature, if we made
 “ the conduct of divine providence the rule of ours.
 “ GOD makes the sun to rise upon the evil and the
 “ good, and he sends rain on the just and unjust.
 “ He involves the innocent with the guilty in great

* Vol. iii. p. 412.

“ calamities;

“ calamities ; and there is no theme on which divines
 “ enlarge more pathetically than on the unjust distri-
 “ bution of good and evil.—Are these appearances,
 “ however constant some, and however frequent o-
 “ thers, to stand as objects which we are to imitate in
 “ our moral conduct? I think no man will suppose
 “ that they are, except those who have so little re-
 “ gard to consistency, that they propose the first to
 “ our imitation, whilst they aggravate the two last to
 “ such a degree, that they assume the justice and
 “ goodness of GOD’s dispensations in this system to
 “ be capable of no other vindication, than that which
 “ supposes another. These writers and preachers,
 “ therefore, must mean, when they exhort us to imi-
 “ tate GOD, not the GOD whom we see in his works,
 “ and in all that his providence orders or permits ; but
 “ a GOD who appears in their representations of him,
 “ and who is often such a GOD as no pious Theist
 “ can acknowledge.”

IN conformity to this scheme of judging of things
 and actions only as they are circumstanced, or *in con-
 creto*, he denies that we can form any idea of justice *
in abstracto. And he gives for reason, That he knows
 the real essence of justice, and can define it several
 ways ; yet these definitions or their contraries, a con-
 formity to one or the other of which constitutes
 every action just or unjust, cannot form in any mind

* Vol. iii. p. 366.

one abstract idea of justice. " We can contemplate
" each of these apart, and compare any particular
" action with it; but we cannot abstract one general
" nature, with which we may compare every action
" that falls under some one of these definitions."
Before he can pronounce an action to be just, he must
compare it with the definition of justice. And what is
this definition of justice? It is not the definition of a
particular just action; for action is not compared with
itself, but with the idea of justice. One must be hard
put to it, to establish and support a system of religious
or irreligious philosophy, to be obliged to speak non-
sense with so much assurance, and so directly contrary
to the first principles of ratiocination. But I have al-
ready fully answered all his objections against the doc-
trine of abstraction. This however is the foundation
of robbing GOD of all his moral attributes, and con-
demning every attempt to imitate his holiness in our
conduct. It may serve the purpose of one who pre-
tends to know no more of GOD's physical or moral
attributes than what sense and experience teach him;
and that is just nothing at all. He hath no use for
reason; and without it I know not what he can learn;
for I do not remember that I ever was an irrational
creature. How doth he prove *a posteriori*, that GOD
is omniscient and omnipotent, without reasoning from
the effect to the cause, and from the nature of the ef-
fect to the nature of the cause? He can have no ex-
perience, that this world, material and moral, is the
work

work of GOD. He did not see it made, nor was he witness of repeated acts of creation. But this great doctor of ignorance, and antirational philosopher, can reason both *a posteriori* and *a priori*, when he is in one of his rational fits. “ Though the divine attributes are exercised in innumerable relations absolutely unknown to us, we are sure, that the exercise of them, in the immensity of the universe, is always directed by the all-perfect Being to that which is fittest to be done.” And upon what grounds can he be sure of this, but by reasoning *a priori*, after this manner: There is an essential difference between right and wrong, independently of all arbitrary appointment, human or divine; from which arises a fitness of some actions, and unfitness in others: and this eternal independent fitness is a rule for GOD, as well as for man: A being of all perfection, both physical and moral, can never do any thing that is unfit to be done; and when we do that which is just and good, we observe the same rule of conduct; we then co-operate with GOD, which, his Lordship says, is honour enough for the creature? And may it not then be said, without impiety and blasphemy, that in this we imitate GOD’s moral attributes?

BUT he objects, “ If we are to imitate GOD, we must imitate the works of his providence; and in that case we should act in direct contradiction to the law of nature; because GOD makes the sun to
“ rise

“rise upon the just and the unjust, and sends rain upon the evil and the good; and he involves the innocent with the guilty in great calamities.” He vindicates the divine goodness and justice in his government of the universe, because whatever he does, is fittest to be done; and in particular he impeaches his GOD of misadministration. He makes the sun to rise and the rain to fall upon the worst and the best of men, without discrimination; and he involves the innocent with the guilty into great calamities. And if we should do so, we should act unjustly. He knows, that it is an article of the Christian religion, that all mankind are sinners; and every one who believes natural religion, acknowledges, that in many things he offends, and falls short of his duty. Those innocents, therefore, who are involved in great calamities with the wicked, are not *absolutely*, but *comparatively* innocent. GOD is omniscient, and knows the case of every individual; but we are often ignorant of the merit and demerit of men and nations. And if a hypocritical knave is signally punished by providence, it can lay us under no obligation to hurt a man in whom we perceive no fault. Our duty can never extend beyond what we can possibly know. And, to be sure not to err, we have nothing to do, but to act according to the rules of morality. And if his Lordship, or you for him, please to stop, (as you frequently advise others to do), without going beyond those duties which we owe to GOD and man, you may assure

F f

yourself

yourself of the approbation of the supreme Being. There is no occasion for giving yourself any trouble with God's government of the world: for you will find yourself under no obligation to make the sun to rise and the rain to fall upon the just and the unjust; but you will find yourself obliged to extend your benevolence and beneficence to the virtuous and to the wicked. I say to the wicked, as far as it tends to their reformation, and is consistent with the peace and safety of the society: for to do good to those who deserve evil, is often to do evil to those who deserve better. Earthly sovereigns take into their own hands the administration of government, and the distribution of rewards and punishments; and they make it a crime in subjects to invade this their prerogative. And it is more criminal in men to invade the divine prerogative, and willingly involve the innocent with the guilty in any distress, because God appears to us, by all observable circumstances of the case, to do so. The most innocent of mankind are infants; and yet I suppose his Lordship would not have thought it an error in God's providence, to have permitted MOSES to have perished in his ark of bulrushes; seeing thereby, according to the course of causes, his Lordship's clients the Canaanites had not suffered extermination. And had BOLINGBROKE died in his cradle, neither his country nor mankind would have lost much; nothing, I am sure, but what might have been made up many other ways. For one who pretends to believe
that

that GOD is the omniscient and omnipotent Creator and Governor of the world, to examine and determine that this particular dispensation of his providence is just or unjust, is an impious invasion on the prerogative of the supreme Being, and a scandalous contradiction to his belief and persuasion. At any rate, Dr CLARKE, and such divines as he, can support the justice and goodness of GOD's government of the world, by the argument *a priori*, drawn from the divine wisdom and power, in the present system, as well as his Lordship does, and that without finding fault with particular events and cases; and in so far better by supposing another system, than his Lordship did, or you can do without it.

I have said before, that by no manner of reasoning can it be proved, that all, either the good or bad, consequences of human actions must be immediate. Lord BOLINGBROKE knew more of the world, than to have imagined, that every great design must be carried on by means with a direct tendency, a tendency obvious to every one, to promote it. If, in the affairs of this life, we must wait for the ultimate and grand event of many various actions, in order to see their influence on the effect first in view; how can we be able to pronounce, that this and the other dispensation of divine providence is well or ill adapted for the good of the creation, and the glory of the Creator, before the whole scheme is finished? Let a man be witness of

the greatest crime committed by a person of reputed probity, who escapes punishment during years; the witness could not conclude, that the criminal therefore must escape for ever. Hidden things of darkness, after long delay, are wonderfully brought to light in the present system of things. GOD permitted (and BOLINGBROKE says, that GOD in his providence orders or permits) JOSEPH to be sold to the Ishmaelites, and permitted them to sell him in Egypt. The sale was cruel and immoral, and yet it was the means of preserving his father and his family. This, I hope, will not be taken for a fable, because it is the foundation of much real history. It is really surprising, that any man who makes pretensions to morality, should maintain, that we cannot know a good from a bad action, either human or divine, but by the immediate consequences of it. Poor is this *prima regula morum*, That whatever action procures the greatest and most immediate good, is to be chosen as reasonable and moral; and of this temporal and immediate advantage every one must judge for himself. This is to renounce all subjection to the great Sovereign of the universe. I do think, that Dr CLARKE, whom you despise and abuse, speaks much better sense. “ * The “ eternal and necessary differences of things make it “ fit and reasonable for *reasonable* creatures to act “ *reasonably*,” (I will not say, *that this causes it to be a duty, or lays an obligation upon them so to do*),

* Evidence, propof. 1.

“ even

“ even separate from the consideration of these rules
“ being the positive will or command of God; and
“ also antecedent to any respect or regard, expecta-
“ tion or apprehension, of any particular, private,
“ or personal advantage or disadvantage, reward or
“ punishment, either present or future, annexed,
“ either by natural consequence, or by positive ap-
“ pointment, to the practising or neglecting these
“ rules.” A great dealer in contradictions is his
Lordship, to maintain, that the morality of actions is
only to be known by their good and bad consequen-
ces; and to assert, (as before observed), that morality
is not made by will, either human or divine, but that
things are right or wrong absolutely and in themselves.
I may now conclude, that it is false and absurd to as-
sert, as his Lordship hath done, that we know no-
thing of God's physical or moral attributes, but by
sense and experience; and that we know nothing of
the morality and immorality of actions, but by their
immediate good or bad consequences; and that there
is no way to know the holiness of almighty God,
but by the immediate consequences of every dispensa-
tion of his providence.

WITH equal disrespect to his intelligent and atten-
tive reader, and discredit to himself, BOLINGBROKE
asserts, that the moral attributes of God “ must be
“ discovered in his works, and in the conduct of his
“ providence;” when at the same time he denies di-
vine

vine providence, at least as to individuals. From a general providence that comes no further down than to nations and communities, one may learn politics, but nothing for his own personal conduct. This philosopher must have imagined himself made only for the management and administration of public business; and that his personal conduct was below his own elevated wisdom, and below the care of divine providence. Grant all this, and he was in the right to refuse an imitation of God's moral attributes. The physical and moral attributes of God are only discernible in the conduct of his providence; and this providence is not extended to individuals, and therefore can have no influence on any man's personal behaviour. And as little could he have been influenced in a public station by a national providence. For he finds fault with God's making the sun to rise and the rain to fall on the just and unjust, and for involving the innocent with the guilty in great calamities, and that finally, according to his theology. From this he must have learned, that an imitation of God's government of the world was unjust. Both in a public and private capacity, he had no occasion for divine providence as a rule and example for his behaviour. All that he knew, and all that you know of God, is, that he abandons every particular man to the conduct of his own understanding, with liberty to act independently on him; and if he governs nations, it is in a way that is not equal. His religion, and his knowledge

ledge of the supreme Being, had as little influence or tendency to make him or you wiser or better men, either in a personal or public capacity, than he might have been, or you may be, as an Atheist.

To hear his Lordship conclude the debate about the imitation of GOD's moral attributes, one would be apt to think that he had learned nothing by his philosophical inquiry into the nature of the supreme Being, but to contradict himself. "Men should content themselves to know GOD, as he hath thought fit to be known by them. And why are not divines, especially, so content? He appears in his works, and by easy deductions of our knowledge of them, to be the first, self-existent, intelligent cause of all things, a being of infinite wisdom and power, and therefore an object to all rational creatures, not of curiosity, but of awe, of reverence, of adoration, of gratitude, of obedience, and resignation." This is in so far true, (and I have already acknowledged it); but it doth not follow from his principles. "To what purpose then do divines contend to make him an object of human imitation, by deductions from his nature and attributes, independently of his works, by which alone they can have the little, inadequate, general, but sufficient knowledge of his nature and attributes, that hath been mentioned? Do they hope to carry Theism any further by nice metaphysical

“ physical speculations, hard to be understood, and
“ inconclusive when they are understood, than by
“ those obvious proofs which God hath proportioned
“ to the comprehension of every man? I conclude
“ therefore my answer to this query, by asking, in
“ my turn, our excellent friend, whether the doctrine of imitating God, even so far as we are able,
“ does not tend to draw men off unnecessarily, and,
“ if I may say so, wantonly, from real knowledge,
“ into those abstractions that have led so many to
“ confound the divine and human nature; to imagine
“ an, uninterrupted scale of intelligence from man up
“ to God; to flatter themselves with notions not
“ only of imitating him, but of being united to him;
“ and to invent and adapt, in the licentiousness of
“ imagination, all that metaphysical and mystical
“ blasphemy which hath passed for the most sublime
“ theology?”

I have said, that I am content to know God as he hath thought fit to be known. But I am very sure, that it is his will and pleasure, that I should know as much of his physical and moral perfections, as I am capable to discover: and therefore I am not content to limit my knowledge of him, to his knowledge and his power. Beyond this his Lordship doth maintain we should not go; and that further we cannot go; because between God's physical and moral attributes there is only an imaginary connection. But,
consistently

consistently with his method of learning, he cannot arrive at the knowledge of the divine knowledge and power. For neither sense nor experience can teach him, that GOD made and governs the world. To know more than, or to know any thing of GOD, he must reason from what he sees and observes; and this he will not do, because such reasoning must lead him into metaphysical abstraction. More than this, if he should mistake error for truth, he ought to be content with being deceived, because it is GOD himself who deceives him. Never was philosopher more idly employed. For if the knowledge or ignorance of GOD, if our conceptions of his being and perfections are according to truth, or according to error, it is the same thing to him, and consequently to every rational creature. What occasion then had he to trouble himself and others with his speculations? since knowledge, error, and ignorance, in our conceptions of the supreme Being, are equally fit and proper, the proper means appointed by GOD himself, for attaining as much knowledge of our obligations to adore and obey him, as is necessary for us. Such a writer is in the right to reject logics and metaphysics, and together with these, to reject all reasoning; and so he does on the subject of natural religion. I know, and I know it by abstract reasoning, that GOD is holy, just, and good, and true. And if his Lordship knows no more than he learns from sense and experience, he hath no use for any deductions, whe-

ther easy or difficult, to learn that God is the first, self-existent, and intelligent cause of all things. And these deductions, easy as they are, he hath never once attempted, because it cannot be done without something of metaphysics, artificial or natural. For instance, if an infinite succession of causes and effects is not impossible, it cannot be demonstrated from the works of nature, or from all that we see and observe in the material and moral world, that God is the first cause of all. It is owing to metaphysics, and abstract reasoning, that we know the world is made, and well made, because it bears all the marks of an intelligent and powerful architect; and because nothing can make itself, since in that case it must be both the cause and the effect, prior and posterior to itself. From which it follows, that this world, and the maker of it, must be two distinct beings. The maker of the world must be an unmade and uncaused being, and therefore must be a self-existent, self-sufficient, and all-perfect being; a being who is himself independent, and on whom all things made to be, are dependent. This is no metaphysical blasphemy. It is the foundation of natural religion, and the most sublime theology. This is so far from leading men to confound the divine and human nature, or confounding God and nature, as Atheists do, that it is the true way to distinguish them.

By our imitation of God's moral attributes and perfections, all that I understand, or others understand,

stand, as far as I know, is our obligation to be holy, because the GOD whom we adore, is himself holy. And can we overact our part in morality? Is it displeasing to the supreme Being, that we should make his holiness an obligation on us to be holy, *as far as we are able*? Is it because men of piety and morality are liker to GOD than the devil and damned spirits are, that his Lordship forbids all imitation of his moral attributes? I am sure, that they who believe the moral perfections of the Almighty, and, in consequence of their belief, make it their study and endeavour to lead a pious and a moral life, act a more reasonable part, and do their Creator more honour, than either his Lordship did, or you do, by denying his moral perfections, and setting men free from all divine obligations to live righteously and godly. Is not the world wicked enough? It seems not, for your purpose. A very poor purpose it must be, to make mankind worse than they make themselves, and to teach them to cut your throat for their own advantage, whenever they find an opportunity of doing it safely. I fear no man who fears GOD; but I shall never willingly trust myself, or what belongs to me, to any man who denies GOD's moral perfections, his providence, and a future state of rewards and punishments; because it is his opinion, that he may do every thing safely, that he can secretly. Are not you afraid lest a brother in unbelief should take the first opportunity to dispatch you, for fear you should dispatch him? Prevention, between you and him, is

the only means of safety. Would it not be for your advantage, that all mankind were honest and moral? And for this purpose divines and preachers exhort their readers and hearers to imitate, as far as they are able, God's moral perfections. This, you say, will lead men unnecessarily and wantonly from *real knowledge* into metaphysical blasphemy. But the reduction of all your means of knowledge into sense and experience, is to lead men into a total ignorance of God; and if not into a persuasive and reasoned, at least into a stubborn Atheism; that is, if not into a disbelief, at least into an unbelief of the being and attributes of God. In place of natural religion, it tends to establish an affected, studied, a learned and laborious, and consequently a wicked ignorance of God, and of all the duties we owe to him, and to one another for his sake *. In fine, I hope the religious reader will excuse me for saying, that I look upon so much of Lord BOLINGBROKE's philosophy as I have examined, as disguised Atheism: and what I have further to say, I believe will confirm me and my reader more and more in this opinion.

* No man who hath any right apprehension of the holiness of God, and of the morality of human actions, can forbid our imitation of the divine moral attributes. His Lordship's doctrine serves no religious purpose, but may be a *caveat* against carrying the principles of Atheism too far. For on supposition that "ignorance and knowledge, truth and falsity, fidelity and perfidy, virtue and vice, are equally emanations from the first being," it were a disservice done to mankind to teach them to imitate such a being.

S E C T.

S E C T. IX.

Of GOD's preserving providence.

I HAVE said, that Lord BOLINGBROKE's philosophy leads to a total ignorance of GOD, and to an unbelief of his being and attributes, so far as I have examined it. And what I have to say, confirms me still more in this opinion; and particularly his doctrine of divine providence. For the satisfaction of readers not well acquainted with the subject, I shall first state my notion of it; and if I do not obviate, I shall afterwards answer my author's objections against it.

By the term *providence*, I understand in general, the care which GOD takes of his creatures, considered as actually created. This, though true, is not sufficient to give us a distinct notion of all that concerns the subject; and therefore it must be considered more fully and particularly. Scarce any ever denied the whole of providence, except those who likewise denied GOD's creation of the world. So close is the connection between these two, that by common consent it hath passed for an axiom, *If GOD is, the world is governed by providence*. It is true, the ancient Epicureans did, and modern Epicureans do, in words, acknowledge a Deity; but strongly opposed, and

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and still oppose a providence; and no wonder, for they both deny a creation. The ancient Epicureans were therefore justly esteemed Atheists by men of learning and solid sense. The Stoics taught other and better things; and if what they say of fate, had not hindered, they deserved applause for their doctrine: and it is possible that their meaning, even in that, is not rightly understood.

UPON supposition that GOD is the *creator*, I am to maintain that he is therefore the *curator* of this world. Nor is there any difficulty to demonstrate this, by comparing the excellence of the supreme Being with the manifold imperfections of the creature. SENECA said, and said well, *Non sine custode stare tantum opus*. But more particularly, we are to consider divine providence as it is exercised with respect to those things that depend on it. In every being produced by creation, there are two things to be considered, the permanency or duration in existence, and its activity in operation. From this arise two distinct acts of divine providence, (I mean relatively to the effects), commonly and properly called *conservation* and *government* *. To prevent mistakes, I do not mean, that, in our conceptions of divine providence, by *preservation* is to be understood a bare negative *non-destruction* of the things which GOD

* Conservation, preservation, and sustentation, are used promiscuously.

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might or may destroy or annihilate, if he pleased. They who seemingly admit divine preservation, and contend that there is no more necessary to preserve created beings in existence but divine permission or indulgence, do but divert themselves with a negative and positive meaning of the word. They imagine, that a thing once created stands in need of no further assistance, but only to be left to itself in order to continue in existence. But I undertake to prove, that *preservation* is an efficacious act of providence, whereby things created are made to continue in being; just as the sun preserves and continues the day as long as it is day: for it doth not only not destroy the meridian light, but by a very positive virtue and influence, no less efficacious than that by which it produced the morning, it operates for the preservation of the day.

THAT preservation is something *positive*, the manifest imperfection of all created beings doth plainly demonstrate. Every thing created is dependent, contingent, and successive in duration. This no man who admits creation can deny. And no less certain it is, that the permanency of a created thing *in suo esse*, in its own being, is not a mere nothing; otherwise a thing created would begin to be nothing as soon as it began to be; than which nothing can be more absurd. Duration, then, is something true and real. Not only so, but this duration is something distinct from the first

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first moment of existence. It is likewise certain, that nothing of independency can belong to a created being. Therefore permanency in existence, which is something and positive, hath no place in such dependent and created beings; but is entirely to be ascribed to an independent God, by whose true and real influx they all continue in existence. By creation they became dependent, and by the same productive power they continue their dependency. As creation brought them under the dominion of the Creator, their duration rather increases than dissolves their subjection.

By considering the contingency of creatures with respect to their duration, we shall find the same conclusion. For what hath only a contingent being, is no more determined to continue in existence than to discontinue. What of itself is determined, and able to prolong its existence, can have no contingent, but a necessary duration. If it is not permanent by the necessity of its nature, its duration must be owing to the influx of some other cause. And of what cause? Surely to the influence of that cause which, from a thing only possible, made it actual. All contingent beings, that is, all the creation, owe their existence, and the continuation of it, not to themselves, but to that self-existent cause, that, from a state of possibility, raised them up to actual and permanent existence.

THE same conclusion follows no less plainly from

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a successive duration in created things. The different moments of a contingent and successive permanency, have no connection one with another, and far less have they any influence and causality one upon another. Certainly I am not now, because I was an hour before: nor doth it follow from my present being, that I shall be an hour after this; otherwise my duration would not be contingent, but necessary. For if the cause of my present duration is my preceding duration, then my present duration must be the cause of my duration hereafter; and so one moment must insure another, and that to all eternity. Thus it follows, that what of itself is insufficient to continue its existence for one moment, (and whatever lasts by a contingent and successive duration, is insufficient), must therefore owe its conservation, as well as its creation, to an external cause; to GOD the first cause; who, as he possesses in himself duration in the most perfect manner, that is, *eternity*, without contingency or succession; so is he the fountain and source of all other beings, and of their duration, by a true and real influence of his power.

To this it is objected, That every thing of itself can easily retain what is once given it by creation, without any additional influence, provided what is given is not taken away. And to confirm the objection, it is added, that it is superfluous and vain, and even

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absurd,

absurd, to suppose a new, needless, and real action, to which no proper and positive effect can be assigned.

To every creature existence is at once bestowed by creation; yet its duration, which is successive, is not: and as by a successive flux it cannot subsist altogether and at once, so no more can this successive duration be altogether bestowed by one momentary act of power. An instantaneous and successive duration cannot belong to one and the same thing: therefore, to establish a continued existence, recourse must be had to a continued production. And its proper and specific effect is the existence of the thing preserved; not as it came first from nothing or non-existence, (in that case it belongs to creation), but in so far as it is extended more and more beyond its first appearance in a world of beings. On this account it is commonly, and well said, that preservation is a continued creation. The same act of GOD's almighty will gives being to things which before had none, and prolongs and continues them in existence. It is therefore properly a continued, but not a repeated creation. For it is obvious and known by experience, that what exists this moment doth not cease to be the next; which it must do, were the act of creation perpetually renewed and repeated.

BOLINGBROKE, and you, DAVID MALLET, Esq; say, “* When we speak of the world as the work of

* Vol. ii. p. 59.

“ GOD,

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“ God, we must not conceive it to have been made
“ by a laborious progression, and to have at last re-
“ mained imperfect, as the works of men: we must
“ conceive, on the contrary, as well as we can, that
“ God willed it to exist, and it existed; that he will-
“ ed it to continue, and it continues, distinct from
“ the workman, like any human work, and infinitely
“ better fitted and contrived, by the disposition of it,
“ to answer all the purposes of the divine architect.”
To the same act of power and divine will all things
created owe their existence, and the continuance of
them. They depend as much and as immediately on
omnipotent pleasure that they are now, as they do
that they once began to be. This you admit, because
“ God wills things to exist, and to continue in ex-
“ istence.” And it is only by that cause that they
began to be, and still are. If creation is immediate,
so is preservation; for it is an act of the same effica-
cious power. He therefore who supposes that things
can subsist without this perpetual and continued influx,
or without an interposition of it, may as well suppose
that created things made and created themselves.

HIS Lordship was dextrous in turning old objec-
tions into a new model, and passing them upon the
world as his own inventions. He says, (and it hath
been said long before), “ * It is injurious to true
“ Theism, to assume the immediate presence of the

* Vol. ii. p. 58.

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“ supreme Being in all the operations of corporeal
 “ nature, however the assumption may be palliated
 “ by metaphysical distinctions, and how innocent so-
 “ ever the intentions of those who do may be. They
 “ who do this, do in effect reduce GOD in their ideas,
 “ notwithstanding all the magnificent expressions they
 “ employ, to a sort of plastic intelligent nature,
 “ working constantly on matter, if not in it.” But,
 before I return an answer to this metaphysical re-
 proach, I shall add his appeal to the philosophers of
 the Cape of Good Hope. “ To think otherwise,”
 (that is, to think that GOD interposes immediately and
 continually in the conservation and operation of mate-
 rial beings), “ is to measure divinity by a more scanty
 “ measure than humanity; and because we cannot
 “ perceive how the operations of this vast machine
 “ are performed, to account for them, by supposing
 “ it, in this instance, less perfect than a machine of
 “ human execution. Carry a clock to the wild inha-
 “ bitants of the Cape of Good Hope, they will soon
 “ be convinced, that intelligence made it: and none
 “ but the most stupid will imagine, that this intelli-
 “ gence is in the hand that they see move, and in the
 “ wheels which they see turn. Those among them
 “ who pretend to greater sagacity than the rest, may
 “ perhaps suspect, that the workman is concealed in
 “ the clock, and there conducts invisibly all the mo-
 “ tions of it. The first of these Hottentot philoso-
 “ phers are, you see, more rational than Atheists;
 “ the

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“ the second are more so than the Heathen naturalists; and the third is just at a pitch with some modern metaphysicians.”

BESIDES metaphysical distinctions, there are metaphysical demonstrations: and this is one of them, That whatever continues to exist of itself, is in so far independent. But upon supposition that created things do continue in being of themselves, then as to this their duration they must be independent. Now, GOD the Creator is the only independent Being, and by his work of creation all things do *essentially* depend on him. He must therefore change the unchangeable essence of things, and dissolve the relation between the Creator and the creature, before any created being can subsist independently on him. This I think his Lordship cannot decently refuse, because he says, “ * That GOD is the absolute master and free cause of all things, is a proposition which belongs to the nature of the Creator; That the creature is essentially dependent on GOD, is a proposition which belongs to the essence of the creature.—These propositions are in truth identical; and the one belongs to the essence of GOD as really as the other. And to say that the creature depends on the Creator, or that the Creator is absolute master of the creature, is the same thing.” For this reason, therefore, whoever imagines, must imagine amiss,

* Vol. iii. p. 344. *ad marg.*

that

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that GOD may abandon the works of his hands, and even dignify them with an intrinsic energy to remain such as he hath made them, without any interposition of his power. This is his Lordship's doctrine. But though masters may bestow liberty and independency on their slaves, and, as far as is in their power, make them their companions and equals; yet this prerogative of independency GOD cannot bestow on a creature, because he cannot depart from his sovereignty and dominion over every thing that he hath made. A power therefore to continue itself in being, is what GOD by his essence cannot bestow, nor the creature by its created essence receive; and that because of the mutual and immutable relation between them. I do think it is no injury done to true Theism to say, That GOD, by an act of his omnipotent will, makes the sun to rule by day, and the moon by night, and continues every planet both in being and in motion; and that this is a part of his unalienable prerogative. Though I cannot hinder men of wit and impiety to lessen the majesty of GOD, by uncouth comparisons; I do not see, that those who assert that the world subsists by a continued exertion of the divine power, the same power that made it, do thereby reduce GOD in their ideas to a sort of plastic intelligent nature. GOD, as the GOD whom Christians adore, is not an indolent and idle Deity, like that of EPICURUS; but a being of such power, that all things are equally easy to it, and, as is allowed by BOLINGBROKE, whose doings
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are neither *operose* nor *laborious*: and therefore to assert, that he works constantly on matter, or in it, tends rather to his glory, than to assert, that, after creation, he leaves the material world to continue to be and move, without any influx of his omnipotent will. To make GOD work constantly on matter, or in it, is not to lessen his perfections. It is to speak and to think of the supreme Being suitably to his immensity and omnipotence: for matter doth not exclude his omnipresence, let it be ever so large and so solid; for, saith his Lordship, "GOD is an infinite spirit."

IT being once admitted, (and it is proved), that all that is besides the supreme Being does subsist by the influence of his almighty will, it is a just consequence, that whatever exists without this influence, were it but for a moment, must for that moment be independent. This independency it must have of itself, and in itself; for GOD cannot give it; and he cannot give it, for the reason just now taken from BOLINGBROKE, That it is essential to the Creator to be master of the creature, and essential to the creature to depend on the Creator. And indeed whatever exists of itself, though but for a moment, may subsist to all eternity, and might have subsisted from eternity. From all which it follows, that all created beings depend on GOD for the prolongation of their existence; and that every thing which of itself subsists, must be necessary, eternal, and self-sufficient; that is, it must be GOD.

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I know this can give no great offence to my authors; for they have no quarrel with the eternity and independency of matter. But I shall find another place to examine this Atheistical concession. To think that all the operations of the material world are performed by the immediate influence of God's omnipotent will, is not to measure divinity by a more scanty measure than that with which we measure humanity; nor is it to suppose the work of God less perfect than the work of human execution. An architect builds a house in such a durable manner, that the stones and timber remain in the same situation in which they were placed, when all hands are removed from them. We praise the industry of artificers who make machines to last and to move the best and longest, without putting a hand to them to continue or renew the motion. From which it hath been argued, before BOLINGBROKE, that unless we ascribe to God less power and skill than we do to such artificers, we must acknowledge that he can create, and doth create beings, that may and do subsist of themselves, by bare permission or indulgence, without any positive influx of power. But the cases which are supposed the same, differ widely. For, 1st, All these inventions and contrivances shew both the wants and the weakness of mankind. Could they measure time without clocks, or other machines, they would not make any; could they raise and remove great weights without counterbalances, or multiplication of screws, they would

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would not spend their time, nor weary themselves with such work. Their understanding and their power furnishing ready and easy means, they would make use of them for every purpose. But the doings of GOD are neither *operose* nor *laborious*. He performs all by his will; and all things obey. 2dly, The materials which the artificer uses, are entirely independent on him. He neither made them, nor doth he preserve them. And, 3dly, The artificer himself, with all his skill, depends upon his maker and creator: therefore, whatever he is, and whatever he does, he does it only as a second and dependent cause. It is certainly a mark of supereminent perfection, to have all things every way dependent on it, when all this can be had without trouble or pains. The more extensive dominion and power is, the more perfect and glorious is that being to whom it belongs. And therefore, without denying his own perfection, GOD cannot divest himself of his prerogative of having all things, at all times, in the most immediate manner dependent on him. And, without doubt, he must divest himself of universal superiority and dominion, and diminish his own empire and kingdom, did he make beings which could subsist without the interposition and influence of his almighty will. His Lordship admits, that it is a contradiction to say, that GOD can make independent creatures. To shew that his objection drawn from machines against the continued influx of GOD's

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preserving power is older than he, I here subjoin both the objection, and an answer to it *.

I am obliged to attend his Lordship to the Cape of Good Hope, in order to exhibit his clock to the

* Non difficilis est difficultas alia petita ab artificibus, quorum imprimis laudatur industria, si struant machinas, quibus manum admoveere ad earundem conservationem nihil est necesse. Inde arguunt, minorem longe agnosci Dei quam hominum sapientiam ac potentiam, nisi fateamur eum saltem producere posse creaturas quæ ipsæ per sese subsistere queant, solo numinis indultu, citra ullum istiusmodi continuatum conservationis influxum. Sed non attendunt isti quam quæ duo tanquam paria hic component, toto cælo, revera sint disparia. Dedit quod ipsi contendunt, si machinæ cujuscumque a suo opifice tantam esse dependentiam demonstraverint, quanta creaturæ cujuscunque est a suo creatore. Profecto, uti supereminentis perfectionis atque excellentiæ nota est, res etiam perfectissimas a sui, tanquam causa, influxu habere pendentes omnimodo, (tantum si id continget absque labore et defatigatione illius a quo pendent), ita non absque ingenti tantæ perfectionis abnegatione, hac se prærogativa exueret causa perfectissima. Exueret revera, si quid tale produceret, quod perpetua sua manutentione, quamdiu existet, non indigeret. Dixi, si sine labore id fiat et defatigatione: absque qua quatenus artifex in rem arte factam nec influit nec influere potest, industriæ alicujus atque peritiæ argumentum opera fabricare, quæ quam diutissime per se subsistent et durent, citra architecti sui manum atque curam. Sed quid hæc omnia ad illum mundi custodem attinent, qui nulla unquam operis magnitudine distrahitur nec fatigatur? cujusque activitas ideo, non absque contumeliæ nota, cum laborioso nostrorum fabrorum conamine confertur. GERARDI DE VRIES *exercitationes rationales de DEO divinisque perfectionibus.*

philosophers

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philosophers there. Upon first sight they are all convinced that intelligence made it. Some of them imagine, that the intelligence is in the hand which moves, and in the wheels which turn. Others pretending to greater sagacity, suspect ("and perhaps suspect") that the workman is concealed in the work.—Before I meddle with the comparison between these opinions, and those of ancient and modern philosophers, I desire it may be remembered, that it is his Lordship's opinion, and a first principle, That we cannot attain any knowledge of the natural and moral attributes of GOD, but by sense and experience; which, if true, is to make his Hottentots better philosophers than he is himself. They all of them immediately see the clock, and see that it is made; and that the materials did not dispose of themselves in the order that causes the motion; and that therefore the hand doth not move, nor the wheels turn, of themselves. But his Lordship, who knows nothing of the matter but by sense and experience, doth not know whether it moves of itself, or moves by an impelling cause. To put him in the case of the Hottentot, whom he personates, he never saw a clock made; he never saw it first stop, and afterwards winded up; he never saw it taken down to pieces, and then joined, and then set agoing by a spring or by a weight. And therefore, until the machine is demounted and mounted in his view, he is not in a condition to determine whether it moves of itself or

not. He makes all the Hottentots reason, that nothing makes itself; the clock therefore, they conclude, was made by a cause distinct from it; and that the motion depending upon the construction or the make, the motion must be the effect of the cause that made the machine. But I cannot allow his Lordship to reason after this manner, because all his knowledge is founded on sense and experience. The Hottentots are sure, that the make and motion of the machine are both of them the effect of an intelligent cause; some placing this intelligence in the hand or wheels, and others *perhaps suspecting*, that the workman is concealed within the machine, and invisibly and immediately directs the whole work. He who perhaps suspects, that the workman lurks and plays his tricks to amuse a Hottentot, is just at a pitch with modern metaphysicians; who maintain, that God, by the immediate influence of his almighty will, directs all the operations of the vast machine of the visible world, and makes the sun to rise and the rain to fall. With leave, it is not true, that modern metaphysicians do *only suspect*, and *perhaps suspect*, that the sun rules by day and the moon by night, and that the whole creation depends immediately on God, for existence, preservation, and operation. This they conclude, and this they demonstrate, from a previous knowledge of many general truths. And did he not despise that part of philosophy, for mad, delirious, and unintelligible jargon, (I believe, because

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cause he did not understand it, or because it is scarcely ever on his side of a question), he might have saved himself from many blunders, and not a little impiety, to be found in his philosophical works.

HIS Hottentot philosopher, who perhaps suspects that the clock-maker is concealed in his clock, is in a fairer and nearer way, by raising his thoughts from the small machine to the grand machine of the universe, to find out, that the architect is a being of greater knowledge and power, than his Lordship was. Whether the make and motion by which the world subsists and is ruled, is inherent in itself, or dependent on a distinct cause, he is not clear enough in his judgment to determine. But his Lordship determines one step backward (and such a step that he can never recover) from the conclusion. He holds, that it subsists and operates without the immediate interposition of a distinct cause. He must therefore first determine, whether this self-subsistence and operation is essential to the grand machine, or accidental only. If it is accidental or contingent, it must be made such by a superior power, to which it owes, and on which it depends for its independency. And a dependent independency is such an absurdity, that no Hottentot can swallow and digest. If the subsistence and operation of the mundane machine is not adventitious, but essential to it, then from all that his Lordship hath learned by his sense and experience, and all that
his

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his reason can supply, he cannot demonstrate the being of GOD, and his infinite wisdom and power. Perhaps he did not intend it. And this is another reason that induces me to think that his philosophy leads into Atheism.

FROM what hath been said, and proved, it follows, that all created things depend on GOD for their being. For as creatures they could not begin to be, nor continue to be of themselves. All of them, as such, have a dependent, contingent, and successive duration. Whatever account we make of things created, whether we esteem them valuable or contemptible, useful or hurtful, excellent or mean, they are creatures, and as such, must be under the dominion of divine providence. No creature can be so perfect as to transcend its dependency on GOD, and none so mean and abject as to be below the influence of his preserving power, or to become unworthy of his regard. GOD doth not make things to be thrown away for their meanness, nor to surpass his preserving power, for their excellence and perfection. In a word, if there is any thing independent on GOD as preserver, it must be independent on him as creator also; and so must be eternal, self-existent, and self-sufficient, as is the supreme Being; or rather, there can be no being supreme, or superior to it. His Lordship, who acknowledges and refuses at his pleasure, does acknowledge a supreme Being,
the

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the first, intelligent cause, and the source of all other beings; and if he reasoned consequentially, he must therefore admit, that all things depend on him for their existence, past, present, and to come. Whether things are preserved by the mediation of second causes or without it, it is always owing to the first and creating cause, that they subsist and continue in being, whether in their original, or new state and condition.

ALL the works and doings of GOD *ad extra* are voluntary, and purely arbitrary; and all of them therefore liable to change. They depend totally on his good pleasure. But then whatever alteration they undergo, it is the effect of his omnipotent will. And as preservation is not a repeated, but a continued creation, all these changes and alterations do not imply any change in the divine will. So reasons the *Psalmist* as a good philosopher. * *Of old thou hast laid the foundations of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure: yea, all of them shall wax old as a garment; as a vesture thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed. But thou art the same. For † with him there is no variableness, nor shadow of turning.* All the changes that have happened or shall happen in the creation, are entirely consistent with GOD's immutability.

* Psal. cii. 25.

† James. i. 17.

DESCARTES,

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DESCARTES, and some of his followers, have erred grossly in maintaining, that the divine immutability is a standing reason for the preservation of the same quantity of matter and motion, without annihilation of any part or piece of the universe. And why? because, say they, that would spoil the beauty and harmony of the whole mundane fabric. Good; if GOD had promised, or could they prove, from the perfection of the Creator, or from the nature of the creature, that the stupendous building of the universe must remain the same. But as the world was made, not by any supposable connection between the divine perfections, and the existence of any other being, and only by arbitrary will and pleasure; it was made for no longer duration, in the present, or any other order, than GOD, at the instant of the creation, or rather from eternity, was pleased it should continue by the influx of his preserving power. GOD was in himself, independently of all things, before the creation; so if all that he hath made were annihilated, his happiness and self-sufficiency would still be the same. Man, without doubt, is the principal inhabitant of this our planet; and if such creatures as we can neither add to, nor diminish the happiness of the supreme Being, what can beings more glorious than we do more? We and they, in that respect, are upon the same level; for we and they are the work of GOD's hands. The Almighty can easily dispense with all revenue of reverence, adoration, obedience,

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obedience, and resignation, of the noblest creature that ever he made. We are dependent totally on God, and God is totally independent on us. His self-sufficiency is the essential basis of his own happiness; to which we cannot add, and from which we cannot take any thing away. This is a piece of ancient and sublime philosophy. For ELIPHAZ the Temanite hath said, * *Can a man be profitable unto GOD, as he that is wise is profitable to himself? Is it any additional pleasure to the Almighty, that thou art righteous? or gain to him, that thou makest thy ways perfect?*

CREATION is an act of power; and for that reason annihilation is not a positive act of power. And they who imagine that an act of power is requisite to annihilate any part of the creation, or the whole of it, must conceive that there is something inherent in every work of God, and independent on his preserving power. But, as hath been proved, by virtue of his creating power, all things owe their first being, and their continuance, to God; and therefore, to reduce into nothing, there is no more requisite, than to withhold the influence or influx of his power. A positive act of power annihilation cannot be, because God cannot exert such a power in vain, or make nothing by it. I acknowledge, that it is not easy to conceive how a thing can be

* Job xxii. 2. 3.

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reduced to nothing. But creation, or bringing things into being which formerly were not, is not more level to our comprehension. And since we are sure that GOD only is eternal, we are as sure that this world, both the materials and the frame of it, were made from nothing, just as sure as we are that the world at present exists. And though natural reason cannot determine that annihilation will certainly happen, yet it is certain that it possibly may; because the beginning of beings, and their continuance, do altogether depend on GOD's arbitrary will and mere good pleasure. So much for GOD's preserving providence. I shall, in the next place, endeavour to vindicate his governing providence, against Lord BOLINGBROKE's and Mr MALLET's misrepresentations and objections,

S E C T.

S E C T. X.

Of GOD's governing providence.

MODUS operandi sequitur modum essendi, is a metaphysical axiom; and signifies, that every thing acts as it is, and not otherwise. And seeing the whole creation depends totally on GOD, every creature that doth act, must act dependently on him. If it acted otherwise than it is, I may say, (for it hath been said), that in its being and nature it is a creature, but in its way of acting it must be a GOD. On the rational part of the creation GOD hath bestowed powers and faculties of acting; which powers and faculties they use; but then they use them dependently on him who bestowed them: and therefore the supreme Being, the author of all rational agents and all their faculties, presides over all their actions, and directs all their doings, for the purpose for which he made the world. We observe the uses and ends of innumerable creatures, and the wonderful agreement and mutual subserviency of one part with another. And if the minutest parts are so well contrived, there is no doubt to be made, that the whole is perfectly fitted for the great end and purpose for which the Creator made it. And can this be done, if all his creatures and all their actions were not under the divine superintendency and direction?

I do admit, that rational creatures are mistresses of their own actions in the order of second causes; but these actions of theirs, and their secondary power over them, do not exclude the over-ruling power and influence of the first cause. They who suppose, that every degree of liberty bestowed upon an intelligent creature diminishes as much of the dominion and authority of GOD, neither understand his power and authority, nor the nature of liberty. For, on the contrary, their liberty and their total dependence make the more glorious display of divine wisdom and power. A wise and a powerful monarch hath many ways, both to induce his subjects to act for the purposes he hath in view, and to hinder them from acting against his designs. And the wiser and more intelligent his subjects are, the more easily are they governed. And at the same time he makes no incroachment on their freedom of acting. For since liberty is essential to all rational creatures, the more intelligent they are, the more liberty they must be possessed of. And can there any reason then be given why GOD cannot govern his rational creatures consistently with their liberty? If some things were more easy, and others more difficult to the Almighty, (which cannot be), I might affirm, that the more intelligent, and the more rational, and consequently the more freedom creatures possess, the more easily are they influenced and directed by divine dominion. His Lordship says, “ * That the creation

* Vol. v. p. 296.

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“ of a man, or an angel, in the works of GOD, is not
“ more considerable than the creation of the meanest
“ insect, nor requires that the divine energy should
“ be exerted in a longer or more operose process of
“ nature.” And sure any man, except his Lordship,
must think, that GOD can as easily govern, as he
could make the world.

THOUGH what I have already proved may furnish
sufficient answers to all the objections which BOLING-
BROKE and you have brought against divine provi-
dence, yet I shall consider them more expressly and
particularly, that I may not seem to neglect what he
did, and you do think very material. The reader
must not expect, that I am to give all that is said on
the subject in his Lordship's own words, (his words
are many); however, I shall endeavour to make use
of them rather than my own, as often as occasion al-
lows. There is no great danger of mistaking his
meaning; for it is too plain to be mistaken. He
says, “ * We have not in philosophical speculation,
“ nor in our own experience, sufficient grounds to
“ establish the doctrine of particular providences, and
“ to reconcile it to that of a general providence.”
And it is his opinion, that what hath been said to re-
concile them, not only seems to him quite unintelli-
gible; but also to conceive such interpositions possible,
either in the material or moral system, is to conceive

* Vol. v. p. 28.

a violation of the mechanical constitution of the first, and the natural order of causes and effects in both. What he says of the moral world, is singularly remarkable. “ * It is impossible to conceive such occasional
 “ interpositions in the intellectual system, as shall give
 “ new thoughts and new dispositions to the minds of
 “ men, and, in consequence, new determinations to
 “ their wills, without altering in every such instance
 “ the orderly and natural progression of the human
 “ understanding, or without resuming that freedom
 “ of will which every man is conscious that he has.
 “ I confess, that I comprehend as little the metaphysical as the physical impulse of spirits; and that
 “ the words *suggestion, silent communication, sudden influence, influx, or injection of ideas*, give me no
 “ determinate, clear, and distinct ideas, nor even, as I
 “ suppose, to the persons who talk of them most.” And so he confesses, that he supposes that these words convey no determinate, clear, and distinct ideas to him, nor to any one besides.

It is well, however, that you admit a divine providence in national affairs, though you exclude all divine regard from individuals. You say, “ † It is
 “ plain from the whole course of God's providence,
 “ that he regards his human creatures collectively,
 “ *not individually*, how worthy soever every one of
 “ them deems himself to be a particular object of the

* Vol. v. p. 29.

† Vol. v. p. 110.

“ divine

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“divine care.” Admire his Lordship's humility, in deeming himself the worst, and the most unworthy of mankind, below the regard of God who made him. He is welcome to do himself justice, by acknowledging his own insignificancy: but I cannot allow him to impute to God a neglect of any thing which he hath made. This modest, this humble man, who thinks himself unworthy of divine care, acknowledges, notwithstanding, the obligation he owes to God, for placing him in the human rank of beings, when he might have made him an ass or an oyster. He accepts of all the good things his Creator bestows on him as an individual. And how can he, as an individual, refuse the divine justice? Sure he did not like to be an object of it. “* Individuals are the objects of human justice, societies of divine.” There needs no more passages to shew that his meaning is plain beyond mistake.

THE first observation that I make on this paradoxical blunder, That divine providence regards human creatures collectively, not individually, is, That consideration should be had to the number of individuals that compose the different nations and societies of men. For if God had any regard to nations and societies as such, the greater the number, the greater must the divine regard be. According to such principles, the empire of China requires more of a national providence

* Vol. v. p. 111.

than

than the republic of Ragusa. A single family is a society, and therefore an object of the divine care. And if a family in a wilderness, as a society, is under the government of GOD, why may not a family in the most populous nation on earth be subject, as a family, to the protection or punishment of divine providence? This philosopher of a nobleman might have been of this opinion, and even without any detriment to his blunder of a paradox. For he says, that “ * reason, instructed by experience, shews the law of human nature, and the sanctions of it, which are as invariable and as uniform as the law. For in all the ages of the world, and among all the societies of men, the well-being or ill-being of these societies, and therefore of all mankind, has borne a constant proportion to the observation or neglect of it.” If divine providence, in the government of nations and societies, leaves them in their collective capacity to the natural and unchangeable consequences of their reasonable or unreasonable doings, (and he admits of no additional interpositions of providence), then virtue and vice must produce their natural effects where-ever and by whomsoever they are practised. The sanction of the law of human nature is as unchangeable as the law itself: and therefore individual and personal happiness must be the consequence of individual and personal virtue, and personal trouble and distress the inseparable consequence of personal

* Vol. v. p. 102.

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vice. And can you say, or could he have said, that this is actually the case of every individual? If the consequence of virtue is as fixed and uniform as the law of right reason, how comes it to pass, that the best of men have often a scanty portion of human and temporal happiness? Must all the good consequences of morality, and all the bad consequences of immorality, though necessarily connected, be suspended, until the one sort overbalances the other in great collections of good and bad men? If every virtuous and moral man is not happy, and every wicked man is not unhappy, whether in a solitary or social state, it must be owing to the over-ruling providence of God, and to the special interpositions of it. For his Lordship rejects Epicurean chance with disdain and indignation.

ALL communities are made up of individuals; and upon the orderly or disorderly behaviour of these individuals, the happiness or misery of the whole society depends. And if GOD takes no care of twenty millions of such individuals assembled in one collection, but abandons every one of them to walk in their own ways, and to the consequences of their good and evil doings, how can he be said to rule and govern the whole nation? A machine depends upon all its parts for performance: and a monarch, whose government doth not extend to all his subjects, can never take care of all his dominions; for he that neglects the parts, neglects the whole; and if he should indulge but a

few to act independently on him, these few might defeat the best contrived methods of promoting the happiness of all the rest of his subjects. And if divine providence did not extend to individuals, it could never extend to the government of kingdoms and empires. How often are nations raised to honour and happiness, and how often are they reduced to ruin, by one single person? The wisdom and virtue of a good prince, as a second cause, makes his subjects happy; and the pride and ambition of a vitious and foolish prince, brings his innocent and virtuous people into misery, captivity, and slavery. And if divine providence does not extend to these men as individuals, by consequence it cannot extend to mankind either in their collective or personal state. I am of opinion, that though his Lordship might have thought himself above or below the regard of divine providence, that it is owing to this providence, that, as a second cause, he did not betray his country, and that in violation of an oath, into the hands of an arbitrary supreme magistrate.

AGAINST this he objects, *1st*, That “* to suppose a constant series of particular interpositions from above as necessary to this purpose,” (that is, to the government of the world), “seems, to my apprehension, little less absurd, than to suppose the necessity of a perpetual and universal theocracy;

* Vol. v. p. 40.

“ and

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“ and to complain that such a government of the
“ world hath not been established, is as silly as to
“ complain that the golden age of the poets is ended.” From this I see no absurdity that follows. For if it is true that the whole creation depends on GOD for its continuance in being, and that all active creatures act dependently, and as dependently as they exist, (and this I have demonstrated); then it follows, not absurdly nor sillily, that GOD's government of the creation is *perpetual* and *universal*. Instead of being ashamed of this conclusion, I beg Mr MALLET's leave to triumph in it. And if he means by theocracy any thing else than GOD's government, whether mediate or immediate, I hope to be excused for not understanding what he hath not said. I know, that the Jewish government, from their exode, until the election of King SAUL, is called a *theocracy*, by reason of very remarkable interpositions and directions of divine providence. But unless it can be proved, that the first cause doth not act by second causes, that nation afterwards, and until now, is as really under the divine dominion, as they were in the days of MOSES and of JOSHUAH. And a first and a supreme cause is so far from excluding the agency of second and subordinate causes, that it supposes it. A *first* without a *second*, is neither logic nor arithmetic. If second causes are not admitted, GOD must be the *only*, and not the first cause in every event. Were there any things or events to which divine providence doth not

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extend, (*mediately* or *immediately* makes no difference), or were there any temporary discontinuance of it with respect to those things and events to which it doth extend, there would remain a possibility of wrong events, or events unfit to answer the great and ultimate end of the creation. And to suppose that infinite wisdom and infinite power can possibly miscarry in any design, is an absurdity which even his Lordship doth not admit.

THE *second* objection is fully as trifling as the first.
 “ * Particular providences would be miracles, if they
 “ were real; and such they would be strictly, whether they were contrary to the established course of
 “ nature or not: for the miracle consists in the extraordinary interposition, as much as in the nature
 “ of the thing brought to pass.” And *particular providences would be miracles strictly, whether contrary to the established course of nature or not.* This I take for a close and clever contradiction. The thing comes to pass according to the established course of nature; and if GOD acted in it as the first cause, then he thinks it would be a miracle strictly. Then all GOD's doings are miraculous; and therefore we can never know what is a miracle, and what is not. He adds, “ If they are real.” He denies that there ever were any miracles, and says, “ they are founded on ridiculous stories, which passed in times of ignorance

* Vol. v. p. 83.

“ and

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“ and superstition.” I presume it lay out of his way to give a definition of a miracle, when in the same paragraph he denies them all; and it lay just as much out of his way to call particular providences miracles. He is so far in the right to say, that miracles are extraordinary; and in so far he is in the wrong to say, that particular providences are miracles, whether they come to pass in conformity or contrary to the established course of nature or not. And he is again in the wrong for saying, that the miracle consists in the extraordinary interposition; for, besides, it must be wrought for some end and purpose made known previously to them who observe the event. That the sun rose to-day, is owing to the providence of GOD; but not to a miraculous interposition of it, because it is ordinary: but if to-morrow, during twenty-four hours, the same sun should be invisible to all the inhabitants of the earth, it would be extraordinary, but not a miracle; unless an appeal was made to such an event, as a confirmation of some great and important truth. It is GOD that makes grass to grow for cattle, and herbs for the use of man; and by this GOD displays his wisdom and power as much as in the creation and preservation of man and beast. For, as hath been already observed, his Lordship says, “ the creation
“ of man, or angel, in the works of GOD, is not
“ more considerable than the creation of the meanest
“ insect.” That there is grass, that there are herbs, that there are cattle, that there are men, is owing to
the

the providence of GOD, not in a miraculous, though in an infinitely wise, and in an omnipotent way.

I am unwilling to leave the matter here, (though it might well be done), because he attempts to carry it further. He says, “ * The circumstances of individuals, the public conjunctures wherein numbers are involved, and the merits and demerits of particular men, as well as of collective bodies, are so nearly alike, and they return so often to be equally objects of these supposed providences,—that no one dares to pronounce where these providences have been employed, and where not.” No man indeed who considers GOD as a being of infinite wisdom, will take upon him to determine, that the divine administration might have been better than it hath been; nor will he say, that all private and public connections and relations wherein all mankind is involved, and their frequent alterations, are too heavy a charge for infinite wisdom and infinite power. This must be left to his Lordship, and Mr MALLEY, who speak and think most unworthily of the supreme Being. For nothing can perplex infinite wisdom, and nothing can stop or hinder infinite power. “ This scheme, if true, would be universal in extent, and continual in time.” And so it is, and so it must be, as hath been already demonstrated. From which he says, “ these great absurdities would arise, that

* Vol. v. p. 86.

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“ the world would be governed by miracles, until
“ miracles lost their name.” This is so much wit
thrown away, or laid out upon his own ignorance of
the nature of a miracle. For all events, even the
most astonishing and surprising, and such as nothing
but omnipotence can bring to pass, are not miracles,
unless appealed to for the confirmation of some truth.
Let me suppose, that many more prodigies happened
in Egypt than are recorded by MOSES, they would
not have been miracles, unless MOSES had appealed
to them as a proof of his divine commission.

THE other absurdity is what I understand as a
third objection against particular providences. “ That
“ is, the established order of natural causes and ef-
“ fects would be subverted, and the general rule
“ would be absorbed in the exceptions to it; or that
“ GOD would govern his human creatures by two
“ rules that do not consist very well together: since
“ by one of them the wants and petitions of these
“ creatures would be submitted to one common pro-
“ vidence, which carried on the affairs of the world,
“ according to the first constitution and original laws
“ of it; and by the other, this common providence
“ would break, if I may say so, into a multitude of
“ particular providences, for the supply of these
“ wants, and the grant of these petitions; every one
“ of which is an appeal to the second rule of govern-
“ ment, against the first.” He had said before,
“ That

“ * That we have not in philosophical speculation,
 “ in any history except the BIBLE, nor in our own
 “ experience, sufficient grounds to establish the doc-
 “ trine of particular providences, and to reconcile it
 “ to the course of things in the material and intellec-
 “ tual systems, as these systems were originally con-
 “ stituted by the author of nature.—It is impos-
 “ sible to conceive, that the course of the sun, or the
 “ double revolution of the earth, should be suf-
 “ pended or altered by a temporary, nay, a mo-
 “ mentary interposition of some particular providence,
 “ or that any thing worthy of such an interposition
 “ should happen in the material world, without vio-
 “ lating the mechanical constitution, and the natural
 “ order of causes and effects.” And what he adds
 concerning the moral system, amounts to this, That
 GOD cannot meddle with his understanding without
 spoiling it.

IT was never thought, that the mechanic, by med-
 dling with the machine of his own construction, must
 necessarily spoil it. And far less must GOD, of ne-
 cessity, spoil his own works, either by a general or
 particular providence. Did a being of less knowledge,
 skill, and wisdom, but of power sufficient to stop the
 motion of the earth, meddle with the make of the
 material world, he might possibly spoil it: but GOD,
 who made the universe, cannot, by any interposition

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of his providence, so far disorder any sun or planet, as to surpass his wisdom and power to repair, and restore it to its original constitution. To make the eternity of the world pass for credible, his Lordship says, “ * If a constant rotation from existence to “ non-existence, or from generation to dissolution, “ maintains our world and the inhabitants of it in being, why should not such a rotation of worlds “ maintain the universe in being?” It is surprising, that he who affirms that our world is continued in being by restoring it from corruption by generation, and back from generation to corruption, should deny that God can make the world continue in order, if he interposes by particular providences in the administration of it. And though this nobleman of a philosopher thinks it impossible that any thing should happen in the material world worthy of any alteration, I think, though he does not, that God knows when and where these alterations are fit and proper for the government of the world, and for the government of the intellectual part of it in particular. — Though it doth not belong to the present purpose, I cannot but observe one of the greatest blunders that ever writer, either peer or commoner, ecclesiastic or laic, was guilty of. That is, “ A constant rotation from existence to non-existence, and “ so back again, maintains our world in being.” From existence to non-existence, is not to maintain

* Vol. v. p. 332.

the same thing in being. It is to annihilate one world, to make place for another. And what a rotation forwards and backwards, of causes and effects, of annihilation and creation, and of creation and annihilation, would contribute to maintain and continue our world in being and in order, I leave to DAVID MALLETT, Esq; to determine; or if he cannot shew what influence a rotation from existence to non-existence hath to maintain the same thing in being, he may leave it out of the next edition; for it is enough to disgrace Lord BOLINGBROKE's works, were they ten times more voluminous.

It is another bold and false assertion, That "we have not in philosophical speculation, in any history except the BIBLE, nor in our own experience, sufficient grounds to establish the doctrine of particular providences." For it is certain, and clear to demonstration, that, by philosophical speculation, we know all things depend on GOD for their being, because he is their creator; and that every thing acts as it is, and not otherwise; and therefore they all act dependently on GOD. And this demonstrated truth is in a great measure confirmed by profane history. As the order, harmony, and mutual subserviency of the parts of the universe, prove that all is owing to a designing cause; so the many surprising and apposite events proper for the government of mankind, are brought to pass by a wise and powerful

ful governor. That his Lordship found nothing of this in his own experience, I can easily believe. For he that thinks prayer impertinent, and asserts that GOD cannot give audience to all at all times, and he who doth not consider GOD as the governor of the world, cannot impute events, great or small, general or particular, to his providence. Prayer, he says, "is no better than an appeal from the first and " original rule of government to the second. * No-
" thing can be less reconcilable to the notion of an all-
" perfect being, than the imagination that he un-
" does by his power in particular cases, what his
" wisdom, to whom nothing is future, once thought
" sufficient to be established for all cases."

If any one case is omitted in the general and original plan of providence, it is not sufficient for all cases, and infinite wisdom could not think it sufficient. He says, that "† the whole series of things
" is at all times actually present to the divine mind."
And here he says, that nothing is future to infinite knowledge. This is allowed him. But how doth it follow from particular providences, that GOD undoes by his power in particular cases, what he thought sufficient for all cases? All cases were known to him, and all cases are provided for. "‡ The world,"

* Vol. v. p. 35.

† Vol. v. p. 82.

‡ Vol. v. p. 30.

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says his Lordship, "is governed by laws, which the
 " Creator imposed on the physical and moral systems,
 " when he willed them into existence.—These
 " laws are invariable, but they are general; and
 " from this generality, what we call *contingency*
 " arises." *Necessary* and *contingent*, is a distinction
 which is justly admitted, but such as can take no
 place in events. They may be called ordinary or
 extraordinary, but cannot be said to be necessary or
 contingent. For GOD alone is necessary, and all o-
 ther things depend on him; and because dependent,
 they are contingent, and may be or may not be. What
 he means by *contingency* must be *chance*; that is, e-
 vents happening beyond the original and general plan
 of divine providence. Of these chances and extra-
 providential events, the original and general plan ad-
 mits of such a latitude, as is enough to *absorb* the ori-
 ginal and general rule of GOD's government of the
 world. And he likewise reasons, that if GOD made
 provision for such events, it would render the ge-
 neral rule of no use; or he governs the world by two
 inconsistent rules, a general, and a multitude of par-
 ticular providences. There are *generals*, which in
 their nature, and in our conception of them, take in
 all particulars. And why GOD's general providence
 should exclude all particulars, is what I cannot un-
 derstand, nor what you nor any man can prove. The
 distinction of *ordinary* and *extraordinary* is admitted;
 but a general providence, without particular provi-
 dences,

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dences, is nonsense, and a contradiction in terms. *Generals* and *particulars* are *relata* and *correlata*, of which one cannot be without the other.

IF these extraprovidential events, independent on GOD as their cause, and independent in their effects on his government, are so many that they *absorb* the general rule of divine government, he may say, and say it in consequence of his principles, that GOD doth not, neither can he govern the world. What I have already observed on this unphilosophical word *absorb*, applied by him to the divine goodness being absorbed in divine wisdom, is enough to prove, that, among a multitude of chances and independent events, GOD's general rule of governing must be swallowed up and smothered, and become useless. He urges and insists, that if GOD took in all particular cases into the original and general plan of his providence, he must undo by his power in some cases, what in his wisdom he thought fit to establish for all cases. This is to beg the question, and to beg it absurdly. For how doth he know, that GOD in his wisdom hath established a general rule of government for all, without providing for particular cases? This in itself is absurd, as I have proved; but still the more absurd, by omitting in the general plan as many chances and extraprovidential events as defeat the general rule of government. Known to GOD are all his creatures, and all their actions. And is it to be supposed, that it was inconsistent

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inconsistent with his wisdom, to take his creatures and all their doings under his own government and dominion? Or was it fitter to leave them out of the original plan, and in such numbers and multitudes, as to suppress the very plan from which they are excluded? God must govern all things without exception, or he cannot govern the world perfectly. I am so far from taking his Lordship's word, (and I have no more for it), that if particular cases were comprehended in divine providence, he would undo by his power what he hath established in his wisdom; that, on the contrary, I am obliged to believe, because it is demonstrable, that divine providence extends to all events, whether they come to pass in the ordinary course of things, commonly called *the course of nature*, or in the most extraordinary way. And those things which BOLINGBROKE calls *contingent*, are all of them under God's government and direction, as really as the rising of the sun, which comes to pass once in the space of twenty-four hours. "The laws of matter and motion are fixed, no doubt, but within the latitude which they allow; though nothing happens which is repugnant to them, many things happen which seem so to us." So says his Lordship. But as a reasoner only *a posteriori*, he hath no right to say so. For if any thing appears to him repugnant to the fixed laws of matter and motion, he must conclude they are really so. And his right is still less, as he pretends to know nothing of God, nor of nature, but by sense
and

and experience. The most incompetent judge of mankind must be he, to determine what is within and what is without the reach and dominion of divine providence.

As he allows of an imaginary, precarious, and presumptuous latitude for independent events in the material world, so as precariously establishes he a greater latitude for such events in the moral world. His words are: “ * There is no need of any great sagacity to perceive, that the case is much the same in the moral world; nay that it is more liable to contingency than the natural. The moral world is subject to the law of right reason, fixed, unvariable, promulgated in the very nature of things, and enforced by the sanctions of rewards and punishments,” (one would think it is Dr CLARKE who speaks), “ which follow often the observation or the breach of it. But then, instead of two principles, whereof the one is active, and the other passive only, as in the other case, there are in this two active principles, the one slower than the other, Reason, and Passion.—Between both stands the freedom of our will, which can determine either way.”

On this passage I have two occasional remarks to make. First, he says, in the government of the natural or material world, there are two principles concerned, the one active, and the other passive: and these two

* Vol. v. p. 31.

must be GOD and matter. And if matter is a collateral principle with GOD, it must be eternal, and as absolutely independent as he. That this is false and absurd, I hope to demonstrate. Until then, let us suppose that matter is eternal. But it is not so stubborn as to resist omnipotence. GOD can dispose of matter as he thinks fit: for, being passive, it cannot dispose of itself; and by fermentation, sublimation, and by a certain degree of elasticity, he hath made philosophers; and, to take their own word, out of senseless and inactive matter, he hath made LORD BOLINGBROKE, and DAVID MALLET, Esq; and can turn their intellectuals into dust. However, let matter be only matter that is purely passive, it can have no part, as such, in the government of the world; no, no more than a stone or a brick in your house hath in the government of your family.

THE other remark is, that though he had but just said, that the sanction of the law of nature, or the law of right reason, is as fixed and invariable as the law itself; yet, in this passage, he takes this connection between the observation and the breach of this law in so low a sense, that it destroys and dissolves the indissoluble union between the sanction and the law. For he says, this law of right reason "is enforced by the
 " sanction of rewards and punishments, which follow
 " often the observation or the breach of it." According

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ding to his principles, he should have said, *which follow always.*

To make place for chances in the government of the moral world, he says, that this world hath in itself two active principles, Passion, and Reason: and that these active principles may have room to exercise themselves, a latitude for extraprovidential events, and a greater latitude must be allowed than is just necessary in the government of the material world. His Lordship holds, that matter is eternal, and independent on GOD: but he must allow, that whatever he makes of matter, in so far as it is made, it must depend on him. Now, as our reason and passion, a desire of good, and an aversion to evil, are entirely owing to GOD who made us, our animal and rational faculties must be entirely under his dominion. And if, instead of two, we had twenty active principles in our nature, they could never surpass the wisdom and power of their author to rule and govern them. His Lordship cannot conceive how this can be done. And no great wonder, for he forgets that he is speaking of the supreme Being of infinite wisdom and power. He says, "It is impossible to conceive such occasional interpositions in the intellectual system, as shall give new thoughts and new dispositions to the minds of men, and, in consequence, new determinations of their wills, without altering in every such instance the ordinary and natural progression of the human
N n "understanding."

“ understanding.” And yet he himself hath endeavoured to give new thoughts, and a new turn of mind, not to one individual only, but to the far greater part of mankind, and that without altering the ordinary and natural progression of the human understanding. Whether the human soul is material or immaterial, he doth allow, that it is the work, and a creature of GOD. And why may not GOD make a soul capable to persuade others into such sentiments as shall induce them to act any part that GOD thinks proper and fit for their own and the government of the world? And if he hath no determinate, clear, and distinct ideas of suggestion, silent communication, sudden influx, and injection of ideas, this his ignorance doth not prove that there is no such thing. For he hath no such determinate, clear, and distinct conception of the rise and occasion of every particular idea that came into his, nor have you of every one that comes into your mind. For though GOD hath permitted him to write, and you to publish many things tending to the dishonour of your Creator, and to the hurt of mankind, divine providence can easily prevent their intended bad consequence. And I hope and pray, that my endeavours may, as a second cause, contribute towards so good an end. Without your knowledge of sudden injection of ideas, GOD can raise up, and make human souls qualified and fitted to answer his design in governing the world. This, according to BOLINGBROKE's doctrine, can be done by a stronger or weaker

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weaker fermentation, or by more or less elasticity. And admitting the human soul to be an immaterial substance, and a spirit, God, who is himself a spirit, may have immediate access to human minds, in a way which we can as little comprehend as we do the manner of his creating them. I believe it will be allowed me, that God acts by his operative will, which all things obey. By this he made, by this he preserves, and by this he governs the world, and by this too he forms and informs the minds of men; but how this his will is operative, and how it operates, we can as little comprehend, as we can create, preserve, and govern the world. His Lordship's ignorance of the manner wherein God gives new thoughts and new dispositions to the minds of men, is no argument against his giving these new thoughts and new dispositions, no more than it can be against his making man.

It is owing to this affectation of knowing the works and ways of God as he does the works and ways of men, that his Lordship makes the government of the world surpass his infinite wisdom and power, and that he makes so many contingencies, exceptions from the over-ruling providence of God, left entirely to chance and accident, or to the discretion or indiscretion of every individual moral agent. Without determining whether God made the world for the sake of man, and man that he might communicate happiness to him, or not; it is certain, and allowed as such by

BOLINGBROKE, that man is the principal inhabitant of our planet; and if he possesses such a rank in our terrestrial world, it is astonishing that ever it should come into the head of any one of the human species, that he is below the regard, below the care, and so turned out of the dominions of his Creator. If GOD takes care of the dwelling-place made for the accommodation of the inhabitant, it is an absurdity, and reproach to his Lordship's understanding, to assert, that this inhabitant is of no consideration with the great architect of the world. From his own words I reason against him. The words are: "Whatever was the
 " final cause of the world; whatever motive, for we
 " speak after the manner of men," (and he should allow others to do the same), "the first cause had to
 " create it, which motive could not arise from any
 " thing without himself, must be therefore resolved
 " into his mere will. We conceive easily, that infinite wisdom which determined, and infinite power
 " which executed the plan of the universe, had some
 " secondary, some inferior regard, in making this, and
 " every other planet, to all the creatures that were to
 " inhabit them. Neither any of these creatures, nor
 " all of them, were, in a proper sense, the final
 " cause for which these planets were created." True; for GOD made all things for his own glory, or, as Dr CUDWORTH says, "the parts were made for the
 " whole, and the whole for the maker;" and by his
 providence

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providence he hath conducted, and will conduct all things to answer that end.

BUT if all events which his Lordship calls *contingencies* in the material and moral world are placed without the reach of God's providence, and if these are so many that they absorb the general rule of God's government, even omniscience and omnipotence cannot insure the end, the glory and honour of the Creator. All these extraprovidential events are either of themselves beyond the knowledge and power of the supreme Being, or he hath freely and absolutely bestowed exemption and independency upon them. This cannot be done without divesting himself of his dominion, and without making agents dependent in being, independent in acting, or making them act otherwise than they are. And if these contingencies are of their own nature beyond the knowledge and power of the supreme Being, then he is neither infinitely wise nor almighty. And these are the only attributes which his Lordship ascribes to the Deity. But, not to trust any argument to the concession of such an author, it is a contradiction in terms to affirm, that there can be any thing unknown to omniscience, or any thing that cannot be done by omnipotence.

THE *fourth*, and the last objection against divine providence, the last that I shall trouble my reader with,

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with, is, That there are so many mean and trifling things done by mankind, and of so little consequence, that it is below the majesty of the supreme Being to regard them. This is altogether in the Epicurean style. He that excludes all the individuals of mankind, that is, every single person, from the care and regard of God, may well exclude their actions. But that every individual and particular person and his actions depend on God, hath already been demonstrated. Nor is this below the majesty of God, since it was not below his majesty to create man. I cannot believe, that the author had any but very mean apprehensions of the dignity of the Deity, by making him, in imitation of his own pride and vanity, so stately as to neglect the works of his own hands. God cannot be weary in caring for his creation, nor can the greatest variety of events perplex his infinite wisdom; nor can it surpass his infinite power, to provide for them all, and direct them finally to his own glory. If the vegetative and animal parts are the works of God; if the least and meanest insect is made by him, and are likewise preserved by his providence, shall the rational part be entirely neglected?

I am pleased that his Lordship had so much metaphysics as to see, that between the Deity and his creation there is an unmeasurable distance, because between finite and infinite there is no proportion. And if it is unworthy of God to regard the meanest
of

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of his creatures, and the lowest of their actions, upon account of his infinite superiority and majesty, the whole creation must for that reason be below his providence. For, strictly speaking, in an infinite distance in perfection, to use the author's comparison, man cannot be nearer his Creator than an oyster; nor all the universe nearer than the least part of it. And so said the prophet, or, if you please, so sung the poet. * *Behold, the nations are as a drop of the bucket, and are accounted as the small dust of the balance: behold, he taketh up the isles as a very little thing.*—*All nations are before him as nothing.*

THAT the actions of men are, in appearance, mean and trifling, and often worse, I do admit; they are to us, as he says, no better than farces. But mean as they are, they are not too mean for divine regard, which nothing can exceed, and nothing fall below. They are the actions of his creatures, whom he hath made to exist, subsist, and act. Tho' not always to our observation, yet these farces, these trifling occupations, often give rise to very great events. In the rational world the philosopher admits a greater latitude for contingencies, than in the mere material or animal world; and therefore the moral world requires a singular administration, suited to the nature of the moral subjects. I know no actions of men more childish and trifling than gaming; and yet

* Isaiah xl. 15.

the gain or loss of a game at chess gave rise to a war between England and France; and since that time these two nations never were good friends, but rather constitutional enemies. A debate occasioned by a cartful of skins gave rise to a war, which cost a Duke of Burgundy an army, and his own life. But it is not my present business to write history.

ONE would be apt to think, that his Lordship must have been very sure of what he hath taken so much pains to prove, and yet he acknowledges he is not. For he says, “ * Though there is little credit to be
 “ given to all that lying legends, suspicious tradi-
 “ tions, and idle rumours, have reported concern-
 “ ing particular acts of providence, yet I will not
 “ presume to deny that there have been any such.” And if there have been any such, why not many such? All those contingencies, or chances, are not without the reach of divine providence. Any one particular act of providence demolishes all his arguments that tend to prove that GOD hath no regard to individuals. For if any one of these contingencies are under the dominion and government of GOD, it is impossible to prove, and presumption to assert, that any one is exempted. For all events whatever are as easily provided for by infinite wisdom and power, as any one of them. If a divine providence, then, is not perpetual and universal, it is not for want of

* Vol. v. p. 35.

knowledge

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knowledge and power, but for want of will. And how hath Lord BOLINGBROKE found out, that GOD was unwilling to have any thing to do with him, and that he had, by a special grant, made him absolute master of himself; that is, that GOD hath in many instances surrendered his right of dominion and sovereignty, a right founded in his creating and preserving power, and an essential perfection of his being?

To what purpose could his Lordship have taken so much pains to deceive himself, and to deceive others, with a conceit of independency on GOD? I know none, after trying the utmost of my imagination and invention, except that he had rather things should run at random in the material and moral world, than that they should be under the government and direction of an infinitely-wise and almighty being. He might have thought, and such as he may think as they please, (and it is only because they please); but with pleasure, and with gratitude to GOD, I am convinced that I am safer in his disposal, than in my own. VELLEIUS the Epicurean could not bear the thoughts of having a GOD wreathed upon his neck, to be dreaded day and night. “* And what man,” saith he, “would not dread a GOD, whose providence is universal, who knows and observes, and claims a concern in every thing; a GOD so full of business and employment?” A strong desire to be freed

* Cicero de natura deorum, lib. 1.

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from those fears and terrors did induce the ancient, and does induce the modern Epicureans, to reject a divine providence. The ancient Epicureans owned the charge, and gloried in the discovery; and whether modern Epicureans confess it or not, I cannot hinder myself to think that the same reason is the foundation of their doctrine. They may say and unsay, (and no man does it more freely than his Lordship), I do approve of an ancient saying, *The fool*, that is, the wicked man, *bath said in his heart, There is no GOD*; to which I add, no providence, no future state of rewards and punishments. After all the pains he hath taken to disprove a providence, and a future state of rewards and punishments, he is not ashamed to say, “ * The ancient and modern “ Epicureans provoke my indignation, when they “ boast as a mighty acquisition, their pretended certainty that the body and soul die together.” Is it credible, nay, is it possible, that any man of candour and sincerity can talk after such a rate; or that any man of common sense should flatter himself, that he can impose on the world such a gross and industrious contradiction, for a truth? Such an ignoble and dishonourable prevarication is enough to provoke the indignation of a gentleman Atheist.

THE amount of all the nobleman author's doctrine of providence comes to this, and no further,

* Vol. v. p. 125.

That

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That God hath made the universe, and set all the suns and planets agoing, and furnished every habitation with materials for the accommodation and happiness of such as do, or may inhabit them; with thistles for asses, and proper food for other beasts, and for men. To some he hath bestowed instinct and appetite, on others sagacity and reason; and hath left to every creature the use of its faculties, and the disposal of itself; with a large allowance of contingencies and chances in the material world, for which he hath made no provision; and with a larger in the moral world, for which every moral agent must make provision for himself, without any assistance or favourable interposition of his providence. He might as well have said in few words, that God doth not govern the world; that earthquakes and inundations, pestilence and famine, storms and tempests, which sweep off the inhabitants of this earth, without difference of the good from the bad, are all of them contingencies and extraprovidential events, not under the dominion and government of the Creator. For though he did foresee, or rather sees them, yet he sees them as an unconcerned spectator. Nor have the most innocent and virtuous of the human race reason to complain of this administration, because he hath furnished them with materials and faculties sufficient to provide for their own happiness. And tho' some contingencies should surmount their greatest care and precaution, there remains no ground of complaint,

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plaint, and no ground of gratitude, for whatever happens, because none of these things are the doings of their Creator. They have their lot in this world, nor have they reason to expect another in a world to come.

IT was a maxim admitted by all except the Epicureans, *Si DEUS est, mundus regitur providentia*. And Epicureans were therefore justly esteemed Atheists. Between the doctrine of EPICURUS and that of BOLINGBROKE, I see no difference in this capital point of providence; and I therefore conclude, that so much of his philosophy is Atheism.

S E C T.

S E C T. XI.

Of the immateriality of the human soul.

AS the denying of divine providence, or absurdly limiting it to nations and societies of men, is Atheism to all the purposes and consequences of Atheism; so doth the denying the immateriality of the human soul clear the way, and lead into the same impiety. “* For as there were never any yet known, who asserting incorporeal substance, did deny a Deity; so neither can there be any reason, why he that admits one, should exclude the other.” A materialist may be, and really is an Atheist; but he that admits incorporeal substances, can have no reason to reject the being of a spirit infinitely perfect, and the father of spirits. Notwithstanding, his Lordship labours hard to prove, that all men are pneumatically mad, who assert that there is any created being but mere matter. And at the same time he would make the world believe, that he maintains this with sorrow of heart. For he says, “† There is nothing, philosophically speaking, at least I could never find to my sorrow that there is any thing which obliges necessarily to conclude, that we are a compound of material and immaterial substance.” As it is pointed, his meaning may be, that he never

* Cudworth, p. 135.

† Vol. i. p. 20.

was sorry to find, that we are one single system of mere matter.—“For they denote plainly one single “ system; all the parts of which are so intimately “ connected and dependent one on another, that the “ whole begins, proceeds, and ends together.” The ancient and modern Epicureans provoke his indignation, by maintaining that we die whole, and that the soul and body perish together; and therefore, since he is sorry to find their opinion so well grounded, he should have been as much displeased with himself, for maintaining his two favourite tenets, the materiality and mortality of the soul. To shew his skill at hedging, or speaking for and against the same thing, and that too both diffidently and dogmatically, he says, “ * I do not pretend to deny the possible existence of spiritual, that is, according to the present notion, of immaterial beings. I have no more right to deny that there are such, than others have to affirm it. God alone, the author of all beings, knows how many different kinds of substances, how many various sorts of beings, his omnipotent will hath made to exist.” It is reason that gives right to affirm or to deny. And if he hath no more right to deny the existence of immaterial beings, than his opposers have to affirm it, reasons must be balanced on both sides; and, he himself being judge, it must be a needless debate; because he cannot persuade his opponent out of his own, into

* Vol. i. p. 207.

the author's opinion; and after all he hath said, or can say on the subject, he obliges himself to leave it as he found it, that is, problematical.

ALL that I observe more in this place, is, that whatever kinds of substances, or how many various sorts of beings God hath made, they must be either material or immaterial; for there is no *medium* between corporeal and not corporeal. That corporeal is one branch or species of being, he and those he opposes do admit: and if there is any other species, it must be incorporeal. And it is this incorporeal being that must have the variety of beings in it. And these immaterial and spiritual beings are made to act, or be acted upon, or both. If they are made to be only active, or only passive, they must be of the same kind with pure body, or pure spirit: and if they are made to be both active and passive, they can be neither purely body nor purely spirit; but something partaking of material and immaterial, something that is, and is not. However, I do admit, and admit cheerfully, that as there are several degrees in the corporeal world, some more and some less valuable and perfect; so in the spiritual world there are actually some completer and more perfect than others. But all of the first sort are material and corporeal, and all of the second sort are immaterial and spiritual.

BUT to take off the distinction of material and immaterial,

material, which notwithstanding his Lordship admits, (for he does not take it on him to deny the possibility of immaterial beings), he says, “ * Though our idea “ of thought be not included in the idea of matter or “ body, as the idea of figure in that of limited extension; yet the faculty of thinking, in all the “ modes of thought, may have been superadded by “ omnipotence to certain systems of matter; which “ is no less than blasphemy to deny.” This is strongly and terribly spoken for one that believes and adores the supreme Being. Notwithstanding the danger of blasphemy, I am not satisfied with his doctrine; which he hath either borrowed from Mr LOCKE, or he makes use of his authority to support his own opinion. “ † LOCKE,” he says, “ finds no “ contradiction in it, that the first, eternal, thinking “ being, should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as “ he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, “ and thought.” This is such a sort of philosophy, which his Lordship is far from admitting on other occasions. “ ‖ Universal possibility is the range of divine, particular actuality, past or present, and that “ in a very confined system, of human intellect.” He acknowledges himself an incompetent judge to determine what God can or cannot possibly do. All his means of knowledge is sense and experience; and all the objects of such knowledge are things actual,

* Vol. i. p. 21. † Vol. i. p. 212. ‖ Vol. i. p. 189.

not possible. Sensation he hath in common with the meanest animal: and experience is the schoolmistress of fools; and of some sort of animals too; such as, his half-reasoning elephant, dogs, and others. I cannot allow so low a genius as his Lordship's to judge of possibilities and impossibilities; of what doth, and what doth not imply a contradiction. I allow him capacity enough to determine, that all things actual are and were possible: but I do not allow him to find fault with others for concluding actuality from possibility; which never any man did, except those who demonstrate the being of GOD from the possibility of such a being. In every other case all possibilities are accounted contingencies. “* Whenever we frame “ ideas without being authoris'd by existence, these “ ideas must be fantastical.” And what hath he then to do with possibilities?

NEITHER LOCKE nor BOLINGBROKE write like philosophers, when, to prove that matter thinks and reasons, they appeal to the divine omnipotence to make it capable of ratiocination. The question is not precisely, What GOD can do? but, What he hath done, that makes out the conclusion, *Matter actually thinks?* His Lordship should give up his appeal to omnipotence, because the ideas he forms of possibilities do not constitute real, but only fantastical knowledge; and therefore he can as little rely on Mr LOCKE's

* Vol. i. p. 184.

supposition, for the support of the materiality of the human soul.

LOCKE, I think, rather limits than extends God's infinite power; and that in two instances. *1st*, He limits the power of superadding the faculty of thinking to certain systems of created senseless matter; and, *2^{dly}*, To some degree of sense, perception, and thought. For seeing the faculty of thinking is a superaddition to matter, it may be bestowed on all matter as such, or upon any part or particle of it, as well as upon certain systems of it first put together as God thinks fit. Neither LOCKE nor his Lordship do nor can make out, that thought and reason can be produced by any disposition of matter, without the superaddition of a new power and faculty; and they therefore must admit, that omnipotence can bestow this faculty of thinking on any part of matter, as well as upon the most refined and subtilized. And thus a pebble may become at once a sensitive and percipient substance. This his Lordship cannot well refuse, who says, “ * No man living hath higher notions of
“ divine omnipotence, nor carries them further than
“ I do. An argument fairly drawn from the power
“ of God will determine me at any time, and on
“ any occasion.” To this he adds, “ I am persuaded,” (he should have said fantastically), “ that
“ God can make material systems capable of thought,

* Vol. i. p. 135.

“ and

“and that he hath done so.” If there is nothing in matter, abstracting from this possible superaddition of a power of thinking, and if, in opposition to LOCKE’s second limitation, no reason can be assigned why *some degree* of sense, perception, and thought, may be superadded, and not the highest that we know in created beings; then the pebble may be as full of thought and knowledge, and may be internally as great a philosopher, as either LOCKE or his Lordship. If the comparison degrades the intellectual powers of these two authors; upon their own hypothesis, it exalts the power of the almighty and supreme Being beyond any thing that ever entered into their minds.

EVERY superaddition is supernatural, that is, above the nature of the thing to which it is superadded. The faculty of thinking superadded to senseless matter, is beyond all our ideas of it, as it is matter. If thought could proceed from matter without this superaddition, it must flow from motion, or from rest, to neither of which it can electively determine itself. Motion, and far less rest, in my conception, (of which only I can speak with assurance), hath no affinity to thought and ratiocination. Nor do these two philosophers admit it to be natural to corporeal beings. It is therefore easier to conceive, that thought proceeds from a substance of quite another nature and constitution, distinct from that which is merely material, than that a pebble can become an angel, or a being in the highest round of

the scale of creation. This is no violence offered to his Lordship's understanding, who admits the possibility of immaterial beings. Lord BOLINGBROKE and Divines are agreed, that there is in us a thinking substance. Divines say, that this thinker is a substance of a sort and nature distinct from matter. Lord BOLINGBROKE says, that it is of the same nature and sort, not *naturally*, but by a superaddition of an active faculty, whereby it is made capable of thought. Then by the acquisition of this active faculty it loses passivity, and ceases to be mere matter: and if it retains both, it must be a free and an active agent, and itself a passive subject for it to act upon. I say, matter must retain both activity and passivity: for a superaddition to the nature of any thing, doth not change or destroy the nature of that thing to which the superaddition is made. Addition and alteration are not the same in things themselves, nor in my ideas of them. Matter to which the superaddition of thinking is made, still remains matter without specific change or alteration, and just as incapable of thought after the superaddition as it is supposed to have been before. It is not therefore a new-acquired faculty in matter. If, instead of an additional faculty, Mr MALLET will admit a superinduction of an immaterial and thinking substance to a system of matter, divines and he are agreed. But if he will insist, that only an additional faculty, and superior to the nature of mere matter, is made, and this matter remaining the same that it was before the superaddition,

superaddition, I do affirm, that matter can never think and reason. And the pains that he takes to prove that it may and doth think by the alledged superaddition, is a fair acknowledgment, that it neither does nor can think while it remains matter.

ONE would be apt to think, that LOCKE and his Lordship should have said, that divine omnipotence can alter or change a piece or system of matter into a thinking substance; but then they were aware, or might be aware, that this change must be total, that is, from one nature to another, before it could answer their purpose. For let matter be condensed into gold, or rarefied into ether; let it ferment, or let it cohere; let it rest, or let it move; let it move slowly or swiftly, circularly, angularly, or straightly, upwards or downwards; it is still matter, without a total or a natural change, and as unfit as ever to be capable of thought and ratiocination. If the change is total, and such as reaches the very substance of matter, it must be made immaterial; that is, it must be annihilated, and a new immaterial being must be made in its place.

How this nobleman writer came to borrow from SPINOZA, and do more than borrow, I cannot, nor am I obliged to understand. For he doth not approve, or pretends not to approve of the whole system of that Atheistical writer; and yet he allows it *should* be said,
“ That

" * That the vegetative and sensitive, and even the
 " rational soul, can be nothing else than matter dif-
 " ferently fermented and subtilized in systems of it
 " differently organized." To say *it can be nothing*
else, is to determine dogmatically on a subject which
 he pretends to leave problematical. But he did not
 consider, that by this he leaves no place for a suppo-
 sed and possible superaddition of a power of thinking
 to be made to matter: so that all he hath said of his
 own head, or from LOCKE, goes for nothing. For
 matter as it is can do the whole business, by ferment-
 ation, sublimation, and organization. I cannot say
 that this is an objection against what I have said; for
 it is no more than a simple and silly assertion.

OF the same sort is what may be placed as a *second*
 objection; that is, That " † it cannot be proved by
 " metaphysical jargon, about essences, attributes, and
 " modes, that we are a compound of material and im-
 " material substance." Not by jargon of any kind,
 most certainly, even though mathematical. But it
 may be done by metaphysics, provided the whole
 science is not jargon. And that it is not jargon, or
 words without meaning, is as certain as that the whole
 is more than any of its parts, and that the cause is
 prior to the effect, and that every thing acts as it is,
 and no otherwise. For these are metaphysical axioms.
 His Lordship, when he finds it to his purpose, can

* Vol. i. p. 200.

† Vol. i. p. 21.

make use of metaphysics. For by these he proves, that man comes no nearer to infinite perfection than an oyster. It is something extraordinary for him or you to imagine, that your readers will accept of such language for argument. That no regard may be had to your contempt of logics and metaphysics, I have already said enough, and to which I refer my reader *.

A *third* objection, or rather an apology for a material thinker, is taken from an article of the Christian religion. “† The soul, the spiritual monarch of the human system, doth not remain long in its government, because the system it governs is soon dissolved by death: but the short time it remains in it, decides of its state to eternity. It seems to be delivered from the body, and to be restored to the full force of its nature, and to the free exercise of its powers, in order only to suffer, for the most part during an eternity, for what it did in the government of the body, when it enjoyed neither during a moment. As soon as philosophers and divines are able to reconcile all this to the ideas of the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God, the hypothesis will be no longer necessary to the former; since they will not find it at all more difficult to reconcile thought to their ideas of the properties of matter.” This passage, which I have faithfully transcribed, not for the elegancy, but rather to shew the

* Sect. ii.

† Vol. i. p. 202.

confusion of it, is entirely impertinent. He who reasons as a philosopher, should confine himself to such arguments as reason dictates. For admitting it an absurdity, that God should punish human souls eternally for their misgovernment of themselves, and of the body while they remained in it; it will not justify him for making thought and ratiocination, fermentation, sublimation, elasticity, and organization of matter; because one absurdity cannot vindicate another. And I do assert, that philosophers, and divines as philosophers, can sooner reconcile the punishment of impenitent sinners with the justice and goodness of God in another life, than he can reconcile his notions of the supreme Being with common sense, and clear them of Atheism.

HE says, “* It is a common-place topic,” (*place* or *topic* would have served me), “that infidels are
“ desirous to keep God at a distance from them;
“ though it is in him they move, and live, and have
“ their being. This charge cannot be laid justly against any man who believes a God. For a God
“ without the attributes of an all-perfect being, cannot be the supreme Being.—For my own part,
“ I am fully persuaded, that there is a supreme Being, the fountain of all existence, by the efficacy
“ of whose will the whole universe was made, and is
“ governed as well as preserved; in a word, who is

* Vol. i. p. 256.

“ the

“ the first efficient of all things, and on whom all his “ creatures depend.” Now, all this orthodoxy is entirely demolished, not by omitting, but by expressly denying God’s moral attributes, as I have already proved *. From which either of these two things follows, that *holiness* is not a perfection; or if it is, God is not an all-perfect being. Holiness is essential to the supreme Being; otherwise this great, this almighty, this fountain of all existence, this governor of the universe, may be considered as a tremendous, but not as a desirable and adorable sovereign. Without holiness, or moral attributes, those who obey, and those who disobey the law of right reason, and consequently what we call the law of God, (for a God without morality cannot be the author of a moral law), are to him equal; neither objects of his pleasure or displeasure, of reward or punishment.

HIS Lordship, with more contempt than philosophers and Christian divines deserve, or becomes the character of a gentleman to bestow, accuses them of absurdity, and sometimes of blasphemy, for asserting, that God will punish souls in another life for transgressing his laws in this life; and that because such a procedure is, as he imagines, inconsistent with the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God. The inconsistency of the punishment of souls in another life with the justice and goodness of God, supposing it an

* Sect. vii.

absurdity, returns fully with as great strength on the author, as he lays it to the account of Christian philosophers and divines. They assert, that God is good and just: he denies that he is either; and yet maintains, that in such a case his justice and goodness may be impeached. As no moral attributes are by him ascribed to the supreme Being, so no immorality hath place in his nature. Whether therefore souls are happy or miserable in the body or out of it, either here or hereafter, it is not the doing of God; who, according to his Lordship's doctrine, does neither good nor evil: and therefore he hath no right to reason from his moral attributes for or against any procedure of his providence.

WHETHER his Lordship intended it as an objection against immaterial beings or not, yet what he says about the origin of our ideas, were it true, must destroy all that can be said for the immateriality of the human soul. “* We have no ideas until we receive
“ passively the ideas of sensible qualities from with-
“ out. For though, from impressions made upon the
“ mind by objects from without, another source is
“ opened for our ideas; yet all the thoughts proceed-
“ ing from this new spring, *have either immediately*
“ *or ultimately corporeal things for their objects.*” (If this is true, we can have no notion of the Deity, but that of a material being). “Sensation would be

* Vol. i. p. 22.

“ of little use to form the understanding, if we had
“ no other faculty but mere passive perceptions.
“ But without sensation these other active and ope-
“ rative faculties would have nothing to operate
“ upon. Reflection would have nothing to reflect
“ on. In this manner all our ideas arise from our
“ senses; and there is nothing in the mind which
“ was not previously in the sense. This is evi-
“ dently so true, that even those ideas about which
“ our reason is employed in the most abstract medi-
“ tation, may be traced back to this original by a
“ very easy analysis. Since these simple ideas are
“ the foundation of human knowledge, this know-
“ ledge can neither be extended wider, nor elevated
“ higher, than in a certain proportion to them.” Is
not this something like metaphysics, and, I think, the
delirious part of it? For if all this is true, and if our
most abstract thoughts can be easily traced back to
sensible sources, then must all our ideas have some
resemblance to, or rather some connection with cor-
poreal objects. But this is so far from being true,
that it is evidently false. “ * The idea we have of
“ thought by reflection, is as clear as that which we
“ have of extension by sensation.” Now I ask, as I
am allowed, what similitude, what proportion, what
connection, is there between the idea of thought,
and any corporeal object, or any of its sensible qua-
lities, secondary and primary? *In our most abstract*

* Vol. i. p. 101.

meditations, we view thought without regard to the object of it, whether intellectual or corporeal; and in such a case there is no analysis that can trace back such ideas to original sensation; no, not *per millefiam consequentiam*. If Mr MALLET should turn the idea of thought, abstracted from every object of it, until his head turned round, neither you nor any man shall be able to extract any thing corporeal out of it. For this reason his Lordship gives up the cause, after pleading long and laboriously for it. “ * To assert that there is no other source of ideas but sensation, is to assert something most evidently false. For, to explain what hath been touched already, or hinted at, at least, we have as determinate and as clear ideas of thought, as of extension or solidity; of our inward faculties, and their operations, and of the modes of thinking, as of the powers, the actions, and the modifications of mere body. Were it otherwise, we should have no intellectual ideas at all. For ideas, if they cannot be represented in thought without corporeal images, are not such most certainly.” All that his Lordship hath said (and he hath said much to little purpose) concerning the rise of ideas, and the operative faculty of thinking, instead of supporting the materiality of the human soul, rather makes against it. It is far from being certain, that mere matter hath any operative or active power, either essentially or adventitiously. Essen-

* Vol. i. p. 129.

tially,

tially, no man since HOBBS, or at least since Lord KAIMS, if he deserves to be mentioned, and no man before STRATO, ever pretended that matter hath. If mere matter acquires such a power, by addition, by deduction of parts, by consolidation or division; such a disposition thence arising, must be supernatural, and beyond all the known properties of matter. Even a power of motion, either inherent or adventitious, is an inexplicable and inconceivable property of matter. And if ever matter, or any part of it, great or small, hath a power of determining itself to motion or to rest, it must be by a superaddition, such as his Lordship and LOCKE makes the power of thinking to be. An operative power bestowed on mere matter, if it is at all exerted, it must be on something distinct from itself: which is not the case of the human soul; for it acts on itself: it penetrates its own inmost recesses, searches out, examines the ideas there laid up in store, and makes an assortment of them; it thinks on its faculties, and thinks on its thoughts; it commands the body, it moves it by an act of its will, and even commands or determines itself to consider this or the other subject with attention. And is all this no more than mere matter? No, certainly. For nothing can be more unphilosophical, nothing more unaccountable in his Lordship, than to maintain such unintelligible stuff, when it might be avoided; because he doth not take on him to deny, that there
are

are immaterial created substances. He says, “ * That
 “ we live, and move, and think, according to certain
 “ human modes of thinking; and that there must be
 “ something in the constitution of our system of be-
 “ ing, *beyond* the properties of matter to produce such
 “ phenomena as these, are undeniable truths. But here
 “ certainty ends: what that something is, we know
 “ not; and surely it is time to be convinced that we
 “ cannot know it.” And why then should he dog-
 matically assert, that it is fermentation, sublimation,
 and organization, or all of them, that produces the won-
 derful phenomenon of thinking? It is *beyond* the pro-
 perties of matter, beyond all of them; and therefore
 can be none of them. Notwithstanding his Lord-
 ship’s moderation in inquiring, he thinks nothing of
 transgressing himself the limits he sets to human un-
 derstanding, and going beyond certainty with an air
 of assurance; when he says, “ † If we are to form
 “ a conclusion from concurrent phenomena, without
 “ any further reasoning about them than such as they
 “ justify, what must it be? It must be plainly this,
 “ that there is in the whole animal kind one intellec-
 “ tual spring, common to every species, but vastly
 “ distinguished in its effects; that though it appears to
 “ be the same spring in all, yet it seems to be differ-
 “ ently tempered, and to have more elasticity in
 “ some, and less in others.” This spring he is plea-
 sed to call an intellectual spring, though he knows

* Vol. i. p. 206.

† Vol. i. p. 229.

nothing

nothing of it, and though it is time to be convinced that it cannot be known. And why not a material spring, since the whole animal system, and the human system in particular, is not a compound of material and immaterial parts? He is willing to set bounds to the understanding of all mankind, especially to the understanding of those who cannot understand as he does; but for his own part, he pretends to extend it beyond a possibility of conceiving. After calling this spring intellectual, he at the same time makes it material, by giving it more or less elasticity; and still he knows not what it is.

IN the character of a plain man, who hath formed this general conclusion, that all animals think by one common spring, he supposes one asks him this trite question, "Whether he conceives, that matter, how-
" ever figured or moved, subtilized or fermented,
" can be pleasure or pain, desire or aversion?" To which I add, can it be demonstrative knowledge, acquired by a process of reasoning, as long and as large as to fill volumes with heaps of thoughts, drawn up in order to produce conclusions, to establish truth, and to defeat error? "To answer truly, I
" think he must answer, that he cannot conceive
" matter to be any of these, or even how a system
" of matter can be capable of having any ideas; but
" that he cannot draw any other conclusion than this,
" that all animal systems are material." A strange draught

draught this must be. Conclusions are often drawn from weak and insufficient premisses; but this plain man's conclusion is drawn directly against them. The power of thinking is beyond the properties of matter; and what this thinking principle is, he knows not; neither can he conceive, that a system of matter can be capable of having any ideas; and therefore all animal systems are material. Instead of this conclusion, I should chuse to draw this other, That all animals are not merely material, or I do not know what it is that makes any of them capable of thought. —“ The plain man hath pushed his inquiry as far “ as the true means of inquiry are open, that is, as “ far as the phenomena can guide him.” What phenomena? Surely the phenomena of matter, and such phenomena as he knows, extension, solidity, figure, motion, rest, and all the sensible qualities that belong to matter. But thinking is none of these, because beyond them all, and because he cannot conceive that matter is capable of it. Whatever I conceive, I judge possible; what I cannot conceive, may be possible in itself, but not in my judgment. In my opinion, this plain man plays tricks with his understanding, and endeavours to put his tricks upon mine, when he would teach me to conclude against my conception, and against possibility. With this inconceivable and impossible conclusion the plain man must be content, “ * unless some other can be

* Vol. i. p. 230.

“ drawn

“ drawn from the same phenomena ;” that is, until from the known phenomena of matter we can draw this conclusion, That thinking, which is beyond all the properties of matter, and consequently none of them, is a phenomenon of matter. Out of which, to make another conclusion different from this contradictory conclusion, That *therefore all animal systems are material*, it must be, All animal systems are not merely material, or systems made up of mere matter.

“ THE philosopher is not content with the plain
“ man’s conclusions ; and if physics will not serve
“ his purpose, metaphysics and theology shall.
“ And because the particular phenomena of the
“ whole animal system lead to a conclusion he does
“ not like, he resolves not to be determined by
“ them. And from his abstract ideas, he draws a
“ conclusion as inconceivable as that which he re-
“ jects.” And a more inconceivable, and a worse
connected conclusion, no man can draw. The phi-
losopher’s conclusion is, That thought proceeds from
another sort of being than matter ; that it neither is,
nor can be any of its known properties ; and as no
unknown properties can be ascribed to matter, think-
ing is none of them. It is not only unknown as a
property of matter, but beyond them all. And if
the properties of any thing are of the same sort, and
certainly they are ; then thinking, which surpasses all

the properties of matter, never can belong to it. The plain man is unable to explain how matter thinks, " though the phenomena are so many positive proofs, " that oblige him to conclude that a material system " hath this power." Absolutely false, as the author states the debate. He will not take on him to deny, that there are immaterial beings or substances: for this phenomenon of thinking may, for what the plain man knows, belong to this possible immaterial substance. The immaterialist maintains, that thinking is no property of matter; the materialist acknowledges, that he cannot conceive how it can be capable of thinking; and may not the philosopher be allowed to conclude, that it is not his material part, but an immaterial substance, his soul, his spirit, that thinks and reasons?

THE plain man however insists, " That the phenomena are so many positive proofs, that oblige him " to conclude, that material systems have this power " of thinking." The plain man hath an ill memory, and a worse judgment. Thinking goes beyond all the properties of matter, and therefore is none of them; and yet he concludes, and that most obstinately and absurdly, that the phenomena oblige him to conclude, that thinking is one of them. The philosopher says, as the debate is stated, the plain man plainly begs the question; because he once admitted, that thought may be a property of an immaterial substance.

stance. The plain man decides positively for matter.
“ The philosopher decides negatively, on such proofs
“ as abstract ideas furnish him, that no system of
“ matter thinks; that omnipotence cannot any way
“ communicate to it the faculty of thinking; and
“ positively, that whatever thinks, is a simple being,
“ immaterial, indissoluble. The plain man hath
“ recourse once more to the phenomena, and objects,
“ That we must be reduced, if we receive this hy-
“ pothesis, to assert, that other animals, besides man,
“ have immaterial and immortal souls; or that no o-
“ ther animal besides man hath the faculty of think-
“ ing.”

THIS, I acknowledge, is a grand objection, and such as well deserves an answer. And I freely join with his Lordship in rejecting a modern system, that makes all bodily appearances to be delusions, though I never saw what is said in support of it; for I am resolved to believe no delusions, knowing them to be such. And I as freely join with him in rejecting the hypothesis of DESCARTES, which makes all animals, man only excepted, mere machines, or *automata*. It is of the author's own shewing, that “ * GOD alone, the
“ author of all beings, knows how many different
“ kinds of substances his omnipotent will hath made.”
As in the material part of the universe there are several sorts of bodies, so in the immaterial creation there

* Vol. i. p. 207.

may be several sorts of spirits. As the author's intellectual and material spring in animals hath in some more, and in others less elasticity; so in the world of spirits, some may have more and higher, and others fewer and lower faculties. All animals, all living and sentient creatures, have a degree or sort of immaterial substance in them, such as answers the end and use for which they were made. That which makes animals move; and live, and act, is not a part of the body, or any thing material; but some sort of spirit and immaterial substance; of which there may be as many sorts as God pleases, and many more than his Lordship could have imagined. And as they are, so they act with a lower and weaker, and with a higher and stronger energy and activity. Though the author may make a great difference between a lump of a rock, and a piece of the same or other matter fermented into thought and ratiocination; he thinks it no wise below his understanding to maintain, that
“ * it implies a contradiction manifestly, that a substance capable of thought by its nature in one degree or instance, is by its nature incapable of it in another.” It were to be wished the author had adverted, that the question is not, What may be? but, What is? His own intellectual spring in all animals hath not the same elasticity in an oyster, as it had in his Lordship, or hath in DAVID MALLET, Esq; And why may not these immaterial beings or substances,

* Vol. i. p. 236.

which

which I put in the place of his elastic springs, differ as much as a philosopher differs from an ass? In the material world there is a difference between a moss and a mineral; the one fit for many uses, and the other fit only for fuel. All matter is extended and solid, but all matter is not fit for every thing. Even those philosophers who make the universe out of a collection of atoms, do not make all these atoms of the same sort, but of as many sorts as there are elements. The atoms of which air is made, differ, as they say, from those of which water is made, and terrestrial atoms from both. I do not say, that all the Democritical philosophers maintained or supposed a difference in atoms, but some of them did. If in the inanimated parts of the creation there is a specific difference, it implies no manifest contradiction to assert, that there are some spirits, or immaterial substances, capable of some actions and passions, but incapable of others. Lord BOLINGBROKE might have had a head turned for mathematics; but for metaphysics, he had a head or a heart turned against them. All spirits, in his Lordship's hypothetical scale of beings, were not made with equal powers and faculties. And as they were made, so they act. And this their *make*, and manner of acting, is called their *nature*. It therefore to me appears a contradiction to say, that a substance capable of thought by its nature in one degree or instance, is by its nature capable of any other, even the highest: for its capacity is its nature. We ourselves have a
sensitive

sentient power, we have a percipient power, and we have a power of reflecting on what we feel, and what we perceive; of comparing and compounding our simple ideas, and a power of judging of their agreement. But admitting that every animal is informed with an immaterial principle of action, it doth not follow, that every one of them must have the same, or a principle of action perfectly equal. The spirits of all animals have a sentient power. They feel, they see, they hear, they taste, they smell; and many of them possess these sentient powers in a higher degree than man doth; and all of them have this power so far as is necessary for their preservation. They have likewise a power of distinguishing one object from another; and this power may be called *percipient*. And therefore they must be allowed to have ideas: for idea and perception is the same thing; though his Lordship, from his aversion to logics, makes them different, by saying we *perceive ideas*; or he must mean, that we *perceive perception*. Upon some animals I can bestow memory, judgment, and even ratiocination. Observations made on several sorts of animals plead strongly, and, I think, unanswerably for it *.

BUT the greatest difficulty consists in a consequent immortality. To me this is no difficulty at all. Nor should it be any to Mr MALLEY, whose soul is neither the better nor the worse in this, nor in another

* RORARIUS de ratione brutorum.

world, that these animal and brutal spirits do subsist after the dissolution of their material system. I am not able to believe, that human souls always think, though they always remain capable of thought. And why may not the souls of brutes remain the same, though they do not exert any of their active powers? Naturally they are as immortal as the soul of the greatest philosopher. They are both of them immaterial substances. Dissolution is the division and separation of parts. Immaterial substances have no parts, and are naturally not dissolvable. We do not build the immortality of our souls upon their immateriality, as his Lordship ignorantly asserts. We put the perpetuity of their duration upon the good pleasure of the creator and father of our spirits. If the supreme Being pleases, he may continue the spirit of every animal in being, or he may extinguish them totally, or annihilate them. It is not our knowledge in arts and sciences, nor the strength of our reason, nor the immateriality of our souls, that intitles us to immortality. It is nobler knowledge. It is the knowledge of our God, and of his will, as the rule of our conduct and obedience. And this even Lord BOLINGBROKE is forced to acknowledge, when he distinguishes between ethics and physics. “ * The infinite wisdom
“ and power of God manifested in the natural system
“ of the universe is the object of one, and the will of
“ God manifested in the constitution of our moral

* Vol. i. p. 74.

“ system

“system is the object of the other.” It is this that makes us accountable, and it is this that makes us immortal. But it is not simply the knowledge of our duty that determines our happy or unhappy state. It is the choice we make, and the part we act, that renders us objects of commendation or blame, of the approbation or disapprobation of our maker and master. It is this that lays the foundation of a future state in happiness or in misery.

WE observe nothing in other animals that constitutes them subjects of a moral law. They cannot be said either to observe or transgress it; and have nothing to answer for here or hereafter. Many and wonderful marks of sagacity are to be seen in the brutal creation; but it was never observed, that any one of them, for the greatest cruelties exercised on one another, gave any signs of remorse, regret, and repentance. If Mr MALLET's coach-horse, or his cat, knew as much as BOLINGBROKE hath wrote, and as he himself hath wrote or published; and, at the same time, did not know morality from immorality, vice from virtue, and sin from duty, they could have no right to rewards or punishments, or to a future existence. But thy master and thy maker, * O man, *hath shewed thee what is good; and what doth the LORD require of thee, but to do justice, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy GOD?* For this knowledge, for

* Micah vi. 8.

this

this gift, for this honour and dignity, we are answerable here and hereafter. It is not therefore to be thought, that our souls, and the souls of such animals as cannot distinguish between vice and virtue, are to be put upon the same footing, to perish alike in death; and if theirs and ours survive the bodies, that both must remain in a state of insensibility. Though the parts, and pieces, and members of animals are turned into dust, yet they still remain matter. Nothing of annihilation is observed, or pretended. Matter may change its form, and pass from the grossest to the finest, and from earth to ether, and back again, it still remains. And there is no reason to suspect or suppose, that the human soul, or even the immaterial principle of action in brutes, perish quite, and vanish into nothing. Dissolved these spirits cannot be; for they are indivisible. If they remain at all, they must remain the same in substance. I cannot think, that the infinitely-wise Creator of the universe makes and unmakes, creates and annihilates, either bodies or spirits. The first he forms and models anew, to answer the purposes of his providence; and to the second he may give powers and faculties, higher or lower. The belief of such a futurity naturally leads into a reverential awe of the ALMIGHTY; it inclines us to a cheerful obedience to his will; it makes us live and act reasonably, that is, suitably to our highest faculties and powers; and tends to the improvement of our natures: whereas they that think their whole being is

S f

made

made of mere matter, and that after death, and the dissolution of their bodies, they are to be no more, find little encouragement and inducement to live morally and reasonably. This life, such as it is, is their all. Their temporal interest and advantage is their *prima regula morum*, and the supreme rule of their actions. This is the grand principle of materialists, and, when reduced to practice, renders them unworthy of human society. I know they all deny the practical part of their philosophy; but if their principles do not support and enforce every social duty, and especially if they hinder and obstruct the performance of any, their principles can neither be true nor natural. Strange infatuation, amazing meanness of mind, greedily to embrace an opinion that puts them upon a level with the lowest animals, and that without any positive proof, or demonstrative reason for it!

It is true, his Lordship, in the character of a plain man, affirms, that “ * he sees no positive and determining proof for the immateriality and immortality of the human soul; and that all the phenomena, from our birth to our death, seem repugnant to these two articles of natural religion and the Christian revelation; and that he is forced to conclude with LUCRETIVS,

“ — *Gigni pariter cum corpore et una*

“ *Crescere sentimus pariterque senescere mentem.*

* Vol. i. p. 269.

“ That

“ That GOD hath given him reason to distinguish
“ and to judge, and external and internal sense by
“ which to perceive and reflect; but that this very
“ reason shewed him the absurdity of embracing an
“ opinion concerning body and mind, which neither
“ of these senses supports; and that how short and
“ imperfect soever the knowledge acquired by the
“ phenomena might be, he was contented with it,
“ because it was knowledge acquired in GOD’s way;
“ that is, the only way that GOD hath opened to our
“ inquiries about the nature of things, corporeal and
“ spiritual. Nay, further, if he could suspect him-
“ self to be deceived in this way, he would be con-
“ tented still. He would conclude on this and other
“ occasions, that whether things appear to him as they
“ are absolutely, and such as the supreme intelli-
“ gence knows them to be, or not, they appear to
“ him such as is fit for his nature they should appear
“ to him. On this undoubted truth the plain man
“ would rest his mind, instead of perplexing it about
“ indeterminable questions, and struggling presump-
“ tuously and vainly to know things otherwise than
“ his nature and theirs admit that he should know
“ them.”

THIS passage, in my opinion, is a specimen, and
a very extraordinary specimen, of enthusiastical impiety
and blasphemy. If, by internal sense, he means
any thing besides reason, he means what neither he

himself, nor any man else can understand. Of sensitive philosophy, I have already said enough to shew that it is nonsense *. And because neither his sense nor his reason afford him a positive proof of the immateriality of the soul, it would be absurd in him to embrace it. Sense and experience are the only sources of his knowledge; and from these he cannot acquire the knowledge of an immaterial being, I do admit: but it is because he will not hear reason, that he refuses demonstrative proof that our soul is not a material substance. But if it is an absurdity to embrace an opinion that cannot be supported, it is an equal absurdity to deny an opinion that cannot be disproved. And he immediately adds, “† On such principles as these, though he could not affirm, he would not deny the immateriality of the soul.”

OBSERVE, the plain man is still uncertain of the soul's materiality or immateriality, its mortality or immortality. On this *uncertain* and *undoubted* truth he rests his mind. And this uncertain and undoubted truth, the stay and prop of a stupid head and a vitious heart, is, Whether he is deceived, or not, in disbelieving the immateriality of the soul, he is resolved to adhere to the negative, and to hold fast his opinion; which he cannot embrace without an absurdity; that is, he chuses, as || *be is made after the image of other animals*, to live and die as these his brethren do.

* Estimate, § i. † Vol. i. p. 270. || Vol. i. p. 215. *ad marg.*
Either

Either in vain hath God bestowed more understanding on him than upon his brutal brethren, or he abuses it criminally; because he chuses one of two uncertain opinions. Were these opinions pure speculation, his choice could neither do himself or others any hurt; but in this particular case of the soul's materiality, which prepares a way to the disbelief of its immortality, it is of dangerous consequence. It is then a principle of conduct in all our doings.

It is true, he says he is *forced* to conclude with LUCRETIUS, that the soul is generated, grows, and decays with the body; and that all the phenomena, from our birth to our death, are repugnant to the immateriality and immortality of the soul. This is strongly said, but not more strongly than falsely: for, instead of all the phenomena of human nature, there is not so much as one repugnant to the immateriality of the soul. And if there were but one, it would be enough for his Lordship's purpose. But there are several phenomena inconsistent with the materiality of the soul. I think I have already observed, that body doth not act on itself; for it is purely passive and impenetrable: but the mind acts on body, and on itself likewise. It examines its own powers and faculties; it wills and resolves, and, I may say, it commands itself to take this and the other particular subject into consideration; nay more, it judges, acquits, or condemns itself. And this matter, while it is matter,

ter, cannot do. And the utmost philosophical efforts to make matter capable of thought, is only a superaddition faculty; which not only differs from all properties of matter, but is inconsistent with them. And if there is any one phenomenon which belongs to the mind, and cannot belong to body, it must be a substance distinct from all matter.

WONDERFUL is BOLINGBROKE's aversion to spirits, when to support his opinion, not of reason, but of arbitrary choice, he is forced to conclude a falsity with LUCRETIVS. For if it were true, the biggest and the strongest man must have the most enlarged and the strongest understanding. When he lost a leg or an arm, he must lose a proportion of his reason; and as his bodily strength decayed, so must his mind. None of which things hold. His Lordship's correspondent Mr POPE was a man of a very small bodily bulk, and yet he admires his parts, both as a poet and a philosopher. CERVANTES lost an arm at the battle of Lepanto, and afterwards was secretary to the Duke d'ALVA, and wrote the famous romance of DON QUIXOTE. Mr LOCKE, whom he calls his master, retained his judgment and understanding in a very weak and extenuated body: and when he had survived the time he foretold he was to die, called for water to wash his hands; and being put in mind of his mistake, he refused the water, and said, his hands would serve him as they were, and died

died immediately. With what a wonderful capacity of learning and knowledge doth mankind come into this our world? Left to themselves to make their observations on things that surround them, they are able in a little time to distinguish one thing from another; to know papp and mamma, tray and pufs; and sooner still to find out the breast, and the way to suck it. And mean time their ears are not idle. In two years time, and often less, they acquire the names of things, and are able to pronounce them. They make use of verbs as well as of nouns, and speak a language better than some men at the age of twenty can in so short a time, with the use of a grammar and an interpreter, learn to speak a language they never heard before. The child's knowledge overgrows his body, which, in bulk and strength, bears no proportion to its mind.

WITH his knowledge of the materiality and mortality of the soul, Lord BOLINGBROKE is contented; because it is knowledge acquired in God's way. Knowledge it cannot be to him, who knows not whether the soul is material or immaterial. Nor can I call it a mistake, because he doth not take it on him to deny that the soul is immaterial. Unless he can turn ignorance into knowledge, he can have no knowledge of the soul's materiality, either in his own or in God's way. If he could suspect himself to be deceived in God's way, he would be contented still.

Such

Such writers as his Lordship are ready on all occasions to accuse their opposers of enthusiasm; but I defy them to shew, in any serious religious author, such rank enthusiasm. I believe he is among the first that ever was contented to be deceived. He desires to be deceived, and he endeavours it successfully. It is not only in this particular case, but on *other occasions* likewise, that he imputes whatever he believes, or would willingly, or pretends to believe, to God as his teacher or deceiver. Whether things appear to him as they are absolutely, and such as the supreme intelligence knows them to be, or not, they appear to him such as it is fit for his nature they should appear to him. If plain BOLINGBROKE's nature is any thing distinct from human nature, I have nothing to say concerning it, because I am unacquainted with it. But if he means human nature, he must have been extremely idle in writing volumes for truth, and against error. For whether what he, or what you Mr MALLEY, believe, or what you teach, be true or false, it is the same thing; for it is fittest for you to believe. And to what purpose all this pains to introduce a new system of morality and natural religion, when any system, true or false, answers the purpose? And why should you labour to undeceive me, when I can answer as well as you, that whether I am deceived or not, the thing in debate appears to me such as it is fittest it should appear to my nature? Whether things appear to you
such

such as the supreme intelligence knows them to be, or not; they appear to you, and consequently to every man, such as is fit they should appear. And this, you say, is an undoubted truth. A truth, however, scarce ever known before; and a truth that destroys all other truths, and itself likewise. From this it follows, that it is fit, and fittest for you, to believe that the human soul is material, though in reality it may be immaterial, and GOD knows it to be such; and the reason is, because GOD is the author of your deception. Which two propositions are so evidently absurd, that scarcely can words make the absurdity appear plainer. I said, that this doctrine is rank enthusiasm; and such it is, if you really believe, that it is GOD who makes you think right or wrong, as is fittest for your purpose; and if you do not, it is a doctrine founded on this Atheistical maxim, *Whatever is, is right*. It is possible you may deceive yourself; for others do. But I am persuaded, that GOD neither doth, nor can deceive any man; for he is not a cunning and deceitful being, but a GOD of truth, because he is an all-perfect being. His Lordship, however, is not the first that hath given GOD the lie publicly. Lord KAIMS, a senator of the college of justice in Scotland, hath done it before him; and for which he hath received such correction *, as may well suit his Lordship of BOLINGBROKE. Though it gives me pain to think,

* Estimate, p. III.—137.

that men of rank and liberal education should employ their parts and learning to run down the labours of those who employed themselves for the glory of God and the good of mankind; yet it gives me pleasure to find, that all that they advance for impiety and irreligion, ends in absurdity and contradiction.

INSTEAD of helping mankind on in their inquiries after useful truths, they would gladly reduce them to a supposed ancient state of indolence and ignorance. Of which take this for an instance. “* Men were
“ conscious, ever since their race existed, that there
“ is an active thinking principle in their composition,
“ and that there is a mutual influence of body on
“ mind, which shews itself first, and of mind on
“ body, which appears a little after. With this knowledge men of common sense have contented themselves, whilst philosophers, those men of uncommon sense, have filled their own heads, and the
“ heads of all those that have hearkened to them,
“ with fantastical ideas and notions.” That mankind did consider the mind and the body, not as the same, but as two different things, which mutually influenced one another, he doth admit. And though this is conscious knowledge, and as ancient as mankind, yet it doth not well agree with his doctrine of the soul’s materiality. With the knowledge of a mutual influence of mind on body, and body on

* Vol. i. p. 243.

mind,

mind, it is not true, that men of common sense contented themselves. For time beyond tradition, all the ancient world believed, that the soul survived the body, and was immortal, as I have already proved *. And indeed if men of common sense had contented themselves with the knowledge of two distinct parts in their composition, their sense must have been very shallow. For if they did distinguish between this thinking principle and the body, a further inquiry must soon have appeared fit and expedient. No subject of consideration concerned them so much as themselves. It was natural to them to ask themselves and others, what this thinking principle was, how it came into being, how and wherein it differed from the body which it commanded and moved, and whether it survived the body, or was dissolved with it? Perhaps these queries would not occur to one who considered his whole being as one entire system of matter, as you and his Lordship do. But as ye state the case, I cannot see how these questions could be suppressed. For this active thinking principle, which makes but one part of the human composition, must differ from all the other ingredients and compounding parts.

WITH this knowledge of a thinking principle in our composition, it is only philosophers, men of uncommon sense, who are not satisfied. You bestow

* Sect. v.

the dignity of a philosopher on Lord BOLINGBROKE, (and I am persuaded that he thought himself the greatest philosopher of his own, or some preceding ages); and why should he find fault with his brethren, men of thought and genius, and take part with the unthinking and unattentive part of mankind? His Lordship here commits two mistakes. 1st, He prescribes a rule in reasoning, which is not in our power to observe; and, 2^{dly}, A rule which he himself does not observe. While we have the power of reasoning, we can no more stop the exercise of it, than we can hinder ourselves from seeing with open eyes and enlightened objects. This prescription is philosophical Popery; and it is a rule which he himself does not observe. With the knowledge of a thinking principle in our composition, and of a mutual influence of mind on body, and body on mind, he is far from being satisfied. He inquires further; and finds out, that this thinking principle is matter fermented and subtilized, and that he is under a necessity of concluding it is no more, even though he should be deceived. And as if he had not said enough to support his disbelief of the soul's immateriality, he adds, “ * I am ready to think, that
“ God, who leaves us in many cases to collect his
“ will, as he hath made us capable to collect it from
“ his works, shews manifestly in this case, how repugnant it is to the design of his all-wise provi-

* Vol. i. p. 257.

“ dence,

“ dence, that we should attempt to acquire knowledge of soul and spirit.” There is nothing nearer to us than ourselves, and nothing we are so much concerned in. This thinking principle, whatever it is, is the nobler part of our composition or system, and therefore the most worthy of our consideration. It is that by which we are rational, moral, and accountable beings. And doth this philosopher think that God forbids us to bestow any thoughts on it? If he is of that opinion, no man is guilty more directly of disobedience in this case than he, who hath thought and written so much on soul and spirit, until he hath reduced it into matter, fermented and subtilized. And as a conclusion that doth no great honour to his speculations, he thinks it is not our business to know what we are, while he maintains it is our duty (for it is the design of providence) “ to employ our industry and penetration to acquire knowledge of body terrestrial and celestial, in order to promote in general the advantages of human life, and those particularly that result from the admiration of the supreme Being.” I do think he had much better employed his time in writing almanacks, or in chymical operations, in fermenting and subtilizing matter, than in writing on natural religion. This, however, is an acknowledgment of an unsuccessful attempt on the soul’s immateriality; and that all he hath said against it, doth neither satisfy himself, nor can it satisfy his reader. When men once intangle themselves in debate,

debate, they are very willing to quit the subject, and to introduce another. Whatever he may think, I do believe, that every wise and religious man will think it his business and his duty, rather to acquire knowledge of himself, than of things exterior to him. But upon what grounds he finds it repugnant to the design of providence, that we should attempt to acquire knowledge of soul and spirit, is not easily imagined. Because he cannot, or will not, believe that the soul is an immaterial substance, must he conclude, that it is God's design, that neither he, nor any one besides, should so much as attempt to know what this active thinking principle in our nature is? As he charges his errors, so he charges his ignorance to God's account. This is blasphemy or Atheism. Whatever is right, whatever is done, is well done; and whatever is thought, is well thought. And this finishes a system of fatality and of Atheism. But until he attempted in vain to acquire knowledge of soul and spirit, he did not know that it was unacquirable; and until then he did not know that such an attempt was repugnant to the design of divine providence. And, finally, he makes his own understanding the standard of all human understanding at least, and a criterion of God's purposes and designs. Which is to tell his reader, " You need not trouble yourself to
" know what your thinking principle is; for I have
" tried it without success; and I am sure, that if God
" had designed that any man should know more of
" the

“ the matter, he would have allowed me to have
“ made the discovery.” This is to treat God and
man with contempt. The amount of all that he
hath said on soul and spirit, and the mutual influence
between it and the body, is, That he neither knows,
nor ought to know any thing of the whole affair.
One would be apt to think, that ignorance is the ul-
timate end that he and such writers have in all their
studies; while at the same time they value themselves
on their superior knowledge to that of the most learn-
ed and knowing part of mankind. In all their de-
bates with philosophers, whether Christian, Maho-
metan, Jewish, or religious Heathens, they under-
take the *negative*. From such teachers one may un-
learn, but he can learn nothing that is worth learn-
ing, nothing that tends to God’s glory, or the good
of mankind.

BEFORE I finish this article of the immateriality of
the soul, I am willing to take the assistance of Dr
CUDWORTH, to whom Lord BOLINGBROKE shews
a greater regard than to Dr CLARKE, or to WOLLA-
STON. And he says, “ * The atomic or Democriti-
“ cal, and the hylozoic or Stratonical, are the chief
“ forms of Atheism. The former of which, the De-
“ mocratic, admitting a true notion of body, does
“ therefore conclude, that all life and understanding
“ in animals and men are generated out of dead and

* Intellectual system, p. 144.

“ stupid

“ stupid matter, as resulting from the contextures of
 “ atoms, or some peculiar composition of magnitudes,
 “ figures, sities, and motions; and consequently that
 “ they are themselves really nothing else than local
 “ motion and mechanism.——But the latter, the hy-
 “ lozoic, on the contrary, think, that life, cogita-
 “ tion, and understanding, are entities really distinct
 “ from local motion and mechanism; and therefore
 “ cannot be generated out of dead and stupid matter,
 “ but must needs be somewhere in the world, *origi-*
 “ *nally, essentially, and fundamentally.* Yet because
 “ they take it also for granted, that there is another
 “ substance besides matter, do thereupon adulterate
 “ the notion of matter, blending and confounding it
 “ with life, as making them two inadequate concep-
 “ tions of substance; and concluding, that all matter
 “ and substance, as such, hath life, perception, and
 “ understanding, natural and *inconscous*, essentially
 “ belonging to it; and that sense, or conscious rea-
 “ son and understanding in animals, arises only from
 “ the accidental modification of this fundamental life
 “ of matter, by organization.

“ WE conclude therefore, that if these two A-
 “ theistic hypotheses, which are found to be the most
 “ considerable, be once confuted, the reality of all
 “ Atheism will be *ipso facto* confuted.” If this con-
 “ sequence holds, I have good reason to support the
 “ actual immortality of the soul, and so hath Mr MAL-

LET,

LET, if you are not an Atheist, as well as the possibility of it, which he and I admit. The author, I mean Dr CUDWORTH, adds, "There is nothing more requisite to a thorough confutation of Atheism, than the proving of these two things: 1st, "That life and understanding are not essential to matter as such; and, 2^{dly}, That they can never possibly arise out of any mixture or modification of dead and stupid matter whatsoever. The reason of which assertion is, because all Atheists, as before observed, are mere corporealists: of which there can be but these two sorts; either such as make life to be essential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible; or else such as suppose life, and every thing besides the bare substance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable and corruptible, as rising out of some mixture and modification of it. And as the disproving of these two things will overthrow all Atheism, so will it likewise lay a clear foundation for demonstrating a Deity distinct from the corporeal world.

"Now, that life, perception, and understanding, should be essential to matter as such, or that all senseless matter should be perfectly and infallibly wise, (though without consciousness), as to all its own congruities and capabilities, which is the doctrine of the Hylozoists; this, I say, is an hypo-

U u

"thesis

" thesis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outrage-
 " ously wild, that very few men ever could have A-
 " theistical faith enough to swallow it down, and di-
 " gest it : wherefore this hylozoic Atheism hath been
 " very obscure ever since its first emerſion, and hath
 " found ſo few fautors and abettors, that it hath look-
 " ed like a forlorn and deſerted thing. Neither in-
 " deed are there any public monuments at all extant,
 " in which it is avowedly maintained, ſtated, and re-
 " duced into any ſyſtem ; inſomuch that we ſhould
 " not have taken notice of it at this time as a parti-
 " cular form of Atheiſm, nor have conjured it up out
 " of its grave, had we not underſtood that STRATO'S
 " gholt had begun to walk of late ; and that, among
 " ſome wellwiſhers to Atheiſm, deſpairing in a man-
 " ner of the atomic form, this hylozoic hypotheſis
 " began already to be looked upon as the riſing ſun
 " of Atheiſm."

AND it is becauſe I find his Lordſhip inclined to
 one or other of theſe Atheiſtical ſyſtems, and ſome-
 times to both of them, that I have made this, though
 a long, but I hope no uſeleſs quotation. And to do
 myſelf and his Lordſhip juſtice, I here tranſcribe
 what he ſays on both theſe ſyſtems. " * The atomi-
 " cal ſyſtem, which LEUCIPPUS took perhaps from
 " other philoſophers," (perhaps he would give it
 greater antiquity than it deſerves), " which DEMO-

* Vol. i. p. 226.

“ CRITUS took from LEUCIPPUS to improve it, and
“ which EPICURUS took from DEMOCRITUS to cor-
“ rupt it, hath been revived with great reason. But
“ yet we must not talk of matter, as if we knew it in
“ these first elements or principles, and abstractly
“ from all the forms under which we perceive it.”
And yet talk he will, and talk he must of them ab-
stractly, if he believes that the atomic philosophy
hath been revived with great reason. “ These origi-
“ nal particles, in which the nature of it consists, and
“ on which the constitution of it under all its forms
“ depends, are far beyond the reach of any analyse
“ we can make, of any knowledge we can acquire.
“ Whether these particles be uniform and homogene-
“ ous, or whether they be of different kinds, and dif-
“ ferent even in substance, as well as in size, figure,
“ or other circumstances or accidents, is as much un-
“ known to the proudest dogmatist as to you and to
“ me. Nay, whether many of these original particles
“ may not be endued with active principles such,
“ for instance, as cause fermentation in some, and
“ cohesion in all” (fermentation dissolves cohesion)
“ bodies, is a point which none of them can deter-
“ mine. And yet one need not scruple to say, that
“ the affirmative may be assumed on better grounds
“ than their hypotheses are, notwithstanding the re-
“ peated din of inert, senseless, stupid, and simular
“ epithets, which they ring in our ears, whenever
“ they speak of body and matter. The whole dis-

“ course, when they go beyond some apparent properties, whereof we are fitted to have ideas, and which have been already discovered, is one continued petition of principle.”

Now, the atomic and hylozoic philosophy, which Dr CUDWORTH calls *forms of Atheism*, are directly opposite to one another; and yet, to support the materiality of the human soul, his Lordship adopts both. He says, that the original particles may be endued with active principles, may be assumed on better grounds than the atomic; that is, he prefers the hylozoic to the Democritical philosophy. He must therefore give up his fermentation and subtilization, as the foundation or formal cause of thought and understanding, or rather in itself *thought* and *ratiocination*. He acknowledges, that some matter is *indeed* inert, senseless, and stupid, in appearance. If it is *indeed* inert, it must be really, and not *apparently* only passive. And all matter, except what belongs to the animal kind, is equally inert, senseless, and stupid. And, notwithstanding, rather than admit spiritual and immaterial substances, he endeavours to persuade himself and his readers, that many original particles of matter are endued with active principles. I leave it to Mr MALLEY to decide the debate between Epicurean and Stratonian matter: for I have nothing to do with such hypotheses, that destroy one another. And indeed what his Lordship contends for keenly, destroys both;

both; that is, a possible superaddition and supernatural faculty of thinking divinely bestowed on senseless matter. Matter, in its original particles, is beyond his understanding; and "therefore the whole discourse, when it goes beyond some apparent properties, whereof we are fitted to have ideas, and which have been already discovered, is one continued petition of principle." This he hath certainly spoken against his own understanding, and the whole scheme of a material soul. If to go beyond some apparent properties of matter, is to beg the question; then he that goes farthest, is the boldest beggar: and he that bestows the faculty of thinking on certain modifications of matter, and life and understanding on all matter, goes far beyond all those who ascribe nothing to matter that hath any thing of activity in it.

DR CUDWORTH hath said, that " * cogitation may be conceived without extension, as extension may be conceived without cogitation;" (that is, the idea of cogitation); "whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that whereof it is a mode." And indeed thought or cogitation hath no relation, no affinity, no manner of conceivable connection, neither with the primary nor secondary properties of matter; neither with extension, solidity, impenetrability, or divisibility; nor with figure, or any

* Intellectual system, p. 830.

of its sensible qualities; nor yet with motion, the only thing in it that bears a resemblance to activity. Thought is neither thick nor thin, broad nor narrow, long nor short, circular nor angular, neither green nor gray, motion nor rest; and as little is cogitation either fermentation or cohesion. His Lordship, in my opinion, hath unluckily pitched on fermentation, from among all the known properties of matter, as the fountain and spring of understanding and ratiocination. While things are in a ferment, they are always confused and drumly. It may serve for an emblem of his own understanding, but can no wise represent the source of clear and distinct thoughts. If his Lordship's soul was material, and if its activity consisted in fermentation, his philosophical works are its genuine production. They are full of disorder, confusion, perplexity, vain struggling, repugnancy, and contradiction. A dread of an omniscient, almighty, and just judge, is the yeast that hath set his soul a-working.

It was objected, as he observes, That “ * since
 “ thought is not the essence of matter, nor any attri-
 “ bute of matter neither, in as much as it does not
 “ flow necessarily from that essence, it cannot have
 “ been communicated or superadded even by omni-
 “ potence to any system of matter, because essences
 “ are unchangeable, and attributes incommunicable;
 “ so that matter cannot be made to think: for the

* Vol. i. p. 212.

“ moment

" moment any system begins to think, it ceases to be
" material; and that which was matter becomes a
" system of another kind." To which I add, that
whatever is naturally inert and inactive, can never
become naturally active, cogitative, and rational. If
it doth, the nature of it must be changed, and cannot
therefore remain the same thing. And therefore
whatever is made to think, cannot be matter; because
it is impossible for it to be active and purely passive at
once. To which, after his usual flourish of con-
temptuous language, he says, " These reasonings a-
" mount to no more than this: We metaphysicians
" and ontosophists have fixed the essence of matter;
" it can be no other than it is represented in our ab-
" stract ideas, those eternal natures independent on
" God himself. If you suppose it modified or mix-
" ed, so as to be no longer inert and senseless, it is
" no more conformable to our ideas; it is therefore
" no longer matter, as it came out of the region of
" possibility into that of actuality."

No man who understands metaphysics ever said,
that abstract ideas are eternal natures, or spiritual
substances, as he imagines, or rather as he falsely
asserts, that ontosophists do. Nature is from *natus* or
nascendo, and regularly and commonly denotes some-
thing real and actual. He who maintains that the e-
ternity of matter is consistent with the existence of
one supreme being, the first cause of all things, as
his

his Lordship does, may well assert that there are *eternal natures independent on GOD himself*; but not those who maintain that GOD alone is the only eternal being. It is true, that a question hath arisen about truth and righteousness, whether they are dependent or independent on GOD's arbitrary appointment. But this question I have already stated, and decided *, and will say no more on that subject. In analysing the properties of matter, there is no occasion for abstraction. The knowledge of them is founded on experience. It is by *physics*, or natural philosophy, which hath body or matter for its object, that the properties and attributes of it are fixed and determined. And naturalists, as ontosophists, (for there is no inconsistency of these two sciences), may reason on these fixed properties, and likewise reason abstractly. The atomic philosophy, which he says is revived with great reason, doth make all matter essentially inert and inactive. I would learn from him, (for I cannot learn another way), if any of the most eminent improvers of the corporeal science have, in their discoveries and experiments, found out any thing inconsistent with its *vis inertiae*, or pure passivity. And if this hath not been done, metaphysicians are as free as the most eminent modern naturalists, to hold, that matter is naturally senseless, inactive, and stupid. And I have the assurance to conclude, that no piece of matter, great or small, round

* Sect. iii.

or square, in motion or in rest, can be inert and alert, purely passive and active, at the same time. The paper on which I write was once flax, then linen rags, but cannot be all the three at once. Though body could be changed into spirit, which I think is impossible, yet it cannot possibly be both body and spirit at the same time. To this he answers, with the air of a most masterly teacher, “ * Learn, that “ human knowledge is derived from existence; and “ that to be real, it must be conformable to things “ as they are. Conform your ideas therefore to “ them, and pretend no longer to controul or deter- “ mine particular existence by abstract notions.” Though the author sometimes allows me to extend my reasoning to possibilities, yet in this case he confines me to actual existence. And I can submit to his orders; because I do not want abstraction, to know the properties of matter, whether simple or compounded; and to know, that, to the constant experience of naturalists, passivity is one of them. “ As “ long as matter is senseless and inert, it is not a “ thinking substance, nor ought it to be called so.” So far agreed. “ But when, in any system of it, these “ essential properties, extension and solidity, &c. “ are maintained, the system is still material, though “ it become a sensitive plant, a reasoning elephant, “ or a refining metaphysician.” I take the freedom to supply his &c. with inertness and passivity, divisi-

* Vol. i. p. 219.

bility, resistance, and impenetrability, which are all of them as essential to matter as solidity and extension. And then let him put his own fermented understanding to the trial, to make any piece of matter, or composition of it, to be active and passive, inert and alert, divisible and indivisible, at the same time. It is true, he says, "It is nonsense, and something worse than nonsense, to assert, that God cannot give the faculty of thinking, a faculty in the principle of it entirely unknown to you, to a system of matter whose essential properties are solidity and extension, &c. and not incogitativity." I have no reason to think that I speak nonsense, and worse than nonsense, when I say that contradictions are not in the number of possibilities. You assert that omnipotence can make matter think, by a superaddition of a new power or faculty, the principle of which is *entirely unknown*. The principle therefore to which this new faculty belongs, is not matter, because it is very well known. If, together with the faculty of thinking, a new principle of it is superadded to matter, it must be immaterial. And what do you gain for a material soul, by your appeal to omnipotence? I have said before, that superaddition to the nature of matter, doth not change the nature of it. For addition and alteration are not the same thing. And tho' I do not admit the term *incogitativity*, yet matter, while matter, is as essentially inert and passive, as it is

is extended and solid; and cannot be active and inactive at the same time.

I freely allow, that the negative term *immaterial* doth not denote the substance and essence of the soul. But this should give no offence to Mr MALLEY, who maintains that all essences are unknown to us. We know indeed more properties belonging to matter, and we can analyse the idea of it into more attributes, than we can that of the soul. And the reason is plain. Matter is compounded, and consists of various parts, so far as we know it. But the soul is a simple substance; and one single and simple phenomenon discovers as much of the principle of thinking, as all the known properties of matter discover of its nature and essence. His Lordship says, “ * Our ideas of solidity and extension do not include the idea of thought, neither do they include that of motion; but they exclude neither: and the arguments which you draw from the divisibility of matter against its cogitability, which you deny, might not be ill employed against its mobility.” I cannot admit, that what is not included in an idea, is not therefore excluded. For it is either comprehended in the idea, or not. If it is comprehended, it is included; and if it is not comprehended, it is excluded. The idea of a triangle takes in all sorts of triangles, whether plain or spherical, and every figure bounded

* Vol. i. p. 220.

by three lines. But this idea does not include either a circular or square form; and therefore excludes them entirely from the conception of every triangular figure. If there is any thing like argument in *including* and not *excluding*, it amounts to no more than this, Because I cannot prove from the extension and solidity of matter that it is moveable, I ought to admit that matter thinks, though it doth not follow from any of its known and essential properties, that it doth. Neither motion nor rest are inconsistent with extension, solidity, passivity, and inertness. On the contrary, as possible modifications, they are included in the idea of matter. As solid, it resists; as it resists, it admits of pulsion; and whenever this pulsive force is superior to the resistance, move it must. Matter, besides its solidity and extension, is inert, stupid, and insensible, dead and inactive: but the thinker is active and alive. Were cogitability and mobility equally connected with, and included in the idea of matter, I should allow that matter might be forced to think as well as to move. I affirm positively, that the idea of matter doth as certainly exclude the idea of thinking, as the idea of a triangle excludes rotundity, because it is inconsistent with several of its known properties. The thinker is alive, and matter is dead.

THOUGH perhaps the reader may be as weary of the debate as I am, yet I beg his patience to hear his
Lordship's

Lordship's strongest reason against the immateriality of the human soul. " * He who affirms, that there is
" in the composition of the human system a substance
" to which cogitability belongs, as well as a subject
" to which mobility belongs, must have ideas of the
" first of these substances prior in the order of nature
" to that of its cogitability, as he has the idea of the
" second prior in the same order to that of its mobility; or he must talk at random, and affirm what
" he doth not know. His supposed distinct substances must sink into nothing, or be confounded with
" one another. It will cost a reasonable mind much
" less to assume, that a substance known by some of
" its properties, may have others that are unknown,
" and may be capable of various systems of operations quite inconceivable by us, according to the
" designs of infinite wisdom, than to assume, that
" there is a substance concerning which men do not
" pretend to know what it is, but what it is not."

Reasoners *a posteriori* (and such is my author under examination) are so fully satisfied to know in that method that the thing is, that they declare against proceeding any further. And I acknowledge, *that it is*, and *what it is*, are very different, and different subjects of inquiry. By reasoning *a posteriori*, he finds that matter is extended and solid; and I find besides that it is inert; and though he does not, yet I find that mobility hath a connection with the solidity of

* Vol. i. p. 210.

matter.

matter. All that he knows is some of its properties; which do not lead him up to the knowledge of its essence. And if the property of thinking discovers to me a substantial thinker, I know the nature of this thinker as well as he doth the nature and essence of matter. When we say, that the soul is immaterial, it doth not follow that we know no more, or know nothing about it: for we know besides, that it is a living and active substance, a substance that can command and move the whole human body from one place to another; that it can act upon itself by reflection; that it can draw conclusions, and form resolutions; and by an act of its will put them in execution. All this makes it plain and evident, that the human soul, or thinking principle, hath an intrinsic energy, and self-determining power. But this, you think, should be ascribed to matter, according to the *Stratonic* philosophy; or to a composition of some select parts of it, according to the atomic or *Democritical* philosophy; or to a superaddition of a thinking faculty infused into matter, a subject of itself incapable to receive it. I have already observed, that all these three suppositions are inconsistent with one another; yet his Lordship is willing to accept of them all, rather than suppose another substance distinct from matter, as the principle of such wonderful phenomena. Of the three hypotheses, he seems to make the *Stratonic* the last support of a material thinker. *STRATO*'s living original particles of matter, particles endued not only with

with life, but with understanding, are either complete animals in themselves, or become such by addition and multiplication. Leave these particles in their original state, you and I, and the whole, would have been, and are but the *minima naturæ*. If by addition and multiplication of these intelligent particles you are become a poet and philosopher, you are not one single, individual DAVID MALLET, Esq; but a swarm of little thinkers. You may find, that “it will cost
“ your mind less to assume, that a substance known
“ by some properties may have others unknown, than
“ to assume a new substance for every unknown property.” These are your words, and the strength of your asylum of a material soul. I think an unknown property will never require a known subject. And if you did not know the property of thinking, it were needless, and even impossible, to inquire, whether thinking was a property of body or spirit, of a material or immaterial substance. But now that the property of thinking is known, it cannot be ascribed to matter, because inconsistent with several other well known essential properties of it. And when you ascribe thinking to matter, you do it in an *inconceivable*, and not simply in an *unknown* manner. His Lordship’s, and your words are, “A substance known by
“ some of its properties, may have others that are
“ unknown; and may be capable, in various systems,
“ of operations quite inconceivable by us.” These are your words, such as they are; and if my reader
does

does not understand them, you are to be blamed for not expressing yourself more distinctly. All I observe, or have occasion in this place to observe, is, that it is your opinion, that it is quite inconceivable that matter doth think. And because I cannot conceive that matter in any system is capable of thought and reasoning, I ascribe the wonderful phenomenon, not to a material, but to a spiritual and immaterial principle and substance: and so should you; for to do otherwise, is as inconceivable to you as to me. Wonderful is your aversion to spiritual things, when you had rather establish the doctrine of the soul's materiality upon an inconceivable, and quite inconceivable foundation, than admit there is any other created substance than matter: for, as hath been observed before, you have no more right to deny that there are such immaterial beings, than I have to affirm it. "God alone, the author of all beings, knows how many different kinds of substances his omnipotent will hath made to exist." And why may not one sort of such substances be allowed to animate and inform, to direct and to command the human body, and to be the thinker in mankind? This is not inconceivable; whereas the hypothesis which you adopt is quite inconceivable, and indeed wrought up through many manifest contradictions: and therefore it will cost a reasonable mind less to assume, that this faculty of thinking belongs to a spiritual and immaterial, than

than to assume that it belongs, in an inconceivable manner, to a material substance.

To conclude this section, I add, by way of APPENDIX, that CUDWORTH is of opinion, that disproving the Democritical and the Stratonian Atheistical hypotheses, does *ipso facto* demolish all Atheism; and it likewise lays a clear foundation for demonstrating a Deity, distinct from the corporeal world. To which of these purposes have you an aversion? The pains taken to disprove the immateriality of the human soul shew, that you consider it as an article entirely inconsistent with your system of irreligion. And if matter can think, know, and reason; then may it know in the highest as well as in the lowest degree. It may be omniscient; it may be GOD. His Lordship and you are professedly and learnedly ignorant of GOD's moral attributes; and as little do ye desire to know his physical and natural perfections. Ye confess yourselves guilty of an unpardonable presumption, for asserting, that " * GOD is not a system of matter, because there arise from the contrary supposition a multitude of absurdities, that cannot destroy the demonstration of his existence, but that are inconsistent with it." This is so much well-connected nonsense. These absurdities that follow from the supposition that GOD is a material being, he says, cannot destroy the demonstration of his existence: but

* Vol. iii. p. 138.

these absurdities, and the existence of GOD, cannot stand together, because they are inconsistent; and therefore the being of GOD, or his materiality, must go, unless consistency and inconsistency are the same. I have reason to suspect, that he is not unwilling to part with both. To extenuate the guilt of an unpardonable presumption, he appeals to the ignorance of some fathers of the Christian church of the nature of the divine being, who spoke in terms which made him material, at least not immaterial. These fathers spake often figuratively; which the author is apt to take in a literal sense, as he does Dr CLARKE's saying, that GOD hath a hearty concern for the happiness of mankind. And if it is impossible to conceive what these fathers thought of GOD, when they made him neither material nor immaterial; it is as impossible to know what you and your author mean, when you say, " * GOD is not a system of matter; but he is " not therefore a spirit, such as we conceive spirits " to be." What your notion of spirits is, ye yourselves only know. However, ye admit, that the present notion of spirits is that of immaterial beings. Between material and immaterial, corporeal and not corporeal, there is no medium. And by this, if ye mean any thing, ye mean, that GOD is neither a material nor immaterial, but an inconsistent, inconceivable, and impossible being. After assuming, as a first principle, That " † the only criterion we have where-

* Vol. i. p. 266.

† Vol. i. p. 101.

" by

“ by to judge of spirit, or principle of thinking, is our
“ own spirit;” he hath taken care to let the world
know what he takes his own spirit to be; that is, mat-
ter fermented, subtilized, or endued with more or less
elasticity, according to the organized body it moves
and commands: all which, take it as you will, is but
a system of matter. And therefore, according to his
only criterion whereby he judges of spirit, God is a
system of matter. When he says we *conceive*, if he
means his conception of spirit, he speaks nonsense,
when he says, that God is not a system of matter,
but he is not therefore a spirit, such as we conceive
spirits to be; for he conceives spirit to be nothing
but a system of matter. All that I can make of his
words, and of his meaning, if he means any thing,
and which I make with grief and horror, is, that God
is either a material or an impossible being. Perhaps
he means, that God is a material being, but a sub-
stance of matter far superior to our spirit, and of an-
other kind than the matter out of which the human
soul is made; but still he is material. For if we
could divide matter into a thousand classes or *species*,
all would still remain matter, and not so much as an
atom become immaterial. Whatever he means, it is
certain, that he runs himself into numberless absurdi-
ties, by departing from the common way of thinking
and speaking of God, and of the spirits whereof he
is the father. “ *Spirit*,” he says, “ is not certainly
“ an univocal term, because the distance between

“ GOD and the highest created being is infinite.
“ Thus we should think and speak of GOD : but the
“ men we have to do with, have accustomed them-
“ selves to think and speak in the same manner, and
“ in the same style, of the divine and human spirit,
“ with no other difference than that of adding *infinite*
“ to the one, and *finite* to the other. They conceive
“ them both to be immaterial beings, and substances
“ too.” And to keep his infinite distance from GOD
in speaking, he should have pointed out some other
terms than *finite* and *infinite*, as more proper for his
purpose. If one cannot mend a fault, it is with an ill
grace that he pretends to find it. Would you have
those men with whom you have to do, deny of GOD
whatever they affirm of created beings? If so, you
must deny that GOD is a being. And then the di-
stance in your conception is as far as something is from
nothing. Because you are a substance, does it follow
that he is none? For my part, I see no offence that
it can give to your pious ears to say, that the human
soul is a spirit, and that GOD is a spirit; that you are
a substance, and that GOD is a substance; and that
GOD is a being, and you another; that the Almighty
is the living GOD, and you a living animal. And
the difference of finite and infinite, created and un-
created, is the most proper, and therefore the fittest
to be used. It is good he doth not meddle much with
the nature and attributes of the supreme Being; for
he

he seldom does without blundering, as will evidently appear by what I have next to say.

OUR author BOLINGBROKE, in speaking of spirit, which, as he thinks, hath put mankind mad, says, “ * The ideas we have of some few modes of thinking, are as clear as those which we have of numberless modes of extension. So far then we have a criterion by which to judge of the immaterial spirits we are pleased to create. I call them creatures of metaphysics and theology, because in truth, considered as distinct substances, they are such. All spirits are hypothetical, except the infinite spirit, the father of spirits, the supreme Being.” He who would not take on him to deny that there are immaterial created beings, has at last found assurance to affirm, “that all spirits are the creatures of metaphysics and theology.” That the soul and body are distinct substances, I have already determined; and the reasons I have given, I rest upon. That we have in our make something that thinks, he admits; and I am sure, that neither metaphysicians nor divines have created this thinker, though they indeed judge it to be immaterial. But it is astonishing that a man of common understanding, and a man of one half the author’s learning, and who is not an arrant and a professed Atheist, should say, that *all spirits are hypothetical, except the infinite spirit,*

* Vol. i. p. 102.

the father of spirits. This is too plain to pass, or to be excused as a blunder. There are no spirits but hypothetical spirits, and the supreme Being is their father. This can bear no meaning, except that God is the chief, the father of imaginary spirits, and the grand bull-beggar of mankind. "All spirits are the children of metaphysics and theology, and God is their father: and if children resemble the father, God and they must be of the same sort."

By the many advices he gives his readers to stop all inquiry concerning the nature and attributes of God, and by his own bad success, so far as he hath attempted it, it appears, that the ALMIGHTY, in his opinion, is a being he neither knows, nor desires to know. And all this affected Atheism and impiety, he covers with a veil of the highest esteem and veneration for his unknown God. If the subject were not too serious and important, one might divert himself with what he says to shew the antiquity of the belief of a material supreme being. He says, " * The absurdity of supposing him of matter, like other material beings, was discovered, and the notion of a spiritual substance was established. Whether this notion was entertained first of the supreme Being, and was applied afterwards to the human soul; whether it was entertained first of the human soul, and was applied afterwards to the su-

* Vol. ii. p. 75.

" preme

“preme Being; or whether the idea of spirit and
“spiritual substance was determined exactly, either
“by ancient philosophers and Christian fathers, as
“we have determined ours; if ever it was, or is as
“much determined as we suppose it to be, I shall
“not inquire at this time.” The Noble author, or
rather, nobleman author, gives himself and his reader
needless trouble, about the priority of two errors,
the immateriality of the human soul, and the im-
materiality of the supreme Being. For if all spirits
are hypothetical, and the supreme Being the father
of them, the opinion of their reality, if an error
now, must have been such from the beginning.
That the human soul is material, he contends ob-
stinately; and if the spirituality and immateriality of it
was first established, and if from that established er-
ror, the immateriality of the supreme Being follow-
ed, these two opinions are both of them alike errors.
And if from the immateriality of the supreme Be-
ing, the immateriality of the human soul was estab-
lished as a consequence, and if this consequence is
false, as he contends, so must the antecedent be.
And, to speak my opinion, unless the phenomena of
our own minds convince us of its immateriality, we
can never arrive at a certainty that God is not a ma-
terial being. And my author having embraced the
opinion of the materiality of the human soul, he is
of consequence led to make God a kind of material
being likewise. He says, “It is absurd to suppose
“the

“ the supreme Being to be matter,” but with this limitation, *like other material beings*. Material beings are so many and various, that few of them are in every thing alike. His Lordship’s soul and a pebble are both of them material, and both of them very different. So far then, and for all that he hath said, GOD may be a material being, though different from many other material beings, and from all the material beings which we know. And this I conceive to have been his opinion, or what he intended should pass for his opinion; because, as I have just now observed, he affirms that it doth not follow, that GOD is a spirit, from his not being a system of matter. I leave it to the reader’s judgment, whether or not he doth not ascribe the immateriality of human souls, and of the supreme Being, to the prevalence of imagination over all our rational faculties. His words are, “ * One may think that nothing can shew
 “ so marvellously the wanderings of the human mind,
 “ and the prevalence of the imagination over all the
 “ rational faculties, as this inveterate habit of dog-
 “ matizing about spirit and spiritual things, and even
 “ about GOD, the father of spirits.” We are conscious that we have some knowledge and some power; and, notwithstanding, he contends obstinately that we are but a system of matter. And why may not he ascribe all knowledge and all power to a material system infinitely transcending ours? for it depended

* Vol. ii. p. 79.

on his own imagination to make of matter whatever he pleased. It is an observation made by Dr CUDWORTH, and with which I began this section, That no man who acknowledged a God, ever denied the immateriality of the soul. And I may be allowed to say, that no man who makes the human soul material, can have sufficient and demonstrative reason to believe that God is an immaterial being.

I did observe already, that to make matter co-eternal with God, (and postponed the consideration of it), was to weaken the argument for his necessary existence. For whatever is eternal cannot depend on any other being for its existence. It never began to be; it always was; and therefore, as to its being and existence, it must be as independent on God, as God is independent on all things. A co-eternity of God and matter, were to establish the doctrine of two independent beings: than which nothing can be more absurd. For whatever exists independently and eternally, must exist necessarily, or it could not exist at all. But two such beings are impossible; because, as they are eternally independent on one another, they might subsist, the one without the other, and so neither would exist necessarily. Not to repeat what I have said to this purpose, I refer my reader to the *Estimate* *. How his Lordship is warranted to say, “† Though the universe were conceived to be eter-

* P. 201.

† Vol. v. p. 73.

“nal, it could not be conceived *self-existent*,” is to me inconceivable. For whatever exists eternally, must exist independently and necessarily, and must be *self-existent*, if any being is such.

I learn from Dr CUDWORTH, that “* some
“ Theists persuade themselves, that the matter
“ and substance at least (if not the form also) of the
“ corporeal world did exist from eternity; yet, ne-
“ vertheless, they both alike proceeded from the
“ Deity, by way of emanation, and do continually
“ depend upon it, in the same way as light, though
“ co-eval with the sun, yet proceeds from the sun,
“ and depends upon it.” I cannot say that this is
his Lordship’s opinion. For I believe he was not so
stupid as not to see, that all emanations from the Deity
must be divine; for they cannot be considered as the
effects of his arbitrary will and good pleasure. And
this the comparison with the sun and the light doth
confirm. For the light is not the effect, but a part
of the sun scattered in particles, which continually
flow from it. It is true, that some talk of an eter-
nal effect of an eternal cause, (and I think the au-
thor somewhere does). But this is a contradiction in
the plainest terms; because every effect hath a be-
ginning. And though GOD is an eternal being, yet
he was not actually a cause until he created the uni-
verse. The divine attributes are some of them *rela-*

* Intellectual system, p. 84.

true, and others *absolute*. The relative are such as, Creator, Governor, Preserver, and Judge; for they suppose the Creator's property in them. God's absolute attributes are, self existence and sufficiency, eternity, power, knowledge, justice, goodness, and truth, and all other essential perfections, without which the Deity cannot be conceived. I do not blame his Lordship for asserting directly the contrary. For he holds, that all other beings besides God owe their being to his omnipotent will. But whether this is consistent with the eternity and independency of matter, I leave to the reader, and to DAVID MALLET, Esq; to determine.

BEFORE I conclude this section, I cannot omit what Dr CUDWORTH hath said on the subject *.

“ The true and proper idea of God, in the most
“ restricted form, is this, *A being absolutely perfect*;
“ for this is that alone to which necessary existence
“ is essential, and of which it is demonstrable. Now,
“ as absolute perfection includes all that belongs to
“ the Deity, so doth it not only comprehend (be-
“ sides necessary existence) perfect knowledge and
“ understanding, but also omni-causality, or omni-
“ potence in the full extent of it. God is not only
“ the best living being, or the most powerful of all
“ things, as some materiarian Theists described him,”
(and such as his Lordship means by the supreme Be-

* Intellectual system, p. 200.

ing), " but as absolutely omnipotent and infinitely
" powerful ; and therefore neither matter, nor any
" thing else, can exist independently on God ; but
" he is the sole principle and source from which all
" things are derived : " not necessarily, or by way
of emanation. As the *effluvia*, or imperceptible perspiration in human bodies, doth not depend on the human will, but is a consequence of our vital constitution ; no more do God's works proceed naturally from his essence or being ; and therefore must be the effect of his will and good pleasure. In my opinion, scarce any hypothesis can be more absurd, than that which makes God, or the first and best living being, and the most powerful of all things, as materialists speak, no more than a necessary or material agent : for such a being cannot be said to act at all. The sun enlightens and warms the habitation of men, but it hath not in itself the power of directing or suspending the emanations of light or heat. Were it thus with the supreme Being, other beings, which are free and voluntary agents, such as DAVID MALLET, would be the more noble being of the two. And as the effect cannot be more perfect than the cause, DAVID cannot owe his reason and understanding, his freedom and disposal of his inherent powers and faculties, to any being who is not himself a free and voluntary agent. From all which I may conclude, that a being from which nothing but involuntary emanations flow, can neither be the creator, preserver,
nor

nor governor of the world, and consequently cannot be even Lord BOLINGBROKE'S GOD, who is wise and powerful; *alias*, the grand bull-beggar of the children of men, or of men who, in understanding and fortitude, are no more than children.

S E C T.

S E C T. XII.

Of the immortality of the human soul, and a future state.

AS his Lordship left the question about particular providences, and that of the immateriality of the human soul, seemingly undetermined; so he makes the question about a future state of rewards and punishments problematical. For he says, “ * Reason
 “ will neither deny nor affirm that there is, to be a
 “ future state; and the doctrine of rewards and pu-
 “ nishments in it has so great a tendency to inforce
 “ civil laws, and to restrain the vices of men, that
 “ reason, which cannot decide for it on principles of
 “ natural theology, will not decide against it on prin-
 “ ciples of good policy. Let this doctrine rest on the
 “ authority of revelation. A Theist who doth not
 “ believe the revelation, can have no objection to the
 “ doctrine in general: and even a Theist who doth
 “ believe the revelation, may refuse to admit the
 “ doctrine on the principles on which it is usually
 “ established by divines.” But this professed neutra-
 lity, and his skill in politics, do not hinder him to di-
 rect all his reasonings against a future state. The in-
 equality in the distribution of temporal good and evil,
 hath from time immemorial been made a sufficient

* Vol. iv. p. 311.

foundation for a future state of rewards and punishments.

AGAINST this way of reasoning his Lordship undertakes two things. 1st, “ * The dispensations of providence in the distribution of good and evil stand in no need of any hypothesis to justify them;” and, 2^{dly}, “ If they did, that of a future state would be insufficient.” All the arguments used for a future state, the author at once dignifies with the epithet of sophisms †. But this is owing to the impertinence of his logics: an eminent instance of which is just at hand. For tho’ the reasonings for a future state are at least regular, yet they may not be just. The premisses may be ill founded, and therefore may be denied, or disproved. But upon supposition of their regularity, they cannot be esteemed captious and sophistical. And upon this supposition, that the reasonings are regular, he enters into an examination of them, and represents them in these words: “ || If there is not a future state, GOD is neither good nor just, according to our ideas of goodness and justice, in his dispensations; if he is not good and just according to our ideas of these moral attributes, neither can the physical attributes, such as infinite wisdom and power, belong to him; and a being which hath none of these, is not a GOD. *But there is a future state.*” Had he understood *l’art de penser*,

* Vol. iv. p. 311. † Vol. iv. p. 207. || Vol. iv. p. 312.
put

put into his hands when he was young, he would not have put a subsumption in place of a conclusion: for so do his words stand. That which religionists intend to prove, is a future state; and as a medium, they make use of the divine attributes: but as he miserably and ignorantly represents the argument, he makes the divine attributes the point to be proved, and a future state to be the *medium*. If I should say, that this is a fraudulent misrepresentation, the accusation would not be more unjust than many with which he charges as good men, and better reasoners than himself. They reason, that there must be a future state, because God is holy; and he makes them say, that God is holy, because there is a future state, that he may with the more assurance assert, “that divines have dared to
“argue, and I am justified in saying, that they betray the cause of God to the Atheist, when they
“join with him in so many points, that nothing remains to be opposed to him in defence of God’s existence, but the problematical and futile reasonings
“they employ to prove a future state.” Poor reasoner! I had almost said contemptible. If the premisses do not bear the conclusion, must the disputant therefore renounce them? And upon supposition that the religionist doth not make out a future state, is he therefore obliged to deny the being of God? This may be his Lordship’s meaning, and very likely it is. May not the religionist, with the same right which the author pretends to use, let the conclusion remain problematical?

blematical? It is generally established as a maxim, That matter neither doth, nor can be made to think and reason; and if from this I should conclude, that DAVID MALLET neither thinks nor reasons, because he is entirely material, I am sure he would deny the maxim on which my conclusion is founded. That he thinks and reasons, stands in need of no proof. The point then to be discussed is, Whether the human soul, and DAVID's in particular, is material or immaterial? In favour of the maxim, That matter doth not reason, I must conclude, and think it a just conclusion, that his soul is immaterial. Nor hath he such grounds to deny as I have to affirm that it is: for he and his author do not take on them to deny that there are created immaterial beings. And he hath said, in the present case, that *reason will neither deny nor affirm that there is a future state.* And how then can religionists, who maintain a future state as agreeable to the divine moral attributes, be said to betray the cause of GOD to the Atheist? Such are the vain and confounded effects of a fermented understanding. Whatever risk religion may run by maintaining a future state of rewards and punishments, the world can be no greater loser by it, than gainers by his Lordship's philosophy. He is himself a mere material system, made for a momentary life: his GOD is neither good nor just, according to any idea that we can form of goodness and justice: his GOD neither regards what he does, nor what he suffers, as being personally be-

low his providence: that a life to come is but at best an useful fable: and if it is not a fable, he and every other wicked and impious man are perfectly safe; because GOD is an all-perfect being, and will deal with him and them according to the perfections of his own nature, and not according to the imperfections of poor DAVID MALLET, Esq; in particular. And in all this scheme, is there any principle, any reason contained, why the said poor DAVID MALLET should be a better man than an Atheist?

THE same DAVID MALLET makes his Lordship say, That “ * no doctrines were ever inculcated more “ strongly in the minds of men, nor enforced by more “ authority, than those of a future state. The instructors of religion, and the priests of these religions, “ were careful to establish and maintain them in belief.” The author, I hope inadvertently, makes all religion a human institution; and from this inadvertency he reasons consequentially, when he makes a future state of rewards and punishments a human invention. I say, this is to reason consequentially: for if this doctrine of a future state is taken away, there is no such thing as religion left. It is no wonder, then, that much pains are taken to maintain this doctrine, and just as much as to maintain religion. I am very well convinced, that, without the belief of a future state of retribution, religion, and the belief of

* Vol. iv. p. 346.

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LORD BOLINGBROKE'S GOD, would be of no use to mankind, either in a single or social state. He hath said, that " * the belief of future rewards and punishments was *very necessary*, and could not fail to " have *some* effect on the manners of men, to encourage virtue, and to restrain vice." Now, if the belief of future rewards and punishments is not only necessary, but *very necessary*, it must not only have some effect, but a proportionable effect on the manners of men. Take this belief away, and there is nothing left to hinder a man from doing for himself, and for his temporal ease and advantage, whatever he can do safely. It is not at all therefore surprising, " that some at this day scruple not to declare, that if " this doctrine is taken away, all difference between " good and bad is taken away, and there is no such " thing as religion left †." Though *just* and *unjust*, essentially, and eternally, and independently of divine appointment, differ, as hath been fully proved; yet this difference brings no man under a formal obligation to sacrifice himself, and all his enjoyments and expectations, for the sake of this his speculative knowledge. And, according to his Lordship's doctrine, he hath nothing to fear from GOD for chusing his temporal happiness, (and he expects nothing beyond this life), because he is an individual, and as such below the care and inspection of divine providence. As such he is an extraprovidential being, whose doings and

* Vol. iv. p. 207.

† Vol. iv. p. 346.

whose sufferings are entirely indifferent to his Deity. If it is a matter of surprise, according to his Lordship, it must be in favour of the sincerity and integrity of MOSES, “ * that a doctrine so useful in all “ religions, and therefore incorporated into all the “ systems of Paganism, is left wholly out of that “ of the Jews.” And I am no less surprised with his ignorance: for that MOSES taught, and the Jews believed, the doctrine of a future state, I have already made appear from the instance of ENOCH’s translation. And is it not still more surprising, that one who makes profession of some sort of religion, and skill in politics, should labour hard to prove, that this doctrine, so useful to mankind, and incorporated into all systems of religion, is only a fable and fiction, of pure human invention. And though “ † legislators and “ magistrates have, for political purposes, authorised “ the same doctrines, solemnized them by religious “ institutions, confirmed them by laws, and set education, the great nurse of theological opinions, on “ their side,” (to excuse his contempt of this their wisdom, or of their real belief, he adds, though these were great advantages), “ we do not find that this “ doctrine ever had an effect suitable to it, or to the “ importance of it.” But this he alleviates, by adding, “ that remote considerations, though they are “ believed, have not the same influence which immediate objects have; but they have an influence

* Vol. iv. p. 207.

† Vol. iv. p. 347.

“ proportionable

“ proportionable to the belief of them, especially in
 “ a case like this, where the punishments held out are
 “ unavoidable; and no man can hope, as every man
 “ does in all other cases, to escape them.” It cannot be denied, that men are very ingenious in finding out expedients to reconcile their religious principles with their immoral practice; and sometimes, with great success, they plead in favour of their lusts and passions what would always stop them in the prosecution of temporal things. To convince a man, that if he proceeds in the execution of some such views, he will certainly repent his doings, infallibly hinders him: but with respect to another life, his repentance (without which there is no pardon) is often his only encouragement to undertake and to pursue his lustful purposes. This disorder of mind is not to be accounted for, but by that general disorder of the human race taught in the sacred records of the Christian religion.

THAT men are governed by their passions and appetites, and not by their principles, hath been maintained by Mr BAYLE; and I have already made my remarks on this his doctrine. But this nobleman of an author, after many declarations made for the utility and necessity of religion for the support and government of society, as hath been before observed, should not say, and cannot say, without contradicting himself, that it never had an effect suitable to the importance

importance of it. Though many who really believe a life of rewards and punishments when this life is ended, do not act on all occasions suitably to such a persuasion; I am convinced, that numbers are ready to forfeit any temporal advantages, and even their lives, rather than forfeit their glorious hopes, and incur the displeasure of their God in a future state. Martyrdom his Lordship may, and does reckon madness: but no man is, or can be admitted a member of society on lower terms than the loss of life when justice due to the society, and his implicit engagement, require it. What an ill man was Lord BOLINGBROKE, and what an ill, or rather what a worse man is DAVID MALLET, Esq; to write and publish, in their mother-tongue, such impious and injurious tenets as tend to their own, and the ruin of mankind, to banish the fear of God from the earth, and to dissolve society, only that they may live as they list, and die like the beasts?

AND the more unreasonable both of them are: for they do not say, “* that to believe a future state, “is to believe a vulgar error;” but this they say, that “it cannot be demonstrated by reason. It is not “in the nature of it capable of demonstration. It “was therefore originally an hypothesis, and may “therefore be a vulgar error.” Whether it is an error or not, neither the author nor the publisher know.

* Vol. iv. p. 248.

But

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But I know, that if it is an error, it is a most wonderful error; an error, if not co-eval with mankind, at least of the greatest antiquity and universality. When none returned from the state of death, nor any animal, (if some insects may be excepted), how could it come into the minds of men, that death was but a passage from this to another life? All the phenomena of nature were against this ancient and universal opinion. It is wonderful, I say, at any rate; but still more wonderful, had men started into being, or grown out of the earth like mushrooms. But this wonder ceases, by supposing man to be made an intelligent creature by an infinitely-wise Creator, who is himself a spirit, and the Father of our spirits, who taught man his duty, and the consequence of performing or neglecting it.

I know for certain, that the belief of a future state is as ancient, as universal, and as useful, and as necessary, as religion. And his Lordship admits, that it is not only necessary, but *very necessary*; and so necessary, that there can be no society nor government without it. And if society is natural, so must all the means, without which it cannot subsist, be natural likewise. Was this then an hypothesis made by some Egyptian legislator? Not by a priest, for priesthood must have been posterior to religion. I should rather believe, the necessity of religion, abstracting from its being directly taught by God, and particularly a future

ture state of rewards and punishments, forced itself into the minds of men. To shew the utility, necessity, and truth of religion, I have already published my thoughts largely *. Of all which I only transcribe these words †.

“ THOUGH I should admit, that the essential difference between moral good and moral evil, while the mind is affected with it, is a principle as strong as self-preservation; and that all the motives for being virtuous and honest, and the motives for preserving one’s self, just balance one another; the case then would be a continual irresolution, or a perpetual contradiction. For this cause the debate about *utile* and *honestum* was first started, and continued from beyond the days of SOCRATES until now, and will continue for ever undecided, according to the Atheistical hypothesis. Between unanswerable arguments on both sides of a question, there always lies some unknown truth, in which these unanswerable and contradictory reasons must centre. And in the present case, it is the belief of GOD and his providence; for this conclusion the debate will bear: for, by our make and constitution, virtue and honesty is to us good and eligible. That our happiness is our chief end, and that we are wise enough to consult it, is certain beyond debate. And therefore there must be sufficient provision in ex-

* Estimate, § ix. x. xi.

† Sect. x. p. 365.

“ peccation

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“ pection for the happiness of those who chuse to
“ act the virtuous and reasonable part. This the
“ great, the omniscient, the just, and the almighty
“ God, the supreme and sovereign being of the
“ universe, can only do. And this certainly he will
“ do, if man is not a composition of contradictions.
“ There is no contradiction in nature. We are told
“ by our reason, that we ought to act virtuously; and
“ the same reason tells us, that we ought to act for
“ our own happiness. How easy, how natural, and
“ how comfortable then is it to conclude, that there
“ is a God, whose kingdom is universal and everlasting,
“ who will make all the virtuous actions of a reasonable man turn out to his happiness, either here
“ or hereafter?

“ Our interest and our reason, our honesty and
“ our happiness, *honestum* and *utile*, are two collateral pillars supporting human conduct, and religion is the basis of both. The natural fitness of things, and the intrinsic rectitude of virtue, is not the first and original obligation of all. For, properly speaking, it is no obligation; and if it were, and whatever force it might have, our own happiness and preservation hath at least an equal, and sometimes an opposite force. Separately, these forces act against one another. Interest and honesty in this life, in many cases are irreconcilable; and it is hard for a reasonable man to part with either.

“ Here his reason leaves him, by becoming useleſs.
 “ And if he retains it, it is to his trouble and diſ-
 “ quiet. The brutal ſpecies of beings, by their
 “ conſtitution, are regularly over-ruled by their in-
 “ ſtinct of ſelf-preservation, without any obſtruction
 “ from the philoſophy of *right* and *wrong*, or the
 “ diſtinction betwixt *utile* and *honeſtum*. If the A-
 “ theiſt, like the beaſt, is to be eternally diſſolved
 “ into the duſt, he muſt be at a loſs when his reaſon
 “ reſtrains him from the immediate uſe of every
 “ means that tends to the preſervation of his being.
 “ More miſerable than the beaſt muſt that man be,
 “ when his nobleſt faculties become troubleſome and
 “ vexatious! If one eye represents a plain, and the
 “ other represents it a precipice, both become uſe-
 “ leſs, and not only uſeleſs, but perplexing to the
 “ traveller. This is his caſe, who ſees the ſame
 “ thing to be reaſonable and ruinous, to be good and
 “ eligible in itſelf, but to him dreadful and deſtruc-
 “ tive. But put the force and influence of virtue
 “ and advantage, like two weights in the ſame ſcale,
 “ and they become ſufficient to overbalance the
 “ ſtrongeſt and the moſt unruly paſſions of human
 “ nature.

“ THIS conjunction is only made, and eaſily made,
 “ and always made, in religion. He that ſeparates
 “ *utile* from *honeſtum*, and virtue from happineſs,
 “ has as little knowledge of the make of the human
 “ mind,

“ mind, as he hath of the make of the human body,
 “ who is for cutting off one leg, that the man may
 “ stand the firmer upon the other. We have no rea-
 “ son then to renounce religion and a mercenary mo-
 “ rality, as libertines call obedience to *GOD*, and
 “ the expectation of happiness, to learn of them ge-
 “ nerosity, brotherly love, and all social duties and
 “ virtues. For by how much more religious any
 “ man is, the better man, and the better member
 “ of society is he.”

I might here put an end to the dispute concerning a future state of rewards and punishments; but that Mr MALLEY, and such as he, may not triumph in their objections as unanswerable, I chuse to follow his Lordship and him as far as they go. That all rational beings are essentially free agents, I have elsewhere proved*; and this my author, and Mr MALLEY for him, do admit. For they expressly say, that “† *GOD*, when he gave us reason, left us
 “ to our free will, to make a proper or an improper use
 “ of it. So that we are obliged to our Creator for a
 “ certain rule, and sufficient means of arriving at
 “ happiness; and have none to blame but ourselves
 “ when we fail of it. It is not reason, but perverse
 “ will, that makes us fall short of *attainable* happi-
 “ nesses. The rule is certain, and the means so suf-
 “ ficient, that they who deviate from them are self-

* Estimate, § ii.

† Vol. iv. p. 392.

“condemned.” But from this rule, and these means, all men do deviate, some more, and some less. This rule, and these means, are bestowed on man by his Creator; and it is therefore his will and pleasure, and consequently his law, that we follow the rule, and use the means. And as there can be no law without a sanction, this sanction may be immediately executed, or it may be delayed. That sentence against every evil work is not speedily executed, no man will deny. It may therefore be delayed; and, for all that can be remarked to the contrary, it is postponed till after death; and if it is not executed then, the sanction is vain, and so is the law: than which there cannot be greater blasphemy.

WELL, saith the author, they are punished here. By their own fault they fall short of happiness, and are self-condemned. That they are self-condemned, I do admit. But this self-condemnation doth not make void the law of GOD, by which they were bound to obedience, nor annul the sanction of it. It is rather an homologation of the law, and of the sanction of it, than the punishment of transgressing it. And it is nothing but the fear of merited punishment, that makes self-condemnation so very severe and smarting. Without such troublesome apprehensions, criminals would be, and generally they are, as happy as other men, or as any Atheist in the world. And as far as the course of nature, and the ordinary state of things,

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things, and the common standard of human affairs, permit, he hath his share, and a very large allowance, of all the happiness that is to be found in this life. It hath been observed by an ancient Jewish writer, that * *the wicked are not in trouble as other men: neither are they plagued like other men.*—*Their eyes stand out with fatness: they have more than heart could wish.*—*And they say, How doth GOD know? and is there knowledge in the Most High? Behold, these are the ungodly, who prosper in the world.* And if it was not his Lordship's, and if it is not Mr MALLET's case, it is the case of many wicked, and even of the worst of men. The desires of mankind are various; and what every man desires most, must be his chief happiness when obtained. And wonderful is their choice. The Arabian in his tent, the Tartar in his car, and the savage in his hut, are all of them happy, in so far as they enjoy what they desire. And he who sets his heart upon worldly pleasures and enjoyments, is in a fairer way of being happier in this life, than the most moral and religious person; his glorious hopes, which often fill his soul with joy unspeakable, excepted. Mr MALLET, who hath nothing to fear, and nothing to hope after death, may be as easy in the practice of vice as in the practice of virtue, just as his doings in either case turn out to his temporal advantage. But he may allow others to think that a woful futurity awaits him,

* Psalm lxxiii.

or GOD hath given him no law, or he hath left it to his discretion, either to obey or to break it. On such a supposition, GOD divests himself of his sovereignty, in order to confer on his worthless creature the sole disposal of himself. How happy must that man be in his own conceit, who imagines himself in such state? But O how unhappy, if after this life he finds himself to have mistaken the great business of his being! And he is neither sure, nor can be sure; and he says he is not sure *.

“ † NOTHING,” say both the author and the publisher, “ seems more natural to man, than to “ live without restraint or fear;” desirable to the wicked it may be, but it is not natural; “ and yet “ how ready were the multitude in the Pagan world to “ embrace the hope of immortality, though it was accompanied with the fear of damnation?” And he says, “ || Strange vanity! They assume themselves to “ be exposed to eternal damnation, and the rest of mankind to be almost entirely damned, rather than not “ assume that their souls are immortal.” And again, “ ** They who giving man immortality, exposed “ him to eternal damnation by it, were fondly received.” This, no doubt, the author thought fine saying, since he says it so often. It was highly desirable to him, to live without restraint from the

* Vol. iv. p. 398.

† Vol. iv. p. 206.

|| Vol. i. p. 273.

** Vol. iii. p. 135.

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law of GOD, and fear of the sanction. How vain must he think those who hope for a happy immortality? And how humble is he whose desires have led him to hope and to believe, that as an individual he lives independently on GOD in this world, and hath nothing to fear in another? But how the belief of the immortality of the soul can expose any one to damnation, is not to be conceived. The doctrine is at least problematical; and if there is any danger in believing it, the danger must be vastly greater in disbelieving it. And whereas the belief of the soul's immortality tends to promote a regular, a reasonable, and a religious life, and the disbelief of it leaves the man without restraint from vice, and inducement to virtue, the danger is wholly on the side of disbelief. It is true, that he who believes a future state of rewards and punishments, fears more than he who does not. But what does he fear? He fears to offend GOD, and he fears to transgress his law, the law and dictate of right reason. And *the fear of the Lord is to depart from evil*. It is not then the belief, but the disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments, that exposes men to damnation.

WITHOUT the apprehension of danger there can be no precaution. I acknowledge, that sometimes the means used to prevent danger may be more troublesome than the dreaded evil would be, did it happen: but this is not the case of those who endeavour to prepare

pare themselves for a trial before the tribunal of the great Sovereign and Judge of mankind. Upon the hypothesis of natural religion, (for I do not speak of revelation), all that GOD requires of man, is, that he should live and act according to the dictates of right reason. And such a life, and such a conduct, is the only means that can procure happiness in this world, as his Lordship often allows and asserts. The belief, then, of a future state of rewards and punishments, instead of occasioning trouble to the man of such a persuasion, and who lives up to this principle and persuasion, makes him happy here, and frees him from all fears of unhappiness hereafter. And who would exchange such thoughts, and such a situation of mind, such ease and comfort of life, for LORD BOLINGBROKE's uncertainty of a future state; or for a persuasion, that both here and hereafter (if there is an hereafter) every individual is below the providence and care of the Deity? His Lordship uses great freedom in bestowing the character of madness on those who differ from him: and I may be allowed to say, that he is neither wise nor virtuous, who thinks it a hardship to live a reasonable life, and a happiness to be free from all inducements and reasons to do so.

BUT, say they, it is man's own fault if he fails in acquiring happiness; and is not this sanction sufficient, without any future fears or expectations? It is not so in the present and supposed case: for it is possible

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fible that a wicked man may be happy enough in this life, by being successful in all the elections he makes, of whatever kind they are. Were it his choice to live without restraint put on him by the law and dictates of right reason, he is happy if he succeeds. He hath his choice, he hath his wish, and more he cannot desire; and he who hath all that he can desire, must be happy. But this happiness doth not exceed that of a beast. A mind capable of nobler and higher enjoyments, must be brought very low, in order to be content with such mean attainments. Happy for such they had never heard, never thought of a future state; and happy for them not to know the difference between right and wrong, vice and virtue; and happy to know no more of their maker and master than the beasts of the field. And such a state suits as ill the make of the human mind, as a bull's head would become a human body. Without future hopes of happiness, and without an assurance of the goodness and mercy of God, such must be the case, and even the happiest condition of mankind. Better it were for an Atheist to be an irrational, than a rational animal; to have no thoughts at all about futurity, and dependence on God, and of his being a moral and an accountable subject of his government, than to have only such thoughts as are vexatious and troublesome. It is not in the power of man to suppress all surmises of his being accountable to God, here or hereafter, for all his transgressions of the law of right reason; no

more than it is in his power to change his nature, and become a beast. It is therefore both natural and necessary for us to be persuaded, that God, who hath made us reasonable and accountable creatures, will bring mankind to account either here or hereafter. It is true, if God should exert all his right and power to punish sinners, the thoughts of a future judgment must be terrible, and even distracting to all mankind: but all that believe in God, whichever way it came to pass, believe, that as he is just, so he is good and merciful. A Jewish poet hath said, * *If thou, Lord, shouldst mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand? But there is forgiveness with thee, that thou mayst be feared.* And, † *Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered. Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity.*

HIS Lordship hath exerted his utmost strength and reach of invention, to prove, that the evils which befall mankind in general are but few, and those avoidable or supportable; and that if they are neither one nor the other, we and our habitation is so small a point in the universe, and of so little account in the sight of God, that the very best of men have no reason to complain of their lot in this world, even though there should not be another.

I acknowledge, that I cannot argue so strongly for

* Psa. cxxx. 3. 4.

† Psa. xxxii. 1. 2.

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the remuneration of the good and virtuous, as for the punishment of the wicked and vicious, in another life. For as a Christian I believe, and so may he that is but a Deist, that all have sinned, and come short of rendering obedience, adoration, and glory to God. And his Lordship and Mr MALLEY do, and ought to allow it. They say, “ * I should rouse in my mind a grateful sense of these advantages above all others, that “ I am a creature capable of adoring and worshipping my Creator, capable of discovering his will in “ the law of my nature, and capable of promoting “ my happiness by obeying it. I should acknowledge “ thankfully, that I am able, by the superiority of “ my intellectual faculties, much better than my fellow-creatures, to avoid some evils, and to endure “ some others which are common to us and to them. “ I should confess, that as I proved myself more rational than they, by employing my reason to this “ purpose; so I should prove myself less rational, by “ repining at my state here, and by complaining that “ there are any unavoidable evils. I should confess, “ that neither perfect virtue, nor perfect happiness, “ is to be found among the sons of men; and that “ we ought to judge of the one, as we may judge of “ their perseverance in the other.—Not by this, “ that we never fall from either; since in that sense “ there would be no one good man, nor no one happy man in the world.” Though we should not

* Vol. iv. p. 396.

complain of unavoidable evils in this world, (** For why should a living man complain, a man for the punishment of his sins?*), yet there are many such evils to which the best and the worst of men are subjected. And in many cases, as is the righteous, so is the wicked; and he that sacrificeth, as he that sacrificeth not. Though all have transgressed, yet one may be allowed to believe, that some difference is to be made between one who raises in his mind a grateful sense of his being a creature capable of knowing, adoring, and worshipping his Creator, of discovering his will, and promoting his own happiness by obeying it; and an arrant Atheist, who admits no distinction between right and wrong, but in so far as such doings tend to his own temporal advantage; and is as ready to ruin the human race, as to preserve them, as the case may turn out for his own personal satisfaction: or between a man who believes natural religion, and lives up to the rules and laws of it; and another who only professes to believe it, and lives in a beastly sensuality in his personal situation, and like a villain in every public and social station; and then dies mad for fear of death: and, for fear he had not done enough to signalize himself for vice and wickedness during his life, leaves a legacy, contrived to banish the fear of God, and the reverence and obedience due to him, from among his rational creatures, and to teach mankind to live immorally with safety, and with assurance of impunity

* Lam. iii. 39.

both here and hereafter. And indeed a very strange difference is sometimes made in this life; for the best men have often the lot that more justly belongs to the worst, and the worst have that share of happiness to which the best have a claim. I know, that, in particular cases, it is hard to determine who is the best, and who is the worst: but certain it is, that the virtues of one, and the vices of another, cannot be always mistaken; for they are often very conspicuous. The wickedness and immorality of some is often open and declared. And so far we are sure. But whether the good actions of others are done for a good or for a bad purpose, is not so certain: only it is presumable, that the motive is as good as the action. Suppose a man who hath lived an inoffensive and useful life, and hath voluntarily undergone hardships and dangers for the sake of others, and at last perishes by the hand of a villain whom he had just before delivered from death; and suppose that this ruffian prosperously goes on in crimes, and ends his days in peace; can any one who is persuaded that both are the subjects of GOD's moral government, believe, that the affair is finally ended? For my part, I should embrace any hypothesis that is not absurd, which establishes the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: and nothing less than a demonstration of the impossibility of it shall ever make me reject it. My authors attempt it, and their attempt shall be considered.

DR

DR CLARKE is used very roughly, for presuming to say, “* It is certain and necessary, even as certain
 “ as the moral attributes of GOD,” (and he had before affirmed, that the moral are as essential to the divine nature as the natural), “ that there must be at
 “ some time or other such a revolution and renovation
 “ of things, such a future state of existence of the
 “ same persons, as that, by an exact distribution of rewards and punishments therein, all the present disorders and inequalities may be set right, and that
 “ the whole scheme of providence may appear at its
 “ consummation to be a design worthy of infinite
 “ wisdom, justice, and goodness.”

“ THE hypothetical certainty and necessity,” says his Lordship, “ on which the Doctor is willing to risk
 “ our acknowledgment of a supreme Being, is founded on this assertion, That rewards and punishments
 “ in general are necessary to support the honour of
 “ GOD, and of his laws and government; and on
 “ this assumed proposition he concludes, that the condition of mankind in this present state is such, that
 “ the natural order of things is perverted, and virtue
 “ and goodness prevented from obtaining the proper
 “ and due effects.” To this, in his usual and unmannerly way, he begins his answer with an exclamation, “ Audacious and vain sophister!” “ The
 “ Doctor’s terms,” he says, “ have a very solemn

* Vol. v. p. 4.

“ air,

“ air, that may impose on the unwary, and confirm
 “ the habitual prejudices of others.” It is then his
 opinion, that it is dangerous to believe a state of re-
 wards and punishments hereafter, though this belief
 tends to the temporal advantage of men in their pri-
 vate and public capacity and situation, as he himself
 hath, oftener than once, advanced. However, the
 danger of seducing the inattentive reader into the be-
 lief of a future state of retribution, is not great, if it
 is true, that *more absurdity cannot be stuffed in so few*
words. Wonderful is his acuteness. For all the ab-
 surdities stuffed in the Doctor’s words amount to this:
 “ His whole chain of reasoning from the moral attri-
 “ butes of GOD downwards, is nothing more than
 “ one continued application of moral human ideas to
 “ the designs and conduct of GOD; and in this case
 “ he assumes most presumptuously, that the scheme
 “ and order of things which GOD hath established in
 “ this system of ours, cannot be reconciled even to
 “ the notion of human justice.” His Lordship throws
 away his wit, in calling the Doctor’s doctrine of a fu-
 ture state of rewards and punishments, a *hypothetical*
certainty and necessity: for that is not the Doctor’s
 meaning, but the Doctor’s and his joined, but ill join-
 ed together. And the only way that his Lordship
 proves a future state to be an hypothesis, is, by assert-
 ing, that it was not revealed, but only invented by
 the Egyptians. The Doctor pretends, and proves,
 that future rewards and punishments, abstracting from
 revelation,

revelation, are certain and necessary; or that God is neither just nor good, according to any ideas that we can form of justice and goodness, *in abstracto* or *in concreto*. Could Mr MALLEY, for his Lordship, demonstrate, that such a future state is impossible, what would follow from it? Truly no more than both of them teach, without proof, that moral attributes are not essential to the Deity. It is said by them, “* Artificial theology pretends to connect, by very problematical reasonings *a priori*, the moral attributes, such as we conceive them to be, with the physical attributes of God; though there be no sufficient foundation for this proceeding in the phenomena of nature, nay, though the phenomena are, as hath been said already, in several instances repugnant.” Dr CLARKE makes the moral attributes of God as essential as his natural attributes; and from these attributes reasons into a conclusion of a future state of rewards and punishments. And he reasons like a religionist; whereas the author and his editor reason like Atheists, by maintaining, that the present state of this world is repugnant to the justice and goodness of the supreme Being, and that afterwards there is no place for reparation. My authors deny the justice and goodness of God; for what reason, it is hard to imagine, except it be that they may not be obliged to admit a future state: and this, in effect, is to acknowledge, that if God is good and just, a lover of righteousness,

* Vol. iv. p. 304.

and

and a hater of wickedness, there must be a future state. Upon the Doctor's hypothesis, all the moral attributes of GOD are saved; and upon his Lordship's they are all rejected, as being inconsistent with the present moral system of things. Only a fermented understanding, such as his Lordship acknowledges his own to be, can accuse the Doctor, the GREAT DOCTOR, as an *audacious* and vain sophister, and for cramming as many absurdities in a few words as words can bear; when he advances nothing but what he himself contends for occasionally, except this conclusion, *There is a future state*: for if there is not, all that follows, *is*, that GOD neither does, nor ever will administer justice in his government; which to his Lordship is *quod erat demonstrandum*. He knew, and Mr MALLETT does know, the difference between *right* and *wrong*, *just* and *unjust*, and they are irresistibly forced to condemn the wrong, and approve the right: but a GOD without moral attributes is not so complete, so perfect, and so desirable a being, as either of them.

THIS nobleman of a philosopher, who confesses that “ * we reason on human ideas because we have
“ no others to reason on, will not allow us to reason
“ on GOD's moral attributes, because our ideas are
“ human, and not divine †.” Atheists and divines reason *a priori*, from the assumed attributes of the divinity. “ So they call their method of reasoning

* Vol. iv. p. 318.

† Vol. iv. p. 322.

“ and such it is in a false sense. It cannot be such
 “ in a true sense, since their ideas of these attributes
 “ are very human ideas, applied arbitrarily to the
 “ divine nature, not founded on any knowledge of
 “ it, that we have really.” It is certain we have
 no other ideas than human ideas; and if we are not
 to make use of them, when we think and speak of
 GOD, we must neither think nor speak of him at all.
 And if this is not positive, it is negative Atheism.
 What he adds in the same page is as false, as it is in-
 jurious to the divine. “ The premisses wherein A-
 “ theists and divines concur so amicably, are plainly
 “ contrived to establish such notions of the attributes
 “ of GOD, as shall appear repugnant to what we see,
 “ and feel, and know, when they are applied to the
 “ constitution of the world, and the state of man-
 “ kind in it.” In this nobleman’s opinion, therefore,
 all the notions of the divine attributes established by
 divines, are inconsistent with the constitution of the
 world, and the state of mankind in it; and that it is
 therefore matter of fact, that none of these attributes
 belong to the divine Being. And if this doctrine is a
 contrivance, suppose of Dr CLARKE, he must have
 been both stupid and wicked to establish GOD’s mo-
 ral attributes, only in order to reject them, on ac-
 count of the constitution of the world, and the state
 of mankind in it. The DOCTOR doth establish
 (and thousands join with him in establishing) the
 moral attributes of GOD, because a GOD who is nei-
 ther

ther good, nor just, nor true, is the same thing with no GOD; seeing he must want all moral perfections, and cannot be an all-perfect being. And if his Lordship's GOD was such, his Lordship was an Atheist without Dr CLARKE's leave; and so is Mr MALLET without mine. "When Atheists and divines," say they, "have shewn that the present state of the world, and of mankind in it, is inconsistent with the goodness and justice of GOD; a COLLINS concludes there is no GOD, and a CLARKE, that there is a future state of rewards and punishments." His Lordship will conclude with neither; but concludes by himself, that if there is a GOD, he is neither just nor good, according to any idea he is able to form of goodness and justice; that is, that all the moral attributes of GOD are to him inconceivable, impossible, and absurd. I have reason to believe, that COLLINS was persuaded, that if there is a GOD, he must be good, just, and true. And as he best knew his own honesty and integrity in all his inquiries, so he expected to be dealt with after this life (if there was an hereafter) as an honest and sincere man. My reason is as good, and better, for saying so, than his Lordship's was for saying and believing the contrary. Though all Lord BOLINGBROKE's ideas are human, not divine; and though therefore he hath no right to affirm any thing concerning GOD's moral attributes, yet he retains a right to deny them. They are repugnant to the constitution of the world, and the

state of mankind in it. “ * And it is from this constitution, and this state alone, that we can acquire “ any ideas of the divine attributes.” This constitution, this state, is repugnant to God’s moral attributes; and there is no other way to know them, than that which disproves them.

To refute abundantly the two allies, and first the Atheist, he thinks it sufficient to say, *he cavils*; and no more he says, from the beginning to the end of his philosophical works, against him. I have better reason to think, that he and the Atheist are confederates, than that Atheists and divines are allies. But to confute the divine, the object of his contempt, aversion, and indignation, he is at some more pains. He pretends to put an end to his presumption, by saying, “ † I assume no more than what is proved,” (and admitted, and much better proved by divines than by him), “ when I assert, that the supreme Being is “ infinitely wise, as well as powerful; and if he be “ infinitely wise, I need not stand to prove that he “ always knows, and always does that which is fit “ test to be done.” Agreed; whether what he doth ultimately, or what he doth as a subservient means to an ultimate end. The author laughs at MOSES’s account of the creation, for finishing it in six days; and rather believes a Tuscan philosopher, who said it took up the space of twelve thousand

* Vol. iv. p. 322.

† Vol. iv. p. 223.

years.

years. Had he been witness to this work from the beginning of things until it was finished in the present form, at first he might have observed in the procedure, what to him did not display any thing of wisdom; and far less could he say that every thing was done to the best purpose possible, until he saw the whole finished. He might believe, that every production, and every advancement made in melioration, was proper and fit for some intended ultimate end; but this he must have believed upon the credit and character of the artificer, and not on any unfinished piece of the work. One who knew nothing of husbandry, (the comparison is made by Dr KING, in his book of the origin of evil), admitted at first as a witness to sowing, must think that the husbandman does but throw away his grain; but after seeing it grow, ripen, cut down, and threshed out into twenty grains for one, which at first he thought thrown away, he concludes, that what at first he thought foolishly, was well and wisely done; not as an ultimate end, but as a means of increasing the husbandman's store. I am not pleased with those who limit the wisdom and power of GOD to the present constitution of the world. For all that I know of the symmetry, order, harmony, and the use and subserviency of every part of the universe to the whole, I dare not say that GOD can make no farther improvements. For as the first materials being made, were afterwards improved into the present form of the world; and

as we observe several things in the material part of the creation advancing from one degree to another, into maturity; so I can believe, that every disorder shall at last be rectified, and every thing, without interruption from another, shall be made perfect in its kind. Inundations, earthquakes, the devouring sword and pestilence, which I consider in some respects as *corrective*, and in others as *vindictive* punishments, (and so doth my author), and are now the proper means for the reformation of mankind, shall all cease when there shall be no more occasion for them. And when the irreclaimably wicked shall be sent to another place, the remainder shall improve in holiness and happiness, and GOD shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.

THOUGH all things that may be, or not be, are contingencies, and though such are all the doings of the LORD GOD *ad extra*; yet some think, that every thing that is, could not possibly be otherwise than it is; and that this world neither could nor can be better or worse than it is. To hear them, and to believe them, one would think, that this world cannot admit an additional pound weight, or a deduction of so much, or of a foot measure, without undoing the whole. "Know therefore," saith Dr KING *, "it is necessary you should be what you are, or not at all." Sure he could not mean, that you could not have

* Origin of evil, chap. iv. § 5.

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been taller or lower, stronger or weaker; and that you could not know either more or less than you actually do, and be neither a better nor a worse man than you are: and as your case is every man's case, so every man, and every thing, is what it is, and could not possibly have been otherwise. But as this is *Fatal Atheism*, I cannot think it was his GRACE's opinion. And here I may be allowed the use of the metaphysical distinction into *sensus divisus*, and *sensus compositus*. Every thing is what it is, while it is just the same, I grant; and this is *sensus compositus*: but that thing might have been, and may be otherwise; and this is *sensus divisus*. But say the contrary who will, I am very sure, that any man may be a better man than he is, and notwithstanding continue to be the same person.

ONE would think, that Mr MALLET, or his author, should have adduced clear proof of some of the absurdities stuffed in Dr CLARKE's assertion, That a state of rewards and punishments is as certain as are the divine moral attributes; and for which he is called an audacious and vain sophister. But, instead of this, I find nothing but a definition of the terms *good* and *bad*, *happy* and *unhappy*. And on this head he talks and trifles, until he comes to deny particular providences; and then promises to shew, that “* God “ is wise, and man a fool,” (and how does a fool

* Vol. v. p. 14.

know

know wisdom?); “and that of all fools, the most
 “ presumptuous, and at the same time the most tri-
 “ fling, are metaphysical philosophers and divines.”
 Whether he hath made good his promise or not, the
 reader may judge by what I have already said on that
 subject. Does not all the world know, and did they
 not know since the world was inhabited, that men
 differ much in their morals; and that the best have
 sometimes the worst, and the worst of them the best
 worldly lot? For his satisfaction, let Mr MALLETT
 try to find out, among all his acquaintances, dead or
 alive, a better man than Lord BOLINGBROKE. And
 since the best and the worst of men are unequally
 dealt with in this world, the justice and goodness of
 GOD require, that this inequality be rectified in ano-
 ther life; or this inequality is below the regard of in-
 finite wisdom, or above the power of the ALMIGHTY
 to redress it.

DR CLARKE is an audacious and vain sophist, and
 Mr WOLLASTON is a madman. The accusation of
 madness ought to be well laid; and whether it is well
 or ill grounded, can only be learned from what his
 Lordship hath quoted * from his *Religion of nature de-*
lineated. “I am sure, that I am above lifeless mat-
 “ ter, above the vegetative tribe, and above the sen-
 “ sitive animals that I see. I have not only imme-
 “ diate sensations, but ideas of a higher order. I can

* Vol. iv. p. 374.

“ make

“ make excursions into futurity: I had almost said,
 “ that I could, by strict reasoning, get into another
 “ world before-hand. Can I be made capable of
 “ such great expectations, only to be disappointed at
 “ last? Can I have such overtures of immortality,
 “ if after all there is no such thing? I make great
 “ improvements in knowledge, which I have no op-
 “ portunity of shewing here: must they not be pre-
 “ parations for another world? Can the author of my
 “ reasoning faculties be himself so unreasonable, as
 “ to give them to no purpose? By the exaltation of
 “ my reason, and by the practice of virtue, I ap-
 “ proach to a higher manner of being, and taste al-
 “ ready something spiritual, and above this world.
 “ Must my private acts of religion be all lost? Can
 “ God have so little regard to me, who have so much
 “ for God?” Thus Mr WOLLASTON is indicted for
 a madman. And yet all he says amounts only to this,
 That he was made for a more noble purpose than to
 eat and drink, to sleep and wake, to laugh and weep,
 to speak and write, to reason about his own origin
 and end, and to chop logics with his Lordship and Mr
 MALLET. However, they acknowledge, that “ the
 “ man who wrote all this nonsense, was a man of
 “ parts, of learning, a philosopher, and a geometri-
 “ cian. But he made one mistake in the delirium of
 “ metaphysics. Instead of reasoning about a creature
 “ of God’s, he reasoned about one of his own crea-
 “ tion.” And for this he is one of the *learned* luna-

tics. It is to be observed, that the author, as a master of hard words, an attainment unbecoming a nobleman, uses those who have writ with the greatest reputation on natural religion, with the greatest contempt. So collie-dogs bark at mastiffs. But this, instead of shewing the superiority of his own understanding, only shews, that he doth not know who writes well, and who writes weakly on the subject. That WOLLASTON did improve his natural parts and capacity, and that he with his faculties was a creature of GOD his Creator, (for he did not make himself); this, I say, is certain: but the improvement which, by his natural power, and the freedom of his will, he made in knowledge, did not make him a creature of his own creation. If blunders, lies, and industrious contradictions; if contempt or ignorance of logics and metaphysics, are symptoms of a bad writer, there never was a weaker or a more contemptible author than his Lordship. And were it not for the sake of the important subject he writes on, few would read them all, and none would read twice his philosophical works.

To make good his charge against WOLLASTON for a madman, and that the extract of so much from the *Religion of nature delineated* as he hath given, is all of it nonsense, he says, “ * After all endeavours to
“ make a man a being superior to the whole animal

* Vol. iv. p. 377. 380.

“ kind,

“ kind, rather than a superior species of the same
 “ kind, man will appear what he really is to every
 “ unprejudiced mind.” No man, no philosopher,
 ever denied that man is an animal, and WOLLASTON
 never attempted to take him out of that *genus* or kind.
 And if man is a superior *species* in the kind of animals,
 he must be superior to all other animals. To all un-
 prejudiced minds, I allow, man will appear what he
 really is, the ruins of a noble creature; but such ruins
 as admit of reparation and improvement. No reli-
 gionist ever said directly nor consequentially, as his
 Lordship’s accusation stands, that “ the natural state
 “ of mankind is unnatural, a state neither agreeable
 “ to the nature of GOD himself, nor to that nature
 “ wherewith he hath dignified man.” Man by na-
 ture is a free and a voluntary agent, and as such he
 may use or abuse his natural powers. He may im-
 prove in virtue and morality, -or may misimprove in
 vice and wickedness, consistently with the dignity
 wherewith his Creator hath honoured and distinguished
 him; and that in a consistency too with all the divine
 attributes. Man’s state is naturally a free state, and
 this freedom essential to rational beings remains the
 same whatever use or abuse he makes of it. And this
 state and condition of mankind, I acknowledge, is no
 imperfection in the grand system of the creation. The
 great work of the grand architect of the universe is
 not as yet completed. The author says, “ The sen-
 “ sitive inhabitants of our globe, like the *dramatis*

“ *personæ*, have different characters, and are applied
 “ to different purposes of action in every scene.”
 Things therefore are carrying on to a conclusion of
 the whole plan of GOD’s creation. His Lordship al-
 ways mistakes the means for the end, and concludes,
 that every thing that is done, is done for no other pur-
 pose than for the sake of doing it. “ The whole or-
 “ der and system of the *drama* would be spoiled, if
 “ any alteration was made in it.” So far from that,
 that alterations are made, and must be made, in order
 to finish and complete the grand *opera* of GOD’s go-
 vernment and creation of the universe. His Lordship
 is of another opinion: for he says, “ If man was a
 “ creature superior or inferior to what he is, he would
 “ be a very preposterous creature in this system. If
 “ our reasoning faculties were more perfect than they
 “ are, the order of the intellectual system would be
 “ broken unnecessarily, and man would be raised a-
 “ bove his proper form, without any real advantage
 “ to himself; since the reason he hath is sufficient for
 “ him in the state allotted to him; and since higher
 “ faculties and greater degrees of knowledge would,
 “ on one hand, increase his presumption, and yet, on
 “ the other, would rather excite than satiate his curio-
 “ sity, by shewing him more clearly the *extent of his*
 “ *own ignorance*.” How can his Lordship, or rather
 Mr MALLEY, know the extent of his own ignorance,
 unless his ignorance and his knowledge are the same
 thing?

I think it best, before I make any more observations, to give my reader a view of what more my authors say on this head. And they say, “ * In this
 “ scale of being, why should not we be the creatures
 “ we are?” And that they mean we should be just
 such creatures as we are, neither better nor happier,
 with neither more nor less knowledge, appears from
 another passage. “ † We may presume to say, that if
 “ it had been in the order of God’s design to make
 “ the state of mankind as happy as the universal law,
 “ and the steady observation of it, would make it, he
 “ would have made the sanctions of the law as perfect
 “ as the law: but we see by what he hath done,
 “ which is the only sure way of knowing what he
 “ designed, that we were made to live in a moderate
 “ and mixed state of happiness.—Had the sanctions
 “ of the law of nature been stronger, we should have
 “ risen above this state; had they been weaker, we
 “ should have sunk below it. Thus they are relative-
 “ ly perfect, relative to the design of the lawgiver;
 “ and neither the goodness nor the justice of God
 “ require, that we should be made better or happier
 “ than we are.” And again, “ ‖ If there had been
 “ no conflict between appetite and sluggish reason,
 “ and had all been done in a close conformity to the
 “ law of nature, the moral state of mankind had been
 “ truly paradisaical; but it had not been human.
 “ We should not have been the creatures we were

* Vol. iv. p. 366. † Vol. v. p. 150. ‖ Vol. iv. p. 98.

“ designed

“ designed to be, and a gap would have been left in
 “ the gradation of created intelligences.—The ta-
 “ bles of the law of nature are hung up, and made
 “ obvious to the sight of man; not because we are
 “ able to observe them in their whole extent, and in
 “ every part alike, but that we may keep them con-
 “ stantly in view, and depart as little as possible, in
 “ the midst of so many infirmities, and so many temp-
 “ tations, from them. God hath shewn us wherein
 “ our wisdom and happiness, and the perfection of
 “ our nature, consist; and hath left us to pursue the
 “ end by the use of our own reason.” And, to add
 no more, he says, “ * It is true in fact, that neither
 “ reason nor revelation, neither Heathen nor Chri-
 “ stian philosophers, neither human nor divine laws,
 “ have been able to reform the manners of men ef-
 “ fectually; may we not, nay *must* we not conclude,
 “ that such a reformation is *inconsistent* with the origi-
 “ nal constitution of the human system?—Why
 “ there is such a state as this, and how to reconcile it
 “ to the ideas of holiness and goodness, let those who
 “ presume to judge of divine goodness, judge accor-
 “ dingly: but let you and I pronounce, that since
 “ there is such a state as this in the universal system,
 “ it was fit and right there should be such a state.
 “ On this head we may and ought to be dogmatical.”
 What a field is this of nonsense, impiety, and Fata-
 lism?

* Vol. iv. p. 243. 244.

Sect. XII. *human soul, and a future state.* 407

THE whole universe is filled with beings material, sensitive, and rational, connected in one immense design: from which it follows, that the design is not yet attained nor accomplished. The theatre subsists, and the *dramatis personæ* continue to act their respective parts; and as long as they do act, the *drama* is unfinished. Some great change, some amazing alteration to the better, is to be expected, for the greater perfection of the system, and for the manifestation of the glory and honour of the infinitely-wise and almighty architect. To act continually and everlastingly in the same course and method, were to act for the sake of acting; which is to act rather without design, than with a view to an immense design, a design worthy of infinite wisdom and power. Whatever intelligent beings or actors there may be superior to man, certain it is he is the only actor, or at least the principal actor in this our globe, under the command of his creator and the author of the whole *drama*. The directions given to us how to act our part, are the law of nature, or the dictates of right reason. While we observe this law and this rule, we act our part well; and when we depart from these directions, we act our part ill: and therefore until the whole is finished, we cannot expect to be finally commended or blamed, rewarded or punished. The sufferings of the best, and the enjoyments of the worst of men during the action, are but the encouragements and corrections administered in the mean time, and not the total reward or punishment:

nishment : for these are to be complete. And it gives me no wonder, that wicked men enjoy more happiness and prosperity than the good and virtuous. There is no man so very wicked who does not some good thing ; and our God is so very good and just, that no good action passes without a reward. Though the Egyptian midwives told a lie, to save alive the male children of the Israelites, God rewarded them for their compassion. He built them houses, or gave them good settlements in this world. And as little should the sufferings of the best of men give any surprise, because they are but corrective. This life is a state of mixed happiness and mixed misery, of sufferings and enjoyments ; but that which is future to the conclusion of the whole *drama*, is final, and without mixture, all reward or all punishment.

THAT some men grow in virtue and morality, and that others degenerate into vice and wickedness, and even shut their eyes against the knowledge of God, and the duty which they owe him, is certain : these increase in number, and those decrease in proportion. And when, by prevailing wickedness, this part of the creation is overburdened with sin and iniquity, and the disorders thereby occasioned hinder and obstruct the happiness of a few worthy inhabitants, it appears congruous to divine wisdom, to take this spot of the universe out of the grand system of the universe, or change it into another form, fitter for the best inhabitants.

bitants. It was said by the author of the Christian religion *, *The Son of man when he cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?* And Christians therefore believe, that when this world of ours can bear no more wickedness, it is to be changed, and a separation made between the good and the bad inhabitants. When mankind can be no longer governed by reason nor by faith, it is fit they be governed by sight, and that a period be put to this our earthly system. I beg Mr MALLET's excuse for troubling him with a quotation from the BIBLE. So far am I from thinking, that the whole system of the *drama* would be spoiled, if the least alteration were made in the material or moral part of it, that I rather believe that some alterations are fit and proper means for carrying on the whole unto a glorious conclusion. By counteracting our part, we spoil the harmony of this globe; and to rectify this part of the grand system, it is fit it should be changed, fitted up, and filled with better inhabitants. That inundations, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, and the sword, are corrective and partial punishments, and warnings to those who are witnesses, and stand in need of amendment, is the opinion of his Lordship, as hath been already observed: and with these divine providence hath proceeded, and the order of the *drama* hath been hitherto carried on. And sure it cannot be said, that a total change of this earth, and of its inhabitants, can

* Luke xviii. 8.

obstruct the grand and ultimate design of the Maker and Governor of the universe; and until this great design is fully accomplished, (and accomplished it shall be), all changes and alterations are the proper means of advancing God's great and glorious purpose.

WHEN he says, that the reason which man hath, is sufficient for him in the state allotted to him, he cannot mean, that every individual hath as much knowledge as is proper and fit for him to have. For, in that case, he and the Hottentot know enough for their purpose, and the business of their being. The world therefore would have been as well without, as with his philosophical works, or the works of the best mathematician or moralist. God hath given reason to all mankind, and the means of improving it. These means some neglect, and are the cause of their own ignorance, errors, and miscarriages in their conduct. "Had the sanctions of the law of nature
" been stronger, we should have risen above this
" state; had they been weaker, we should have
" sunk below it:" so saith his Lordship. That is, it is not the will of God, that man should know more or less than he actually does; that he should be better or worse, more moral or more immoral, more happy or unhappy, than he actually is. But I take on me to affirm, that though human knowledge were more extended than it is, and though the will of man
were

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were more obedient to his understanding, there could not proceed from such knowledge, and such rectitude of conduct, any inconveniency to himself, or to the order of the universe. From the nature of our reason and understanding, and from the improvements already made in knowledge, (and they are amazingly great), I can conclude, that the human mind is capable of more and higher degrees of knowledge and wisdom. And were it not for his own, and the fault of other men, both his knowledge, and the practice of his duty, would be far superior to what it is. What if our reasoning faculties were raised above what they are, must not our knowledge and our morality be raised in proportion? And though we should become holy, harmless and innocent, useful and benevolent, and thankful and obedient to God our maker and our master, we should still be men. For our ignorance of what we ought to know, and the neglect of what we ought to do, are not essential to humanity, or to the nature of a reasonable soul. On the contrary, these defects and imperfections seem to be acquired and adventitious; and that our faculties must be some way or other spoiled and perverted, and not the same that they were originally, nor becoming the operation of a most holy being. The account we have from *Moses* of the creation, and fall of man from his primitive state, with his Lordship and you passes for romance and forgery. But how ye come to assert that it is an Egyptian allegory,

ye are still to account. For ye assert it without historical authority; and, for what ye know, it might have been a tradition handed down to them from ADAM's first transgression. But revelation and conjectures apart, I say, though the reasonable human soul might be proper to make up a scale of beings, it doth not follow, that acquired errors, industrious ignorance, vice, and immorality, are a necessary part of the great *drama*, or a link to connect a chain of beings. On the contrary, they are defects and irregularities, proceeding from man's counteracting his part. All which shall be supplied and rectified, when this *drama* and God's glorious design shall be finished. Better let this gap in his Lordship's imaginary scale of beings stand open, than to make our good and holy God fill it up with the wickedness and immorality of men.

THIS, I think, his Lordship with presumptuous impiety does deny. For he presumes to say, that "if it had been in the order of God's design to make the state of mankind as the law of nature, and the steady observation of it, would make it, he would have made the sanctions of the law as perfect as the law." This I should not have understood, had he not said, that "the divine law should insure obedience." By this he would teach the world, that God inforces his law with different sanctions, some weaker, and some stronger. He admits, that the law of nature is the law of God, which he and
all

all men have transgressed. He forgets, that every rational creature is essentially a free agent. And would he have a law given to man, which would deprive him of his essential liberty? With such an irresistible energy the law of GOD would be no moral law, and man must be no moral and free agent. The sanction of the law of GOD and of nature, as it stands discoverable, and actually discovered by reason, is the approbation, the protection, and favour of GOD on the one hand, and his displeasure on the other. And what the effects of the pleasure and displeasure of almighty GOD on the obedient and disobedient may be, must equal, or surpass our imagination. This sanction, though sufficient in itself to influence and direct our doings, yet on men such as this world is furnished with, they make no suitable impression. The reason is, they are not firmly believed, and when believed, they are frequently adulterated with reserves and exceptions. His Lordship adds, that “neither the goodness nor justice of GOD require “that we should be made better or happier than we “are.” To make us better and happier than we are, whether we will or not, were to unmake us, and from free and voluntary agents, to convert us into mere passive beings. It is enough that GOD hath made us capable to make ourselves better and happier. And his Lordship says, “GOD hath shewn “us, wherein our wisdom, our happiness, and the “perfection of our nature, consist; and hath left us
“to

“ to pursue these ends by the use of our reason.” And if we do not pursue these ends by the use of our reason, (and certainly we do not), it is our fault, not the doing, though the permission of GOD, that we are not better and happier men than at present we are. And though neither the goodness nor justice of GOD require that he should make us either better or happier than we are, and are willing to be made, (for all GOD’s operations *ad extra* are purely voluntary); yet now that we are made rational and free agents, his justice requires that we should not make ourselves worse than he hath made us, but rather that we should grow and improve in the knowledge of GOD, and in the knowledge and practice of every duty we owe him.

“ THE tables of the law of nature are hung up
“ and made obvious to the sight of men, not that we
“ should observe them punctually and in every case,
“ but only that we should depart as little as possibly
“ from them.” This is his Lordship’s doctrine. But who gave him authority to restrict the law of GOD, and the law of nature, to a partial obligation? And with what power was he invested to indulge the subjects of GOD’s moral government to transgress his laws at their own discretion? Allow him to plead infirmities and temptations, and there will be no end of excuses. But this is to plead, that a rational creature may reasonably act irrationally. The law of nature,

nature, as the law of GOD, is fixed and unchangeable, as unchangeable as *right* is into *wrong*; and as such it requires complete and perfect obedience. But because it is not obeyed perfectly, it doth not follow, that it admits either of abrogation or derogation. And if the law subsists, so must the sanction.

BUT because the sanction is not put in execution in this life, his Lordship and Mr MALLETT conclude that it never will; for there is not another. Whereas the premisses can better bear the contrary conclusion. For our GOD is a GOD of truth; and whatever our reason discovers to be his law, with the sanction annexed, we must believe, that he who transgresses incurs the penalty, not to be remitted at the transgressor's fancy and pleasure. And because men disobey the law of GOD in this life with safety, to conclude that all the danger is over, is to reason on the reverse. The nobleman of a philosopher seems to divert himself, when he says, “ * Some make good health and the advantages of fortune constitute principally happiness, “ because good men sometimes accuse GOD for want “ of them: they pretend to keep an account between “ GOD and man, and to barter so much virtue and “ so many acts of devotion, against so many degrees “ of honour, of power, of riches, and to have their “ piety purchased by the gratification of their passions. “ If GOD exacts the duty, he must pay the debt. If

* Vol. v. p. 13.

“ he

“ he does not pay it in this life, he must pay it in another. Till then they give him credit; and if he does not pay it then, he is an unjust and cruel being.” It doth not belong to the character of a *good* man to accuse God of injustice, nor is it just to say so. Neither doth it belong to a man of piety to make God debtor to him here, or at least hereafter, for honour, power, and riches, on account of some acts of virtue and devotion. And can his Lordship say in good earnest, that good men barter with their God? I rather take it for a burlesque both on virtue and piety. But if he must state an account between God and good men, and that in jest; I presume to state another in good earnest. All transgressors of the law of God become debtors to divine justice; and if the debt is not cancelled by the mercy of God on their repentance in this life, it will certainly be punished in a life to come. This the divine justice and holiness requires.

To prove that it is not our fault that we are not better and happier men than we actually are, he says, that the original constitution of the human system does not admit of an effectual reformation of manners and morals. And his reason is, because neither reason nor revelation, neither Heathen nor Christian philosophers, neither human nor divine laws, have been able to effect such a reformation. From which it follows, that it either is the will of God that we should not obey his

his law, nor conform our conduct to it; or that some way or other man hath disabled and disqualified himself for rendering such obedience. That vice and wickedness do abound among men, is a certain, and sorrowful matter of fact. This I chuse to impute to man himself, rather than charge it to the account of my holy GOD. My author rather blames GOD for not making him a being incapable of abusing and misimproving his nature. But, for the honour and dignity of man, GOD hath given him power and dominion over his own actions. Upon man he hath bestowed man himself, with power and ability to use or abuse his faculties, but still accountable to his maker and master for all his doings: for GOD cannot divest himself of his sovereignty. I appeal to Mr MALLEY, and to every man of common understanding, if it was not in his, and in their power, to have acted a more reasonable part than in many cases they have actually done. It is therefore our own fault that we are not better men than at present we are. And as there is no man who does always that which is good and right, the contagion and disqualification must be universal. It is their own fault, an universal fault in mankind, as much as it is mine and yours personally, when we transgress the law of GOD, or the dictates of right reason, by omission or commission. I promised not to meddle with revelation, and therefore forbear to mention the rise and origin of our inability to obey the law of GOD to perfection; but since it is universal,

and of the greatest antiquity, I may assume, that it proceeds from the first of men, or the first man. And since a good and holy God is not to be blamed, it must have been his or their fault. Can any imagine, that a holy God could have created the first man just such as we see many of his posterity? I cannot persuade myself, that such as Lord BOLINGBROKE was, might be the immediate workmanship of God; no more than I can believe, that the righteous and holy LORD approves of all his Lordship's doings. However it hath come to pass, it hath happened to man by his own fault, that he is not such as he was when he came first out of the hands of his Creator. He was then perfect, and fitted and finished to obey the will of God; and, by such a regular and steady conduct, to be a happy creature. GOD made man perfect, but man hath sought out many ruinous inventions.

LET us suppose a plain and a straight way, (*and wisdom's ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace*), it may be thought practicable to walk in this way without straying or stumbling: but if he who attempts it should always stumble, and frequently fall; if, instead of proceeding in a straight course, he deviates sometimes to the one side, and sometimes to the other; must we not conclude, that this traveller's feet are lame, that his eyes are dim, or that his head is giddy and vertiginous? Can man be a reasonable creature, and at the same time incapable

pable to act as such? The sun observes a regular course; and many animals, by mere instinct, keep their station: but these are immediately under divine direction; and man, for his honour, is under the direction of his own faculties. He blunders in the business of his being; and from one unreasonable action to another, he goes quite astray from the law of God, and the dictates of right reason. The remains of reason, and an occasional approbation of what is good and right, shew what man originally was, and to what a low and lamentable condition he hath reduced himself. Such thoughts as these dispose me to believe the Christian account of the forlorn state of mankind, though it may dispose Mr MALLEY to laugh at me for my pains. However, I have proved, that all irregularities, vice, and immorality, are owing to man himself, and not to God. And I have reconciled the human state to the ideas of the holiness and goodness of the Creator, upon supposition, and upon his Lordship's admission, that the great *drama* is not as yet finished; and that there shall be a future state of retribution of rewards and punishments.

FROM the incorrigible and incurable indisposition and distemper of mankind, which neither reason nor revelation, neither Heathen nor Christian philosophers, neither human nor divine laws, have been able to cure and to reform effectually; from this, I say, his Lordship concludes, that such a reformation is in-

consistent with the original constitution of the human system ; though at the same time he gives it up as inconsistent with the holiness and goodness of GOD. His words are : “ Why there is such a state as this, and “ how to reconcile it to the ideas of holiness and “ goodness, let those who presume to judge of divine “ goodness, judge accordingly.” If it is presumption to judge of divine goodness and holiness, and if the original constitution of the human system is inconsistent with these divine attributes, he judges presumptuously and peremptorily, that there are no such attributes belonging to the Deity. But he adds, “ Since “ there is such a state as this, let you and I pronounce “ that it was fit and right there should be such a “ state : ” A state, to be sure, which GOD never ordered, because inconsistent with his holiness and goodness. Perhaps every reader doth not know, that the principles of Fatalism or Fatal Atheism are, That every thing is what it is, and how it is, and could not possibly have been otherwise ; and therefore fit, and right, and just to be such and so. All I observe here is, that men, by departing from the religious scheme, and a belief of GOD’s creation and government of the universe, (and this they do, that they may flatter themselves with impunity), are led from error to error, until they lose their reason, and run into Atheism as their only refuge. I have distinguished between the end and the means. Whatever GOD does, whatever he permits ; if he delays, or executes judgment

ment immediately; it is fit and right for carrying on the great plan of providence, or the universal *drama*, as his Lordship calls it, to a conclusion. Were this present state of things to undergo no alteration, and if it neither wanted nor admitted any; then all that is done here must be final, and the present must be without relation and without connection to futurity. The nobleman of an author, who says we are connected with the animal race, and even with plants, and all the parts of the universe connected with one another, in one great design, ought to admit, that the present state of things is subservient, fit, and the right means for carrying on the whole creation into greater perfection, and for finishing and completing the grand *drama* that is now in action.

THE Noble author says strangely, (and he hath many strange sayings), that WOLLASTON is brought, or hath brought his reader “* to the very brink of
“ the precipice. He cannot believe a GOD unjust,
“ cruel, unreasonable; but he may find it as difficult
“ to believe a GOD who acts against his attributes and
“ the perfections of his nature in one system, only
“ to have a reason the more for acting agreeably to
“ them in another.” That GOD may inflict on the good and the best of men corrective punishments, and such as tend to their improvement in piety and morality, and to their future happiness, is no wise incon-

* Vol. iv. p. 353.

sistent with the wisdom and goodness of GOD : but to inflict such punishments as tend only to render them unhappy during the whole space of their being, upon supposition of their perfect innocence, would be cruelty and injustice. But this cruelty can by no means be ascribed to WOLLASTON's scheme, though it may be, and must be ascribed to BOLINGBROKE's. It is his doctrine, that man is neither better nor worse, more moral nor immoral, than GOD designed he should, or has commanded him to be. And if he is unhappy in this his only life, it is not his fault. It is his present state, and it is fit and right it should be such. It is a part of the universal system, which admits of no alteration. This philosopher admits but one grand system, one immense design in the Deity : but here he divides this grand system into two, to make place for imputing to WOLLASTON what I am sure he never said, and what I believe he never thought, that GOD acts against his attributes here, only that he may have an occasion the more for acting agreeably to them hereafter. He may make as many systems as he pleases, one for every individual man, which is finished and completed by death. But it is of his own shewing, " * that it is a great truth, that the whole series of " things is at all times actually present to the divine " mind." To GOD therefore all is one system, who cannot therefore mend in one what he did wrong in another. It is therefore a vain and a dangerous pre-

* Vol. v. p. 82.

sumption,

sumption, to assert, that our state is final when this life is ended: whereas this state of things is a part of the great system of God's creation and government, which still subsist. The past, the present, the future, are all connected in the grand series of things, always present to the divine mind.

BECAUSE sentence against an evil work is not speedily executed, my authors conclude, that it never will be executed. But to make out this conclusion, it must be immediately executed: for if it is delayed a day, it may be delayed a hundred years, and even postponed till after death. But an immediate execution would leave no place, as I observed before, for repentance and reformation, admitting the punishment to be total and final. With Mr MALLET's leave, I will indulge myself in vindication of the wisdom of God in the government of the moral world. If we were witnesses of the sentence, and execution of it, which for ever determines the state of good and bad men; did we see a judgment-seat erected, and an angel of light placed thereon, (and it is said, that there are legions of them attending the throne of the Most High, and ready to execute his orders); did we hear sentence passed, and see it immediately put in execution; and did this happen periodically in every parish, the consternation would be so great, that the business of this life would be neglected. It would then become the wish and prayer of every reasonable and living

ving man, that their departed friends and acquaintances might not be judged so soon, and that these parochial assizes might be adjourned until one great day, until an end was put to the present system, and until the consummation of things; when, by the dissolution of all terrestrial relations and connections between man and man, they may be enabled to bear an eternal separation from their justly-condemned friends and former favourites. That the wicked are not immediately and finally punished, nor the good immediately and totally rewarded, is so far from being an objection against a future state of rewards and punishments, that it is rather an argument for the certainty of it.

To prove that no man, and in particular Mr WOLLASTON, have any reason to complain of the evils of this life, my author affirms for a reason, that they are overbalanced by the good things he enjoys; and that it must be so, since if any charitable person had offered to cut Mr WOLLASTON's throat, he would have been ill received. By an act of resignation, his Lordship pretends to make life and death equally welcome. But had his Lordship been in Mr WOLLASTON's supposed case, he would have received the throat-cutter the same way, because “* having tasted existence, he abhorred non-entity.” But if the offer had been made to either of them, to

* Vol. iv. p. 398.

live the very same life over again, without the least variety, I doubt much if it had been thankfully received. A prolongation of life, health, and strength, no man, even in prison, would refuse. He would be apt to flatter himself, that his past errors in life, and the remembrance of them, would make him more careful and cautious than he was before, and wise enough to embrace every opportunity of promoting and securing his happiness.

Credula vitam

Spes fovet, et melius cras fore semper ait.

But as men are much the same, I have reason to think, they would deceive themselves in their expectations. Some have unexpectedly received a new lease of life, and even that hath been employed much to the same purpose with the preceding part. And since, on a review of a long and prosperous life, there appears nothing in it, without some additional variety, worthy of the pains of living it over again, I conclude, that our desires are not to be satisfied here; and I further conclude, that we are made for more noble business and enjoyment than this world can afford. Small and trifling subjects ingross our thoughts when children. Youth is full of strong desires, often never gratified; and when gratified, are often more hurtful than profitable. After a bustle in the business of life, and bestowing more pains on making ac-

quisitions than they are worth, we sit down still unsatisfied. We grieve and mourn, we laugh and sing, we sleep, we wake, we eat and drink, and then become hungry and thirsty, and the circle returns, and then we die. And though you should call me mad, as Lord BOLINGBROKE calls Mr WOLLASTON, I cannot but believe that man was made for more noble employment and enjoyment; and if it is not our own fault, we shall at last have none but regular and reasonable desires, which never shall be disappointed; and so enjoy all the happiness that our rational nature is capable of. I add, only as my own opinion, that our present faculties shall not only be strengthened and improved, but also that an addition of new ones shall be bestowed on us, to make us capable of joys unspeakable and full of glory. As the deaf made to hear, and the blind made to see, are surprisingly delighted, the one with a variety of colours and objects, and the other with the harmony of sounds; so shall the godly man be when he enters into possession of his great reward. Shall such great and glorious views be renounced, for no other reason but that we may live and die like the beasts? With such hopes and expectations, instead of dying mad for fear of death, I have seen some leave this world with as much joy and pleasure, as ever his Lordship of BOLINGBROKE lived in it. Miserable must those principles and opinions be, which fail when
their

their support is most wanted. “ * Hope,” saith his Lordship, “ is the cordial drop that sweetens every “ bitter potion, and even the last.” But those who deny a future state, or look for nothing comfortable in it, cannot partake of it in the last, or extremity of this life. I could indulge myself in meditating on the glorious subject of a blessed eternity: but I consider, that I write not for those that do, but for those that do not believe such a future state; and from them, while they persist in infidelity and Atheism, I expect no other return than the character of a delirious enthusiast, or the Italian proverb, *Questo e bueno por la predica.*

If the happiness of human life is exalted and magnified on the one hand, the whole race of mankind is made of small account on the other. “ The evils “ we complain of,” (it is his Lordship who speaks), “ are the constant or occasional effects of the constitution of a world which was not made for our “ fakes.” Natural philosophers “ have done more “ service to true Theism, than all the metaphysical “ reasoners *a priori*; or, to say something stronger, “ and equally true, have done it more service than “ divines and Atheists have done it hurt.” These men, he says, “ have made it evident, that we ought “ to consider the world we inhabit, no otherwise “ than as a little wheel in our solar system, nor our

* Vol. iv. p. 382.

“ solar system any otherwise than as a little, but a larger wheel, in the immense machine of the universe.” By others this earth is represented as a point, and this point as the dunghill of the creation, and all its inhabitants as mushrooms growing upon it, when compared with other innumerable sub-systems in that of the universe.

ONE would be apt to think, that these astronomers and natural philosophers had been transported to other planets, and had conversed with their inhabitants, and brought from thence systems of their religion, ethics, and politics, for our instruction, and for our improvement in the knowledge of God, and in the duty which we owe him, before it could be said that they have done more service to religion, than either divines or metaphysical reasoners *a priori*. I own the discoveries they have made are admirable, and that they serve to demonstrate the wisdom and power of the grand architect. They serve, as far as these discoveries are new, as new and additional proofs of the existence and being of God. The ancients, from what they knew, (though they knew less), could, and did reason themselves into a persuasion that God made, and does govern the world. This metaphysical reasoners *a priori*, and divines, did not, nor do they deny. They make use of these discoveries, as well, if not better, than those astronomers who made them. They are able to correct
our

our author for asserting, that the world or the universe is *immense*. For what is immense is unbounded; but all corporeal beings, in their nature, and in our conception of them, do imply limitation. Let the author make the universe as large as his imagination is able to make it, he can never make it immense or infinite. But whatever his Lordship can make of the power and knowledge of God, he is far from concluding his moral attributes; and without a persuasion of these, there is no motive, no means left to render mankind better and happier than they are. This I have already made appear. Whatever astronomers and divines may learn from the magnificent works of God, his Lordship hath no occasion for those discoveries they bring from the stars. For he forgets that he hath said, “ * This world, which is “ the scene of our actions, is the scene of our know- “ ledge. We can derive none that is real from any “ other, whatever intellectual worlds we may ima- “ gine.”

BUT however many habitations and inhabitants there are, and how they are ruled and governed, is not our business to know; and did we know it, it would make little to our purpose. I acknowledge that the world was not made for us, though his Lordship blames all Heathen and Christian philosophers for maintaining it was. But he blames them

* Vol. iii. p. 383.

without reason. Such an article of belief he will not find in any established system of Christianity. He excepts Dr KING; and he might have likewise excepted Dr CUDWORTH; who says, "The parts
 " were made for the whole, and the whole for the
 " Maker." It was a Christian who wrote this doxology; * *Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power: for thou hast created all things; and for thy pleasure they are, and were created.* But to pass this, with which his Lordship makes a mighty and impertinent din; *though the world was not made for us,* yet we, and all things besides, were made for the glory, and honour, and good pleasure of our GOD and Creator. And though there should be a million of millions of systems, as large as our solar system, filled with inhabitants superior to us in knowledge; yet such as our habitation is, and we are, we are not below the care and inspection of an infinitely-wise, powerful, good, and holy GOD. Known to him are all his works, from, and before the beginning of the creation. By his power he upholds them in being; by his providence he rules and governs them; and by his holiness, or moral attributes, he judges, rewards or punishes all rational creatures, who, by being rational, are free and moral agents, and who, by being such, are the subjects of his moral government. If this earth was not made for us, as little were we made for the

* Rev. iv. 11.

earth. Our state, therefore, doth not necessarily depend on it, nor on the constitution of the system, whereof our present habitation is a part. And let me ask Mr MALLEY, "Why should the evils we complain of, be the constant or occasional effects of the constitution of a world that was not made for us, nor we for it?" We are under the dominion, and under God's moral government; and we are not therefore necessarily subjected to the changes and variations to which our habitation is liable. Nor can it be said, consistently with the divine attributes, that our state and condition must follow that of our present dwelling, whether our conduct be pious or impious, virtuous or vicious, moral or immoral. God hath made no more worlds, no more intelligent and rational beings, than he is able to govern. And let this earth, and we that dwell thereon, be ever so comparatively mean and contemptible, we are part of God's dominions, and he takes care of them all. And this earth being but a small part of the universe, were it to be neglected in the grand plan of the Almighty, so might the whole. For all nations, all worlds, are before him as a very small thing, as the dust in the balance, as nothing. From all which I conclude, that all the discoveries that mathematicians and astronomers have made, and his Lordship hath made from them, do not alter the case of mankind, nor involve the good and the bad, without discrimination, into the same state of happiness or misery. Whatever

ver service mathematicians and astronomers have done to Theism, the use which his Lordship makes of their lucubrations, is no better than blasphemy. That is, GOD hath so much to do with other systems, and their inhabitants, that he cannot attend to what passes on our earth; or that we who dwell thereon, are not worthy of his inspection, and that though we and our habitation are the workmanship of his own omnipotent hand.

WHETHER he intended it as an objection against a future state of rewards and punishments, or not, it is a very strong one, if it were true, that GOD cannot make men happy. After putting his reader in mind that he hath rejected all GOD's moral attributes, and particularly his goodness, he says, the argument which divines and Atheists draw from it to establish a future state of happiness of those who suffer for the sake of righteousness, proves a great deal too much. His reason is, “ * If goodness ought to be, as they assume, the directing principle in the case; and if “ wisdom ought to contrive, and power to execute “ under this direction; the happiness of man ought “ to be proportionable to the goodness of GOD, that “ is, infinite: than which no greater absurdity can be “ conceived. But if we assume, in opposition to these “ confederates, that divine wisdom, whereof we have “ ideas much better determined than we have of di-

* Vol. iv. p. 335.

“vine goodness, ought to be deemed in this, as in
 “every other case, the directing principle of divine
 “conduct; it will follow, without any absurdity,
 “nay most agreeably to the reason of things, that
 “the effect may be proportionable to the cause, that
 “is, infinite. It implies a contradiction to say, that
 “God should have made a creature infinitely happy;
 “but it implies none to say, that he made a system
 “of creation infinitely wise, and the best of all pos-
 “sible systems.” The amount of this is, If God
 makes good men happy, he must make them infinite-
 ly happy; but he cannot make them infinitely happy,
 therefore he cannot make them happy at all. The
 whole passage is a piece of sublime metaphysical non-
 sense.

FIRST, He did say, that all God's moral attributes
 are absorbed in his wisdom; and here he makes the
 divine wisdom and goodness two different things, and
 that our idea of the one is not so well determined as
 the idea of the other. Lord BOLINGBROKE might
 act sometimes according to reason, and then it was the
 directing principle; and sometimes according to his
 lusts and passions. But God always acts in consisten-
 cy with all his attributes; nor does any one of them
 command and direct the rest. Skill and wisdom are
 different things. The one can never be used but
 for a good and important purpose, but the other may
 be exerted either for a trifling or for a bad end. God

is not a necessary, but a free and voluntary agent with respect to all his doings *ad extra*. His Lordship is much in love with his imaginary scale of beings, and must, in consequence of this his favourite notion, admit, that GOD makes some more, and other things less perfect. But did he act necessarily and adequately to all his attributes and perfections, he must make them all equally perfect; that is, he must make as many GODS as beings, or make nothing at all. This he may admit, but admit as an Atheist.

SECONDLY, He asserts, that it is no contradiction to say, that GOD made a system of creation infinitely wise. This might pass for Spinozian Atheism, if he had not said, that GOD *made* this infinitely-wise system. But it can never pass for common sense. For we cannot say that GOD hath made a world infinitely wise, no more than we can say, that the house is as skilful as the architect who built it.

THIRDLY, He asserts, in support of all this nonsense, that divine wisdom ought to be deemed in every case the directing principle of divine conduct; that is, wisdom without goodness: for he makes them different attributes of the Deity, if not inconsistent. But how is it possible, how is it conceivable, that GOD hath made the world for a wise, but not for a good, and consequently not for an ill, and, by another consequence, for no purpose at all? But admitting wisdom
to

to be the directing principle, how can it follow, that God hath made the world infinitely wise, that is, as wise as himself? He forgets that he had said before, “ * To maintain that the material world is a divine animal, a wise being, and a God, is blasphemous and absurd.” God hath made the world freely, not necessarily, (this I am obliged to repeat); and, by the freedom of his divine will, he bestows more or less perfection; more upon a man than on an oyster, the lowest in his Lordship’s animal scale. He who professes to know nothing but by sense and experience, (and this his Lordship does, as before observed), cannot want for assurance and ignorance to speak as much nonsense, in the way of abstraction, as he pleases. Did he ever, by any of his senses, perceive any wisdom or understanding in stones and plants? If he hath perceived some wisdom in beasts, he hath perceived more in himself. And he imagined, and said, “ † that he had no reason to doubt, that there were created beings above him possessed of greater wisdom and knowledge than he was master of, but in perfection infinitely below the supreme Being,” that is, God. The universe therefore neither is, nor could be made infinitely wise: for infinity admits of no degrees, nor can it be made up of finite and limited perfections.

ANOTHER, and one of his Lordship’s strongest ob-

* Vol. iii. p. 414.

† Vol. iv. p. 310.

jections against a future state of rewards and punishments, is the evils and calamities which the best of men suffer in this life, and suffer innocently. The injury is done them; and all the reparation that can be made them in another life, doth not acquit the justice and goodness of GOD. This was not his Lordship's case, nor is it Mr MALLET's, nor is it mine, His Lordship and Mr MALLET confess, that " * neither perfect obedience nor perfect happiness is to be found among the sons of men; and that we ought to judge of the continuance of the one, as we judge of our perseverance in the other; not by this that we never fall from either, since in that case there would be no one good, nor no one happy man in the world." And if GOD, to train up some of these for future happiness, should chastise them with sufferings and afflictions; instead of doing them an injury, he does them a favour. " Mortality," his Lordship says, " is no hardship." And if GOD, in his wise providence, should make it a good man's duty (I might say an innocent man's duty) to lay down his life in the service and in obedience to his maker and master, he only exchanges it for a better. And it is only by a firm belief of a future state of rewards and punishments, that a man can be enabled to suffer every thing rather than offend his GOD,

* Vol. iv. p. 396.

THE conclusion of the fourth volume, and the intended conclusion of all his Lordship's philosophical works, is so extraordinary, that, in my opinion, it deserves to be transcribed for the benefit of those who have not the book, and to save those who have it the trouble of consulting it. " He alone is happy, and
 " he is truly so, who can say, Welcome life whatever it brings; welcome death whatever it is: *aut*
 " *transfert aut finit.* If the former, we change our
 " state, but we are still the creatures of the same
 " God. He made us to be happy here; he may
 " make us happier in another system of being. At
 " least this we are sure of, we shall be dealt with according to the perfection of his nature, and not according to the imperfection of our own. Resignation, in this instance, cannot be thought hard to
 " one who thinks worthily of God; nor in the other, except to one who thinks too highly of man. That
 " you and I, and even WOLLASTON himself, should
 " return to the earth from whence we came, to the
 " dirt under our feet, or be mingled with the ashes
 " of those herds and plants from which we drew nutrition while we lived, doth not seem any indignity
 " offered to our nature, since it is common to all the
 " animal kind: and he who complains of it as such, does not seem to be set by his reasoning faculties so
 " far above them in life, as to deserve not to be levelled with them in death. We were like them before our birth, that is, nothing; so shall we be,
 " on

“ on this hypothesis, like them too after death, that
 “ is, nothing. What hardship is done us? None;
 “ unless it is a hardship that we are not immortal, be-
 “ cause we wish to be so, or flatter ourselves with
 “ that expectation.—If this hypothesis were true,
 “ which I am far from assuming, I should have no
 “ reason to complain; though, having tasted exist-
 “ ence, I should abhor non-entity. Since then the
 “ first cannot be demonstrated by reason, nor the se-
 “ cond be reconciled to my inward sentiment, let me
 “ take refuge in resignation at the last, as in every
 “ act of my life. Let others be solicitous about their
 “ future state, or frighten or flatter themselves, as
 “ prejudice, imagination, bad health or good health,
 “ nay as a louring day or a clear sunshine, shall in-
 “ spire them to do; let the tranquillity of my mind
 “ rest on this immovable rock, that my future, as well
 “ as my present state, are ordered by an almighty and
 “ all-wise Creator; and that they are equally foolish
 “ and presumptuous, who make imaginary excursions
 “ into futurity, and who complain of the present.”

OBSERVE the trimmer, or rather the prevaricator.
 He is far from assuming, that death is annihilation, or
 a conversion of all our animal and rational faculties in-
 to dust and dirt. This however he hath not only as-
 sumed, but also endeavoured to demonstrate. And
 trimmer as he is, or affects to be, he cannot forbear
 degrading those who differ from him, particularly Mr
 WOLLASTON,

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WOLLASTON, and to condemn him to be mingled with the ashes of beasts and plants, for not making a better use of his reasoning faculties; that is, for not reasoning himself, as his Lordship does, into a disbelief of a future state. It is, says he, equally foolish and *presumptuous*, that is, *sinful*, to make any imaginary excursions into futurity. To be no better nor worse after death than the dirt under our feet, and to be put on the level with other animals, even with an oyster, is no indignity offered to our nature. To die, and to be nothing after death, is no hardship. To some wicked men it would be rather a favour, and it is generally such to those who delight in the doctrine. The author is far from assuming, (and he acted as if he had been certain, and advises others to do the same), that there is no future state of rewards and punishments; yet, contrary to his uncertainty, it was his purpose and resolution not to be solicitous about it, nor to frighten or flatter himself with the consequences. Whatever he believed, or whatever he doubted, he thought it best to live here as unaccountable to his God and Creator hereafter. The tranquillity of his mind rested on this immovable rock, that both his present and future state are ordered by an almighty and all-wise Creator; and that this almighty and all-wise Creator will deal with us according to the perfections of his own nature, and not according to the imperfections of ours.

HAD

HAD we nothing to answer for but the essential imperfection which belongs to all created beings, the perfections of our Creator would for ever be our safeguard and protection. But the case is otherwise. We are not only imperfect, but we are criminals; and such criminals, with his Lordship's and Mr MALLET's leave, as condemn ourselves, as his Lordship did; and if Mr MALLET does not, I do. Surely GOD knows as much as we, or he knows nothing; and therefore knows that we deserve to be condemned. But, instead of begging or accepting pardon, upon the terms of repentance and amendment, his Lordship charges GOD with all the faults which he either did or could commit. They are the necessary consequence of the necessary and essential imperfection of his nature. It is his opinion, that we are neither better nor happier, worse nor more unhappy, than GOD intended we should be; that though the law of nature is the law of GOD, yet it was not given to us to be observed, whenever we can plead, for our transgression, infirmities and temptations. It was his opinion, and it is yours, that a more exact and strict obedience is inconsistent with the original constitution of our nature: but on other occasions, like one who says and unsays at his pleasure, he charges man with all the faults he does commit, and blames those who go so far, as " * to impute to GOD the introduction or permission of those very evils, that neither GOD is an-

* Vol. iv. p. 395.

" swerable

“ fwerable for, (if I may use fuch an expreffion), nor
 “ nature, nor reason, but our own perverse wills, and
 “ the wrong elections we make.” The perfections of
 GOD, our Governor and Judge, cannot be our refuge
 againft the vices and immoralities which we commit,
 nor againft the evils and calamities which we bring up-
 on ourfelves in this life, nor againft the confequences
 of them in another life, upon fuppofition that there
 actually is, or may be fuch another life. So far are
 the divine perfections from the protection of the irre-
 claimably wicked, that they infure their punifhment.
 A GOD of infinite perfections always acts fuitably to
 them, and proportions all his difpenfations, as the ma-
 jefty of his nature, the univerfal good and happinefs
 of the rational creation, require. And if, after death,
 we do fubfift rational beings, and fubjects of the all-
 wife government of the ALMIGHTY, I do conclude,
 that if a difference is not made here, it muft be made
 hereafter, between the good and the bad. Every thing
 that GOD does, or permits, is fit, but it is not final.
 GOD * *bath appointed a day wherein he will judge the*
world in righteousness. And though this day is not
 yet come, yet † GOD *is not slack concerning his pro-*
mise; for one day is with the Lord as a thousand years,
and a thousand years as one day. The great drama is
 not yet finifhed; but when men have acted their part
 in this terreftrial fcene, and if they are to be employ-
 ed hereafter in another, though his Lordfhip may

* Acts xvii. 31.

† 2 Pet. iii. 8. 9.

think, yet I cannot believe, that we shall be employed again on the same footing. “The tranquillity of his mind rests on this immovable rock, that his present and future state are ordered by GOD.” And because they are ordered by GOD, he thinks it folly and presumption to be solicitous about it, seeing he cannot change or alter it to the better or to the worse. Did not his Lordship, and doth not Mr MALLETT, provide for a futurity of years, months, and days, notwithstanding his, and your present state, are ordered by GOD? The doctrine of fatality takes no place but only on the most important matters, where there should be no place for it. Whether you are to be, or not to be, and how you may be after death, is none of your concern or business. That is ordered by GOD, you mean by Fate; and you cannot change it. But though what you shall eat and drink to-day or to-morrow is unchangeably ordered, yet you are careful to provide for it. Is not this to make yourself ridiculous in your own eyes?

I did say, “* He that disbelieves a providence that extends to men after death, can have no principle superior to the preservation of the present life; and therefore cannot blame himself for making that his chief and only end, to which all his philosophical notions must give way. This is no weakness in him; it is his wisdom, it is his virtue, it is his for-

* Estimate, p. 334.

“titude.

“ titude. For to be content to be no more, for ha-
 “ ving once been a philosopher, is foolish and unna-
 “ tural. It is not only unnatural, but contrary to na-
 “ ture, for a man totally to destroy himself. The
 “ gentlemen Atheists, of whom I speak, do not want
 “ to be taught by me how to reduce their speculations
 “ into practice. For the sake of practice, many, if
 “ not all of them, have adopted the speculation. And
 “ that I do not misrepresent their opinion, nor do
 “ them injustice, I here appeal to their apologist
 “ M. BAYLE.

“ * ONE may reduce Atheism to this general te-
 “ net, That Nature is the cause of every thing; that
 “ it is eternal, self-existent; and that it always acts
 “ according to the utmost extent of its power, and
 “ according to unchangeable laws, of which it knows
 “ nothing. From which it follows, that nothing is
 “ possible but what it does; and that it produces eve-
 “ ry thing that is possible: that no human efforts can
 “ alter the least thing, or break its chain of causes
 “ and effects: that every thing comes to pass by fa-
 “ tal and unavoidable necessity: that no one thing
 “ is more natural than another, and neither more nor
 “ less convenient to the perfection of the universe:
 “ that in whatever condition the world is, it is always
 “ such as it ought to be or can be: that Nature be-
 “ ing a mother who knows none of her children,

* Vol. iii. p. 400.

" hath no predilection for any of them, and favours
 " none to the prejudice of others; but bestows on
 " every one of them all the attributes and qualities
 " which it ought and can have according to time and
 " place: and, finally, that Nature enacts and appoints
 " no punishment for what is called *immoralities*, and
 " no recompense for *morality* and *virtue*; that is,
 " such as are future.

" IT is certain, that a man who carries the con-
 " sequences of his Atheistical principles so far, may
 " carry them a great deal further. He may per-
 " suade himself, that it is to him a matter of indiffer-
 " ence, (it is M. BALYÉ who speaks), to do this,
 " or to do that; that having no liberty nor choice
 " of one thing more than another, and that all things
 " coming to pass according to blind and irrevocable
 " fatality, he ought to maintain himself in a state of
 " tranquillity and inactivity, without either care or
 " concern about any thing, and abandon all business
 " to the activity of nature; and because ignorance
 " and knowledge, truth and falsity, fidelity and
 " perfidy, virtue and vice, are equally emanations
 " from the first being, and all of them equally ne-
 " cessary for the perfection of the universe, it is ri-
 " diculous to be at pains for one's own, or for the
 " reformation of others." Now, all these conse-
 " quences here mentioned, are directly contrary to
 " what we know, and to what we feel in ourselves.

Does

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Does any man, or can any man persuade himself, that it is a matter of indifference whether he does this or that? Can he believe, contrary to his nature and to constant experience, that he hath no liberty, nor choice of one thing more than another? Can he persuade himself, that he ought to maintain himself in a state of inactivity, and abandon all business to the activity of nature? or did we resolve on such idleness and indolence, could we possibly put such a resolution in execution? Did we persuade ourselves that ignorance and knowledge, truth and falsity, fidelity and perfidy, virtue and vice, are equally emanations from the first being, and all of them equally necessary for the perfection of the universe; we must acknowledge, that we are naturally and industriously idle, to make any distinction betwixt good and evil, and what makes for our happiness or our misery; and all the pains we take for our own, and the information of others, is officious and impertinent. But before all these consequences can be admitted, we, with all our rational faculties, must be unmade, and turned into stupid animals, and even into his Lordship's oysters. Strange must their aversion be to God and to his government, thus to impose on themselves principles inconsistent with the make of their own minds, and inconsistent with their constant experience. And abstracting from words of course, to which his Lordship annexes ideas suitable to the Atheistical hypothesis, it will be found, that it was his opinion,

opinion, at least his doctrine, that all things here, and will go on hereafter, according to unchangeable fatality. Now, whatever speculations and principles are inconsistent with a reasonable practice, must, for that very reason, be false and absurd; but such is the Atheistical doctrine of fatality, and therefore it is absurd and false. What knowledge signify, if it can have no influence on conduct and behaviour? But if it hath a tendency to extinguish our care about futurity, though that futurity should not extend beyond this life, such philosophical learning is not only useless, but even pernicious. And you, and your author, have employed your time not only idly, but to your loss and detriment, if you reduce your principles into practice. If you do not, you cannot regulate your conduct according to the doctrine of unchangeable fatality; therefore you either do not believe such a doctrine, or you believe against your own understanding, your natural freedom and liberty of acting for good, which you judge your interest and your happiness to require.

If any man could be allowed to be a proper judge of Atheism and religion, M. BAYLE must be the most acceptable. For if he was not an Atheist, he would be at least a Sceptic, and as such, most impartial. According to his judgment, Lord BOLINGBROKE was convicted of Atheism, in quality of author, and Mr MALLET, as publisher. Without resuming

t all things go on according to whatever speculations a reasonable practice be false and abominable doctrine of fatality, false. What doth no influence on our hath a tendency to though this future life, such philosophers, but even hurtful, have employed our loss and hurt, practice. I know your conduct acceptable fatality; and we such a doctrine, understanding, and of acting for that your happiness.

be a proper judge LE must be unexcusable. Atheist, he was at partial. And, according to BOLINGBROKE stands of author, and you without resuming what

I

I have already observed, I do assert, that you have published as his Lordship's doctrine, what the learned Mr BAYLE declares to be Atheism. To avoid repetition, I recommend to you a review. Either you Mr MALLET did not know the difference between Atheism and religion; or you did know the difference, and approved his Lordship's Atheistical doctrine; or you did and do condemn it. If you are in the first case, it is your duty, as an honest and good man, to beg God and your country pardon, for publishing things that tend to the dishonour of your Creator, and to rebellion against the Sovereign of the universe. If you are in the second case, and of the same opinion with his Lordship, all that at present I can do for you, is to pity you, and pray for you. If you are in the third case, and of a different opinion from your author, you must be one of the worst of men. For your own profit and worldly advantage, you expose simple souls, and souls ready to run to their own ruin, to eternal misery and destruction. There is no kind of barbarity so great as this of yours. If the murderers of human bodies are in the sight of God and men highly criminal, what must be the case of such as murder human souls, with everlasting destruction from the presence and favour of their God? You may chuse any of the three characters that suits you best. For you could not possibly persuade yourself, that if Lord BOLINGBROKE's works did not good, they would do no ill to your readers; or that while

while they served only for their amusement and diversion, they turned out to your worldly advantage. This is more than you could be sure of. And you have therefore risked human souls for the sake of a frolic, or for a mean and sordid purpose. * *A man who deceiveth his neighbour, and then saith, Am not I in sport? is as a madman, who casteth firebrands, arrows, and death.* So said SOLOMON. Christians need not be surprised, being forewarned, that such teachers as Lord BOLINGBROKE, and his publisher DAVID MALLET, Esq; should arise, *who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, and even publicly, denying the Lord that bought them, and the God who made them.*—*And MANY shall follow their pernicious ways, by reason of whom the way of truth shall be evil spoken of; and through COVETOUSNESS shall they with feigned words make merchandise of you* †. I say, since this hath actually happened, it is rather a confirmation of the truth of the Christian revelation, than a discredit to the GOSPEL.

THOUGH it is a repetition ‖, I presume to put you in mind, that his Lordship of BOLINGBROKE hath said, and you have published, that, “to make government effectual to all the good purposes of it, there *must* be a religion, this religion *must* be na-

* Proverbs xxvi. 18. 19.

† 2 Peter ii. 1. 2. 3.

‖ Introduction, p. 9.

“ tional,

“ tional, and this national religion *must* be maintain-
 “ ed in reputation and reverence.” This you say
 in contradiction to all that you have said against God
 and his providence, and against the great design of
 his Lordship’s philosophical works. You condemn
 yourself; and you must allow me to join with you
 in condemning you, for an unworthy citizen of
 Great Britain; not only as an unworthy, but as a
 pestiferous member of any religious society. Sure, an
 Atheist can have nothing in view, in his personal capa-
 city, but his own interest; and in a civil or social ca-
 pacity, nothing but the happiness and prosperity of the
 society, as far as his own depends on it. Let every
 man then be an Atheist, and there is an end of all trust
 and confidence, and an end of all society and go-
 vernment. What your design can be in declaring
 yourself to be an Atheist, and in persuading others to
 disbelieve a God and his providence, which tends to
 the dissolution of society, and to the ruin of yourself
 and others, surpasses my imagination. * *Abraham*
said, Because I thought, Surely the fear of GOD is
not in this place; and they will kill me for my wife’s
sake. And he had reason to distrust one who did not
 fear God, and had no occasion to be afraid of a
 stranger and sojourner. You Mr MALLET have been
 recommended to the care of the civil magistrate, who
 hath treated you with disregard, and the works you

* Gen. XX. 11.

have published in name of Lord BOLINGBROKE, with contempt. And I recommend you to the God whose being and dominion you deny, together with my most earnest prayers, that he may grant you repentance and pardon for what you have done.

F I N I S.



